Double Vision: Territorial Strategies in the Construction of National Identities in Germany, 1949–1979

Guntram H. Herb

Department of Geography, Middlebury College

The establishment of two separate German states in 1949 had far-reaching effects on German national identity. Initially, both governments claimed to represent the German nation as a whole, and each professed an identity that went beyond its state borders. When the two German states started to recognize each other in the early 1970s, the GDR (East Germany) embarked on a separate path and posited that a separate Socialist nation had developed in the territorial confines of the GDR. Now the GDR needed to explain how its construction of identity could be unique when it had the same German cultural roots as the FRG (West Germany). In the FRG on the other hand, the narration of national identity had to square the recognition of the eastern border of the GDR in international treaties and with demands to former German territories beyond it. The paper addresses these challenges over territory and identity in the two German states, using a conceptual framework inspired by works from critical geopolitics and recent studies on nations as local metaphors. I identify and discuss three key elements that are central to territorial strategies in the construction of national identities: territorial differentiation, territorial bonding, and territorial script. Next, I apply these elements to an empirical analysis of identity construction in the FRG and GDR. Sources include geography textbooks and atlases, which have a decisive influence on shaping conceptions of the nation. Dominant constructions of national identity in the two states did not respond to each other’s initiatives and failed to produce effective strategies by the end of the 1970s. Key Words: Germany, nation, territory, construction of national identity, geographic education.

The establishment of two separate German states in 1949 had far-reaching effects on German national identity. Throughout the Cold War, the two Germanys clashed not only over the political ideologies of their respective blocks but also over the territorial extent of the German nation. The position of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), was to keep issues of national territory open and to maintain claims to large areas in Poland and other East European countries. Communist East Germany, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), opposed these claims and denounced them as a continuation of the imperialist policies of the Hitler regime. The GDR regime did not refrain, however, from arguing for the unification of the German nation under its leadership until the late 1960s. When the Cold War began to thaw and the FRG officially recognized the GDR as a result of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, the GDR changed its rhetoric. Starting in the early 1970s, the government denied the existence of significant commonalities between East and West Germany and posited that a separate socialist nation had developed in the territorial confines of the GDR. The FRG leaders vehemently rejected this claim and maintained their stance on the continuity of a greater German nation.

Each German state faced a dilemma in trying to construct a convincing vision of its version of national identity. The construction of national identity in the GDR needed to show the development of a separate nation despite common roots in the German national movement of the 19th century, a movement that was centered on the cultural unity of all Germans in Central Europe. The construction of national identity in the FRG was pressed to explain how the recognition of the eastern border of the GDR, the so-called Oder-Neisse line, in international treaties could be squared with demands for German unification beyond the confines of the two German states. The two challenges were explicitly territorial in character. In the GDR, the difficulty was to reduce the spatial extent of its national identity conception to the confines of the GDR state territory, while in the FRG, the struggle was to keep the full spatial extent of its national identity conception in light of the restrictive conditions of realpolitik.

What was the response to these territorial challenges in each German state? In particular, what strategies were employed in each state to construct a clear and convincing image of the territorial foundation of “its” national identity? To answer these questions, this investigation
will focus on the period 1949 to 1979. This time frame was chosen to trace back the development of the construction of national identity to the founding of the two states in 1949 to understand the fundamental changes that occurred around the end of the 1960s, extending to the end of the 1970s when the notion of a separate GDR identity was fully developed. The 1980s witnessed new developments in terms of the identity construction in the FRG and GDR in the changing context of the appearance and disappearance of the Second Cold War, which will be discussed in a forthcoming publication.

The present paper has significance for understanding not only German identity during the time of division, but national identity construction in general. The role of territory in the construction of national identities is an important part of the political geography literature, whether dealing with national identity in the context of globalization (Marden 1997), identities related to associations of states, such as the European Union (Murphy 1999), or regional identities (White 2000). The case of divided Germany allows a direct comparison of territorial strategies in national identity construction between a centralized totalitarian and a federal democratic state and between an ethnic and a civic identity.

The main argument is organized into three parts. In part one, I shall develop a theoretical framework for the investigation, conceiving nations as narrative identities and combining works from critical geopolitics with recent studies on nations as local metaphors to offer a more balanced conceptualization of nations as forms of territoriality. The argument here is that the territorial strategies in the construction of identities can be made more tenable through a two-step process. First, the territoriality of national identity is dissected into its two fundamental components, territorial differentiation and territorial bonding. Second, the rationale behind the territorial strategy—what I term the “territorial script”—is conceived as a “geograph.” Territorial differentiation and territorial bonding offer insights into the building blocks of territorial strategies in the construction of national identity. The script allows us to see the broader narrative that serves as a justification for the strategy. The advantage of the approach is that it provides a clear structure and sound basis for the analysis of a highly complex phenomenon.

Part two employs this two-step process in an empirical analysis of divided Germany 1949–1979. The main data sources are schoolbooks and atlases in geography and related fields. Although other sources, such as novels, films, and popular magazines are clearly important (e.g., Sharp 1998, 2000), geography texts seem particularly suitable to analyze the construction of national identity (Buttimer, Brunn, and Wardenga 1999, 130). I shall first present the two fundamental components of territoriality in German national identity, territorial differentiation and territorial bonding. Then I shall address the territorial scripts in divided Germany, paying particular attention to how these scripts relate to the findings from territorial differentiation and territorial bonding.

Part three will focus on the interactions between the different strategies in the GDR and FRG, discuss the effectiveness of the conceptual approach, and point out avenues for further studies. On a more general level, I hope to show in this paper that concepts informed by the school of critical geopolitics can strengthen empirically oriented work in historical geography and thus offer a bridge between these areas of inquiry.

**National Identity, Territory, and Geographic Knowledge**

Despite a veritable flood of scholarly works on national issues, the concept of nation defies easy definition. A useful approach is to conceptualize nations as narratives or discourses (Bhabha 1990; Wodak et al. 1998). The idea of narration explains that individuals acquire an identity by conveying the often discordant and conflicting experiences and events of their past as a coherent story to others. The elements of the narrative, that is, different experiences and events, can be arranged and rearranged, interpreted and reinterpreted to resolve discontinuities and changes. The narrative provides continuity and coherence because the plot can always be revisited to produce an acceptable story that fits new circumstances and gives meaning to one’s existence (Wodak et al. 1998, 55–56; Langthaler 2002, 788). The narrative construction of individual identity also applies to nations. As Bhabha (1990, 3) points out, nationalist discourses seek to present nations as “holistic concepts located within an evolutionary narrative of historical continuity.” For example, in the narration of the national history, every new historian makes corrections to the descriptions and explanations of earlier historians and eventually also to the events themselves on which the historiographical work was based (Wodak et al. 1998, 57, fn. 48). Therefore, national traditions have to be viewed as myths (Connor 1992; Anderson 1991; Balakrishnan 1996).²

To understand how national traditions can be invented, we have to view national identity as a form of “collective memory.” Collective memory is premised on the idea that the past as such cannot be remembered; only those elements of the past are memorialized that a collective group is able to reconstruct within its own cultural context (Halbwachs 1992). Cultural context here should not be
understood as patterns of behavior, such as customs or traditions, but rather as a set of rules and guidelines that govern behavior (Geertz 1973, 44). A multitude of memories and a host of different identities coexist in a nation. Many of them are conflicting. For example, different groups in the United States can remember the American Civil War as a victory or a defeat. Race, gender, class, and religion provide further tensions. Collective memory represents the process of negotiation and exchange that allows a reconciliation of these often contradictory memories and conflicting identities. It selects the elements of the past that make up the “formative sense of cultural knowledge, tradition, and singularity” that is shared by the members of the nation (Confino 1997, 7–8). These memories are made real by connecting them to cultural symbols, such as monuments, and to rites of belonging, such as the singing of anthems. The end result is the invention of a national tradition (Hobsbawm 1983).3 Narrations of national identity are not free-floating linguistic constructs, but constituted in concrete sociohistorical and spatial contexts. There is no clear separation, however, between the narrative and the material setting: “representations of social life [i.e. the nation]4 and life as lived spatially must be understood dialectically” (Jones and Natter 1999, 243). As MacLaughlin (2001) shows for 18th- and 19th-century Great Britain, middle-class elites actively determined the construction of the British nation to ensure their dominance in the nation-state, while at the same time their hegemonic role in the nation-building process was determined by changes in socioeconomic structures due to industrialization and modernization.

The narrative construction also reveals national identity as a dynamic entity because there is no uniform definition for what is included. The customary use of national identity as a static concept, for example, to explain the recent conflicts in Kosovo or Rwanda, is misleading. It presupposes the existence of collective groups who are shaped by their specific history into centuries-old enemies and who will act as a unified whole when they are threatened (Wodak et al. 1998, 48–49). Alternative versions of the content of national identity exist even within hegemonic groups. What unifies the various strands is the distinction of the nation vis-à-vis an opposing Other. Internal cohesion is achieved by external differentiation. Nations, therefore, are bounded communities of exclusion (Conversi 1997). The exclusive nature is so important that nations seek to have freedom from outside influences (Anderson 1991, 7). But what is the process by which these boundaries and the identities they contain are conceptualized and become a dominant vision?

Despite the crucial role of the us–them distinction in national identity, the nationalism literature has generally focused only on social boundaries and neglected their fundamentally territorial nature. Geographers have long argued that territory is central to the nation’s self-definition (e.g., Knight 1982; Williams and Smith 1983; Kaplan 1994), but it is only recently that they have addressed the links between boundaries and identities from a theoretical perspective. These works fall mainly—though not exclusively—within the amorphous field of critical geopolitics. O’Tuathail (1996, 15), Dijkink (1996, 5), Paasi (1996, 1999, 226–27), and Sharp (1993, 2000, 27–29) stress the definition and demarcation of the Other in the production of “self” and expose the role of spatial representation, such as regional descriptions and maps in national identity.

Paasi’s (1996, 32–35) concept of “institutionalization of regions” illustrates the creation of bounded communities of exclusion, that is, national identities. It explains that practices such as administrative districting, naming of regions, and enforcing citizenship are used to define regions territorially, to express and demarcate them symbolically, and to reproduce them institutionally and collectively. National identity construction can be understood in this way as a “sort of boundary producing political performance” (Ashley 1987, 51, cited after O’Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 4).

Authors of critical geopolitics stress that identity construction occurs at different scales (MacLaughlin 2001) and discuss regions below the national level as building blocks of national identity (Paasi 1996; Håkli 1998a). They also analyze how the “socio-spatial consciousness” that characterizes national identity manifests itself in everyday practices, the life-world of individuals at the local scale (Paasi 1996, 204). Critical geopolitics scholars writing on nationalism respond to the persistent call for attention to the local in the discipline (e.g., Agnew 1987). All these investigations from the national to the regional to the local are driven by a concern for boundaries that separate the nation from the Other (Paasi 1999; Dijkink 1996; Sharp 2000). Even the sense of place is understood as imbedded in bounded social groupings and determined by boundaries between us and them (Paasi 1996, 206, 213).

The focus of critical geopolitics on boundaries introduces an imbalance in its treatment of the territorial dimensions of nations. It seems to suggest that borders are the sole means through which a national community becomes linked to a given territory. Recent studies on nations as local metaphors by Confino (1997) and Confino and Skaria (2002) illustrate that bonds between the nation and the land can also be created independent of
defined boundaries. Both works use the German notion of Heimat to show how boundaries can be transcended in national belonging.

In the idea of Heimat, the nation is conceived as and subordinated to a local metaphor. The nation’s boundaries lose their importance; its shape and size become flexible. Heimat is a malleable and dynamic notion that can represent interchangeably the locality, the region, and the nation (Confino and Skaria 2002, 11). Confino and Skaria often use the term “locality” as the equivalent for Heimat, which I find problematic since it masks the dynamic nature of the concept and relegates it to a specific scale, that is, the local. The key difference between Heimat and the local in critical geopolitics is that Paasi (1996, ch. 8) and others seek to demonstrate how the national is reproduced locally while Confino and Skaria (2002, 9–10) insist that Heimat—what they term the “other local”—goes beyond the national and that it is this “other local” that penetrates, engages, and molds the nation and not the other way around. Yet, the difference between Paasi (1996) and Confino and Skaria (2002) is not crucial. They simply approach national identity construction from two different foci, territorial boundaries and territorial bonding. Their views can be combined in a fruitful manner, as I shall argue below. First, though, I shall explain how national identities can become a dominant vision. Sharp’s (1993) notions of popular and elite “geographs” and MacLaughlin’s (2001) discussion of hegemonic processes are particularly helpful in this regard.

Geographs are geographical descriptions that structure how people see the world and make sense of political events and activities (Dalby 1993; Häkli 1998a; O’Tuathail 1992). They should be conceived as “frames” or “scripts” that tell us how to interpret events (Myers, Klak, and Koelh 1996, 25). These scripts, not specific events or facts, make reality (O’Tuathail 1992, 157). While elites produce geographs, such as maps, that define national identity, their views do not simply “trickle down” to popular conceptions of national identity. Rather, there is a constant interaction between these two discourses; elite geographs influence themes learned in schools and are at the same time influenced by them (Sharp 1993, 493; Häkli 1998b, 335). Viewed in this way, popular geographs are integral parts of a process that links elites with the “national-popular mass” and helps them exert hegemony (Sharp 2000, 30–31).

MacLaughlin (2001) provides further insights into the dissemination of national narratives. He uses Gramsci’s notion of organic intelligentsias to explain that elites become hegemonic in nation building through fundamental beliefs they share with a national-popular mass. Thus, the construction of national identity involves “cultural capital and political leadership, not just the economic power that ownership of the means of production conferred upon any one class” (MacLaughlin 2001, 39).

A crucial element in making conceptions of national identity into hegemonic visions is education (Gellner 1983). As Hobsbawm (1990) has pointed out, schoolteachers were particularly influential in the nationalist movements of the 19th century. They shared the class background and vernacular of the peasantry from which the majority of them had descended, and they were familiar with existing popular conceptions through close contact with their students and communities (see also MacLaughlin 2001, 38–39).

All texts with a wide audience, including popular magazines, schoolbooks, novels, films, or news reports, are important in the “common-sensical construction” of the nation (Sharp 1993, 494–95), but school geography texts are uniquely suited to convey the border between us and the Other that is at the heart of national identity (Paasi 1999, 226–27). Moreover, they are consumed at a crucial stage in the development of sociospatial knowledge of the nation (Schleicher 1993, 23–24; Dijkink 1996, 2–3). Textbooks do not fall neatly into the category of popular geographs, however. Textbooks reflect popular conceptions, but they are written by an intellectual elite, and their content is regulated by “gatekeepers” such as publishers and government ministries (Buttimer, Brunn, and Wardenga 1999, 130). Thus, they are at the intersection of elite and popular geographs and a bona fide reflection of the shared beliefs between elites and national popular masses.

At the same time, the impact or reception of texts on national identity is difficult to measure. Surveying the spatial perceptions of individuals to determine the spatial extent of “regional consciousness” (i.e., national identity) as suggested by Bloevevogel, Heinritz, and Popp (1987) is problematic. On the one hand, it is virtually impossible to trace the perceptions to specific texts. On the other hand, such objectivist studies of spatial consciousness privilege the spatial over the human (Reuber 1999; Werlen 1997). Yet, space does not have a separate ontological existence; it is only a formal concept and a system of classification. Space can only be experienced in the intentions and activities of individuals. This means that empirical analyses of regional identity should forego surveying the spatial markers used by the inhabitants (e.g., Pohl 1993), but instead investigate either how institutions, organizations, and elites employ regional terms, images, and symbols for their hegemonic purposes (Hard 1996, 38–39) or how the region is “constructed (perceived and interpreted) and instrumentalized” by different actors in the context of their life-world (Reuber 1999, 35). Rather than
investigating the activities of selected individuals involved in policy decisions as suggested by the latter work, the paper adopts the first approach to determine the prevalence of different strategies in the construction of identity in East and West Germany.

The foregoing discussion of narratives, territoriality, and geographies provides a basis for the conceptual approach taken in this paper in the analysis of identity construction in divided Germany. On the most basic level, I consider nationalism a form of territoriality. As Sack (1986) has shown, territoriality is to be understood as a strategy to influence, affect, and control. In the case of national identity, this means a strategy to create a community that is "deemed worthy of the ultimate sacrifice—to give one's life for its continued existence" (Herb 1999, 16; see also Aschauer 1996, 10).

While scholars of critical geopolitics have shown convincingly how boundaries are crucial in constructing a national identity, I feel their treatment is imbalanced because it does not give sufficient attention to the process of attachment that is exemplified in the notion of the nation as a local metaphor. I wish to restore the balance as follows: As a first step, I propose dissecting territoriality into its two fundamental components. One is establishing the border of the national territory, or "territorial differentiation." This defines who is included and who is excluded and makes the us–them distinction that is so fundamental to national identity visible (Anderson 1991, 7). The other component of territoriality is assigning or linking the nation to the territory, or "territorial bonding." This fuses the national population to the land and creates an emotional bond that makes the "belonging" tangible. The process transcends specific boundaries. The two basic components of territoriality allow us to see the construction of the nation as a dual process: the construction can emphasize external difference or internal unity (Herb 1999, 17–18).

Yet, the two components alone do not constitute a "strategy," but simply a tactic. For territoriality to be a strategy, there needs to be a larger design or rationale that explains the importance of the territory to the nation and justifies claims to the territory. This rationale is a geographic narrative or "territorial script" that helps members of the nation make sense of the world. It is a geograph and can be analyzed as such. Thus, territorial strategies in the construction of national identities should be conceived as a synthesis of the basic components (territorial differentiation and bonding) and a broader script that serves as an explanation and justification.

The three dimensions (differentiation, bonding, and script) of territoriality in national identity can be illustrated with the analogy of a religious temple. Territorial differentiation is akin to the walls or other physical barriers, such as fences or enclosures. These structures serve to separate what is holy (inside) from what is profane (outside) just as national boundaries serve to identify who is included and who is excluded. The act of territorial bonding is similar to the rituals that are performed in a temple. These rituals are given profound meaning because in general they relate to fundamental human experiences such as birth and deaths. They tie the individual to the temple and to its community of members just as individuals are tied to the nation through place-based experiences that have been interpreted as local metaphors of the nation. Territorial scripts are analogous to the sanctification narrative of a temple. Temples are established for a reason, and there is a narrative that explains and justifies their holy nature. This story of the temple is reinforced by the physical structures of the temple and the rituals that are performed there. It expresses the destiny of the religious community. Similarly, the territorial script expresses the destiny of the nation and builds on territorial differentiation and territorial bonding. I shall elaborate further on each of the three territorial dimensions (differentiation, bonding, and script) in the empirical section where I also discuss their specifically German dimensions. The metaphor of the temple will be helpful in the interpretation of the empirical findings.

This approach to the territorial construction of national identity has important advantages. Dissecting the strategy into territorial differentiation, territorial bonding, and territorial scripts allows for a clearly structured and more comprehensive analysis. This dissection aids a direct, explicit, and nuanced comparison of different territorial constructions of national identity. A comparison of the strategies as a whole runs the danger of failing to see subtle changes and hidden processes. We need to understand how each of the dimensions of the strategy is affected by material contexts and practices to expose different layers of the discourse of national identity construction.

In following sections of the paper I shall apply this approach to an empirical analysis of the competing constructions of national identity in divided Germany 1949–1979. I shall compare and contrast how the FRG and GDR used territorial differentiations and territorial bonding and then incorporate these findings in the contextual examination of conflicting territorial scripts.

**Dimensions of Territorial Strategies in Divided Germany: Empirical Findings**

The previous discussion lays the foundation for the analysis of territorial strategies in divided Germany. After
explaining the process of data collection, I shall offer and interpret selective findings from a more comprehensive study that covers the entire period of division 1949–1989, which will be published elsewhere. I only present those findings here that best exemplify the insights that can be gained with the proposed conceptual framework. The two basic components—territorial differentiation and territorial bonding—will be discussed first. As building blocks for territorial strategies, they help take the analysis of the territorial scripts that follows one step further. Since the three dimensions (territorial differentiation, territorial bonding, and territorial script) are not unchanging universals, but context dependent, each of them will be prefaced by a general characterization that elaborates on their specifically German aspects.

Data Sources

The main data sources for the analysis are geography textbooks and atlases. Although there are many other potential sources to examine the construction of national identity, such as novels, films, and popular magazines, I have selected textbooks and atlases in geography for specific reasons. As mentioned above, textbooks represent an interaction between elite and popular geographies. Their dissemination and impact is widespread; given mandatory schooling in both German states, all school-age children were exposed to them and required to engage with them in class. The content of textbooks reflect popular conceptions, the professional expertise of the authors, the mass marketing decisions of publishers, and the views of the government ministries that approve them. Paasi (1996, 1999) argues that schoolbooks in geography are particularly influential: “no other documents employed in education have such a power for the creation of spatial consciousness” (Paasi 1996, 70). Therefore, geography textbooks are ideally suited to investigate which visions of the nation are dominant at different times. These “visions” express the territorial strategies in the construction of the nation that are hegemonic. The empirical analysis will focus on texts, images, and maps. The interpretation of the rhetoric and ideological dimensions of these artifacts and their discursive role will pay careful attention to the larger political, societal, and intellectual context (Häkli 1998b, 335).

The relevance of “reading” such texts for an assessment of national identity construction in the two Germany is revealed in the controversies surrounding their production and use. For example, in the FRG, changes in the designation of national boundaries in school atlases resulted in debates in news media and parlaments, court action, scholarly studies, and attacks on publishers by teachers and private organizations. Conversely, in the GDR, the institutions involved in the production and regulation of maps were so obsessed with forestalling any potential controversy that they censored existing publications for the most insignificant inconsistencies even though this must have incurred significant financial costs.

The selection of the textbooks and atlases was guided by several criteria, including the need to ensure (1) that the publications were representative of national policies, (2) that they covered issues related to German national identity in sufficient depth, (3) that they were directed at similar audiences in the two states to allow comparison, and (4) that they went through enough editions to be able to see changes in argumentation over time.

In the case of the GDR, the selection was straightforward since the GDR was established as a unitary state, that is, a highly centralized system with one power focus, Berlin. Further concentration of power was achieved by placing members of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in all leading positions. As a consequence, there was only one official version of textbooks and atlases, and their designs were centrally controlled. A more difficult situation existed in the FRG. As a federal democratic state, the secondary regional divisions or Länder of the FRG had autonomy in the education sector and regulated schoolbook designs or curriculum content. In addition, textbook production occurred in a free-market context, which meant that different publishers were involved as well. By necessity, I had to restrict the number of sources, and I chose to concentrate my efforts on the most prominent textbooks, that is, those publications that were certified for use in several Länder and went through enough editions to trace developments over time. Incomplete preservation of textbooks and atlases further reduced the sources for the FRG by default. While essentially all GDR textbooks and atlases could be accessed, some FRG publications were even missing in the specialized collections of textbooks at the Georg-Eckert-Institut für internationale Schulbuchforschung, Braunschweig and the Bibliothek für Bildungsgeschichtliche Forschung, Berlin.

Published surveys of German national issues in geography textbooks (Engel and Sperling 1986; Ittermann 1991) and teaching guidelines (see appendix 3) complement the analysis and enhance its comprehensive character. The textbooks and atlases that were used in the empirical analysis are listed in appendix 2. Since geography education in the FRG and GDR generally focused on the national territory in the 5th and 6th grade, I concentrated on textbooks from this grade level.
Sources for the contextual analysis of the textbooks and atlases included primary documents in archives, published documents, and publications on education (see Appendix 3). Correspondence relating to map design and initiatives by publishers in the FRG was surveyed at the Westermann Werkarchiv (WWA), the archive of one of the largest geography textbook publishers in the FRG. Information on map design in the GDR and publisher’s activities had to be collected indirectly. Despite repeated attempts, I was denied access to the records of the GDR publisher Herman Haack. I was informed that the collection was not organized and that there were no funds to hire personnel to remedy the situation. The records on cartographic censorship in the GDR that are held at the Bundesarchiv (BA) in Dahlwitz-Hoppegarten offered the only way to get a glimpse at the process. Published documents, such as the materials of a commission of the German Bundestag and ministerial directives were combined with publications dealing with educational guidelines to round out the investigation.

Territorial Differentiation and German National Identity

The German nation has been challenged from its beginnings to outline the limits of its territory. Islands of ethnic German settlements historically have been dispersed far into Eastern Europe, and the boundaries of political control have fluctuated widely. Yet, to fulfill its ultimate goal to be free from outside influence, a nation needs to have the territorially sovereign power of a state and thus clear territorial boundaries (Herb 1999). Natural borders, such as mountain ranges, rivers, or coastlines, are preferred solutions, as they appear just by virtue of their “organic” origins. The reference to rivers and straits in the first verse of the original German anthem illustrates this well. Such verbal descriptions, however, only convey a general sense, not a clear territorial image. Effective territorial differentiation requires visualization, in particular, maps (Herb 1997). Presented in the language of measurement and computation, maps and the boundaries depicted on them appear authoritative (Harley 1989; Black 1997). As Latour (1986, 19–22) explains, such devices make it possible not only to see the invisible, that is, the national community, but also to prove its existence, an existence that can be controlled since it is moveable across time and space. These qualities make maps excellent tools to outline claims to national territory. In the aftermath of World War I, when national self-determination was elevated to a just cause, the common practice was to outline the region where a national group had the majority (Herb 1997). The abuse of such ethnically based claims by the Nazis, however, has made claims based on historical boundaries the only acceptable justification since then (Murphy 1990, 537). Given the multitude of historical and existing German boundaries—some of them hotly disputed—territorial differentiation in divided Germany was a daunting enterprise in the two states.

For the GDR, the most conspicuous aspect of territorial differentiation was the infamous Wall, a border that came to be a West German metaphor for the entire system. The GDR was often called Mauerstaat or “wall state” in the FRG. In the GDR, the preferred term for the Wall was Antifaschistischer Schutzwall, or anti-Fascist protective barrier. Yet, the obsession with an impenetrable western boundary was not part of the founding ideology of the East German state; rather, territorial differentiation from the FRG came into being step by step.

During the early years of the GDR, the western border with the FRG did not even appear on most GDR maps. The territories of the GDR and the FRG were always depicted as a unified whole that was labeled “Germany.” Even after the border with the FRG was officially closed on 26 May 1952, maps in school texts continued to omit it for another two years (Figure 1). Explicit territorial differentiation started only in 1959, when the GDR appeared as a fully independent state with regular international boundaries for the first time. A directive by the Ministry of Culture from the summer of 1960 confirms this explicit differentiation as a policy change. It prohibited the term “Deutschland” (Germany) and required the use of distinct territorial colors for East and West Germany on maps. In 1965, differentiation from the FRG was taken all the way. The geography curriculum was restructured to deny any connection with the German territory in the west. Henceforth, the Federal Republic was to be studied like a foreign country and during fewer lessons. Maps of the Federal Republic were placed in a separate section in atlases, and most maps of the GDR itself left blank the territory to the west (Thiele 1989, 45). The terminology for the Federal Republic reflected the new vision. Before, it was called Deutsche Bundesrepublik or DBR, which had a corresponding other half in the Deutsche Demokratische Republik or DDR. Now, it was simply called Westdeutschland, with the preferred label WD on maps (see Figure 2). The name change ensured the priority of the GDR in the mind of its population. On alphabetical lists the FRG now appeared far behind the GDR. The official abbreviation BRD was only used after the Basic Treaty of 1972, which entailed mutual recognition as separate states.

The cartographic denial of the FRG in 1965 does not square with changes in the GDR’s official ideology. From
its very beginnings until the late 1960s, the GDR professed a gesamtdeutsch, or German unification ideology. It publicly espoused a German territorial identity that included the area of the FRG, while it simultaneously silenced the FRG’s existence in its maps. Further signs of a shift in ideology came two years later, in 1967, when the names of organizations and institutions were slowly being changed from deutsch or Deutschland to DDR (Azaryahu 1991, 121–22). The official rejection of a larger German identity came with the new 1974 constitution of the GDR. It made an unequivocal official statement in this regard by eliminating the term “German nation” when it talked about GDR citizenship. Party ideologists quickly retreated from earlier positions of a unified German nation and published books and articles to provide a theoretical backing for the assertion that a separate socialist nation had developed within the territory of the GDR.10

Territorial differentiation toward the East was clear from the beginning. The eastern boundary of the GDR, which ran along the rivers Oder and Neisse, was always depicted as an international boundary, be it for united Germany or for the GDR alone. The formerly German territories that were now part of Poland and the USSR were never mentioned. German place names in these territories were prohibited even if they were scientific terms.11

The representation of distinct GDR boundaries was regulated with obsessive precision, an indication of the crucial role differentiation played in the narration of GDR identity. The government office in charge of maps, Verwaltung Vermessungs- und Kartenwesen (VVK), issued base maps that contained instructions on the size of the lettering, on the type of line symbols, and on their placement in rivers.12 Adherence to the rules was strictly enforced, and even if a deviation of the course of the border was only discernible with a magnifying glass, the maps were rejected. The preferred method for the representation of distinct GDR boundaries was the

Figure 1. Territorial differentiation in the GDR in the early years. The existence of the two German states was silenced on GDR maps for several years after their founding in 1949. Even when the border was sealed off by the GDR in 1952, its maps continued to omit the border for another two years. Source: Atlas zur Erd- und Länderkunde. Große Ausgabe. Berlin: Volk und Wissen and Gotha: VEB Geographisch-Kartographische Anstalt, 1954, 7 (detail).
Inselkarte or island representation. Here, the GDR’s borders were akin to a coastline because the surrounding territory was left blank or given a uniform shade. The Inselkarte approach also facilitated territorial differentiation at a larger scale. Starting in the mid-1960s, the “island” of the GDR was expanded to include the Communist world to the East. Such a presentation linked the GDR with the Communist block and maximized differentiation from the capitalist FRG (see Figure 3).

The obsession about the accuracy of the GDR boundaries becomes clear when we apply the notion of collective memory. The GDR boundaries could not be placed into the existing collective German memory without drawing attention to the fragmentation of the German nation. The independent GDR had to be based on a tabula rasa to avoid creating associations with memories it had in common with the FRG. The new GDR identity had to treat the other borders as if they had
disappeared and turn to the future (Halbwachs 1992, 77). Permanence and continuity of the GDR borders could only be evoked by making sure that all representations of them were completely identical.

In direct contrast to the GDR’s obsession with clearly defined, inviolable borders, the FRG’s territorial differentiation was characterized by ambiguity. Maps of the Federal Republic during the period of division always included multiple boundary designations in the East. As Figure 4 illustrates, three different Eastern boundary lines were used in the FRG: (1) the border between the FRG and the GDR; (2) the eastern border of the GDR, the so-called Oder-Neisse border; and (3) the border of the German Empire on 31 December 1937. The last boundary was considered to be the legal basis of a future reunited Germany. The emphasis given to these boundaries changed significantly over time.

Up until the end of the 1960s, the 1937 border was the most prominent. Federal decrees in 1952 (Bezeichnungsrichtlinien) and 1961 (Kartenrichtlinien) mandated the inclusion of this border on official maps and strongly urged that private publications adopt the same principles. The 1937 boundary stood out in nearly all school atlases because it was depicted with a thicker line than other state boundaries, such as the one between France and Belgium, and because the area it enclosed was colored in a uniform hue. It was included on thematic maps as an eye-catching red line. The other two borders were portrayed as internal administrative divisions or as lines of demarcation, that is, as provisional perimeters (Sperling 1991, 24–28). The lettering also indicated the transitional character of the existing internal divisions and stressed the unity of the 1937 territory. Maps labeled the entire area as Deutschland but did not recognize the GDR territory as such. If it was named at all, it was called “Soviet Occupied Zone.” The areas east of the GDR were identified as “currently under Polish (or Soviet) administration” (see Figure 5).

In the latter half of the 1960s, the 1937 boundaries became controversial in the FRG. In 1965 the Protestant and Catholic Churches advocated reconciliation with Poland and recognition of its boundaries. Mounting public criticism of the existing maps led the association of schoolbook publishers to press the government for reform of the decrees in 1967. Yet, despite repeated attempts, the federal government refused to take action and argued that the regulation of school atlases fell into the educational authority of the Länder. Change came only after the Treaty of Warsaw with Poland was signed in December 1970; seven months later, the decrees were revoked without substitute.

In the absence of official decrees after 1971, FRG atlases changed their representations of the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. Publishers were eager to show in their political maps that the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line were now part of Poland and the Soviet Union by shading them in the same color as those countries (see Figure 3).
Figure 6). A few atlas publishers, such as the Westermann Verlag, even started to omit the 1937 border and labeled the combined territory of the GDR and FRG as *Deutschland*. Yet, the change would not last. Conservatives and right-wing interest groups such as *Der Stahlhelm* and the *Vertriebenenverbände* viciously attacked the new maps.\(^{15}\)

By the mid- to late 1970s, the 1937 boundary reappeared in all atlases and the term *Deutschland* was once again used to denote the territory this boundary enclosed. Apart from these changes, however, the depiction of German national territory was plagued by great inconsistencies. There was a deep gulf between those renouncing claims to eastern territories and those holding on to the maximum demand of the 1937 borders, or in the words of Ash (1993, 224) between: "politician-journalists of the left and politician-jurists of the right."

The federal government chose not to become directly involved in the dispute over German territories. The controversy in the FRG was now played out at the level of the Länder, which asserted their educational authority. Länder that had an SPD majority refused to approve atlases that featured the 1937 boundary while those with a CDU/CSU majority mandated that all maps of Germany show it (Sperling 1991, 29–30). A 1973 German Supreme Court decision had contributed to this mess. The decision was made in regard to the Basic Treaty of 1972 in which the FRG and GDR had recognized one another and formalized relations. The court argued that the German Empire in the boundaries of 1937 continued to exist as a legal entity—of which the FRG was the only true representative—but it also recognized the existence of the GDR.

Throughout the period, maps in the FRG carefully avoided complete territorial differentiation from the GDR territory. Line symbols identified the border between the two German states either as a special boundary or as an administrative division, even during the most liberal period in the early 1970s when publishers started to fully recognize the GDR. Blumenwitz (1980, 53), a legal scholar dedicated to the task of preserving German claims to the 1937 territory, had to concede that the border between the FRG and the GDR was always represented as something less than a regular international boundary. Differentiation was only contradictory for the Oder-Neisse line and the 1937 border.

The development of territorial differentiation in the FRG was markedly different from the GDR. In the FRG, the depiction of German national territory was initially uniform, but it became contradictory starting in the mid-1970s. The main reason for this change was that the federal government was no longer willing to issue official regulations or binding guidelines. The territorial vision became dependent on the political orientation of the different Länder governments and the pressure exerted by private interest groups and the media. As a result, there was a rift in the national narrative of the FRG; the contradictory depictions of the boundaries, and the memories associated with them, were not reconciled, but existed side by side.

In the GDR, the vision of the early years was ambiguous, and there was no clear differentiation of the two German states. The GDR only began to define itself as completely distinct from the FRG in the mid-1960s. By
Territorial differentiation in the FRG up to the end of the 1960s. As the political and physical maps illustrate, the Federal Republic during this period used the 1937 boundary to lay claim to the territory of the greater German nation. Source: Diercke Weltatlas. Braunschweig: Georg Westermann Verlag. 139. Auflage, 1957, 40-41, 84 (details).
Figure 6. Territorial differentiation in the FRG in the early 1970s. In the context of rapprochement between the FRG and GDR, maps started to omit the former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse border. On the bottom map, Germany is now shown to reach only as far east as the Oder-Neisse border. Source: Diercke Weltatlas. Braunschweig: Georg Westermann Verlag. 185. Auflage, 1974, 30, 84 (details).
the mid-1970s, the GDR followed up on this territorial differentiation with the public declaration that it constituted a separate Socialist nation. Thus, the FRG started to lack a uniform territorial image at the very time that the GDR's differentiation from the FRG was most explicit and pronounced. It appears that when the GDR began to fortify the walls of its temple, the FRG lacked the determination to build an even higher wall around it. Instead, in the FRG, several rows of walls were presented, but there was no indication which ones were to hold up the roof. As the metaphor of the temple shows, the unfortunate consequence was that the FRG's territorial strategy for national identity was not well constructed.

**Territorial Bonding and German National Identity**

In Germany, the idealized rural origins of the nation have been particularly important. This is most forcefully expressed in the notion of *Heimat*, which connotes an organic unity formed by the people and the land. Here the bond is presented as a deep-seated emotional attachment to the area of descent, which provides a feeling of womb-like security (Boa and Palfreyman 2000, 26–27). The concept was taken to the extreme in the “blood and soil” ideology of *volkisch* nationalism, which was a precursor of National Socialism.

*Heimat* seeks to create a feeling of belonging among the members of the nation by attaching the collective group to the national territory. Other nations employ similar tactics of territorial bonding and present emotive descriptions of the regional geography to make people love their country since “one only loves what one knows” (Capel 1981, 52). Such emotive regional narratives stress the special qualities of the national landscape and its pristine character that hearkens back to an idyllic past when people lived in harmony with the land (Herb 1999, 19; Agnew 1987, 232). Some nations focus on unique features, such as the Jutland Heath in Denmark (Olwig 1984) or the mountains of Wales (Gruffud 1995, 223); others, such as France and Finland, see unity in diversity (Häkli 1998a, 138; Lowenthal 1994, 19). In German national identity, the focus is not on specific landscape features or the *Gestalt* of the landscape. Instead, *Heimat* refers to the quasi-natural character of the bond to the land. In early German nationalism, this attachment was considered to be so deep that it was presented as akin to trees being rooted in the soil (Mosse 1981, 16, 155).

*Heimat* cannot be translated into English as “home.” It is a politicized term with a wider range of connotations. These connotations are illustrated by combinations such as *Heimaterde* (native soil), *Heimatforschung* (local history), *Heimatrecht* (right of residence) or the fact that *Heimat* does not refer to a dwelling (Boa and Palfreyman 2000, 1). *Heimat* has different meanings in everyday usage and in the literature, but on a personal level, it seems to denote the “deep-seated psychological need” for security, identity, and belonging (Boa and Palfreyman 2000, 23). Thus, it can be conceived as a “sense of place” in the tradition of humanist geography (e.g., Relph 1976; Tuan 1977). Of relevance here, however, is not how the individual experience of *Heimat* (i.e., a specific place, the life-world of individuals) contributes to the formation of national or regional identity. Rather, the question is how the concept of *Heimat* (i.e., what it symbolizes) can serve as an element of a strategy to construct German national identity; in other words, how Heimat becomes a building block for German collective memory.

As a basic component of a national territorial strategy, Heimat reinterprets the individual experience of place into a collective feeling of belonging to a group and its values—the German nation (Bastian 1995, 125). *Heimat* is taught and school education, geography in particular, is key. When children learn about place names, historical events, folklore, and other “facts” of their local area, when they celebrate its splendor through activities such as hiking, painting, and singing, they are taught to recognize (and love) its “German” essence. In other words, they are made aware that what they feel is not personal or local, but thoroughly German. *Heimat* is a particularly powerful narrative of territorial bonding because it builds on what appears to be a fundamental individual human need for security and identity (Wollersheim 1998, 54–55). As a result, the bonds to the local territory and its inhabitants have a “natural” or organic feel; they appear like the biological bonds of a family. The boundaries of the local area where this “national education” occurs become secondary. It is not important where the local area ends, but of what it is a part.

Through *Heimat*, the German nation becomes palatable and “real” because German national values and beliefs are “exposed” in the local life-world—the “everyday life experienced by the inhabitants of a specific place” (Strzelczyk 1999, 25). It is important here to stress that *Heimat* seems to represent the rich diversity of specific places but in actuality it embodies universal German national values. The idea of *Heimat* does not encourage diversity; it serves to foster national similarity. *Heimat* is local and national at the same time (Confino and Skaria 2002, 11).

*Heimat* is an intrinsic part of the narratives of German national identity and reflects the demands of the early German national movement (Boa and Palfreyman 2000, 199, 204; Bastian 1995, 121–22). The term was politicized in the 19th century when it came to denote a longing for
an idyllic past when Germans lived in harmony with the earth and were an integral part of a “true” community. *Heimat* was considered a panacea for the changes brought about by industrialization, urbanization, and greater mobility (Bastian 1995, 122). As such, it is antimodern and antiurban. At the same time, *Heimat* has an explicitly utopian dimension; it represents the goal to create an idealized world where social, material, and environmental ills are transcended in the organic unity of the community. This vision of a harmonious and egalitarian community made *Heimat* also attractive to the political left (Boa and Palfreyman 2000, 25). Thus, *Heimat* has the very same Janus-faced quality as national identity; it is an identity that looks to the past and at the same time to the future.

The idea of *Heimat* was perpetuated through cultural organizations dedicated to preserve German folklore, customs, art, and monuments (*Heimattafte und Heimatschutz*), through romantic literature and, above all, through education. The interest in *Heimat* dovetailed nicely with reforms in pedagogy instigated by Pestalozzi and Froebel, which called for active and experiential learning (Capel 1981, 50–51). *Heimatkunde*, or the knowledge of the *Heimat* region, was considered to be vital to the national interest, and geographers were its chief proponents in the educational sector (Engel 1984, 9).

*Heimat* provides flexibility for the symbolic representation of the German nation. Any place or region—from the local to the national level—can be imbued with national German values by identifying it as *Heimat*: *Heimat Stuttgart, Heimat Schwaben, Heimat Baden-Württemberg, Heimat Deutschland*. This flexible identification allows a construction of national identities that is independent of specific boundaries. Paasi (1996), Häkli (1998a), and Wollersheim (1998) have shown clearly that naming is instrumental in creating a regional identity. This means that only specific regions are able to acquire a strong regional identity: those that have been named and symbolically reproduced for an extended time and in an intensive fashion. In the German case, “*Heimat*” makes naming and symbolic representation in a sense universal.16 *Heimat* is the decisive signifier because of its powerful appeal described above; the adjunct place names and the territories they represent are only of secondary importance.

The territorial flexibility of *Heimat* explains how the concept helps mediate the potential conflict between national German identity and regional identities such as Bavaria or Prussia. As the long history of German particularism illustrates, many regions in Germany, such as Bavaria, Saxony, or Prussia, had centuries of separate dynastic rule or political independence. Thus, a Bavarian identity not only can evoke feelings of being German, but also of being profoundly different from Prussia or Saxony. But Bavaria, Prussia, and other German regions cannot be “imagined” without connecting them to place-based experiences. Yet, these experiences are already thoroughly interpreted as national German; they are *Heimat* (Confino 1997).

During the period of division, territorial bonding in the two German states differed significantly. The GDR faced significant problems when it tried to alter the established notion of *Heimat* to make it conform to its Socialist vision. The creation of new Socialist territorial bonds had to be carried out very gradually and carefully given the powerful appeal of the traditional *Heimat* concept. A precursor was the second party conference of the SED in March–July 1952 that demanded the study of the history of local workers’ movements and of industrial plants (*Betriebsgeschichte*) to further the development of Socialism in the GDR. The result was the founding of numerous regional history commissions that produced an astonishing amount of work over the next decades (Schmid 1990, 51–52; Sonnet 1982). Such publications were intended to give scientific backing to a new Socialist version of *Heimat* that was propagated in earnest after 1957. The change became apparent when several old-style *Heimat* journals, which were dedicated to the study of regional folklore and traditions, were closed down in that year (Schmid 1990, 50).

School curricula and textbooks illustrate the new emphasis on Socialist territorial bonding. Until the late 1950s, they still used the more traditional *Heimat* concept that stressed an emotional attachment to Germany as a whole. After that, the focus was squarely on Socialist economic structures. (Schmid 1990, 49–50). For example, when students were introduced to their local districts in the 3rd and 4th grade *Heimatkunde*, the texts only covered issues relevant to the development of Socialism, such as the persecution of workers under Fascism or the friendship with the Soviet Union. Regional culture and folklore were completely excluded. When cultural aspects were mentioned at all, such as in a section on cultural monuments, they were always related to the workers’ movement (e.g., *Heimatkunde. Lehrbuch für die Klasse 4, 1974, 25–27*).

Over time, the new Socialist concept of *Heimat* became more and more sterile and dogmatic (see Figure 7). While the textbook in 1970 started the section on the home district with idyllic pictures of a mechanized farm, factory, city hall, and other Socialist-style buildings, the 1976 edition only featured a close-up photo of a major industrial plant (*Heimatkunde. Klasse 3, 1970 and 1976*). The 1976 text also omitted pictures of playgrounds and other references to the personal sphere of the children. It delved
straight into the political structures that existed at the local level, trying to legitimize the superiority of the Socialist system. This shift toward an unambiguous Socialist identity takes place in the context of the official declaration in 1974 that the GDR is a nation separate from the FRG. Yet, the selective emphasis on political elements in the Socialist Heimat came at a price. It made it difficult to conceive Heimat as an organic community and the discussion became so abstract that it is unlikely it engendered any emotional attachment to the GDR.17

In contrast to the GDR, the FRG faced few challenges in territorial bonding. It could latch on to the established notion of Heimat since it presented itself as the “true” descendant of the old German nation. Here, territorial bonding played a decisive role from the beginning. Education ministries in the Länders of the FRG quickly reintroduced the old-style Heimatkunde in the curriculum (Mitzlaff 1985, 1104), and movies dealing with an idyllic village life, so-called Heimatfilme, had a heyday in the 1940s and 1950s. As in many other spheres of public life, 1945 was not taken as an opportunity to embark in new directions. Geography textbooks continued with the regional focus that sought to fill the students’ hearts with love for Germany.

As in the case of territorial differentiation, change occurred during the more liberal climate of the late 1960s and early 1970s. A general reform of the educational system (Bildungsreform) restructured the geography curriculum in 1970. The old regional descriptions (Länderkunde) were replaced by exemplary topics (Schultze 1998, Köck 1986). Now, rather than imparting an intimate knowledge of a given region in the FRG or Germany at large, textbooks would only deal with a region if it was representative of a certain type of human activity, such as coal mining. Emotional attachment was replaced by an emphasis on universal geographic concepts, such as industrial location or urbanization.

Two factors accounted for this change. First, there was a paradigm shift within German geography. Spurred by initiatives from American geography, the subject was redefined as a spatial science. Instead of regional description, the focus was on generalizations and geographic laws in order to give geography greater legitimacy among other social science disciplines (Engel and Sperling 1986, 382). Second, there was a larger sociopolitical context. The student revolts of the late 1960s and the coming of age of the postwar generation led to a reevaluation of the Nazi legacy. Under the rallying call of “der Gestank von tausend Jahren unter den Talaren” (the stench of a thousand years under the gowns), students questioned the continued influence of Nazi members in high official positions such as university professors, judges, and ministers. Traditional German notions such as Heimat became suspect, and they were discredited by their prominent role during the Nazi reign. The new German cinema was born, and Heimat films were replaced by anti-Heimat films that portrayed rural communities as repressive and xenophobic (Geisler 1985, 36–38; Boa and Palfreyman 2000, 12; Klessmann 1997). Heimatkunde was eliminated as a curricular subject and replaced by Sachkunde, a subject that purported to introduce children to the technological, socioeconomical, and political realities of modern society (Roth 1986, 138–40). Identification with German national territory faded from the instructional scene.

In contrast to territorial differentiation, territorial bonding in the FRG shows some commonalities with the situation in the GDR. Initially, both states employed the traditional version of Heimat. In the early 1950s, the GDR abandoned this focus and started to develop a Socialist version of Heimat, while the FRG held steadfast to the
existing style. In the 1970s, the FRG followed suit and cast off the traditional type of Heimat during the educational reform. Now, territorial bonding lacked emotional power in both states. In the FRG, the focus was on universal principles, and uniquely German elements disappeared. In the GDR, the singular emphasis on Socialist values made the concept so austere that it became sterile. Thus, in the 1970s, both states instituted brand new temple rituals that felt strange to its community members because they lacked referents to past events or experiences; there was no continuity. The rituals did not connect to the shared cultural knowledge and traditions that configure the construction of collective memory (Halbwachs 1992; Confino 1997). Unfortunately, this change came at a time when the walls appeared unfamiliar as well. The GDR built new fortified walls and the FRG could not decide which walls were to be the real ones. These new developments did not bode well for the success of either temple, in other words, for the success of national identity construction.

**Territorial Scripts and German National Identity**

Territorial scripts, or geographs, are the rationales that tie together the fate of the nation and the territory. They explain why a given territory belongs rightfully to the nation, how the nation arrived at the present territorial situation, and which territory would fulfill the destiny. For example, if a nation does not have sovereignty over its territory, that is, freedom from outside influences, a territorial justification will make this discrepancy between what the nation deserves and what the nation has plausible. It might present the nation as a victim of past aggression or as being wrought with internal conflict. Territorial scripts are written with intentions behind them, but these goals are not always explicitly vocalized. The intention of the overall strategies in the FRG and GDR can be deduced by tracing the development of arguments in schoolbooks over time. The empirical findings from the previous section complement this endeavor. Paying attention to the basic components of territoruality ensures that the investigation goes deeper than what is explicitly vocalized in the texts. As suggested by Häkli (1998a, 1998b), the analysis considers the larger political and intellectual context.

At the height of the Cold War, up to the mid-1960s, both sides were busy rebuilding their economies and their relationship was openly hostile. Each state claimed to be the only legitimate representative of the German nation. The GDR presented itself as the essence of a socially just German nation that represented the very best of German heritage. It was a heroic nation that had defeated its Fascist past and was thus a model for the entire German national territory made up of the FRG and the GDR. The inability to include the territory of the German brothers and sisters in the West was first explained by the evil influence of the Western powers, particularly the United States: “In 1948 they [the Western powers] split off the territory they occupied from the rest of Germany in order to undertake their preparations for war without being disturbed” (Lehrbuch der Erdkunde für die 5. Klasse, 1953, 10).

When the FRG became sovereign in 1955, the Germans in the western territory were presented as victims not of other powers, but of their own system. Now, the FRG state was characterized as the offspring of National Socialism. Schoolbooks explained that “a large part of the Fascist war criminals fled from the territory of our republic” and that SS members “even receive pensions from the west German state of more than 1000 Marks per month” (Lehrbuch der Erdkunde für die 5. Klasse, 1959, 11, 122). The stated goal of the FRG government was to wage war against the GDR: “They [the warmongers in West Germany] would not even shy away from attacking our fatherland with nuclear weapons” (Lehrbuch der Erdkunde für die 5. Klasse, 1959, 12). By contrast, the GDR was portrayed as having freed itself from Fascism and capitalism with the help of the Soviet Union. The inner strength of the “better” German nation was most vividly illustrated with a reinterpretation of the 1945 liberation of the Buchenwald concentration camp in the texts of the early 1960s. The German Communist inmates were now identified as the heroes who had staged an uprising inspired by the GDR hero Ernst Thälmann:

His [Thälmann’s] example gave the other prisoners time and again solace and new hope. . . . This international solidarity and readiness to help reached its pinnacle when the prisoners liberated themselves shortly before the end of the war. This prevented the murder of the remaining camp inmates.

—(Lehrbuch der Erdkunde für die 5. Klasse, 1963, 152–54)

This new narrative illustrates how events of the past can be reinterpreted and reframed and how collective memory only selects those elements of the past that fit within the cultural context of the group, in this case the power of Communist resistance (Halbwachs 1992). The actions of the 3rd U.S. Army, which had dispersed the SS guards and thus enabled the inmates to open the gates, were conveniently left out. 18

While the script of the GDR as the German hero supports the official pro-unification position of the GDR during that time, a closer examination reveals that the subtext was changing. As we have seen, territorial bonding and differentiation strategies experienced major shifts.
German traditions were slowly abandoned when *Heimat* was reinterpreted in Socialist terms in 1957. The GDR and FRG were no longer portrayed as being part of a larger Deutschland by 1960. Finally, German national territory outside the GDR disappeared from maps in 1965. Thus, the script was subtly being rewritten to turn the “better” German nation into a “separate” GDR nation.

In the Federal Republic, territorial scripts in the 1950s and 1960s did not stress the FRG as the sole representative, but simply represented the German nation as if it continued to exist in its previous political form. The division was presented as transient. In the early years, up to the late 1950s, the prevailing notion was simply to ignore the territorial changes or the GDR. The texts took the children on an excursion to discover the beauty of Germany unhindered by political realities (Engel and Sperling 1986, 386–87). When the separate existence of the FRG and GDR was solidified in the late 1950s—the FRG was recognized as sovereign and the two states joined their respective blocks, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in 1955—the FRG textbooks began to acknowledge the changed reality. New short sections treated the fortified border between the two German states, the division of Berlin, and the occupied territories in the East (Deutsche Landschaften 1964, 50–55, 114–15; Ittermann 1991, 124–25). Nonetheless, the German national territory was still described as a comprehensive whole. The new sections were simply inserted in different places in the existing regional geography framework without any further explanations. They appeared as though an afterthought (Ittermann 1991, 124).

Territorial differentiation in the FRG during this period helped maintain the illusion that the German nation continued to exist in its previous territorial shape. The use of “Soviet Occupied Zone” for the GDR on maps until the late 1960s, the downgrading of the boundary between the FRG and GDR to an administrative division, and especially the prominence of the 1937 boundary made the larger German nation visible. The intense focus on *Heimat* during this period provides additional insights. The utopian idyll of *Heimat* offered solace from the reality of the division and made the illusory script of a nation unaffected by change palatable. *Heimat* focused on the bonds among Germans and on their unique characteristics without having to outline territorial boundaries for these commonalities. Thus, the responsibility for the division or how it could be overcome was conveniently bracketed out (Confino and Skaria 2002).

Starting in the mid-1960s and throughout the 1970s, tensions between the FRG and GDR eased in the context of détente. Conciliatory moves by church groups and visits by Chancellor Brandt to Erfurt, Moscow, and Warsaw paved the way for the 1970 Eastern Treaties and the 1972 Basic Treaty (*Grundlagenvertrag*). As a result, contacts between the two German states increased. For the GDR, this meant that it finally gained the international recognition it sought so eagerly, but also that it had to sever its links to an all-German past fully if it wanted to maintain a separate identity and distinguish itself more clearly from the FRG. For the FRG, détente meant a balancing act between recognizing the other German state and still professing claims to the German national territory occupied by the GDR. The territorial scripts reflect these challenges.

In the textbooks of the GDR, the dominant theme was the GDR as an inseparable part of the Socialist brotherhood. What made the GDR unique was not its German heritage, but its Socialist character. Now, the anti-Fascist and anti-FRG arguments became less dominant. Rather than emphasizing the historical continuity of the Nazi threat to the present, the threat was presented as ideological. The GDR needed to protect itself because it was at the forefront of the East-West confrontation between Communism and capitalism, not because of Fascist warmongers in the FRG. The territorial script also became more matter of fact. The textbooks before 1965 were flamboyant when they juxtaposed the valiant struggle for equality in the GDR with the evil and exploitative nature of the capitalist and militarist FRG. The new generation of textbooks dispensed with comparisons and presented the GDR on its own. For example, the 1966 geography textbook for the fifth grade started the year-long survey of the GDR only with an overview map of the administrative organization and a few statistics, such as population size. The GDR was presented as an entity whose existence was indisputable, but there was no real stress on a unique GDR identity. Identification with the GDR nation was placed in the context of identification with the Socialist world:

> Of special importance is the unity of patriotic and internationalized (internationalistischer) education. . . . The pupils therefore must recognize and understand already in grade 5 that the German Democratic Republic is an inseparable part of the community of Socialist states. . . .
> 
> —(Unterrichtshilfen, 1979, 8)

Having renounced the powerful ethnic German roots, the leadership of the GDR sought refuge and strength in the transnational character of the Socialist revolution.

The stress on a national identity that is imbedded in a larger Socialist community comes across most clearly in territorial bonding and differentiation. The increasingly sterile character of Socialist bonding, which is exemplified in the 1976 textbook image of a factory as a symbol for the
Spirit of détente, but by the changed disciplinary context later than they had in the GDR, influenced not only by the member of the alliance of Socialist nations. It was worth identifying with because it was an essential member of the alliance of Socialist nations.

In the FRG, the territorial scripts changed a few years later than they had in the GDR, influenced not only by the spirit of détente, but by the changed disciplinary context around 1970. The geography curriculum was redesigned to conform to the spatial-science approach, and universal concepts replaced regional description. Now the impact of the boundary between the two German states was discussed in the context of general functions of political boundaries. The boundary with the GDR was compared to the boundaries with other countries. Schoolbooks downplayed emotive cultural bonds to the other fragments of the German national territory. The focus was mainly on economic problems, such as border regions being isolated or cut off from their traditional market areas (e.g., Erdkunde 6, 1979; Neue Geographie 5/6, 1971, 1976; Schäfer Weltkunde 5/6, 1978). Little in the curriculum engendered personal identification with the members of the German nation outside the FRG (Ittermann 1991, 125–28; Engel and Sperling 1986, 386–89). The narratives pointed to the negative effects of the division but did not make a direct appeal for unification.

For example, the 1964 edition of Deutsche Landschaften explained the border between the GDR and the FRG as follows:

A visit to the GDR ( = German Democratic Republic) is by contrast much more difficult, even though it is German land. From the Czech border near Hof to the Bay of Lubeck this border covers more than 1381 km. It is accompanied by barbed wire and mine fields. . . . Quite a few who tried to leave the GDR have lost their life here. While pedestrians walk along the barbed wire on the side of the Federal Republic of Germany, the other side is dead and empty. . . . The border cuts thousands of roads and pathways, interrupts 3 highways (Autobahns) and 33 railroad lines that used to be frequented by heavy traffic before. . . . Germans are separated from Germans. (54–55)

By contrast, the much shorter text of 1978 edition of Schäfer Weltkunde, 5/6. Schuljahr states:

Borders between states are sometimes difficult to cross. . . . Some states require visas for entry and stays. . . . The GDR ( = German Democratic Republic) also requires a visa for stays. Only a few crossings allow a transit across the border.

The border runs across Germany from the Bay of Lubeck to Czechoslovakia. The GDR installed barbed wire fences and minefields. . . . While pedestrians walk along the barbed wire on the side of the Federal Republic of Germany, the other side is desolate and empty. (128)

The omission of the statement about Germans living on either side of the border and the general tenor of the 1978 text make the GDR appear similar to other foreign countries. The border was still considered “unique” (Grenze besonderer Art), though not because it separated Germans as in the 1964 text, but solely because it was aggressively enforced by the GDR authorities.

The lack of emphasis on cultural and emotional aspects of the division in the FRG’s script is reflected in the rejection of the traditional Heimat concept in territorial bonding. The findings from territorial differentiation during the 1970s add another insight. The oscillating depictions of the eastern German borders sent conflicting messages about the extent of the German nation. Thus, the territorial script was not only presented in more detached and scientific terms (i.e., it was less hostile and nationalist as before), but it also was ambiguous. This was the low point of the territorial script of the German nation in the FRG.

To employ the metaphor once more, by the end of the 1970s, the narratives of the two German temples did not inspire great devotion. Neither story pointed out what was particularly holy or unique about the temple, but each stressed how it was a perfect example of its larger ideology. In the GDR the temple embodied the notion of Socialist equality, while in the FRG the temple represented the idea of Western industrial progress. The failure to inspire great devotion can also be seen in the lack of passion in the language of the narrative. The story was seen only through a political eye in the GDR and through only a scientific eye in the FRG.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper is to understand the territorial strategies in the construction of national identities in the FRG and the GDR during the time of division. The GDR’s first strategy was to establish its preeminence in the German national territory that covered both states by claiming moral superiority. The GDR represented the hero of the German nation. The FRG did not develop a new strategy in response. It refused to acknowledge the GDR, considered the division as temporary, and continued with territorial strategies established before the war.

The next strategic initiative again came from the GDR. In the late 1950s, the GDR laid the groundwork. It tried to
create new links between its population and the GDR territory that were independent of German traditions. A few years later, it began to present itself as territorially distinct from Germany and the FRG and by the mid-1960s it offered a rationale for these changes in its textbooks. The GDR identity was no longer determined by its German origins, but by its fundamental Socialist character.\(^{20}\) Initially, this new strategy was ignored in the FRG. A new strategy appeared in the 1970s, but, again, it did not respond directly to the GDR. The FRG’s strategy sought only to raise awareness of the negative effects of the division in a matter-of-fact style. There was no interest in presenting it as a uniquely German issue. Thus, throughout the period, the two states never engaged directly with each other’s strategy. Instead of confrontation, they pursued separate agendas. National identity construction in divided Germany 1949–1979 was a case of double vision.

On a more general level, the paper helps us better understand the construction of identity under different political systems and for different types of nations. As the situation in the GDR illustrates, totalitarian regimes can initiate new strategies easily and they can use their centralized control apparatus to smooth the transition between different scripts by subtly changing the subtext of differentiation or bonding. They are easily blinded, however, by their power into trying to change the script too drastically. The notion of the Socialist nation in the 1970s was built on a version of bonding that did not have the support of the GDR majority. On the other hand, in democratic states with a federal structure, these “debates” over territorial scripts or bonding and differentiation can lead to a regional fragmentation of identity construction as the case of the different textbook policies in the Länder of the FRG shows.

Could these differences in identity construction in the FRG and GDR also be explained by the customary qualitative distinction that many leading authors (e.g., Smith 1998; Gellner 1983) make between more “natural” or “primordial” ethnic nations and artificial civic nations? I would argue no. As MacLaughlin (2001, 15, 33–36) stresses, ethnicity should not be reified and attributed with historical agency, but neither should ethnic identity be placed above class identity. Rather, ethnic nationalism should be viewed as an ideology similar to socialism, liberalism, and communism that is influenced by concrete social and geographic settings as well as by the activities of individuals. The GDR project did not fail because it negated the “call of the blood,” but because some of its strategies employed elements that were alien to the population. These ill-conceived strategies severed the “organic” links between the elite and the national popular mass that are necessary for hegemony (MacLaughlin 2001, 39).

This interpretation also allows us to reconcile Gellner’s (1983) claim that nations are the products of mass education with Smith’s counter argument that mass education systems in communist and liberal societies have failed to produce loyalties in their populations (Smith 1998, 40). Mass education is crucial for the construction of national identity, but state-sponsored indoctrination with values that are divorced from existing popular ideas will be ineffective. Only conceptions of national identity to which the public is already attuned can be successfully inculcated through mass education and the media.

The paper points to several avenues for further study. First, to follow the argument by Häkli (1998a, 143–46) the present focus on hegemonic strategies needs to be complemented with an examination of tactics of resistance. Second, it is important to analyze how the territorial strategies changed after unification. A look at the changes in strategies will help us understand how the present construction of national identity in Germany deals with the continued “wall” in the heads of the people (Kienbaum and Grote 1997). Third, the crucial role of Heimat in German territorial bonding that emerges from the discussion has to be investigated in a larger context. As we have seen, a focus on the emotional attachment to Heimat in the FRG allowed an escape from the realities of territorial division. Heimat can even been used to explain German unification. Ackermann (1995, 791–92) has argued that the renaissance of regional cultural traditions in the GDR in the 1980s brought Germans in East and West together. Heimat should be compared to territorial bonding processes in other national narratives. Such a comparison will help separate the aspects of territorial bonding that are universally applicable from those that are uniquely German.

From a methodological view, the framework promises to be useful in investigating other territorial expressions of national identity, such as landscapes and monuments. The definition of a unique national landscape and its distinction from other national landscapes can be conceptualized as territorial differentiation. Examples are differentiation via unique cultural features in the landscape, such as the German Volks-und Kulturboden of the 1920s (Penck 1925), or the role of natural features, such as mountains, in Welsh identity (Gruffudd 1995). The practices through which people are made to engage with the landscape and establish an attachment to it can be seen as territorial bonding. These might include processions, regional festivals, or other activities associated with landscape preservation and heritage. The narratives about the landscape, such as their glorification in film and fiction, represent territorial scripts.

For the study of nationalist monuments, the framework provides a new perspective. The notions of territorial
bonding and territorial scripts are reflected in Johnson’s view of monuments as “concentrated nodes” or “circuits of memory” (1995), but they are not separated out conceptually. Johnson’s (1995) approach conflates the act of bonding via rituals and ceremonies with the larger justifications that guide the strategy. Moreover, by not distinguishing territorial bonding, its corresponding basic component, territorial differentiation, is left out entirely. Territorial differentiation prompts us to ask directly about the location of the monuments in the territorial structure of the nation. We need to understand how monuments help define the borders of the nation and make the shape of the territory distinctive.

The metaphor of the religious temple that has been used to illustrate the conceptual framework appears to be advantageous in conceptualizing other areas of inquiry in the geography of nationalism. The walls of the temple also determine the internal structure, which points to the role of internal boundaries, such as administrative districts, and institutional reach in national discourse. The ascription of different spaces in the temple, such as the inner sanctum versus more publicly accessible areas, raises questions about hierarchies of meaning in the national territory. Moreover, wall hangings, floor coverings, and other décor items reflect national iconography and style. The caveat is that the metaphor of the temple may in some cases be limiting. As the long tradition of tools of visualization in geography suggests, however (MacEachren et al. 1992), metaphors offer new insights into highly complex phenomena, such as the construction of national identity. In the German case, it has allowed us to see that the national territorial visions that were dominant in the two states ultimately did not result in a clear picture of what it means to be German. This ambiguity is the legacy unified Germany has to contend with in the ongoing narration of German national identity. The discontinuities and changes brought about by unification are still unresolved, and even though the plot has been revisited, it does not produce a coherent story for all members of the German nation.

Acknowledgments

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Appendix 1: Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRD</td>
<td>Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bundesrepublik Deutschland</td>
<td>Official term for the Federal Republic of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBR</td>
<td>Deutsche Bundesrepublik. (Terminology used by GDR for the FRG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche Demokratische Republik</td>
<td>– official term for the German Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic (East Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WD</td>
<td>Westdeutschland (Terminology used by GDR for the FRG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>Westberlin (Terminology used by GDR for the Western sector of Berlin)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 2: Geography Textbooks

**GDR**


FRG

Terra: Geographie 9/10. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1979

Appendix 3

Archival Sources
1. Westerman Werkarchiv (WWA), Braunschweig
   WWA 2/J26
   WWA 2.3/11
   WWA 2.3/76
   WWA 2.3/77
   WWA=Dokumentation: Karten/Atlanten, Behördliche Anweisungen und Richtlinien für die Karteninhalte, prepared by Verena Kleinschmidt.
2. Bundesarchiv, Dahlwitz-Hoppegarten
   DO1/15 .0 Verwaltung Vermessungs- und Kartenwesen

Published Documents

Mitteilungen des Bundesministers für innerdeutsche Beziehungen vom 6. 7. 1971, lib, 4321, 11082/71 (GMBl 1971, Nr. 16: 272)
BVerfGE 36 (Decision on the Basic Treaty, 31 July 1973).

Teaching Guidelines


Notes

1. The terminology regarding the two German states has always been contested; both states issued directives on “correct” labeling. The political implications of different versions will be discussed below. There is a glossary of abbreviations and terms in the appendix. The terms I use have no political connotation, but are chosen for reasons of style. All translations of terms or text passages are by the author unless indicated otherwise.
2. For a discussion of the contributions of geographers in the creation of national myths, see Schultz (1998).
3. A fascinating recent example is pointed out by Michael Ignatieff in the BBC production Blood and Belonging (vol. 1, “The Road to Nowhere: Yugoslavia,” Princeton, NJ: Films for the Humanities and Sciences, 1993). He filmed the changing of the Croatian National Guard, a ritual that appears to be a century-old tradition, but in reality was newly orchestrated for the occasion of Croatian independence in 1991.
4. My addition.
5. To make the prose more concise, I will identify these hegemonic strategies as “strategies of the FRG/GDR” or state that, for example, “the FRG/GDR developed a strategy,” etc. As the discussion of the notions of “organic intelligentsia” and of textbook as hybrids between elite and popular geographers suggest, I do not view these “territorial strategies” as top-down impositions of ideas or the product of a mono-lithic state.
6. Many of these controversies are documented in Westermann Werkarchiv, Braunschweig (WWA 2/J26; 2.3/76; 2.3/77; 2.3/11). See also the studies by Engel and Sperling (1986), Sperling (1991), and Blumenwitz (1980) which was financed by the leagues of expellees (Vertriebenenverbände).
7. For example, they released a new version of a school atlas only a few months after publication simply to change the name of Stalinallee in Berlin to Karl-Marx-Allee (Atlas für Erdkunde, 5th ed. 1962; one version states “redaktionell abgeschlossen Juni 1961,” the amended version “September/December 1961”). The “correct” depiction of national issues even had priority over the thematic content of the maps. This primacy of national issues is revealed in the correspondence regarding corrections to thematic maps in the Atlas of the GDR as well as in the debate about the use of the geologic term “Sudeten” discussed below (Bundesarchiv, Dahlwitz-Hoppegarten, DO1/15, Nr. 48398-99).
8. The first verse of the German national anthem reads

   Deutschland, Deutschland über alles,
   Über alles in der Welt,
   Wenn es stets zu Schutz und Trutze
   Brüderlich zusammenhält;

   Von der Etsch bis an den Belt,
   Von der Maas bis an die Memel,
   Brüderlich zusammenhält;
   Wenn es stets zu Schutz und Trutze
   Brüderlich zusammenhält;

   Deutschland, Deutschland über alles,
   Über alles in der Welt!
Germany, Germany above everything, Above everything in the world, When, always for protection and defense, It stands united like brothers; From the Maas to the Memel, From the Etsch to the Belt; Germany, Germany above everything, Above everything in the world! (http://www.goethe.de/in/d/frames/schulen/lkpc/Nationalhymne.htm [last accessed 25 July 2003])

9. There were still thematic maps in school atlases, however, that depicted the GDR and FRG together, such as economic maps (e.g., Atlas der Erdbünde, 1962, 22/23). The 1960 directive is mentioned in the files of the Westermann Werkarchiv, Braunschweig (WWA 2.3/77).

10. The change in theoretical arguments is illustrated by the two works by Kosing (1964, 1976). See also Vehoff (1984); Holzel and Schumacher (1981, 3–5).

11. For example, the request by a geologist to use the internationally accepted term of “Studeten” in an article led to a lengthy discussion among censors and other government experts. Correspondence from 1980 in Bundesarchiv, Dallwitz-Hoppegarten, DO1/15, Nr. 53466.

12. The use of base maps to enforce a uniform depiction seems to have been pioneered by the GDR. The VVK sent out samples of its base maps to cartographic institutes in other Socialist countries in the late 1970s. Their responses indicated that they did not issue comparable products. For example, see the letter of the Hungarian topographic office of 18 August 1978 (Bundesarchiv, Dallwitz-Hoppegarten, DO1/15, Nr. 53465).


14. The public criticism and the refusal of the federal government to become involved in the issue is mentioned in correspondence records of the Westermann Verlag (Westermann Werkarchiv, Braunschweig: WWA 2/1261; WWA-Dokumentation). The withdrawal of the decree is published in “Mitteilungen” (see Appendix 3: Published Documents).

15. A sample of letters attacking the maps exists in Westermann Werkarchiv, Braunschweig (WWA 2.3/76).

16. The universal nature is revealed in the generic iconography of Heimat posters and postcards. The landscapes they depicted lacked a specific local referent (see Confino 1997).

17. See the statement by Maria Michalk, a member of the Bundestag Enquete-Kommission, who posits that the Socialist version of Heimat was an alien concept for the majority of the population in the GDR. Her statement is reprinted in Rolle und Bedeutung der Ideologie, integrativer Faktoren und disziplinierender Praktiken in Staat und Gesellschaft der DDR, 768–95. Baden-Baden: Nomos (Materialien der Enquete-Kommission “Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland.” 12. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages, vol. III(1).

18. See also Ackermann (1995, 786), who points out that the memorials at the camps in Buchenwald, Ravensburg, and Sachsenhausen served to illustrate the heroism of the Communist resistance rather than the suffering of the victims.

19. That the threat became less specific can also be seen in discussions of Berlin in geography textbooks. Until the early 1960s, Great Britain and the United States were identified as having carried out bombing raids on the city. Starting in 1966, the textbooks only mentioned that there was destruction during World War II.

20. Changes in the subtext of the strategy, that is, in territorial differentiation and territorial bonding, show that the construction of a separate Socialist nation in the GDR started several years before it became obvious in the script.

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Territorial Strategies in the Construction of National Identities in Germany, 1949–1979

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Correspondence: Department of Geography, Middlebury College, 327 Bicentennial Hall, Middlebury, VT 05753, e-mail: herb@middlebury.edu.