As a presidential candidate, George W. Bush spoke of making Latin America “fundamental” to his foreign policy, not an afterthought. Upon assuming office, President Bush took steps to translate this theme into reality. In a break with tradition, he chose Mexico over Canada as the first country to receive a presidential visit and then honored Mexican president Vicente Fox with his administration’s first state dinner. Bush also addressed the Organization of American States (OAS), a forum U.S. presidents seldom embrace, and at the 2001 Summit of the Americas in Quebec he painted a vision of hemispheric free trade and vowed steady progress toward this goal.

Yet what was billed as a new era in U.S.–Latin American relations remains strikingly familiar. Indeed, the basic U.S. policy objectives in Latin America today—security and stability, expanded liberal trade, and promoting democracy—vary little from those of the preceding three administrations. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration stressed security/stability, democracy, and trade (to some extent) in Central America and the Caribbean. From the late 1980s through the 1990s, the Bush and Clinton administrations pursued these same goals in Mexico, Haiti, Peru, Guatemala, and beyond. Each administration, of course, did more than simply replicate its predecessor’s policies. In the 1980s, Washington emphasized security over trade and democracy, but in the 1990s it reversed these priorities. From the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, to the North American Free Trade Agreement, to establishing a framework for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), expanding trade assumed increasing prominence on the U.S. policy agenda. That said, there has been little deviation from Washington’s traditional triad of objectives: security, trade, and democracy.
In this chapter I make three short arguments and several longer ones. First, the continuity of U.S. interests rests on the enduring concerns stressed by a “realist” perspective of international relations and the heightened relevance of “liberal institutionalist” concerns. In general, realist policy prescriptions emphasize security, stability, and the unilateral use of power to achieve state interests. By contrast, liberal institutionalist prescriptions stress promoting democracy, liberal trade, and the institutional infrastructure needed to foster and sustain robust democratic governments, economic prosperity, and multilateral cooperation. Just as international anarchy triggers the security and self-help aspects of U.S. policy concerns, greater international integration and Latin America’s recent economic and political transitions stimulate Washington’s democratic, liberal, and multilateral thrust.

Second, despite the continuity of U.S. interests in Latin America, since the mid-1980s we have witnessed considerable change in the underlying threats to those interests. Today, narco-trafficking, terrorism, internal conflicts, economic crises, and ineffective governments threaten security and stability more than external subversion. Similarly, the failure of Latin America’s market reforms to promote wider prosperity threatens liberal trade arrangements more than economic nationalism. Popular frustrations over corruption, poor economic performance, and weak institutions threaten democracy more than competing political ideologies.

A third argument is perhaps counterintuitive. Notwithstanding the priority attached to expanding trade arrangements, Washington should not focus its policy efforts exclusively upon Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico—major trading partners whose support is needed to craft the FTAA. Rather, it should devote much greater attention, energy, and resources to the Andean states—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. In the short term at least, the Andean states matter to the United States more than achieving a hemispheric free trade area. The reasons are straightforward. The benefits promised by hemispheric liberal trade can be realized fully only in the long term and after protracted multilateral negotiations. By contrast, the “new” threats to U.S. interests are immediate, and many are concentrated in Andean states. This is not to say that trade is unimportant but rather that there are other more pressing issues. Thus, in the near term, a failure to formalize an FTAA poses fewer risks and imposes fewer costs on the United States than a failure to protect its interests in the Andes.

In terms of larger issues, there are three principal challenges to U.S. policy objectives in this critical region. One is Washington’s tendency to conform to a preferred policy philosophy or engage in preferred policy tactics at the expense of broader policy goals. For example, the U.S. preference against “nation-building” initiatives may stymie efforts to achieve peace in failing states like Colombia. A second challenge is to minimize the costs of policy offsetting, that is, situations where two policies’ underlying logic—and hence
the net effect of their implementation—conflicts, such that both incur efficiency costs and neither achieves full success. The third challenge is to avoid the pitfalls inherent in conflating the wars against drugs and global terrorism; chief among these is a potential commitment trap of long-term, increasingly costly obligations in the region.

The importance of realist and liberal institutionalist concerns to U.S. policy interests, and the changing nature of threats to those interests, require little elaboration. Consequently, I devote this chapter primarily to explaining the compelling significance Andean countries hold for the United States and analyzing the major challenges the current U.S. administration must surmount to achieve its policy goals toward the Andean states.

**Yes, the Andean States Matter to the United States**

Since the 1980s, Andean countries have experienced both advances and reversals in democratic governance, political stability, economic performance, and drug trafficking. Democratic transitions, coups or attempted coups, indigenous mobilizations, insurgencies, and party breakdowns and party resurrections peppered the political landscape. On the economic front, neoliberal market experiments appeared and populism reappeared. Some national economies waxed, some waned, some did both. The region’s drug economy changed as well. At Washington’s behest and with U.S. aid, Bolivia and Peru launched crop eradication programs to reduce coca production. In turn, more production shifted to Colombia, deepening that country’s slide into political, guerrilla, and drug-related violence.

Throughout this period, stopping narcotics grew as a priority in Washington’s policy agenda toward the Andean states. To be sure, it did not completely displace other U.S. interests concerning democracy, security, and trade in the region. It did, however, assume such prominence that almost all U.S. policies were generally constructed in ways that addressed the problems of drug trafficking. In the process, government agencies with different agendas—Agriculture, Commerce, State, Treasury, the Agency for International Development, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Drug Enforcement Administration—were all to some degree enlisted in a broad, antinarcotics campaign. Because Washington’s concerns over the drug war impeded a more sustained focus on other U.S. interests in the region, it is worth examining exactly why the Andean states matter.

The United States has important national interests at stake in the Andean region, beginning with its energy needs. U.S. oil imports from Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela exceed those from the entire Middle East but are threatened by political and economic turmoil. Across the region democracies are under stress and economic progress has stalled while political instability,
violence, and drug trafficking have spiked. In most countries, the institutional infrastructure needed for effective democratic governance has eroded. Political parties in Peru, Venezuela, and Bolivia are in disrepair, and the presidency of Ecuador remains fragile. Colombia’s democratic institutions are routinely exposed to guerrilla, paramilitary, and drug-related intimidation, and its besieged government is now the third largest recipient of U.S. aid in the world after Israel and Egypt. Finally, in all five countries, legislatures and justice systems are weak, underfunded, and too often ineffective.

Even more alarming than this current political snapshot are the region’s political and economic trends. In the last half-decade, poverty, economic inequality, ineffective institutions, corruption, and political violence have undermined public faith in democracy. Since 1996, popular support for democracy has grown increasingly volatile, and the protection of civil liberties—hardly robust to begin with—dipped appreciably in Venezuela (see Table 7.1). During the same time span, economic growth indicators in most countries have, on balance, declined more than they have risen, and unemployment and inequality figures remained distressingly high (see Table 7.2).

### Table 7.1 Andean Countries: Support for Democracy and Protection of Civil Liberties

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### Table 7.2 Andean Countries and Civil Liberties

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*Notes:* A. Excludes respondents who answered “it doesn’t matter” and “don’t know.”
B. Scale: Free = 1–2.5; partly free = 3–5.5; not free = 5.5–7.
### Table 7.2 Andean States and Selected Macroeconomic and Inequality Indicators

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**Source:** Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2001 (Santiago, Chile: ECLAC, 2001).

**Notes:** a. na = not available.
Each country confronts a distinct set of challenges, yet all share some common dilemmas. Among these are controlling illicit drug production and trafficking (see Table 7.3), maintaining effective political parties and institutions, addressing poverty and inequality, and curtailing political violence and corruption.

### Table 7.3 Coca Leaf Production in Hectares, 1991–2000

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
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<td>48,600</td>
<td>45,800</td>
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<td>79,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
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<td>108,800</td>
<td>115,300</td>
<td>68,800</td>
<td>38,700</td>
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</table>


In Bolivia—once a major coca producer—eradication programs sliced coca cultivation 70 percent between 1996 and 2000. As eradication efforts in Colombia have been successful in the past few years, Bolivia has had to step up its own eradication efforts in order to combat the balloon effect. The burden this placed on small farmers, who received scant benefit from crop substitution programs, sparked intense social unrest and resistance among poor indigenous Bolivians to U.S.-sponsored eradication efforts. This backlash helped propel Evo Morales to a surprising second place finish in Bolivia’s 2002 presidential election. A supporter of traditional coca cultivation, free market opponent, and member of the Movement Toward Socialism party, Morales failed to capture the presidency. He did, however, win a seat in the legislature, and his party holds the second largest bloc in Congress. These developments provide opponents of free trade and coca eradication programs legitimate political clout. Morales’s vow to change Bolivia’s drug and economic policies “peacefully in the parliament” constitutes a direct challenge to key elements of U.S. policies. What is more, the indigenous-led violent protests that forced Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation in October 2003 suggest that one cannot ignore Morales’ views—or those of his supporters—on these issues without consequences.

On the broader political front, Bolivia’s competitive elections in 2002 did transfer power successfully. But the major political parties themselves function more as personal vehicles for politicians than as expressions of aggregate social interests. Thus many Bolivians see direct action and protests as a more effective means of political participation than partisan electoral campaigns. This is certainly what drove the events of October 2003. On the economic
front, many also are frustrated by years of austerity, structural adjustment, and privatization measures that have failed to yield greater equality or sustained growth and prosperity. Since 2000, protests against market reforms have pressured the government to renationalize some previously privatized firms in sectors such as petroleum and natural gas.

Unlike Bolivia, Ecuador has never been a focal point for illicit crop cultivation, although Colombian traffickers exploit the country’s porous borders and weak enforcement to transship drugs. Still, few Andean states can match Ecuador’s record for acute, short-term political instability. Between 1996 and 2000, Ecuadorians saw four presidents ousted for corruption or incompetence. The latest turmoil, a January 2000 attempted coup that ultimately led to the removal of Jamil Mahuad and brought Vice President Gustavo Noboa to power, was fueled by the country’s worst economic performance in generations. From 1998 to 2000, gross domestic product (GDP) fell 5.7 percent, GDP per capita tumbled over 11 percent, foreign investment declined 34.7 percent, and imports fell by 38.4 percent. The economic freefall—which ensued despite market reforms and a newly dollarized currency—mobilized broad opposition against Mahuad, Noboa, and currently against Gutiérrez. Though the economy has recovered, growing 3.5 percent in 2003, unemployment has continued to rise, and with it popular discontent.4

In Peru, coca production dropped 64 percent from 1996 to 2000, but coca cultivation has grown between 2002 and 2004.5 The Alejandro Toledo government remains burdened by enervated political institutions, scandals, mounting opposition to free market policies, and poor economic performance.6 To push structural adjustment and market measures, former president Alberto Fujimori centralized power in the executive via his so-called self coup and severely weakened Peru’s democratic institutions. His national security adviser, Vladimiro Montesinos, became a shadowy political puppet master adept at bribery, coercion, and electoral fraud, all used to orchestrate Fujimori’s controversial third term. The spectacular corruption scandal that toppled the president in 2000 also revealed Montesinos’s complicity in arms and drug smuggling. These developments, plus scandals and persistent poverty (more than 50 percent of Peruvians live below the poverty line), have left Toledo’s popular support hovering around 6 percent.7 They also have eroded public faith in democratic government, soured Peruvians on economic liberalization, and sparked waves of violent antiprivatization protests.

Colombia’s situation warrants special attention. Whereas coca production fell in Bolivia and Peru from 1996 to 2000, in Colombia it grew 103 percent. This upsurge transformed Colombia into the largest cocaine supplier to the United States and, by June 2000, had moved Washington to adopt Plan Colombia, a two-year $1.3 billion aid package designed to cut Colombia’s coca cultivation and resolve its decades-old guerrilla insurgency. From 2000 to 2002, Colombia’s coca production actually increased 25 percent, even as its
civil war intensified. Under the Uribe administration, however, there was a sharp decline in coca cultivation between 2002 and 2003, with production falling by over 15 percent in 2002. Decline in coca production was greatest in the southern region of Putumayo, where most of the U.S.-led crop eradication programs were focused. Decline in Colombian coca cultivation, however, has not resulted in decreased levels of cocaine entering the United States.

On the political front, Colombia’s principal parties dominate elections but have not been inclusive beyond the elites nor ensured stable, consolidated democratic governance. Consequently, a great deal of political activity occurs outside the party system. These politics, violent and destabilizing, take place within what can only be described as an unconsolidated state—one subject to severe restrictions on national sovereignty and unable to perform the most basic functions of maintaining order and protecting the citizenry. Leftist FARC and ELN guerrillas control 50 percent of the national territory. Their right-wing paramilitary counterparts protect rich landowners from the guerrillas, often by terrorizing peasant villages suspected of harboring guerrilla sympathizers. Both sides profit from and flourish through the drug trade.

In important ways the state’s weakness is a self-inflicted wound. For decades, the political elite ignored southern Colombia, where farmers now grow coca because the state failed to establish a basic infrastructure conducive to community development and the rule of law. In the 1960s, insurgent guerrillas emerged as a result of the state’s inability or unwillingness to perform its basic functions, and the paramilitaries now justify their existence because the state failed to protect individual rights and property. Colombia’s drug lords and combatants capture much of the revenue derived from the narcotics trade. Although some of these profits no doubt get funneled into legitimate activities, the formal economy itself remains anemic. Economic inequality is especially acute. From 1998 to 2001, the richest 10 percent of the population commanded 40 percent of all income earned.

Unlike Colombia, Venezuela has not experienced significant coca cultivation. As the second most popular point of departure for drugs smuggled into the United States (behind Colombia), however, it plays no small role in the hemisphere’s drug distribution network. But more disturbing to the United States has been Venezuela’s political trajectory under President Hugo Chávez. In 1998, Chávez capitalized upon Venezuela’s economic turmoil and ineffective political parties to win office, then progressively weakened what had been historically close U.S.-Venezuelan ties. Of particular concern to Washington is the Bolivarian Revolution that Chávez launched against political corruption, inequality, and economic mismanagement, as well as against market reforms, globalization and those he held responsible for imposing them on Venezuela. As the revolution unfolded, Venezuelan society became more polarized, jeopardizing its political stability and, from Washington’s perspective, its democratic bona fides too. “We have been concerned,” Colin Powell
told the U.S. Congress, “with some of the actions of Venezuelan President Chávez and his understanding of what a democratic system is all about.”

Domestically, Chávez rewrote the national constitution, concentrated executive power at the expense of Congress, and promised but largely failed to reinvigorate the economy. In the process he garnered broad support from poor and working-class Venezuelans but antagonized the upper, middle, and business classes. Internationally, he campaigned against the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas, ordered the U.S. military to leave its offices in Caracas, refused permission for U.S. war planes to use Venezuelan air space in conjunction with drug interdiction campaigns, and provided assistance to the FARC. He supported Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) production caps to boost crude oil prices and agreed to provide cheap petroleum to Cuba, undermining U.S. economic embargo efforts. He also paid visits to the leaders of Iraq and Libya and publicly criticized the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan and the war in Iraq. Having survived a recall referendum in August 2004, Chávez is now set to carry out the remainder of his presidential term ending in 2006.

To summarize, citizens of Andean states live in (sometimes nominally) democratic countries with market economies. Yet frustration over the way democracy works or does not work and the failure of pro-market policies to improve social welfare fuels much of the region’s political discontent and instability. It also complicates U.S. efforts to promote security and stability, expanded trade, and democratic governments.

**Major Challenges**

Several other challenges stand between Washington and its principal policy goals. Ironically, one is the temptation not to conform to a preferred policy philosophy or to engage in preferred policy tactics at the expense of those policy goals. As shown in the following discussion, U.S. actions to promote security and democracy in Colombia and Venezuela, respectively, illustrate this point. Another challenge is to minimize policy offsetting in terms of trade and counternarcotics policies. A third challenge is to avoid the worst consequences of having conflated the war on drugs and the global war against terrorism.

**Ensuring Security and Stability (Without Nation-building)**

The security problems generated by failed and failing states are attracting increased attention. Failed states lack effective political, economic, and social institutions. These states are not simply underachievers. Rather, they demonstrate a marked incapacity to perform such classic state functions as exercis-
ing sovereignty over the national territory, providing a common defense, or maintaining law and order. They also demonstrate profound deficiencies in modern state functions such as reducing gross inequality, ensuring sound economic performance, and enhancing social welfare. States that are failing become conflict ridden and are prone to political violence and corruption. They become hotbeds of instability and refugee flows that can affect the quality of life far beyond their borders, and they serve as havens for a range of criminal enterprises. As Al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks launched from ostensibly sovereign Afghanistan clearly showed, the consequences of a failed state can be disastrous.

Initiatives to strengthen a country’s political, economic, and social institutions can help prevent state failure. Such nation-building measures can be pursued multilaterally through international financial institutions or unilaterally as foreign policy. For successful self-interested states in an increasingly interdependent world, nation-building can be a useful policy tool. In the past, the consequences of failed states were more easily confined with fewer spillover effects. Today, failing states threaten their own people, their neighbors, and more distant populations as well.

The U.S. administration that assumed power in January 2001 initially saw little utility in nation-building. This antipathy extended beyond the Clinton administration’s use of U.S. troops for peacekeeping in Haiti or Somalia (actions that the Bush administration believed might impair the military’s readiness to fight wars). It also helped define the administration’s foreign policy priorities and, thus, the appropriate policy tools to address them. In a Foreign Affairs article published in 2000, a chief architect of current U.S. policy, Condoleezza Rice, listed five priorities that would command attention under a new administration: military strength, global economic growth, alliance maintenance, Russia and China, and so-called rogue states. Although informative on several levels, the omission of failed states signaled both how little importance the new administration would attach to the problem and its disinterest in nation-building to address it.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq compelled the United States to abandon a no-nation-building posture toward the Middle East. To realize its principal objectives in the Andean region—where the lack of effective, legitimate government and political institutions fuels a host of problems—the Bush administration must rethink its stance toward nation-building there. If states can be said to exist on a spectrum of viability whose benchmarks read successful, weak, failing, and failed, several Andean states already are clustered between the second and third markers; Colombia hovers perilously close to its endpoint. By no means is Colombia a failed state yet, but although Uribe has made significant gains against armed insurgents, the government lacks control over vast segments of
the national territory. Pitched battles among guerrillas, paramilitaries, and regular armed forces have spread from the countryside into urban areas. FARC death threats have compelled dozens of city mayors to vacate their posts, creating vacuums of legitimate power at local levels. Colombia’s internal violence also reverberates routinely across borders in armed clashes and refugee flows. Given Colombia’s strategic location adjacent to Venezuela’s oil fields, the Panama Canal, and the Caribbean Basin, these spillover effects are especially worrisome.

In this context, it is difficult to see how the United States can secure its goals without sustained nation-building efforts. One reason critics faulted the U.S.-backed Plan Colombia was its failure to address adequately the political, institutional, and economic factors that weakened the state and gave rise to guerrilla and paramilitary forces. Washington’s subsequent Andean Regional Initiative—which funneled nearly $800 million toward nation-building efforts across the region—reflects these concerns and is a step in the right direction. But it is a small step. Since most of the money targets Colombia’s neighbors, the initiative seems unlikely to induce effective nation-building where it is needed most.

Promoting Democracy (Without Supporting Coups)

The United States has long promoted democracy in Latin America for strategic, ideological, and altruistic reasons. It believes democratic governments make good political allies and can best safeguard human rights and unlock human potential. In different ways and with different degrees of success, such efforts marked the Wilson, Kennedy, Carter, Reagan, and Clinton administrations. Of course, sometimes democracy brought to power governments that the United States disliked intensely. The leftist governments of Guatemala’s Jacobo Arbenz and Chile’s Salvador Allende are two such instances. Each tested the U.S. commitment to democracy, and in each case Washington failed the test by orchestrating Arbenz’s overthrow in 1954 and at the very least welcoming Allende’s in 1973. Knowledge of U.S. actions against these governments severely damaged Washington’s moral and political standing in Latin America, and the brutal regimes that replaced them did nothing to advance its broader democracy-promoting agenda.

Those who justified U.S. support or sponsorship of these coups typically did so on the basis of realist Cold War calculations. The communist threat was such that it was safer to facilitate the downfall of democratically elected socialist regimes than to permit their continuation. As Henry Kissinger reportedly explained, “I don’t know why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.” Many observers believed the end of the Cold War vitiated such logic and had given
the United States the luxury of supporting democracy even when it spawned governments Washington disliked. Those holding such views can take little comfort in the U.S. response to Venezuela’s 2002 coup.

The coup’s comic-opera aspects are well known. On April 12, 2002, Venezuelan military officers moved against President Hugo Chávez, announced his resignation, and placed him under house arrest. Pedro Carmona, leader of Venezuela’s national federation of business chambers, assumed the presidency, inexplicably bypassing Vice President Diosdado Cabello. Carmona suspended the constitution, and then dissolved Congress, the Supreme Court, and the attorney general’s office, essentially laying the grounds for a government-by-decree until elections the following year. Nineteen Western Hemispheric leaders quickly condemned the putsch and threatened to invoke sanctions under the Inter-American Democratic Charter adopted by the OAS. Several refused to recognize the Carmona regime.

By contrast, the United States appeared to endorse the coup. Washington blamed Chávez for his own demise, refused to label his ouster a coup (“That is not a word we are using,” one official told The Washington Post), and promised to work with the government that had just steamrolled Venezuela’s democratic institutions. Only when the coup crumbled two days later and Chávez returned to power did the United States temper its enthusiasm and bring its official statements more in line with its stated pro-democracy policy objectives. This diplomatic clumsiness, plus Washington’s failure to demand that Venezuela’s crisis be resolved constitutionally, sparked intense speculation over U.S. complicity in the events.

The U.S. government strongly denied any involvement, but circumstantial evidence put Washington on the defensive. Moreover, through various means the United States had signaled repeatedly its displeasure with the Chávez regime: both Secretary of State Colin Powell and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director George Tenet, for example, had spoken critically of Chávez in February 2002 in comments that were front page news in Venezuela. When President Bush addressed a meeting of the Andean Community of Nations in Peru the next month, Chávez was conspicuously not invited, despite Venezuela’s membership in the community. Whether intended to green light a coup or not, these actions undoubtedly encouraged Chávez’s domestic foes. As one Defense Department official later explained, “We were not discouraging people. We were sending informal, subtle signals that we don’t like this guy.”

Regardless of its actual role, by appearing to accept an unconstitutional end to a distasteful but democratically elected government, the United States badly damaged the credibility of its commitment to democracy. Editorials around the world scoffed at U.S. denials of complicity and pointed out that it was the Western Hemisphere’s small players, not its moral leader, who stood up to defend democratic principles. For those already dubious of Washing-
ton’s intentions toward Chávez, a subsequent State Department report exonerating U.S. officials of wrongdoing in Venezuela’s turmoil seems unlikely to change many minds.\textsuperscript{19}

The United States has good reasons for promoting democracy in Venezuela and across the Andean region. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru constitute part of democracy’s “third wave” where political transitions have yet to yield fully consolidated democratic regimes. Other longtime democracies such as Colombia and Venezuela now teeter on the brink of deconsolidation. The collapse of democracy in the region would be a tragedy for our Andean neighbors. It could easily affect U.S. energy supplies and almost certainly would complicate U.S. counternarcotics efforts. “The next 25 years,” wrote the U.S. Commission on National Security/21\textsuperscript{st} Century, “will determine whether Latin America’s march toward democracy is successful or not, and the consolidation of democracy is probably the most important overall determinant of the region’s prospects for security and stability” (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{20} If these predictions hold, consistently supporting democracy, despite the occasional thorns, will advance U.S. interests more effectively and enduringly than any short-term gains from sanctioning unconstitutional changes of power.

\textit{Policy Offsetting: Liberal Trade Versus the Drug Trade}

Policy offsetting occurs when the underlying logic of two policies conflicts, such that the policies themselves work at cross-purposes. Neither policy, therefore, can achieve its full measure of success, and tilting the balance toward one imposes efficiency costs on the other. The dilemma is most acute with free trade and anti–drug trafficking policies. The former requires increasingly open borders to facilitate commercial transactions. The latter requires ever-tighter controls over those same borders. Thus, a second challenge facing the United States is to minimize the costs incurred when policy offsetting cannot be avoided.

Robust liberal trade rests on subsidiary policies that reduce tariffs, upgrade transport infrastructure, and deregulate financial systems. Even without comprehensive free trade agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), these measures help expand trade volume by lowering trade barriers, including regulatory barriers and transport and transaction costs. These benefits, however, are not without costs to anti–drug trafficking campaigns.\textsuperscript{21} Liberalized trade can increase the volume of legally traded goods as well as the variety of hiding places for illicit ones. Infrastructure upgrades for roads, ports, railways, and airports lower transport costs for legal and illegal products. Financial deregulation facilitates legitimate transactions and money laundering. These dynamics reflect the fact that a majority of illegal drugs enter the United States disguised inside legal products and transport
containers and that the logic of vigorous drug interdiction runs directly counter to that of expediting the flow of goods across borders.\textsuperscript{22} The more aggressive border inspections become, the higher the transaction costs imposed on legal trade. Conversely, the more border inspections are streamlined to facilitate licit trade, the greater the volume of illicit goods. This is an important, but surprisingly undervalued aspect of the drug trade–free trade relationship. Failure to take this relationship seriously obscures the reality of policy offsetting and can promote mischaracterization of the effects liberal trade actually has on drug trafficking. The following example illustrates these points.

In 1991, the United States adopted the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), in part to help stem the flow of Andean drugs coming into the United States. The basic idea was that export expansion would complement coca eradication programs and help Andean countries move from illegal to legitimate commercial exports. The act sharply increased trade between the United States and Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru by eliminating duties and restrictions on a range of U.S.-bound products. U.S. exports to ATPA countries rose 65 percent from 1991 to 1999, and ATPA country exports to the United States jumped 98 percent.\textsuperscript{23}

Yet ATPA produced only minimal effects on the region’s overall drug production. From 1991 to 2000, coca cultivation declined in some ATPA countries but actually doubled region-wide. The increase came from Colombia, which saw its legal \textit{and} illegal exports to the United States jump dramatically under the trade accord. This surprising development reflects the underscrutinized assumptions of U.S. trade and antinarcotics policy. As shown in Figure 7.1, the United States based ATPA’s drug reduction potential on the premise that Andean coca producers could substitute legal crops for coca and shift their production positions along the production possibility frontier from points A to B. Such a shift assumed, however, that Andean countries already had devoted their resources fully to coca production, but as noted above, Colombia had not. Colombia’s actual position was perhaps at point C. Thus, its underutilized resources positioned it to increase both the production of licit and illicit exports (point D). Consequently, today Colombia provides more than 60 percent of ATPA exports to the U.S. market but roughly 90 percent of the cocaine Americans consume.\textsuperscript{24} The more customs agents attack the drug influx through closer border inspections of Colombian products, the greater the costs they will impose on legitimate U.S.-Colombian trade.

To be sure, expanded trade between the United States and Andean countries can benefit each. Yet, whatever ATPA’s merits were on trade—the legislation expired in December 2001—it was hardly the effective counternarcotics measure some advocates believed. Vice President Richard Cheney, for example, urged the U.S. Senate to reauthorize ATPA, because the accord pro-
vided “solid economic alternatives to the production of illegal drugs” in those countries; and John Walters, director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, argued for renewal because “for the past ten years [it] has been a powerful trade tool in the fight against illicit drug production and trafficking.” The evidence, however, suggests otherwise. Although Congress now has reauthorized the trade accord, it’s unlikely to dampen illegal drug flows significantly. ATPA’s mediocre antinarcotics record—and that record’s mischaracterization—highlight the need to reflect critically upon the relationship between the narcotics trade and liberalized trade and underscore the challenge officials face in minimizing the effects of policy offsetting.

Conflating the War on Drugs and the War on Terrorism

The third major challenge Washington confronts is to avoid the pitfalls inherent in conflating the war against drugs in Colombia with its global war against terrorism. These pitfalls include (1) the perils of fuzzy policy analysis and (2) a commitment trap of long-term, increasingly costly obligations in Colombia and surrounding states.

Several factors helped move Washington to view Colombia primarily through an antiterrorism lens, including reported linkages between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) operatives and Colombia’s FARC and Plan Colombia’s initial failure to check either the guerrillas or coca production under the
Pastrana administration. Three additional factors, however, entwined the anti-narcotics initiative in the broader war against terrorism: the post–September 11, 2001, political climate, the collapse of peace negotiations between FARC and the Pastrana administration, and the election of Alvaro Uribe as Colombia’s new president.

In the U.S. Congress, the post–September 11 political climate freed up money for antiterrorist initiatives but made any pitch to fund counterinsurgency measures in Colombia a nonstarter. Pastrana’s peace process, meanwhile, had worked against waging all-out war against FARC. Congress implicitly tied U.S. aid to a political settlement and in theory had restricted that aid solely to counternarcotics purposes. When Pastrana withdrew from peace negotiations in February 2002, FARC greatly increased its military assaults, often against noncombatants. These attacks moved lawmakers to call for stronger White House action against Colombian terrorist organizations. Uribe’s election brought the process full circle. His entire campaign platform was based on opposition to peace talks, a frontal assault against the guerrillas and paramilitaries, the doubling of men in police and military uniforms, and the creation of a million-strong civilian militia. It resonated strongly with the get-tough antiterrorist temperament brewing in Washington.

By late summer 2002, U.S. policy no longer legally distinguished among Colombia’s narcotics, guerrilla, paramilitary, and terrorism problems. The Bush administration asked Congress for explicit authority to mount “a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats” to Colombia’s national security. In July 2002, Congress agreed to lift the restrictions on U.S. aid, permitting its use against Colombia’s guerrillas (and presumably paramilitaries) whether they are involved in drug trafficking or not.

The United States has legitimate concerns regarding Colombia’s future. Although their current ties are quite modest, closer collaboration between FARC and the IRA (itself a world-class terrorist operation) could transform the FARC’s lethal potency by orders of magnitude, and access to FARC drug profits could help finance a range of terrorist activities elsewhere. Moreover, should the Colombian state eventually fail, a country controlled by guerrillas, paramilitaries, and drug lords almost certainly would boost coca production, threaten its neighbors’ sovereignty, and endanger transit through the Panama Canal. It could also play host to other terrorist groups.

There is no question that Colombia matters to the United States or that Washington should act to protect its interests there. But there are inherent risks in conflating the wars on drugs and terrorism. One risk is inaccurate analysis. Does the black-white, good-evil dichotomous framework of antiterrorism capture the essence of Colombia’s problems? If terror is the overriding issue and force the only true option, this framework is appropriate. Within this framework, however, conflating the war on drugs with the war on terror could sustain antidrug policies beyond their usefulness instead of orienting policy
around counterinsurgency. If terrorism is not the overriding issue, masking the situation’s complexity in a false sense of clarity could foreclose viable policy alternatives to all-out war. Another risk of conflating the two wars is the mission creep it will produce. As the Uribe administration wages its promised “war without quarter” against Colombia’s guerrillas and paramilitaries, refugee flows and cross-border reprisals are just two of the humanitarian and security issues the United States will feel increasingly obligated to address.

Perhaps the greatest risk, however, is the ease by which an antiterrorist campaign might lead the United States into a commitment trap of costly, expanding obligations. Both the nature of Colombia’s irregular combatants and Washington’s preference not to negotiate with terrorists heighten prospects of a trap. On the one hand, classifying FARC as a terrorist entity, which it is, does not erase its basic guerrilla warfare modus operandi. Other Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary groups operate similarly. It is standard military doctrine that conventional armies require a 10:1 numerical superiority to defeat guerrilla forces. With 37,000–39,000 guerrillas distributed among FARC (18,000), ELN (5,000), and paramilitaries (14,000–16,000), Colombia must recruit, train, equip, feed, and pay tens of thousands of new troops to achieve this ratio and will look to Washington to help underwrite these needs. On the other hand, because guerrilla wars can last remarkably long (Vietnam’s endured for thirty years; Colombia’s has lasted thirty-five years), a refusal to negotiate with terrorists could preclude a political settlement with FARC and lock the United States into pursuing a costly, long-term military victory.

It may be possible to sidestep an unintended, full-scale commitment trap, provided the United States clarifies the scope and time parameters of its Colombian policy. Regarding scope, the utility of unilateral and bilateral action, such as upgrading Colombia’s police and military forces, need not preclude innovative multilateral arrangements. This is especially important for Colombia, whose varied problems affect neighboring states and cannot be mitigated effectively without a coordinated response. Simply put, the more that antidrug strategies, targets, objectives, and assessment criteria are determined by consensus between Washington and its Andean neighbors—perhaps through a Western Hemisphere Inter-Governmental Narcotics Commission—the more likely Andean states are to make credible commitments to enforce them. This would greatly increase these measures’ regional impact and international legitimacy. Washington also could realize significant ancillary dividends from the goodwill generated via such a liberal institutionalist approach. Hemispheric trade, promoting democracy, and transnational crime are all issues the United States could find it easier to address more effectively in a political climate where Latin American governments view Washington as a partner rather than a unilateral actor.

The United States might minimize some of the worst consequences of a commitment trap by establishing clearer policy time horizons before the trap
is sprung. Does Washington, for example, accept former president Pastrana’s
time frame of “15 to 20 years” of sustained U.S. aid, or does it have a shorter
time frame in mind?⁴¹ Although there is nothing inherently wrong with
assuming long-term obligations, a knowing embrace of such commitments is
more likely to get and maintain domestic political support, conserve financial
resources, and preserve policy flexibility as developments unfold.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have underscored the reasons why Andean states matter to the
United States, the new threats to U.S. interests in the region, and the chal-
lenges Washington confronts in achieving its policy goals. These challenges,
though significant, are not insurmountable. They are best addressed by strik-
ing a sound balance between realist and liberal institutionalist policy strate-
gies—a balance forged upon more careful, sustained statecraft. By refusing to
sacrifice its principal policy goals to preferred policy philosophies or tactics,
by minimizing the costs of policy offsetting, and by avoiding the worst con-
sequences of conflating the wars on drugs and terrorism, the Bush adminis-
tration can enhance its prospects of policy success considerably.

Chronology of the Recent Evolution of U.S. Policy
Toward the Andean States

No. 221, declaring that drug production and trafficking constitute a secu-
ritry threat to the Americas. The drug certification process begins (amended
in 1988). Certification requires the president to review antidrug efforts
taken by governments of drug-producing countries and to certify to Con-
gress those governments’ cooperation with U.S. antidrug efforts. Coun-
tries decertified lose their eligibility to receive U.S. aid. Operation Blast
Furnace targets Bolivia’s cocaine factories for destruction.

1987. Operation Snowcap targets Bolivian and Peruvian coca fields and
cocaine factories for eradication.

1989. Colombian presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán is assassinated by
Colombian drug lords. President George H.W. Bush adopts a five-year,
$2.2 billion multifaceted Andean Initiative designed to disrupt activities
of trafficking organizations, encourage increased action by the Andean
military, and provide U.S. military support for counternarcotics forces in
Andean states. The Andean Trade Preference Act is proposed to provide
economic and alternative development assistance to Andean coca-pro-
ducing countries by reducing tariffs on cut flowers, vegetables, leather
goods, and luggage and with the goal of generating legal employment that would provide opportunities to transition small farmers away from coca.

1990. The Cartagena Summit is held with Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and the United States. The Declaration of Cartagena pledges cooperation in the war on drugs, and the United States pledges new resources to assist antidrug efforts.

1991. The Andean Trade Preference Act goes into effect. Exports from Andean countries to the United States rise by 65 percent over the next decade, and U.S. exports to Andean states jump 90 percent during this period.

1992. The San Antonio Summit among Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, United States, and Venezuela takes place. The Declaration of San Antonio reaffirms prior commitments made under the Declaration of Cartagena. The United States pledges to support multilateral antinarcotics efforts and to provide its counterparts technical and financial assistance to eradicate coca production, control trade in narcotics chemical precursors, and promote alternative development programs.

1994. The United States decertifies Bolivia as an effective collaborator in the war on drugs.

1996. The Leahy Amendment restricts U.S. aid from going to military units implicated in human rights abuses. The United States and Bolivia ratify a new extradition treaty to facilitate more effective prosecution of drug traffickers and criminals. The United States decertifies Colombia as an effective collaborator in the war on drugs (and again in 1997).

1998. The United States certifies Colombia as an effective collaborator in the war on drugs.

1999. The United States and Ecuador agree to establish a Forward Operating Location (FOL) for U.S. military surveillance aircraft at Manta, Ecuador, to detect drug-trafficking flights.

2000. The Clinton administration launches Plan Colombia, a $1.3 billion emergency aid package designed to support Colombia’s democracy, increase its security, and assist its efforts to defeat insurgent guerrillas and eradicate coca production.

2001. Through the Andean Regional Initiative, approximately $780 million for both military and nonmilitary aid is dispersed among Andean states.

2002. A Venezuelan coup topples President Hugo Chávez; the United States appears to support the coup until Chávez returns to power.

Notes

1. General Accounting Office [GAO], Drug Control Efforts to Develop Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit Crops in Colombia Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles, GAP-02-291 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2002), 5.


17. Since 2001 the United States had funneled over three-quarters of a million dollars through the National Endowment for Democracy to various Venezuelan media, business, and labor groups that opposed Chávez, and in November 2001, State Department, Pentagon, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials convened to strategize over the Venezuelan situation. Beginning in December 2001, Venezuelan military
officers and civilians who planned and participated in the coup met periodically in Washington with senior U.S. officials from the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Pentagon. The Venezuelans included Pedro Carmona, General Lucas Rincón Romero, and Rear Admiral Carlos Molina Tamayo; the Americans included Elliot Abrams of the National Security Council, Otto Reich of the State Department, and Rogelio Pardo-Maurer, deputy secretary of defense for Western Hemisphere affairs. Similar meetings occurred in the U.S. Embassy in Caracas.


21. For example, although the quantity of legal goods traded between Mexico and the United States rose after NAFTA’s advent in 1994, so apparently did the volume of cocaine shipments. Drug seizures at the border—which provide a proxy indicator of the volume of these illegal flows—tell the story. Between 1994 and 2001, the quantity of cocaine seized at the border rose from 22.1 to 29.3 metric tons. See Narcotics Control Reports (Washington, DC: U.S. State Department, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2002), V-6. Also www.state.gov.


26. In March 2002, both the House and Senate passed nonbinding resolutions urging the president to propose legislation to this effect. Miles A. Pomper, “Colombia Aid Restrictions Reconsidered as Focus Shifts to War on Terrorism,” CQ Weekly, March 9, 2002, 658.


