

# WORLD POLITICS

Vol. 60

April 2008

No. 3

## CONTENTS

Left Government, Policy, and Corporatism:  
Explaining the Influence of  
Partisanship on Inequality

*David Rueda* 349

Economic Roots of Civil Wars and  
Revolutions in the Contemporary World

*Carles Boix* 390

Capital Mobility and Coalitional Politics:  
Authoritarian Regimes and Economic  
Adjustment in Southeast Asia

*Thomas B. Pepinsky* 438

The Rise of Ethnopolitism in Latin  
America

*Raúl L. Madrid* 475

### REVIEW ARTICLE

Immigration and Integration Studies in  
Western Europe and the United States:  
The Road Less Traveled and a Path Ahead

*Erik Bleich* 509

The Contributors

ii

Abstracts

iii

*Review Article*

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION  
STUDIES IN WESTERN EUROPE  
AND THE UNITED STATES

The Road Less Traveled and a Path Ahead

By ERIK BLEICH\*

Nancy Foner. *In a New Land: A Comparative View of Immigration*. New York: New York University Press, 2005, 336 pp.

Terri Givens. *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 188 pp.

Ruud Koopmans, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, and Florence Passy. *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005, 376 pp.

Robert Lieberman. *Shaping Race Policy: The United States in Comparative Perspective*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, 336 pp.

IMMIGRATION and integration are among the most pressing concerns in Western Europe and the United States today. The political struggles surrounding issues of headscarves in France, border patrols in the United States, and anti-immigrant violence in Germany are national and international affairs, all the more so because these episodes—and many others like them—feed into public debates about the clash of civilizations, the value of diversity, and the need for security in a post-9/11 world. Scholars have responded with a surge of immigration and integration studies examining issues such as the movement of workers, families, and asylum seekers; antidiscrimination and cultural policy-making in response to ethnic diversity; state decisions to grant legal residency, citizenship, and dual citizenship; immigrants' interactions with their new countries and their on-going ties to family and friends across international boundaries; and political responses to im-

\* The author thanks Peter Hall, Randall Hansen, Christian Joppke, Robert Pekkanen, and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on this article.

migration by far-right parties and their less collegial civil society counterparts. In other words, the study of immigration and integration has blossomed into a vast hybrid subfield that spans numerous disciplines and encompasses many thousands of research projects addressing issues related to migration, race relations, citizenship, incorporation, and political party development. What links together these disparate interests are questions about human movement across borders and the reactions such movements create.<sup>1</sup>

This research agenda has greatly expanded theoretical and empirical knowledge about immigration and integration (I&I) issues. Yet, perhaps because the topic is of such intense public interest, scholarship in this area has rarely connected with larger discussions in the social sciences. In particular, students of immigration and integration seldom speak directly to theoretical concerns that occupy political scientists in related areas, preferring to concentrate their energies on debates more relevant to their empirical focus. As a result, reviewers responsible for taking the pulse of the political science discipline do not often look to immigration and integration specialists for portable insights that might inform their studies of political economy, the welfare state, policy-making, political mobilization, or other arenas. At an even broader level, recent overviews of comparative politics and of political science as a whole contain almost no citations of the I&I literature—even in summaries of topics such as the state, culture, and identity, which are among the core concerns of immigration and integration scholarship.<sup>2</sup> This disconnect is troubling both because it marginalizes the study of immigration and integration within political science and also because it limits the ability of all social scientists to benefit from insights that emerge from the study of a central area of contemporary politics.

Immigration and integration scholarship has the potential to make a tremendous impact on the discipline of political science. But in order to connect to broader theoretical agendas, I&I specialists must expand

<sup>1</sup> As such, the study of immigration and integration is what Mattei Dogan has termed a “hybrid specialty,” which includes enclaves of political scientists and their counterparts in many other social science disciplines. Mattei Dogan, “Political Science and the Other Disciplines,” in Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds., *A New Handbook of Political Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). A comprehensive attempt to review literature from multiple related fields has been undertaken in Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield, eds., *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines* (New York: Routledge, 2000). This essay therefore focuses on recent contributions from political science and sociology where research questions have overlapped to a great degree.

<sup>2</sup> Goodin and Klingemann (fn. 1); Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2002); and Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

their repertoire of research questions.<sup>3</sup> In particular, students of immigration and integration can apply their extensive empirical knowledge to two categories of discussions. First, they are well placed to address theoretical debates about rational choice and historical institutionalism, to examine wider questions relevant to students of American Political Development or social movements, and to reflect on how game theory or formal modeling generate new insights about immigration and integration that in turn can be applied to analogous interactions in other fields. These theoretical debates and mathematical methodologies need not become the primary focus of immigration and integration studies. But the absence of significant overlap between the central interests of many political scientists and those of the I&I subfield suggests an opening for work that would shed light in both directions. Second, immigration and integration can be developed as a core element of the comparative politics of identity, defined as the study of just how and how much identity matters in political life. Scholars from different disciplines have examined comparative identity politics from a variety of angles, focusing on issues such as ethnic conflict, race relations, the role of religion in politics, gender and sexuality, and sub- and supranational identities. Thus far, however, there have been few attempts to link these related fields to find insights that might spark a common research agenda.<sup>4</sup> As a result, students of immigration and integration are well placed to become central players in developing the comparative politics of identity.

This article seeks to illustrate the significant contributions of immigration and integration research across multiple dimensions and to highlight its potential for even greater impact. Part one advances a framework for analyzing four types of scholarship and applies it to the study of immigration and integration. Type 1 scholarship develops theoretical or conceptual insights for scholars within a subfield; type 2 scholarship tests or refines theories that are specific to a particular dimension of the subfield, such as immigration control or far-right parties; type 3 research imports broader comparative or social-scientific concepts to reshape the study of topic within a subfield; and type 4 research uses evidence from a subfield to develop theoretical tools that can be applied more broadly in political science or the so-

<sup>3</sup>For the exchange to be productive, outreach by immigration and integration specialists has to be matched by other political scientists' increased attention to the subfield. While there are reasons to fault the discipline for ignoring existing immigration and integration scholarship, in this essay I focus on what scholars of immigration and integration can do to bridge the gap.

<sup>4</sup>For one recent move in this direction see Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston and Rose McDermott, "Identity as a Variable," *Perspectives on Politics* 4, no. 4 (2006).

cial sciences. Part two reviews four books that highlight the empirical frontiers of I&I research and display the benefits of each type of scholarship. Nancy Foner's *In a New Land* offers a comparative overview of immigration and integration across time and space. Terri Givens' *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe* explains the relative successes and failures of extreme-right, anti-immigrant parties in Austria, France, Germany, and Denmark. Robert Lieberman's *Shaping Race Policy* seeks to account for how the United States, Britain, and France have fashioned their antidiscrimination policies in light of the presence of ethnic minorities. And, in *Contested Citizenship*, Ruud Koopmans, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, and Florence Passy examine five European countries to explore how citizenship configurations affect the nature of political mobilization surrounding immigration and ethnic relations. Each book tends to epitomize one of the four types of scholarship, but they also demonstrate that it is possible to make contributions on multiple registers. Part three concludes by suggesting promising frontiers within the immigration and integration subfield and by defining the concept of a comparative politics of identity and sketching out its terrain. While there are no fixed boundaries for the comparative politics of identity, there is tremendous potential for scholars across a variety of empirical areas to focus on a common set of important questions. Since immigration and integration researchers are centrally interested in the role of identity in politics, they have the potential to play a pivotal role in advancing this new arena of inquiry.

#### FOUR TYPES OF SCHOLARSHIP

Type 1 scholarship aims to contribute orienting frameworks for a subfield. At its most successful, it identifies meaningful analytical categories and offers a heuristic for interpreting important events and interactions.<sup>5</sup> Rogers Brubaker's *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* is a landmark book on this front, having done a great deal to reinvigorate immigration and integration scholarship over the past two decades.<sup>6</sup> This book does not test competing theories of citizenship

<sup>5</sup> Robert Putnam's two-level games analysis or Albert Hirschman's reflections on exit and voice are classic examples of type 1 contributions; they do not aim to predict outcomes, but rather offer a general framework for understanding important political dynamics. Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988); and Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

<sup>6</sup> Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).

policy (as would type 2 scholarship), nor does it utilize institutional or state theories to explain outcomes in a new way (a type 3 endeavor), nor does it contribute to overarching theoretical discussions about structure versus agency or path dependence among students of political science or sociology (a type 4 goal). Instead, it strives to theorize citizenship, to identify different historical conceptions of citizenship in France and Germany, and to link those to divergent citizenship policy outcomes in the current era. In spite of having its conclusions about policy continuity undermined by subsequent events, this book continues to be widely read for its type 1 insights into citizenship.

Much of the headline work in the study of immigration and integration has focused on providing conceptual tools for analyzing broader topics in the subfield. Riva Kastoryano's *Negotiating Identity*, for example, identifies a common political dynamic of states and minorities negotiating the terms of membership in liberal democracies.<sup>7</sup> In his influential book, Adrian Favell identifies distinctive "philosophies of integration" in Britain and France and offers a framework for understanding how and why these two countries deal with issues of immigration, integration, and citizenship in such divergent fashions.<sup>8</sup> These type 1 books frame important debates and develop perspectives on immigration and integration for scholars interested in these issues. While they often draw inspiration from social or political theory, they do not import and apply models from without nor do they explicitly aim to influence the thinking of audiences outside the immigration and integration subfield.

Type 2 scholarship more closely examines prominent theories within a subfield in order to assess their relative explanatory power. In its pure form, this type of scholarship does not attempt to develop a framework of analysis (as would type 1 work), but rather pursues a "normal science" approach of evaluating hypotheses against empirical data. It does not draw in theories from outside the subfield (a type 3 strategy), but concentrates on the best-known candidates within the existing literature. In the immigration and integration domain, Christian Joppke takes a type 2 approach in *Immigration and the Nation-State*; the work addresses debates between those who see the nation-state as inflexible in adapting to migration and those who view it as virtually power-

<sup>7</sup> Riva Kastoryano, *Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

<sup>8</sup> Adrian Favell, *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain* (London: MacMillan, 1998). A second core aspect of his study is a type 3 endeavor, namely applying the concept of path dependency to explain pathologies in the application of the public philosophies.

less to control immigration and the terms of integration.<sup>9</sup> He contrasts Brubaker's emphasis on the importance of national idioms in conditioning approaches to immigration to Yasemin Soysal's argument that postnational membership anchored in global human-rights discourse has decoupled citizenship rights from the nation.<sup>10</sup> His contribution to this debate is to stake out "an empirically grounded middle position between nation-state defenders and nation-state bashers" in which "the adequate root image is . . . [of] nation-states undergoing internal conflict between their human rights and popular sovereignty dimensions."<sup>11</sup> In doing so, he focuses on bringing in concrete evidence to resolve a well-established theoretical dispute about a specific issue.<sup>12</sup>

Seeking to explain disparate state responses to Muslim demands in Britain, France, and Germany, Joel Fetzer and Christopher Soper follow a parallel approach by assessing the limitations of resource mobilization, political opportunity structure, and political ideology arguments. They assert that the most persuasive explanation relies on understanding the "policy legacy left by a country's history of church-state relations."<sup>13</sup> They do not attempt to bring in a theoretical perspective unknown to these debates; rather, they summarize and test a range of plausible theories and argue that one in particular fits best with the empirical evidence. And in a quintessential type 2 endeavor, Roger Eatwell reviews ten theories of the extreme right, concluding that each by itself is insufficient, but that several in combination are likely to provide a compelling explanation of extreme-right support.<sup>14</sup> Type 2 work thus focuses on analyzing specific theories and propositions relevant to a particular issue, such as the ability of the state to control immigration policy, state-Muslim relations, or the reasons for far-right support.

Type 3 scholarship also assesses theories against evidence, but does so by drawing on theoretical approaches from other disciplines or from

<sup>9</sup> Christian Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

<sup>10</sup> Brubaker (fn. 6); Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

<sup>11</sup> Joppke (fn. 9), 4.

<sup>12</sup> Anthony Messina makes a parallel contribution to this debate by reviewing multiple perspectives on states' ability to control immigration and manage integration, before ultimately concluding that immigration responds most centrally to the political interests of immigrant-receiving countries. Anthony M. Messina, *The Logic and Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

<sup>13</sup> Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper, *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 15.

<sup>14</sup> Roger Eatwell, "Ten Theories of the Extreme Right," in Peter Merkl and Leonard Weinberg, eds., *Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Frank Cass, 2003).

other fields or subfields within the discipline.<sup>15</sup> Randall Hansen's *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-war Britain* epitomizes type 3 scholarship in the immigration and integration subfield. It begins with a review of the relevant state-of-the-art theories (as does type 2 work), in this case theories of immigration control in Britain.<sup>16</sup> It summarizes "racialization" explanations of policy-making, as well the neoliberal thesis identified with James Hollifield,<sup>17</sup> the globalization thesis most associated with Saskia Sassen,<sup>18</sup> and the client politics explanation of Gary Freeman.<sup>19</sup> Although Hansen finds merit in some theories while completely rejecting others, the distinctive intellectual move is in turning to institutional path-dependence theories for a more compelling explanation of British immigration policy-making. He shows how many features of British immigration exceptionalism (such as the decoupling of citizenship and the right to enter, the Kenyan Asians crisis of 1968, and the concept of patriality) are best understood as unintended consequences of the sticky institutional structure established by the 1948 British Nationality Act.<sup>20</sup> By utilizing a literature from outside of the immigration and integration domain (originally derived from economics, but with extensive applications by political scientists working on non-I&I topics), Hansen provides a persuasive account of many distinctive qualities of the British case.

Over the past decade it has become increasingly common in immigration and integration studies to draw on recent developments in the study of institutions. Patrick Ireland and Yasemin Soysal were forerunners of this trend in their focus on how domestic institutions shape and constrain immigrant political mobilization.<sup>21</sup> More recently,

<sup>15</sup> Applications of evolutionary biology's theory of punctuated equilibrium to the study of politics are prototypical examples of type 3 scholarship. See Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," *Comparative Politics* 16, no. 2 (1984); and Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, *Agendas and Instability in American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

<sup>16</sup> Randall Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Postwar Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

<sup>17</sup> Hollifield's own book, richly laced with multilayered insights and observations, can also be seen at core as a type 3 endeavor that draws on liberal theory (in its market- and rights-based variants) to provide a better explanation of immigration policy than prevailing economic "push-pull," Marxist, or statist/realist theories. James F. Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).

<sup>18</sup> Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

<sup>19</sup> Gary P. Freeman, "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States," *International Migration Review* 29, no. 4 (1995).

<sup>20</sup> Hansen demonstrates how the 1948 British Nationality Act established a web of rules that interacted with subsequent developments to generate periodic crises. For his further developments and applications of path dependence theory, see Randall Hansen, "Globalization, Embedded Realism, and Path Dependence: The Other Immigrants to Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 3 (2002).

<sup>21</sup> Patrick Ireland, *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); and Soysal (fn. 10), 65–118.

Romain Garbaye has applied an institutional framework to explain divergent British and French approaches to city-level ethnic minority political participation.<sup>22</sup> The American policy-making literature has been another popular source of intellectual inspiration for immigration and integration specialists. Gary Freeman's much-cited article on client politics, for example, utilizes insights from the work of James Q. Wilson—principally the idea that concentrated benefits to the powerful few are more politically significant than diffuse costs to the masses—to develop an understanding of why the politics of immigration tend to be expansive and inclusive in liberal democracies. Virginie Guiraudon capitalizes on E. E. Schattschneider's insights about venue shopping to explain the extension of citizenship rights to noncitizens in Germany, France, and the Netherlands.<sup>23</sup> And in a slightly different vein, Pippa Norris applies a rational-actor model to develop an analytical framework for understanding far-right party success as a function of public demand and party supply within the context of a country's electoral rules.<sup>24</sup>

While type 4 research utilizes evidence from within an empirical subfield, its primary goal is not to develop frameworks of understanding for that subfield, nor is it to test theories against evidence to advance subfield debates. Rather, it draws on evidence from a particular area to contribute to broader theoretical agendas in the social sciences. Perhaps the clearest example of a type 4 contribution comes from the study of American race relations.<sup>25</sup> In *Political Process and the Development of the Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*, Doug McAdam explicitly aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the civil rights movement, stating that one of his goals is to “provide a more comprehensive empirical analysis of the black protest movement than has yet appeared in the literature.”<sup>26</sup> However, McAdam also seeks to advance social science theory, claiming that “the principal theoretical goal of this work is to summarize and evaluate the current state of social movement theory

<sup>22</sup> Romain Garbaye, *Getting into Local Power: The Politics of Ethnic Minorities in British and French Cities* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005).

<sup>23</sup> Virginie Guiraudon, “Citizenship Rights for Non-Citizens: France, Germany, and the Netherlands,” in Christian Joppke, ed., *Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). See also Virginie Guiraudon, *Les Politiques d'Immigration en Europe: Allemagne, France, Pays-Bas* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2000).

<sup>24</sup> Pippa Norris, *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

<sup>25</sup> Race relations studies in Europe fall more cleanly into the immigration and integration subfield than they do in the United States, where racial diversity is more often seen as divorced from (recent) immigration than linked to it.

<sup>26</sup> Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 3.

within sociology.”<sup>27</sup> He does this by comparing the relative explanatory power of two established schools of thought—classical models and resource mobilization theory—against his own political-process model on the case of the black social movement in the United States. By doing so, McAdam builds a systematic critique of the preceding theoretical frameworks, elaborates his own approach, and then looks to the history for empirical evidence that supports or challenges each theory. That his political-process model works best in the U.S. case does not imply that it is valid in all situations (McAdam admits that this book does not constitute a full test of the model), but the book succeeds in announcing a major new theory of social movements. This contribution has had a tremendous effect beyond the race relations subfield precisely because it was designed to speak to broader social scientific debates.

In my own book, *Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking since the 1960s*, I aim to contribute to general theoretical debates about comparative public policy-making and the role of ideas in policy-making analysis. I review power-interest, problem-solving, and institutional policy-making perspectives, and argue that they are insufficient to explain important differences between the British and French treatment of race policy in the postwar era. I build on the emerging political science literature on ideas to develop a model for how frames—a specific type of idea—can be integrated into the study of comparative policy-making. Applying the model to the cases at hand demonstrates that it offers a much more compelling explanation than models that fail to incorporate ideational variables.<sup>28</sup> Anthony Messina’s *Race and Party Competition*, while primarily aimed at accounting for evolving British party stances on the controversial topic of race, concludes with type 4 observations about the general conditions under which salient electoral issues are excluded from politics. While some of these factors, such as the “centralized, hierarchical, and elite-dominated nature of the major parties” are specific to Britain, others, such as the “single-member, relative-majority electoral system” and the “disciplined, two-party system” are contrasted to institutions in France and Germany to suggest general lessons for students of political parties and electoral

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 1. McAdam also identifies two other goals: a discussion of power in America and an assessment of the fit between the theories he tests and the historical facts of the black movement (pp.1–4).

<sup>28</sup> Erik Bleich, *Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking since the 1960s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Similarly, David Art’s work focuses on explaining the differential success of the far right in Germany and Austria, but he also makes a type 4 contribution to theories of ideas by identifying public debates as key loci of ideational change that can influence political culture and political behavior. David Art, *The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

politics.<sup>29</sup> It is important to emphasize that type 4 goals coexist quite easily with archive- and interview-based case studies that reveal specific dynamics within a particular country of interest to scholars of immigration and integration.

In sum, the four types of scholarship can be distinguished along three central dimensions. Is a project more inclined toward theory development or theory testing? Does it draw primarily on literature from the subfield or from broader social science literature? And, is its target audience subfield scholars or students of comparative politics, political science, or other disciplines more generally? As Table 1 illustrates, scholarship of types 1 and 2 is most grounded in the immigration and integration subfield itself, with the difference between the two revolving around whether the goal is to develop a framework or to assess theories for this audience. Scholarship of types 3 and 4 progressively branches out from the subfield, first by importing theoretical perspectives from other areas, and then by explicitly attempting to export insights relevant to broader social scientific discussions.

The intent in laying out this framework is not to suggest that all scholarship falls cleanly and exclusively into one of these categories. As with similar schemas, the boundaries between types are not always bright or fixed. As theories migrate, for example, they may begin in one discipline, transfer to a subfield within another, and then become so well established in that subfield as to lose their sheen as something new. For example, in its early years, research in policy-making that drew on punctuated equilibrium theorizing was clearly type 3 scholarship; any research assessing this approach today would be considered type 2. In addition, subfields often include literature primarily oriented toward offering specific empirical insights, such as those of an historical, anthropological, or demographic nature. To the extent that such work eschews theory development or assessment, it falls outside of the schema developed here. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that scholarship can and does cross these boundaries to make contributions of more than one type.

Yet, this framework highlights a variety of distinctive contributions that are possible within any given subfield. I argue that for a subfield to reach its full potential, it must include a portfolio of contributions along all dimensions. While the immigration and integration subfield has yielded excellent type 1, 2, and 3 scholarship over the past two decades, it has produced relatively few examples of type 4 research, and

<sup>29</sup> Anthony M. Messina, *Race and Party Competition in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 182–83.

TABLE I  
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FOUR TYPES OF SCHOLARSHIP

	<i>Primary Goal</i>		<i>Primary Theoretical Source</i>		<i>Primary Audience</i>	
	<i>Theory Development</i>	<i>Theory Assessment</i>	<i>Subfield</i>	<i>Beyond Subfield</i>	<i>Subfield</i>	<i>Beyond Subfield</i>
Type 1	X		X		X	
Type 2		X	X		X	
Type 3		X		X	X	
Type 4	X			X		X

even fewer that have broken out to affect comparative politics, political science, or the social sciences as a whole. The following section highlights four examples of cutting-edge research into core dimensions of the subfield, namely integration, far-right parties, race policy-making, and citizenship. Each book makes plain the benefits of a particular type of research, while the final book suggests (more so than the others) the potential for making significant contributions along multiple registers.

#### FOUR BOOKS, FOUR FRONTIERS, FOUR TYPES OF SCHOLARSHIP

How newcomers mix with natives and reshape identities along the way is a central concern of the immigration and integration literature, but the specific questions that scholars have addressed under this banner are wide ranging. They include explorations of immigrant access to the labor market, the political system, social welfare programs, and citizenship rights. They also include studies of issues such as whether migrants and minorities are treated with equal respect; whether newcomers retain their specific cultural practices (such as their language, religion, or customs); whether they maintain ties to their country of origin; and whether identities such as gender, class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, and education level (and others) affect the day-to-day lives of migrants with respect to their host-country nationals and their home-country compatriots.

Foner's *In a New Land* directly addresses a surprising number of these issues, drawing on an impressively broad array of research across historical eras and geographic areas. The book is structured around a series of comparisons, each of which takes into account a variety of specific themes. For example, it assesses transformations in racial and ethnic identities through a study of immigration to New York City around the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries while also

examining transnationalism, gender, and relations between immigrants and native African Americans in these two periods. It compares West Indian experiences across nation-states through a focus on late twentieth-century migrants in London and New York, highlighting the differences and divergent impact not only of race, class, and gender, but also of structural conditions such as the welfare state and other institutions of incorporation. It also devotes attention to how immigrant experiences differ depending on which gateway city they call home in the United States or whether they move to the U.S. or to Europe.

By virtue of its attention to (but not testing of) theories and insights central to the immigration and integration literature, Foner's book makes a series of type 1 contributions. It opens, for example, by comparing the status of New York's Jews and Italians between 1880 and 1920 and present-day Hispanic, Asian, and black immigrants in order to reveal the constructed nature of racial identities in the United States. In their time, Jews and Italians were not considered quite as "white" as the rest of the race; rather, they were seen as "in-between people," "probationary whites," "inconclusively white," and as "racially distinct from other whites" (pp. 13–14). While at the turn of the twenty-first century there are still comparable ambiguities surrounding Arab membership in the white category and African and Caribbean assimilation to the black category, the tensions today no longer revolve exclusively around the black-white divide. The post-1965 influx of large numbers of Hispanic and Asian migrants complicates matters enormously, as they cannot easily be classified within the dichotomy. Following this observation, Foner looks at the factors that helped Jews and Italians assimilate to the white category in an earlier era (principally economic success, physical similarities, conscious self-identification with whites, the end of large-scale immigration, and the presence of groups lower on the racial hierarchy) in order to develop hypotheses for the future of racial dynamics in New York. One possibility is of an expanded "white" category that includes light-skinned Hispanics and perhaps successful Asians, thereby relegating all others to a lesser racial identity. Another scenario places more emphasis on "black" as the core (and inferior) category, freeing those without African ancestry to live without a clearly defined racial identity.

Chapters on "being black" in American versus British cities also offer type 1 observations about identity formation and change without testing theories or linking to research beyond the immigration and integration subfield. Although Jamaican and other West Indian immigrants are labeled "black" upon arrival in both places—which is a shock

to many educated, wealthy migrants who never considered themselves such in their country of origin—different local contexts push their experiences in substantially different directions. The large, residentially segregated, and politically active African American minority means that West Indians in New York stand out less and have opportunities for social integration and political mobilization within a broader black community. This is much less true for West Indians in London and other British cities. On the other hand, West Indians in America often face tensions over trying to distinguish themselves from African Americans and have much less contact with native whites. In London, intermingling with whites is much more common and means that interracial marriages are significantly more likely in Britain than in the United States. While the size of the native black population is a fascinating and critical variable accounting for divergent identity patterns on opposite sides of the Atlantic, Foner is careful to point to other variables that matter too. She addresses the character of migration streams (timing, size, class, gender, age, etc.), the distance from the home society, and the legal and social welfare context of the host country. In these, and in each of this book's chapters, the author identifies variables that affect the integration process and gives specific and revealing examples of just how they matter.

The strength of type 1 scholarship is in announcing, reinforcing or amending perspectives on the subfield. By drawing together various strands of research, *In a New Land* does much of this admirably, and it should be a first stop for anyone interested in issues of immigration and integration. It also convincingly identifies a number of research agendas to be pursued in the future, such as the systematic comparison of diaspora groups across geographic contexts and the on-going study of second- and third-generation migrants to see how their identities are shaped by their circumstances. Disappointingly, however, this book does not announce a major new integration framework. Its unifying theme is "be comparative," an injunction that may be fresher to Americanists than to comparativists.<sup>30</sup> Substantively and theoretically,

<sup>30</sup> Comparativists have included the United States in their single-authored or edited studies with relative frequency. For selected contributions in addition to those referenced above, see William Rogers Brubaker, ed., *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1989); Gilles Kepel, *Allah in the West* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997); Aristide Zolberg and Litt Woon Long, "Why Islam is Like Spanish: Cultural Incorporation in Europe and the United States," *Politics and Society* 27, no. 1 (1999); Joel Fetzer, *Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Randall Hansen and Patrick Weil, eds., *Dual Nationality, Social Rights and Federal Citizenship in the U.S. and Europe* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002). By contrast, it has been much less common for Americanists to include international comparisons in their studies, though for a notable

it highlights interesting variables and demonstrates their impact on integration, however it does not develop an overarching perspective for understanding integration in the way that Kastoryano highlights the centrality of “negotiating identities” or in the manner of Brubaker or Favell, whose studies emphasize the distinctiveness of the entrenched national models. The conclusions of many chapters come tantalizingly close to major announcements before resolving themselves with a call for more research or a statement such as, “No matter what happens in the future, we can say with certainty that the city’s ethnoracial landscape today bears little resemblance to what it was in the past . . .” (p. 61). While it is prudent not to make sweeping or overly bold statements about the future, type 1 work at its most provocative (and productive) often stakes a claim that generates reaction, dissent, and further inquiry. Readers of *In a New Land* may be disappointed that such a knowledgeable author does not elaborate these types of claims for the subfield.

Terri Givens’ *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe* explores a second frontier of the immigration and integration subfield, namely whether natives react to immigration by casting votes for a far-right political party. The book examines and deems insufficient several prominent explanations of radical-right success, using new empirical evidence to weigh in on longstanding debates over the relative similarities and differences in radical-right voters’ socioeconomic profiles and over the effect of unemployment and immigration on the vote for the radical right. More importantly, it crafts a model of how institutional factors such as electoral and party systems affect the likelihood of strategic behavior by voters and parties, which in turn helps to account for the variable success of radical-right parties in generating votes and seats in Austria, France, Germany, and Denmark.

In its aim of assessing and refining existing arguments within this branch of the immigration and integration literature, Givens’ book is a

---

exception see Richard Alba, “Bright vs. Blurred Boundaries: Second-Generation Assimilation and Exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 1 (2005). In addition, Foner’s injunction to compare integration structures across time and to look to different subnational (city or regional) differences meshes well with some of the most interesting comparative work of recent years. See Sophie Body-Gendrot and Marco Martiniello, eds., *Minorities in European Cities: The Dynamics of Social Integration and Social Exclusion at the Neighbourhood Level* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Patrick Weil, *Qu’est-ce qu’un Français? Histoire de la Nationalité Française depuis la Révolution* (Paris: Grasset, 2002); Patrick Ireland, *Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004); Rinus Penninx, Karen Kraal, Marco Martiniello, and Steven Vertovec, eds., *Citizenship in European Cities: Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies* (London: Ashgate, 2004); Leo Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 2005), and Garbaye (fn. 22).

prototypical type 2 endeavor. She devotes a chapter to sorting through different perspectives on who votes for the radical right. Evidence from multiple elections in Austria, France, and Germany undermines Herbert Kitschelt's argument that certain types of radical-right parties (notably populist-antistatist parties, of which the Austrian Freedom Party is a prime example) consistently draw voters from a wide range of social groups, thus accounting for their greater electoral success.<sup>31</sup> Instead, Givens' data reinforces the prominent view that radical-right voters tend to be "predominantly male, blue-collar workers or small business owners who have a low level of education" (p. 47). Furthermore, the data indicates that voter profiles appear to be converging over time. Another chapter tests the extent to which variations in unemployment and the presence of immigrants can explain differential far-right party success, again comparing and assessing existing theories. Although scholars are close to unanimously arguing that unemployment matters,<sup>32</sup> they continue to debate the extent to which (and ways in which) the presence of foreigners affects the radical-right vote, with several observers discounting the connection between precise numbers of immigrants and the level of far-right votes. Givens uses regional-level aggregate voting data from Austria, France, and Germany from the 1960s through the late 1990s to assess these hypotheses. Her results indicate the strong influence of unemployment and the somewhat less-strong (but still significant) effect of the presence of foreigners on regional voting in both Austria and France. In the German case, neither variable was meaningfully correlated with the vote for the far right. These tests—as well as those of the effects of foreigners and unemployment on mainstream parties in the three countries—tend to confirm the popular wisdom in the subfield. However, they also reveal some perplexing inconsistencies and therefore pave the way for further research.

In addition to assessing prominent hypotheses about the far right, this book aggregates fragmented insights about institutions to develop its explanatory model. While this is not the first study of the radical right to examine electoral rules and interactions between parties, it is the first to organize these factors into a coherent model and to place them at the forefront of the analysis. In doing so, it incorporates a type 3 approach by drawing on Gary Cox's work on strategic coordination;<sup>33</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

<sup>32</sup> For a skeptical view of the effects of unemployment and immigration, see Norris (fn. 25).

<sup>33</sup> Gary Cox, *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

however, it does this less to revolutionize the study of the radical right than to organize and develop insights that already exist within the literature. Givens focuses on how electoral systems, mainstream party coalition signals, and party factionalization can encourage or discourage strategic voting (defined as choosing a party for fear of wasting a vote or of allowing a least-favored party to win).<sup>34</sup> She argues that where strategic voting is encouraged, radical-right parties will perform less well, and supports the argument with both historical and quantitative evidence from the individual countries. According to her analysis, Germany has a high level of strategic voting because of its relatively close elections and the longstanding ties between the Christian Democratic Union and the Free Democratic Party; taking votes away from either would substantially increase the odds of the left winning, a fact that explains systematic desertion of the far right and the consistently anemic returns for these parties. In France, mainstream-right parties have signaled that they will not form a coalition with the far right, which has severely undermined National Front success in the second round of legislative elections and impeded it from gaining seats in parliament. By contrast, grand coalitions in Austria have created no disincentives to vote for the Freedom Party because such a vote has no chance of changing the composition of government unless it serves to catapult the preferred party into contention.<sup>35</sup>

This analysis is creative and thought provoking. By replicating tests of hypotheses on new data, type 2 work can help cement an understanding of the variables that matter most by assessing the validity of competing sets of findings. It can also, as Givens' work does well, probe the weaknesses in common knowledge by revealing unexplained outcomes that call for more research. Moreover, by drawing together various strands of institutional insights into a coherent model, Givens offers a new framework for explaining far-right party success—one of the most important topics in European politics today. However, the model remains open to criticism along at least two lines. First, as Givens admits, strategic voting is not enough to explain far-right success (pp. 152–53). Rather, it matters at the margins after other preconditions are in place—preconditions previously identified in the literature—such as

<sup>34</sup> For an analysis that emphasizes mainstream party behavior on the fortunes of niche parties, see Bonnie Meguid, "Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success," *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 3 (2005).

<sup>35</sup> In Denmark, a case used to understand whether the analysis can be extended, Terri Givens finds that a series of minority governments served the same role as the grand coalition in Austria—namely to decrease the impact of a vote for the far right on the ability of a least-favored party to govern, especially given that the mainstream right signaled that it was willing to govern with far-right support.

the type of far-right appeal and favorable economic and social circumstances within the country (p. 153). In addition, while the model is compelling and the evidence is broadly supportive, it seems curious that Givens concludes with a call for further tests in more countries without conducting them herself on Europe-wide data. This model appears highly sensitive to the particularities of national history and context, and thus may be difficult to apply in a large-scale manner. If it does apply generally, it should also be relevant to the study of all small parties, suggesting an opportunity for this work to break out of the immigration and integration subfield and speak to comparativists who focus on political parties and party systems more generally. Thus, while this book pushes frontiers in type 2 and to some extent in type 3 ways, it may have missed an opportunity to reach beyond the boundaries of the I&I literature to contribute to wider debates.

Shifting from the political to the policy consequences of immigration and ethnic diversity, there has been longstanding interest among immigration and integration scholars in how states craft solutions to problems of discrimination and racial inequality. While these challenges have been much examined in U.S. and British contexts, the more broadly comparative study of what might be called “race policies”<sup>36</sup> is a new phenomenon and represents a new research frontier.<sup>37</sup> Robert Lieberman takes up the challenge of explaining variation in race policies across and within three countries in his book, *Shaping Race Policy: The United States in Comparative Perspective*. Although his primary focus is the United States, he devotes almost equal time to Britain and France in order to fulfill the subtitle’s requirement of adding a comparative dimension. At the heart of the investigation is the puzzle of how the U.S. could do so well incorporating racial minorities in the sphere of employment—where affirmative action and antidiscrimination law have dramatically reduced the structural inequalities of the pre-civil rights era—while performing so poorly in key areas of the welfare state, notably in public assistance programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children and its successor Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, where benefits have been steadily declining since the 1970s. In Britain, Lieberman finds relatively strong welfare incorporation contrasted

<sup>36</sup>This is a term that both Lieberman and I use. It is not without drawbacks, however, especially in European countries that deny the existence of “race.”

<sup>37</sup>For other contributions in this vein, see Bleich (fn. 29); Erik Bleich, “Integrating Ideas Into Policy-Making Analysis: Frames and Race Policies in Britain and France,” *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 9 (2002); and Andrew Geddes and Virginie Guiraudon, “Britain, France, and EU Anti-Discrimination Policy: The Emergence of an EU Policy Paradigm,” *West European Politics* 27, no. 2 (2004).

with weak antidiscrimination enforcement, whereas in France he finds mixed welfare incorporation and “particularly anemic antidiscrimination enforcement” (p. 20).

For Lieberman, these puzzling findings cannot be resolved by focusing on the straightforward institutional or ideational explanations that are prominent in recent policy-making literature. Rather, in his book he makes a type 3 move by bringing coalitions to the center of its theoretical framework in order to cast new light on existing debates. Although Lieberman is not explicit about which school he is tapping into, his attention to coalitions as central factors shares an affinity with the pluralist scholarship spotlight on the aggregation of power and interests in political decision-making,<sup>38</sup> the research tradition in political economy that places coalitions at the forefront of its analysis,<sup>39</sup> and the policy learning literature focus on “advocacy coalitions.”<sup>40</sup> Lieberman surmounts these literatures (and many of their drawbacks) in his integrated approach to the triumvirate of ideas, interests, and institutions. He builds all three factors into his model arguing that the rules of policy-making in a particular sphere, the structures connecting racial groups to the state, and the cultural repertoires that influence political actors, form the institutional and ideational context in which such coalitions are built and reconfigured (pp. 9–12). *Shaping Race Policy* therefore announces a model for thinking about how institutions and ideas shape and constrain interests and coalitions in a way that can be applied to concrete cases. This book has no explicit type 4 ambitions however, as it does not aim to develop theoretical tools for scholars outside the immigration and integration subfield. Instead its goal is to draw “general lessons about the cultural and institutional determinants of race politics and policy” (p. 26).

*Shaping Race Policy* opens by assessing the legacies of slavery and colonialism on the early politics of social reform and then traces the history of different national policies, such as social security, social insurance, public assistance, welfare, and employment discrimination, through to the current era. It illustrates how ideological perspectives such as race consciousness or color blindness and institutional central-

<sup>38</sup> Walter Korpi and Michael Shalev, “Strikes, Industrial Relations and Class Conflict in Capitalist Societies,” *British Journal of Sociology* 30 (June 1979); and Walter Korpi, *The Democratic Class Struggle* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983).

<sup>39</sup> Peter Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); and Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

<sup>40</sup> Thought advocacy coalitions operate at an elite rather than a mass level. See Paul A. Sabatier, “Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning, and Policy Change: An Advocacy Coalition Framework,” *Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization* 8, no. 4 (1987).

ization versus decentralization influence the ability of minorities and their allies to organize coalitions to push for national or local change. The model applies best to the American story, where coalitions played the most significant role in the civil rights movement and where ideational and institutional forces have undermined the coalitions' ability to boost minority incorporation into the U.S. welfare state. In Britain and France, minorities have played a much smaller role in progressive coalitions, making strong or mixed outcomes dependent on other forces.

Comparing three countries across two policy areas over more than a century of history raises challenges for any scholar attempting to develop and employ a brittle explanatory model. This book resolves this tension by building flexibility into its framework. Institutions, ideas, and coalitions are not applied in a mechanistic way throughout the book; rather they are used as constellations of variables that at times function in the specific way that Lieberman identifies, but are not obligated to do so. This frees Lieberman to apply his wide-ranging knowledge and tremendously engaging authorial voice to write the history of race policies in the United States, Britain, and France based on the influence of institutions, ideas, and coalitions. However, at several key moments, the book seems to jettison the explanatory model in favor of emphasizing the central role of institutions. This is true, for example, when Lieberman argues that "the institutional logic of the national, or centralized, welfare state is more conducive to broad inclusion than the parochial, or decentralized welfare state" (p. 59).<sup>41</sup> At another point, the institutional focus implies exactly the opposite; Lieberman argues that the fragmented American system permitted more enforcement against employment discrimination than the relatively centralized structures of Britain and France by virtue of opening up multiple access points for reformers (chap. 8).

The principal advantage of type 3 work is in reshaping the subfield's perspective on what matters most in explaining outcomes. Lieberman's book pushes in this direction by drawing attention to coalitions as a fundamental variable. However, type 3 scholarship is most convincing when it is grounded in an extended discussion of the theoretical importance of the perspective it imports from outside the subfield. Unfortunately, this book does not review previous work on coalitions, nor does it assess other attempts to build unified frameworks of ideas, interests,

<sup>41</sup> Lieberman also makes this point when comparing U.S. Social Security to France's Social Insurance, saying "The key distinction that emerges from these cases is an institutional one: centralization" (p. 117).

and institutions.<sup>42</sup> Perhaps because of this, its model does not cohere when applied to the cases. Institutions often emerge as key factors that explain important outcomes, even in the contradictory ways observed above. When the conclusion returns to strong arguments about coalitions, there is thus insufficient evidence to support the contention that “the course of race policy in the twentieth century clearly depended centrally and above all on processes of coalition formation and on the ability of racial minorities to participate in policy-making coalitions” (p. 203). While in the end this book is more suggestive than conclusive, it does encourage scholars interested in race policy-making to consider not only ideas and institutions but also coalitions, and to think more systematically about how these key variables interact. If it is possible to craft a unified model of race policy-making along these lines—a very tall order—then there is an opportunity to apply this model in a type 4 fashion to comparative public policy-making at a more general level.

Although studies of citizenship may also focus on policy-making and policy outcomes, the term has become an umbrella covering a much wider range of topics. Scholarship in this area has tapped into T. H. Marshall’s famous analysis of civil, political, and social rights<sup>43</sup> by exploring migrant access to national labor markets, political representation, and incorporation in welfare-state structures. It has also gone beyond Marshall’s framework to examine the granting of cultural rights and group autonomy; to highlight different conceptions of citizenship across countries; and to investigate specific issues such as naturalization rates, dual citizenship, and asylum policies, among others. Owing to the catch-all nature of the term, it is difficult to map the terrain of citizenship and to pinpoint the unifying elements of the concept. At times, citizenship means the very concrete fact of acquiring the nationality of the host country, while at others it simply implies a robust notion of migrant or minority integration within one or more areas of society.

Within this diffuse field, Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, and Passy focus their book, *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*, on claims-making—political mobilization by migrants, radical right-wing parties and their (un)civil society counter-

<sup>42</sup> For discussions of ideas, interests, and institutions in the fields of political economy and public policy and administration, see Peter A. Hall, “The Role of Interests, Institutions, and Ideas in the Comparative Political Economy of the Industrialized Nations,” in Lichbach and Zuckerman (fn. 2); and Giandomenico Majone, “Public Policy and Administration: Ideas, Interests and Institutions,” in Goodin and Klingemann (fn. 1).

<sup>43</sup> T. H. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class,” in T. H. Marshall, ed., *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1968).

parts, and citizens who stake out pro-migrant or antiracist positions. They expend heroic effort to develop a data set of “purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks” from 1992–98 in Germany, France, Britain, the Netherlands, and Switzerland (p. 24).<sup>44</sup> Drawing inspiration from protest-event analysis and from the political discourse literature, Koopmans et al. sampled one major national newspaper from each of these countries three times a week over this period, coding any type of public pronouncement or action relevant to migrants, the radical right, or pro-migrant/antiracist actors along a number of dimensions. The result is a treasure trove of information that reveals intricate patterns of claims-making across countries.

The authors use this data to address a variety of topics, making significant contributions of all four scholarly types. Their core explanation for the most salient differences in claims-making revolves around cross-national variation in conceptions of citizenship, as reflected in national identities and as crystallized in a series of concrete policies. For Koopmans et al., these identities and policies provide discursive and institutional opportunities and constraints that shape the nature of claims in each country. The authors do not simply rely on out-of-the-box definitions of ethnic versus civic citizenship, however. They make an extremely useful type 1 contribution by situating citizenship in a two-dimensional space within which a particular country’s position can fluctuate across policy area and time. They develop a series of summary scores for both the individual equality rights and cultural difference dimensions of citizenship based on policies in place in 1980, 1990, and 2002. This allows them to demonstrate that in spite of significant policy evolution in a number of countries, there remain very substantial differences in overall citizenship policies between France, which is “universalist;” Britain and the Netherlands, which are “multiculturalist;” and Germany and Switzerland, which fall into the “assimilationist” category.<sup>45</sup> They therefore move away from fixed and purportedly enduring national citizenship models toward measurable and flexible indices of citizenship.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>44</sup> As the authors point out, these are the five most important immigrant-receiving countries in Western Europe, accounting for about four-fifths of its total immigrant population (p. 5).

<sup>45</sup> Koopmans et al.’s framework also demonstrates that (in 2002) Germany was a much weaker case of assimilationism than Switzerland and that the Netherlands was closer to the extreme end of the multiculturalist spectrum than Britain.

<sup>46</sup> For a similar effort to develop an empirically grounded citizenship policy index that allows fluctuation over time, see Marc Morjé Howard, “Comparative Citizenship: An Agenda for Cross-National Research,” *Perspectives on Politics* 4, no. 3 (2006).

The heart of this study, however, is a series of type 2 and type 3 arguments. Working in a type 2 vein, Koopmans et al. deploy their data set to contribute to the debate about whether national or transnational factors matter more in shaping outcomes. Their findings severely challenge the plausibility of transnationalism as a major force in the domain of claims-making. They show that between 95 and 97 percent of all organizations participating in immigration and ethnic relations politics are national or subnational (pp. 85–86); between 76 and 91 percent of all claims made across the countries are purely national or subnational, with only between 0.3 and 1.1 percent of claims having exclusively supra or international dimensions (pp. 96–97); and trends from 1990–99 fail to indicate an increase in supra/international claims, undermining arguments that transnationalism is a rapidly expanding phenomenon (pp. 103–5). In addition, the authors find that claims-making patterns vary significantly by country, a fact that is difficult to reconcile with a transnationalist perspective that emphasizes the universality of global rights-based discourse (p. 105).

Koopmans et al. also stake out type 3 territory by employing social movement theories of political opportunity structures that have been underutilized in studies of immigration and integration. They highlight the theories' significance relative to explanations that rely on more common factors such as migration patterns, socioeconomic conditions, or cultural characteristics of migrant groups (p. 16). The political opportunity perspective convincingly explains why migrants in Germany and Switzerland—which broadly exclude immigrants from domestic political participation—turn in large numbers toward homeland politics, respectively directing only 54 and 41 percent of their claims toward their new country of residence. By contrast, the Netherlands, Britain, and France—which institutionally encourage domestic migrant political participation—see 76, 90, and 91 percent of all migrant claims directed toward their new states (p. 128). The authors also use their framework to account for the relative prevalence of different types of identities ascribed to and used by migrants, showing that in France policy-status identities (such as “immigrant”) are disproportionately employed; whereas in Britain “racial identities” are most common; and in the Netherlands, Germany, and especially in Switzerland, “ethnic and national identities” are preferred (pp. 111–26).<sup>47</sup> This kind of vari-

<sup>47</sup> Koopmans et al. also devote a chapter to the interesting use of “Muslim” as a common identity marker among claims-making migrants in Britain, the Netherlands, and most unexpectedly, France, demonstrating and analyzing the limitations of their own model (chap. 4).

ation reinforces the argument that national citizenship structures that offer distinctive political opportunities remain extremely influential in shaping migrants' identities and actions as expressed through their claims-making.

In addition, the authors aim to make a type 4 contribution by looking beyond the immigration and integration literature to debates about social movements and collective action. They highlight three weaknesses of the general political opportunity framework: a lack of attention to discursive (as opposed to institutional) opportunities and constraints; inattention to variation in opportunities across policy field and type of actor; and a tendency to see opportunities as static rather than as dependent on interactions between actors (pp. 16–23). Their analysis explicitly addresses these concerns. First, it highlights the ability of discursive opportunities to influence the collective identities and specific demands that are likely to be visible, to resonate, and to be seen as legitimate, as demonstrated in their treatment of varying national bases for migrant identification. Second, the authors point out that it matters very little if the Swiss political system offers multiple points of access since noncitizens cannot avail themselves of these options. Understanding immigration and integration politics requires taking into account differences in the institutional opportunities available to a variety of actors (migrants versus citizens) within this particular policy field. Finally, Koopmans et al. closely examine group interactions in a detailed discussion of how migrants, extreme-right activists, and pro-minority forces combine to influence the likelihood and strength of different types of mobilization and countermobilization (chap. 6). While the authors address all three lacunae in political-opportunity theorizing through examples drawn from the immigration and integration subfield, the general lessons apply to all studies of collective action regardless of their specific empirical focus.

Because it makes significant contributions on multiple registers, *Contested Citizenship* is one of the most exciting books in immigration and integration studies today. It deserves the widest possible readership within and beyond the subfield. Yet there are also opportunities—and the necessity—to probe more deeply into some of its insights. As time intensive as it will be, updating the data set to include information through the present day will allow scholars to gauge further movements in citizenship configurations (last measured in 2002) and, more importantly, in migrant claims (last measured in 1998). This would permit more penetrating analysis of parallel developments in these two variables over time within each country and would provide confirma-

tion that the arguments hold in the post-9/11 era.<sup>48</sup> On the theoretical front, the Koopmans et al. model deserves further refinement, especially in terms of devising systematic and independent measures of discursive opportunities. Institutional structures, policy decisions, and claims-making outcomes are sometimes themselves offered as evidence of discursive opportunities or, more broadly, national identities. Skeptics may debate whether it is possible to measure the effects of discursive opportunities if they cannot be precisely defined prior to and independent of political claims-making or policy outcomes. Others may question Koopmans et al.'s measures of citizenship configurations, point to the limitations of their sampling techniques, or highlight the argument that claims-making is merely one dimension of the expansive terrain of citizenship. Nevertheless, one of the principal merits of this book is that it stakes strong and empirically defensible claims that will inspire deeper investigation for years to come.

#### CONCLUSIONS: TOWARD A COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF IDENTITY

Scholars have made significant strides in conceptualizing, analyzing, and explaining the comparative politics of immigration and integration. We know more than ever before about patterns of migration; dimensions of integration (such as how migrants live their lives or how states shape incorporation through policy-making); the forces that influence the success of far-right parties; and how cross-national, evolving differences in citizenship structures affect the political participation of migrants and of host-country nationals. The four books reviewed here sit on the cutting edge of this research, with each contributing to our understanding of a different aspect of the immigration and integration subfield. As much as this scholarship advances specific frontiers, however, it also serves to generate further questions and to reveal gaps in our knowledge about core immigration and integration concerns. Although there is room for more research along any number of fronts, three in particular stand out.

Developing an empirically grounded theoretically satisfying definition of integration would constitute a monumental type 1 contribution to the subfield. Koopmans et al.'s efforts to tease out the various

<sup>48</sup> It would also help overcome modest anachronisms such as their discussion of the Dutch treatment of minorities, which, as they admit, has shifted substantially since the late 1990s. See Han Entzinger, "The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism: The Case of the Netherlands," in Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska, eds., *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); and Christian Joppke, "The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy," *The British Journal of Sociology* 55, no. 2 (2004).

aspects of citizenship, measure them precisely, and track changes over time highlight the absence of such an effort in the study of integration. There has been a tremendous amount of productive effort expended to investigate aspects of migrant or minority incorporation, yet there is strikingly little agreement on what constitutes full integration.<sup>49</sup> How do we know when immigrants or minorities are successfully integrated? Is it primarily a matter of citizenship acquisition, jobs, cultural assimilation, political participation, welfare state benefits, majority attitudes, or some other variable or combination of variables? What are the metrics that should be used to assess groups' progress along each of these dimensions?<sup>50</sup> The immigration and integration subfield would benefit enormously from composite measures that encourage analysis of different levels or types of integration across countries or across time within the same country. While it may be impossible to achieve universal consensus on a single definition of integration, providing theoretically informed concrete measures would encourage more systematic conclusions about comparative trends.

There is also still too little information on just how immigration and integration interact as two sides of the same intellectual and political coin, suggesting an opening for another type 1 contribution.<sup>51</sup> "Threshold of tolerance" theories that once animated discussions about socially viable levels of immigration have faded from view, yet politicians have frequently acted upon British Labor Party Member of Parliament Roy Hattersley's aphorism from the 1960s that "Without integration, limitation is inexcusable; without limitation, integration is impossible."<sup>52</sup> Under what circumstances does immigration lead to integration problems at national and local levels, and why do reactions to immigrants vary tremendously? Do these differences depend primarily on the structure of the local labor market, the geographic concentration and

<sup>49</sup> For two penetrating analyses of incorporation policies that highlight the complexity of the issue area, see Adrian Favell, "Integration Policy and Integration Research in Europe: A Review and Critique," in T. Alexander Alienikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, eds., *Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001); and Gary Freeman, "Immigrant Incorporation in Western Democracies," *International Migration Review* 38, no. 3 (2004).

<sup>50</sup> For an overview of recent contributions to this debate in the American context, see Mary C. Waters and Tomás R. Jiménez, "Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges," *Annual Review of Sociology* 31 (2005). For an attempt to develop comparative integration measures in the European context, see the *European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index*, published in 2005 by the British Council Brussels and available online at <http://www.integrationindex.eu/multiversions/2140/FileName/brussels-european-civic-citizenship-and-inclusion-index.pdf> (accessed April 14, 2008).

<sup>51</sup> This is a point frequently made by James Hollifield.

<sup>52</sup> Quoted in E. J. B. Rose, *Colour and Citizenship* (London: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1969), 229.

density of the migrant population, the perceived social and cultural distance between the new migrants and the established citizens, or other factors? When do integration challenges trickle back up to affect national immigration policies? Although students of radical-right parties and scholars like Jeannette Money address these questions head-on,<sup>53</sup> there is much more to learn about how conflicts between migrants and citizens develop into significant political events.

In a similar vein, there is a growing research agenda surrounding the question of “who is in and who is out?” Paul Sniderman and his colleagues reinvigorated longstanding debates about the causes of prejudice (with 1990s Italy as a case study), using a type 2 approach to test and combine psychological theories with those more in synch with interest-based rational-actor models.<sup>54</sup> Steven Weldon has contributed to this debate by arguing in a type 3 fashion that previously overlooked institutional factors could most persuasively account for cross-national variation in tolerance toward ethnic minorities in Western Europe.<sup>55</sup> And authors such as Michèle Lamont and Christopher Bail have used boundary perspectives in a type 3 manner to help understand the salience of a variety of different markers of inclusion and exclusion in the United States and across Europe.<sup>56</sup> As this field of inquiry undergoes a renaissance, it is vital to continue testing existing theories as well as to draw in new perspectives in order to better understand prejudice and tolerance toward immigrants and minorities. Touching on these three research agendas—theorizing and measuring integration; theorizing and exploring the connections between immigration and integration; and assessing and adding to theories of prejudice, tolerance, and identity boundaries—reveals the necessity for immigration and integration

<sup>53</sup> Jeannette Money, *Fences and Neighbors: The Political Geography of Immigration Control* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999).

<sup>54</sup> Paul Sniderman, Pierangelo Peri, Rui J. P. de Figueiredo Jr., and Thomas Piazza, *The Outsider: Prejudice and Politics in Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). Perhaps more importantly for political scientists, in this and subsequent work, Sniderman and colleagues have examined how these sentiments translate into political and policy action. Paul M. Sniderman, Louk Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior, “Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities,” *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 1 (2004).

<sup>55</sup> Steven A. Weldon, “The Institutional Context of Tolerance for Ethnic Minorities: A Comparative, Multilevel Analysis of Western Europe,” *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 2 (2006).

<sup>56</sup> Michèle Lamont, *The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2000); idem, “Immigration and the Salience of Racial Boundaries among French Workers,” *French Politics, Culture & Society* 19, no. 1 (2001); and Christopher A. Bail, “Diverse Diversities: The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries toward Immigrants in Twenty-One European Countries,” *American Sociological Review* (forthcoming). On the construction of identities and hierarchies, see also the work of Louk Hagendoorn, “Ethnic Categorization and Out-group Exclusion: Cultural Values and Social Stereotypes in the Construction of Ethnic Hierarchies,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 16, no. 1 (1993); Zolberg and Long (fn. 31); and Alba (fn. 31).

research to advance its internal agenda, especially given the politically charged nature of these issues in liberal democracies today.

However, immigration and integration scholars must also look for opportunities to speak to broader debates in the social sciences. As I have suggested, one way to do so involves undertaking type 4 scholarship that uses the empirical evidence from I&I topics to advance theorizing about public policy-making, political parties, social movements, historical or rational choice institutionalism, or other domains. While some authors do branch out in this direction, there have been strikingly few attempts to use the subfield of immigration and integration as a beachhead from which to launch arguments designed to impact other theoretical agendas. Developing contributions for scholars outside of the subfield should not become the primary goal for students of immigration and integration. However, as *Contested Citizenship* illustrates, it is possible to incorporate all four types of scholarship in a manner that provides insight not only for I&I experts, but also for a wider array of social scientists.

An additional and equally promising way for immigration and integration scholars to increase the relevance and readership of their work is to help forge a research agenda around the comparative politics of identity.<sup>57</sup> Given the political implications of heartfelt personal identities in the contemporary era, the comparative politics of identity is emerging as a field of inquiry on the same theoretical level as the study of political economy. Yet, while political economists are generally perceived as part of a common interdisciplinary field in spite of their disparate research agendas, there is very little consciousness of the intrinsic thematic links between studies of immigration and integration and those of ethnic conflict, nationalism, supranationalism, and even gender and sexuality. These subfields operate virtually independently of one another, despite their overlapping interests and research questions.

At the core of this emerging area of inquiry is an effort to understand how identity works in politics.<sup>58</sup> Most fundamentally, this means: (1)

<sup>57</sup> I draw a distinction here between the empirically grounded study of the comparative politics of identity and the normative study of the politics of identity, as exemplified in works such as Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in Amy Gutmann, ed., *Multiculturalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Craig Calhoun, ed., *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); and Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). While it will be fruitful for empirical social scientists to ground their studies in normative work, the comparative politics of identity does not focus centrally on normative debates.

<sup>58</sup> Studies of class consciousness and party identification—less in vogue now than in earlier eras—may also provide useful insights into these issues.

conceptualizing and measuring politically relevant identities, (2) asking what forces shape such identities, and (3) investigating the extent to which those identities influence political outcomes. Immigration and integration scholarship focuses squarely (though often unselfconsciously) on the first of these elements when it examines the identities of migrants and their descendants as well as the national identities of host countries making decisions about immigration policies and integration expectations.<sup>59</sup> One way to sharpen immigration and integration research involves tracing more precisely the patterns and the salience of relevant identities. It is common knowledge that individuals live with numerous identities; but which ones are most relevant and how meaningful they are is less understood. How do we conceptualize and gauge the multiple identities of new arrivals—Mexican, illegal immigrant, hard-working, poor, wife, mother, devout Catholic, Spanish-speaking, mestiza, aspiring American citizen, etc.—and the salience of pro- or anti-immigrant sentiments—passionate, moderate, indifferent—among longstanding residents and citizens? As immigration and integration scholars develop finer-grained analyses of the identities relevant to their work, they will be able to contribute methods and insights to the broader study of comparative identity politics.

Addressing these issues requires a better understanding of the forces that shape identities, the second node of the comparative identity politics agenda. It is possible to discern five schools of thought on the sources of identities: structural, instrumental, institutional, informational, and interpretive.<sup>60</sup> Structuralists emphasize major systemic differences or shifts as a fundamental generator of people's identities. Instrumentalists focus on economic and other forms of competition over well-being as the primary source. Institutionalists highlight the strong role that variables such as national and local political configurations play in influencing identities. Informational theorists look to learning processes to account for why individuals emphasize different identities at various times. And interpretivists stress the effect of socialization on shaping personal and group identities. Immigration and integration experts regularly speak to the origins of identities when they analyze the effects of the existing racial or ethnic structure on new arrivals' identities (Foner), the socioeconomic incentives that encourage people

<sup>59</sup> Sides and Citrin have also presented evidence suggesting the relatively greater importance of cultural identities over material interests in shaping European public opinion about immigration. John Sides and Jack Citrin, "European Opinion about Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and Information," *British Journal of Political Science* 37, no. 3 (2007).

<sup>60</sup> This draws on and adapts the framework I developed to analyze the origins of ideas in Bleich (fn. 29), 187–94.

to vote for radical-right parties (Givens), or the citizenship institutions that shape immigrants' identities and determine the likelihood of their participation in national politics (Koopmans et al.). A productive next step would be to systematize knowledge within the immigration and integration subfield regarding the factors that influence migrant and national identities under varying conditions. This would also reveal the subsequent level of research questions.

Scholars of all forms of comparative identity politics are striving to comprehend the third element of the equation, namely the extent to which and the circumstances under which identity matters as an independent variable.<sup>61</sup> Do instances of ethnic conflict, race riots, tensions over immigration and incorporation, the rise of far-right parties, and other events truly hinge on identities in action? Some prominent students of ethnic conflict have recently argued that while such conflict may be patterned by ethnicity, it is primarily caused by other factors, including economic incentives or political conditions.<sup>62</sup> These arguments require students of identity politics to weigh more carefully the effect of identity as an independent causal variable. The literature on the radical right has perhaps done the most within the immigration and integration subfield to tease out the relative importance of national identities, economic incentives, strategic interactions, and political institutions in paving the way for the rise of such parties. We know less about the extent to which racial identities (as opposed to bureaucratic politics, institutional path-dependence, or labor-market considerations) affect race policies, and the circumstances that push national identity concerns to override economic or human-rights considerations in determining immigration politics.<sup>63</sup>

Exploring these and other questions that explicitly call out identity as a variable of interest is unlikely to result in a one-size-fits-all macro theory that explains outcomes in all types of cases. Just as in the study of violence,<sup>64</sup> there are many specific forms of identity that

<sup>61</sup> In the realm of EU studies, Hooghe and Marks have connected identity to integration outcomes by arguing that shifting decision-making structures since the 1990s have given more power to the general public relative to elites, thereby creating an era of "constraining dissensus" that limits integration options. They term their perspective "postfunctionalist" because its emphasis on identity goes beyond the primary focus on economic interest underpinning both neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "A Postfunctional Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus," *British Journal of Political Science* (forthcoming).

<sup>62</sup> Paul Collier, "Ethnic Diversity: An Economic Analysis," *Economic Policy* 32 (April 2001); and James D. Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003).

<sup>63</sup> This last question lies at the heart of Anthony Messina's latest book (fn. 12).

<sup>64</sup> See Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence," *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998); and Donald Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 34–42.

need to be analyzed separately in order to understand the differences among them. However, if identity has any meaning as a concept in the social sciences, it should be amenable to general propositions built on grounded studies of its multiple forms.<sup>65</sup> The immigration and integration subfield can therefore serve as a key point of reference in the effort to aggregate insights about identity. By contributing to the emerging field of comparative identity politics, immigration and integration scholars have the opportunity to help us understand *just how* and *how much* identity matters. There are perhaps no more important questions in politics today.

<sup>65</sup> For a “brush clearing” effort designed to facilitate movement toward general propositions about identity, see Abdelal et al. (fn. 4).