Skimming Prevention: Overview of Best Practices for Merchants

Skimming is the unauthorized capture and transfer of payment data to another source. Its purpose is to commit fraud, the threat is serious, and it can hit any merchant’s environment. With skimming, thieves steal payment data directly from the consumer’s payment card or from the payment infrastructure at a merchant location. Both techniques typically require the use of a rogue physical device planted onsite. PCI Security Standards currently contain a number of requirements and recommendations to guard against skimming. In addition, the Council has introduced an overview document for merchants containing a "deep dive" about skimming, examples, best practices and tools to thwart its use. This “At-a-Glance” provides a snapshot of skimming and introduces areas requiring countermeasures to ensure an appropriate level of security for cardholder data.

Merchants Must Take Steps to Prevent Skimming

Skimming equipment can be very sophisticated, small, and difficult to identify (see photos on back page). Merchants are the first line of defense because skimming gear is always deployed at the merchant’s point of sale or network. Consequently, it is critical for merchants to become familiar with this category of threats and to take precautions.

Who Does It? Perpetrators skim because it is highly profitable. They may be sophisticated and organized criminals leading complex, effective attacks. Skimming is also done by relatively unsophisticated criminals who use readily available, simple technology to steal cardholder data.

Targets for Attack. There are at least five potential targets for skimming. These include PIN data, often visually captured by people standing near a POS device or swiped with a fake PIN entry device; unattended or temporarily unmanned terminals; merchants with a high transaction volume (allowing a criminal to capture lots of data in a short period of time); terminals with a heavy volume of usage; and merchants with periods of high volume sales.

Impact of Skimming Attacks. Skimming undermines the integrity of a payment system and process, employee trust, industry relationships, and consumer trust and behavior in merchants. There is a cost to skimming attacks that is over and above the actual loss of monies, goods, and services.

Using the Guidelines to Prevent Skimming


The document provides specific recommendations for the contents outlined on the back side of this At-a-Glance, left sidebar. Please see the document for details, including guidelines and best practices, a risk assessment questionnaire, and evaluation forms.
Examples of Terminal Fraud
Criminals use a variety of techniques to skim cardholder data from transactions at the point of sale and through the merchant’s payment system. Photos and sidebars below show three examples of devices used to skim at the point of sale. The document has more examples.

Skimming devices hidden within the terminal are invisible, and neither the merchant staff nor the cardholder will know that a card was skimmed.
This picture shows a skimming device inserted in a terminal. The device was hidden by the SIM card cover plate.

Changes to terminal connections can be difficult to spot.
In these images, the criminals completely changed the cable connecting the terminal to the base unit.
The fatter cable housed additional wires required to capture cardholder data.

Handheld skimmers used by corrupt staff are very small, fitting in the palm of a hand.
Despite their size, these devices can store a significant amount of cardholder data.

Guidelines and Best Practices
Guidelines and best practices mentioned are non-exhaustive. They cover:
**Merchant Physical Location.** Merchants must address measures affecting terminals, terminal infrastructure, cameras, placement, access, and image storage.
**Terminals and Terminal Infrastructure Security.** Areas requiring attention include terminal surroundings, IP connectivity, individual terminal data, terminal reviews, terminal purchases and updates, terminal disposal, PIN protection, and wireless terminals.
**Staff and Service Access to Payment Devices.** Areas affecting people include staff as targets, hiring and staff awareness, outside personnel, and service providers.
**Risk Analysis of Terminals and Terminal Infrastructure.** The analysis includes identification of assets, threat and probability, and severity. Tools are provided to help with the analysis.
Information Supplement

Skimming Prevention: Best Practices for Merchants

Version 2.0
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The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede PCI security standards and requirements.
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Chapter 1: Overview

The primary mission of the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC) is to ensure the security of payment data and the security of the payment infrastructure that processes that data. PCI SSC is committed to build trust in the payment process and payment infrastructure for the benefit of all constituents. As the threats and vulnerabilities of fraud evolve, payment constituents can and should expect the emergence of further security standards and requirements for terminal types, terminal infrastructures, payment devices, and payment processes.

This document was created to assist and educate merchants regarding security best practices associated with skimming attacks. Though currently not mandated by PCI SSC, guidelines and best practices documents are produced to help educate and create awareness of challenges faced by the payment industry. The guidelines are the result of industry and law enforcement understanding of the current and evolving threat landscape associated with skimming. In addition we have incorporated known best practices, currently conducted by many merchants, to mitigate skimming attacks taking place in their respective point-of-sale environments.

This document contains a non-exhaustive list of security guidelines that can help merchants to:

- Be aware of the risks relating to skimming - both physical and logical.
- Be aware of the vulnerabilities inherent in the use of point-of-sale terminals and terminal infrastructures.
- Be aware of the vulnerabilities associated with staff that has access to consumer payment devices.
- Prevent or deter criminal attacks against point-of-sale terminals and terminal infrastructures.
- Identify any compromised terminals as soon as possible and notify the appropriate agencies to respond and minimize the impact of a successful attack.

Additional security can—and must—be provided by merchants to enhance the security provided by payment-terminal vendors and adherence to the current PCI SSC standards. With enough time and resources, any device can fall victim to physical or logical attacks. Limiting the time the device is unattended or unchecked reduces the effectiveness of an attack should an attempt be made against the device. Merchants have an obligation to ensure their respective payment systems and infrastructures are secure. Merchants are the first line of defense for POS fraud and are involved in the execution of the vast majority of controls suggested or required by PCI SSC. Merchants can achieve appropriate security and trust levels at the point of sale by considering all the factors that can influence overall security in their terminal environments and by taking the necessary countermeasures detailed in this document to ensure an appropriate level of security.
About This Document

This document consists of the following:

- **Chapter 1** provides a general overview; describes exactly what card skimming is, who does it, and how it impacts the various payment constituents; and provides some real-life examples of compromised terminals.

- **Chapter 2** provides an extensive list of best practices and guidelines merchants need to consider if they have not done so already. The list identifies threats and challenges and possible remedies merchants can take to mitigate the risk of being victims of skimming attacks.

- **Appendix A** provides a mechanism for the merchant to further quantify risk associated with merchant location and terminal infrastructure.

- **Appendix B** provides a checklist merchants can use to identify and track terminal assets.

What is Card Skimming and Who Does It?

Skimming is the unauthorized capture and transfer of payment data to another source for fraudulent purposes. This unauthorized capture and transfer of payment data is different than mass data-compromise breaches, and can result from one of the event types listed below.

**Data from Consumer Payment Cards**

The first type of skimming event is the acquisition of payment data directly from the consumer’s payment device (payment card). This is normally accomplished through a small, portable card reader and usually involves internal merchant personnel who have both criminal intent and direct access to the consumer payment device. The majority of skimming attacks deal with the capture of payment data from magnetic-stripe payment cards outside of the payment terminal when the payment card is handled by the merchant personnel and when the consumer has little or no observation at the time of payment. Skimming chip cards has also become increasingly popular, and many chip cards also have magnetic-stripes.

**Data Capture from the Payment Infrastructure**

The second type of skimming event results from the capture of payment data within the payment infrastructure at the merchant location, with a focus on compromised POS terminals and their respective infrastructures (terminal locations, wires, communication channels, switches, etc.). Criminals will insert electronic equipment, by various means, into the terminal or the terminal infrastructure, in order to capture consumer account data. The skimming equipment can be very sophisticated, small, and difficult to identify. Often it is hidden within the terminal so neither the merchant nor the cardholder knows that the terminal has been compromised.
**Data Capture from Malware or Compromised Software**

Another type of skimming event results from the capture of payment data from malicious software or memory scrapers. In this attack, poorly coded software allows for malware or malicious code to be loaded on the device. This code may intercept and capture payment card information (both magnetic-stripe and/or chip data) as well as PIN information. The information is then sent to another location for retrieval. This type of activity is largely seen in devices that provide functions other than payment processing. These include ATMs, PCs that have access to card data, electronic cash registers (ECRs), computer-based POS systems, mobile devices (including tablets and smart phones), and more recently, compromised terminals.

**Data Capture from Wireless Interfaces**

Skimming can occur from the interception of payment data across a wireless infrastructure. Wireless networking technologies such as Bluetooth and Wi-Fi allow information to be transmitted across the public airwaves between devices. Poor Bluetooth pairing techniques, lack of encryption, as well as shared or inadequately secured Wi-Fi implementations can allow data to be intercepted and the data network to be compromised. More information can be found in the PCI Wireless Guidance information supplement at:


**Data Capture from NFC or Contactless Readers**

As with data from consumer cards, use of NFC (near field communication) or contactless readers can result in the skimming of the payment information. The NFC data is sent in close proximity to an NFC reader across the airwaves. This information can be intercepted should another NFC reader, such as a capable mobile device or contactless reader, be placed near the payment-acceptance device. In addition, some NFC readers are added on as an aftermarket update and may not have been tested with the terminal or POS device.

**Data Capture from Mobile Devices**

In this type of attack, a modified card reader (skimmer) is attached to the headphone jack of the criminal’s smartphone or tablet. The smartphone then displays a fake prompt to have the consumer enter their PIN directly on the smartphone, thus capturing both the card account data and the associated PIN. PINs must only be entered on PCI PTS approved devices. Refer to the PCI guide “Accepting Mobile Payments on Smartphones at Tablets”

**Data Capture from Overlays**

Overlay attacks have traditionally been used in ATMs or other unattended devices to capture card account and PIN data. (See Image 16 in “Examples of Terminal Fraud” below.) In these types of attacks, an overlay that contains wires or an additional card reader is placed on the ATM or POS terminal. A sticker overlay may be added to the keyboard area to capture the PIN, (Image 12); or, using a 3D printer, a new casing maybe placed over the existing device (Image 13). These overlays can hide tamper evidence, add an additional reader, and slightly change the operation and look of the terminal.

**Perpetrators and Targets**

Understanding the lengths that criminals go to in order to obtain and compromise account data may help you understand the necessity of taking sufficient measures to make it significantly more difficult for the criminals to target your particular location.

**Who Does It?**

Regardless of how it is achieved, skimming is a highly profitable criminal activity, difficult to prevent and detect. As a result, it appeals to both ends of the criminal spectrum:

- The most sophisticated and dedicated organized criminal elements, leading to very complex and surprisingly effective attacks on merchant terminal infrastructures; and
- The most common, least sophisticated of criminal elements, using readily available, simple technology and direct access to ATMs, POS devices, and consumer payment cards.

Criminals want a high and rapid rate of return, regardless of the type of theft they are considering. Skimming allows them to capture massive amounts of account details in a short amount of time, with low risk of detection. As a result, skimming often is their first and foremost consideration. With globalization and the Internet, underground industries have evolved that can move and distribute large amounts of stolen information quickly and efficiently, maximizing the profit to the criminals who may operate in safe havens anywhere in the world.

**Targets**

**PIN Data**

In addition to the acquisition of account data on the card, criminals are very interested in the acquisition of PIN data. The industry and law enforcement have seen significant efforts to acquire PINs at the payment terminal by the following means, among others:

- “Shoulder-surfing” by individuals stationed near the ATM or POS device
- Placement of fake PIN entry devices (PEDs), ATMs, or readers and CCTV cameras directed at the PIN entry area on the payment terminal
- Malware and memory scrapers in PIN entry devices (PEDs), ATMs, or readers.
ATMs, Unattended, or Temporarily Unattended Terminals

Merchant locations that for a wide variety of business needs have self-service terminals, ATMs, unattended payment terminals, exterior payment terminals, and/or multiple terminal locations that are not attended to all the time are prime targets for intrusive-terminal and terminal-infrastructure attacks.

Criminals will also target large multi-lane retailers where, during less busy periods, not all of the lanes are used and terminals are effectively left unattended. Criminals will steal terminals and compromise them, then return them to either the same store or to another store in the same chain.

There have been many cases where criminals have:

- Stolen terminals from cash lanes and desks not in use.
- Broken into a store and taken only the terminals.
- Broken into a store and compromised the terminals.
- Hidden themselves in the store until it closed and compromised the terminals overnight, leaving when the store re-opened.
- Swapped a good terminal for a compromised terminal, using large items to block attendants’ line of sight.
- Swapped good terminals for compromised terminals or installed malware while posing as a service technician.
- Added overlays with skimming and key-logging hardware.
- Shipped compromised terminals to merchants under the guise of a terminal upgrade and required the good terminals to be returned to the criminal.
- Installed malware or automated software called bots that capture and distribute card data. This malware insertion can be local or remote from another device or from the Internet.

High Transaction Volume

Merchants with a high volume of payment transactions are also at risk. For the criminal, the intent is to get as much account and PIN data as possible in the shortest amount of time. Merchants fitting this risk profile normally have significant numbers of payment transactions for smaller dollar amounts. ATMs and petrol stations are examples of both unattended-terminal risk and high transaction volumes, making them prime targets for skimming activity. Other merchant locations and or business types also fit this profile.
Terminals with Heavy Use

A single payment terminal used for a large number of transactions may attract criminal intent. (In-store ATMs are a good example, or locations where relatively few terminals support a business.) The idea is to capture as many accounts as simply and quickly as possible—it’s more efficient to compromise one terminal with high activity than to attack three terminals with the same volume of accounts.

High-Volume Sales Periods

As you develop operational business and security controls for peak activity, keep in mind that criminals also target merchants during busy sales times, whether holidays or special events. Again, the intent is to capture as much account and PIN data in as short a time as possible.

The Impact of Skimming Attacks

The impact of skimming is significant for all the constituents involved in payment and ATM services. There is a cost to skimming attacks that is over and above the actual loss of monies, goods, and services: Skimming attacks undermine the integrity of the payment system, employee trust, industry relationships, and consumer trust in the merchant.

Card-Issuers and Payment Networks

For banks and the various sources of funding for payment cards, the issue is direct financial loss and loss of trust in the payment system. The cost of the fraud itself, incremental monitoring requirements, investigative efforts, consumer notification efforts, and the cost to replace cards are just some of the issues associated with a skimming incident for the issuing banks and payment networks.

Merchants

Recent attacks in the headlines have led merchants to realize that a single fraud incident can put them out of business, or at the very least significantly impact their brand and the trust consumers have in them. Skimming fraud is one of the top three fraud types a merchant must address. Consumers are becoming more aware of which merchants protect their information and which ones do not and are taking their business to different locations or merchants and modifying their choice of payment type accordingly. Any move back to historical payment types (checks, cash, etc.) should be seen as a troublesome and costly trend for merchants. In dealing with a skimming event, a merchant has the additional challenges and costs of forensics and system analysis, system upgrades based on recommendations, industry fines, lawsuits, employee terminations, loss of goodwill, and other liability concerns.
Consumers

The loss of consumers’ trust in their payment brand and the payment system is not good for anyone involved in the payment chain. Not only must consumers deal with the inconvenience of compromised account data but they are also challenged to return to their normal payment practices after such an event. This loss of trust is leading to strained relationships between merchants, merchant-servicing financial institutions, and the various payment networks. Some observed consumer behaviors after a skimming incident are very disconcerting for both financial institutions and merchants. They include but are not limited to changes in buying patterns, changes in shopping locations, self-reduction of credit lines, movement to alternate payment methods and their respective cost management (cash), and less use of direct debit card products at the point of sale (specifically when PINs are also compromised).

Examples of Terminal Fraud

The following photographs are designed to assist in understanding the attack techniques used by criminals at merchant locations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image</th>
<th>Attack Technique</th>
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| ![Image 1](image1.png) | **Image 1**  
Terminals will have a sticker attached to the underside, which provides details of the product and will include a serial number. The majority of terminals will also have a method of displaying the serial number electronically.  
As part of your regular checks, note the serial number on the back of the terminal and check this against the electronic serial number.  
Additionally, run your finger along the label to check that it is not hiding a compromise. |
Image 2
Terminals often have security stickers, or company stickers placed over screw holes or seams that will act as indicators if the case has been opened.

Criminals often remove these labels when compromising terminals and may replace them with their own printed versions.

When you first receive the terminal, make careful note of label position, colour, and materials used. Taking a picture of the device is a good practice.

Also look for any signs that the label may have been removed or tampered with.

Image 3
Skimming devices hidden within the terminal will not be visible, and neither the merchant staff nor the cardholder will know that the card has been skimmed.

This picture shows a skimming device inserted in a terminal. This would have been hidden by the SIM card cover plate.
The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede PCI security standards and requirements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Attack Technique</th>
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| ![Key Logger](image4) | **Image 4**  
Key loggers are used to record all keystrokes made, in this case by an electronic cash register.  
Key loggers can be very small and can look like part of the normal cabling. It is therefore essential to pay close attention to detail when performing any inspection. |
| ![Changes to terminal connections](image5) | **Image 5**  
Changes to terminal connections can be difficult to spot.  
In these images, the criminals completely changed the cable used to connect the terminal to the base unit.  
This was to incorporate the additional wires required to capture card data. |
| ![Modern digital cameras](image6) | **Image 6**  
The modern digital cameras used to record the cardholder entering his or her PIN are very small when removed from their cases.  
This makes them very easy to hide or disguise at the merchant location.  
This type of miniature camera can easily be hidden in a ceiling tile above the terminal. |
<table>
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| ![Image 7](image7.jpg) | **Image 7**  
Staff should also be aware of additional, unfamiliar electronic equipment connected to the terminal, the cash register, or the network connections.  
This device records and decrypts ISDN data. |
| ![Image 8](image8.jpg) | **Image 8**  
Handheld skimmers used by corrupt staff are very small, fitting in the palm of one’s hand.  
Despite their size, these devices can store a significant amount of card data. |
| ![Image 9](image9.jpg) | **Image 9**  
In this picture, the criminal entered the merchant location posing as a service engineer.  
He stated that to prevent credit card fraud the terminal must be placed in this secure box. He then gave the staff a sheet of printed instructions.  
The box contained a card skimmer and miniature camera.  
**Be cautious of unannounced service visits.** |
| ![Image 10](image10.jpg) | **Image 10**  
These devices were used to connect into the telephone exchange of a shopping mall to record all transmissions from the stores to the merchants’ financial institutions.  
Such devices usually consist of voice recorders or MP3 players with very large memories. Often they have external batteries for improved life. |
<table>
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<th>Image</th>
<th>Attack Technique</th>
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</table>
| ![Image 11](image11.jpg) | **Image 11**  
This aerial view clearly shows how Wi-Fi signals can extend far beyond the four walls of the merchant location, allowing anyone to intercept the signal. Data should never be sent unencrypted over any wireless connection. |
| ![Image 12](image12.jpg) | **Image 12**  
Staff should also be aware of the addition of overlays. An overlay can be a small sticker that forms to the device and covers the keyboard area. Overlays may hide damage due to tampering or wires that can allow for keyboard logging. Overlays should not be used. |
<table>
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<th>Image</th>
<th>Attack Technique</th>
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| ![Image 13](image13.png) | **Image 13**  
3D printers have made duplicating plastics easier. In these examples, an overlay that included a card-data and PIN skimmer was added to the device.  
It is important to be aware that if the device remains off or unattended for a period of time, it should be checked periodically.  
The staff should be aware and report actual or suspected changes in the operation of the device. If something is not right, report it. |
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| ![Image 14](image14.png) | **Image 14**  
In an NFC attack, an NFC reader (in this case a smartphone) is placed between the terminal and the customer to capture the card data during a tap transaction.  
Additional equipment should not be placed near or around terminals. |
| ![Image 15](image15.png) | **Image 15**  
EMV or chip cards are not immune to skimming. Staff and consumers should be aware of modifications or wires to the smart-card slot. If anything appears different with the device, it should be reported immediately. |
Image 16

Criminals may not use a single attack against a device, but can use a combination of attack scenarios.

In this attack we see an overlay has been placed on the ATM’s card reader to capture the card data, and an additional overlay was added to the plastic that allowed for a hidden camera to capture the PIN.

Again, it is important to be aware that if the device remains off or unattended for a period of time, it should be checked periodically. The staff should be aware and report actual or suspected changes in the operation or look of the device. If something is not right, report it.
Chapter 2: Guidelines and Best Practices

Best practices and security guidelines for the prevention of skimming are based on successfully established countermeasures as identified by the merchant community, and known criminal activity as observed and investigated by the payment industry and law enforcement.

Guidelines and best practices fall within three major areas.

- **Merchant Physical Location and Security**: Many merchants have realized the benefits of operational and physical security countermeasures that not only provide a consistent brand image and transparent consumer experience, but also have the necessary physical security and operational controls required to support their retail locations and POS environments.

- **Terminals and Terminal Infrastructure Security**: Leveraging PCI SSC standards and approved devices should be considered a core component of any terminal security effort. Merchants should make every effort to leverage and use the controls, standards, and devices already established by PCI SSC for the protection of devices and data at the point of sale. The guidelines and recommended practices we provide in this document complement those standards.

- **Staff and Service Access to Payment Devices**: Employee and staff conduct should be a critical concern to all merchants, specifically in the processing of payment data and services.

**Merchant Physical Location and Security**

The merchant’s physical location, nature of business, and payment-terminal infrastructure have a significant impact on the likelihood of being targeted by criminal organizations for skimming. Merchants select and operate their business locations based on a wide variety of business conditions and requirements. These include but are not limited to the type of business a merchant has, the brand image they wish to project, the type of customer they seek, the cost to operate a facility, the ability to access and maintain an employee base, the ability to get consumer throughput based on retail location, and security and environmental issues required for the business.

A merchant’s physical location, once selected, must rely on physical security and operational controls to maintain a safe and secure environment for its employees, customers, and its line of business. The need to conduct a formal security risk analysis to identify risks—both logical/systems-based risk and physical/operational-based risk—for the business is critical to a merchant’s overall operation and success.

Relative to physical location and business type, a merchant’s ability to mitigate terminal and terminal infrastructure attacks is based primarily on the extent of the physical security and security operations (monitoring) that can be supported by the business.

The intent of this document is to provide supplemental information. Information provided here does not replace or supersede PCI security standards and requirements.
**Threat-Mitigating Resources**

Merchants are encouraged to use every possible resource they have available to mitigate the threat. This would include but not be limited to:

- The use of physical security systems;
- Physical security structure and design techniques for the POS and the retail space in general;
- Operational security processes;
- Terminal checklists and procedures;
- The use of terminal and payment equipment that adheres to PCI SSC standards; and
- The use of security consultants and security services (guard operations).

**Physical Protections**

Some best practices suggested for terminals and terminal infrastructure relative to site location and business type include the following:

**Terminals**

- Design payment locations with the additional intent to control customer access to payment technology and the payment location. Designs should include the protection and security of equipment and the respective cables and power sources. Security should extend into the ceiling and below flooring levels of the payment location, when applicable.
- Leverage and use vendor controls for terminal equipment and payment devices to their fullest extent possible.
- Mount and secure the terminal and cables with locking stands, cable trays, and other securing mechanisms.
- Position the PIN entry device so there is no method of actually being capable of recording or viewing any PIN entered by employees or customers.
- Leverage current PCI SSC standards and practices for terminals, terminal infrastructure, and the payment card data they process. Also look to upgrade to newer device standards for increased protection using approved PCI PTS PED, EPP, SCR, and UPT devices.
- Protect access to administration and configuration menus. Leverage PCI SSC standards and practices for password and access controls. Never use default or common passwords.
• Secure all terminals to the physical structure of the payment location when possible. (See “Terminals and Terminal Infrastructure Security” below). Place payment terminals and technology in a manner that offers the greatest level of security (less consumer and employee access), observation, and monitoring when possible.

• Physically secure and alarm all remote or self-service terminal payment environments to the greatest extent possible. Use long-standing retail physical security concepts (facility and site lighting, facility and site access, physical security systems, security operations and checks, etc.) to complement payment locations and support terminal security needs. Focus specifically on unattended terminals and payment locations to prevent skimming attacks.

• Maintain a list of all devices.

• Develop a schedule or routine to inspect devices to look for tampering or substitution. This could be once a day or at the beginning of each shift.

• Have an incident response plan for reporting tampered or substituted devices.

• Train personnel to be aware of suspicious behavior of customers and to report tampering or substitution of devices immediately as outlined in the incident response plan.

• Periodically rotate the individuals performing the device-checking to ensure nothing gets missed and to eliminate collusion.

Terminal Infrastructure

• Secure terminal wiring and communication lines with conduit or within physical structures of the facility when allowed or required by local building codes. Limit exposed terminal cable and wire or non-secure channels for communication infrastructure when possible. The intent should be to make it as difficult to access terminal wiring and cabling as possible, requiring more time on site to tamper or compromise terminal cabling.

• Protect all telephone rooms, panels, routers, drops, and connections that support terminal infrastructure. Use locks and control access to sensitive electrical and telephone closets that support payment infrastructure. Conduct regular checks of this infrastructure as required with management and security staff trained to be on the lookout for compromises.

• Segment and protect card data network from other functions within the merchant environment that may have access to public or other networking environments as outlined in PCI DSS.

• Protect access to wireless infrastructure such as Bluetooth and Wi-Fi and control access to wireless routers, passwords, and SSIDs. Leverage PCI SSC standards and practices for password and access controls.

• Whenever possible, encrypt the cardholder data leaving the terminal.
Cameras, Placement, Access, and Image Storage

- Use appropriate lighting as required to support payment environments and the monitoring capabilities of surveillance cameras. Ensure ATMs are well lighted and meet minimum physical requirements as defined by the appropriate regulatory mandates.

- The surveillance cameras should be sited such that they record the area around the PIN entry device but allow no method of actually recording or viewing any PINs entered.

- Support PCI DSS guidelines for 90-day storage of surveillance images.

- Locate cameras to cover primary site entrances and facility entrances. Use surveillance cameras to monitor payment lanes and locations when possible. Facility cameras provide a level of deterrence and a record of activity that can be used to support investigations.

- Immediately examine all terminals if a camera has been moved, damaged, or if images have been blocked. This may be an indicator that criminals have targeted your merchant location.

- Note the following:
  - Time stamps—in case the camera was switched off for a period of time
  - Any blackouts
  - Any period when the surveillance cameras image is blocked
  - Any incident when the camera is moved

Terminals and Terminal Infrastructure Security

It is very important to fully understand the security implications of your terminal environment. Where you choose to locate your terminal(s)—and everything that surrounds the terminal—has an impact on how easy it is for a criminal to compromise that terminal.

Terminals and terminal infrastructure are a major investment for the merchant and should be included in any site or location security risk analysis program. They support the lifeblood of any business, the actual payment process. Breaches or security issues can result in negative press and brand damage for the merchant.

Improvements in terminal security requires significantly more time for a criminal to compromise the terminal. PCI SSC has recently developed new security standards for terminals that support POI PED, EPP, SCR, and UPT (unattended payment terminals). However, due to the range, age, and type of terminals in use in the market today, criminals can still target merchant locations with older and “weaker” terminals or terminal infrastructure.

Note:

PCI SSC recommends that duty staff do not have direct unencumbered access to surveillance cameras, recording and control equipment, or tapes. Management or security personnel should review recordings on a recurring basis or when required to support an incident.
Terminal Surroundings

Once you have secured the terminal in its location, you need to be aware of its immediate surroundings and how this can be used to provide criminals with an opportunity to compromise cardholder data. Modern terminals offer a wide range of connectivity methods to enhance the ease and speed of transactions for the cardholder. Though many terminals provide data-encryption services, merchants should be aware that if necessary, certain configurations may have card data transmitted in clear text. Merchants should be aware where clear-text data is present in their network. Because criminals can target this data, it is essential that all staff understand and review all connections to the terminal and note the entire cable path from the terminal to the point where it leaves your merchant location. It is not unusual for criminals to replace a cable or insert logging equipment at any point in the path between the terminal and the external connection point at the merchant location. This could allow a criminal to eavesdrop on the terminal’s communication, regardless of the method you use to transmit card data to either your host or your head office.

IP Connectivity

Many terminals are connected directly to their host via the Internet. This “IP connectivity” enables transactions to be performed much more quickly, as you do not need to wait while the terminal dials up to make the connection. Also, Internet data-transfer speeds are significantly quicker. However, like every computer connected to the Internet, such terminals are at risk of attack and compromise from malware, viruses, denial-of-service attacks, etc.

- If terminal connections use shared wire with other merchant business applications in the retail facility, note any impact to other applications and remember to include a review of terminals and payment technology accordingly.
- Secure terminal cabling in public areas with conduit, or within physical structures where possible. The intent should be to make it as difficult to identify and access payment terminal wiring and cabling as possible, requiring more time on site for a criminal to tamper with it.
- Do not identify or tag the cable as terminal cable in your facility. If tagging is required, develop a code that limits easy identification of the cable as a payment-terminal cable.
- Consider cable locks: Some terminals have slots so that you can attach a cable lock (as used to secure laptop computers) to the terminal. This can then be threaded through the cable connecting the terminal to the cash register and then secured to prevent both the terminal and the cable from being compromised. This is strongly recommended as a best practice. To insert a skimming device, it is often necessary to remove the terminal from its location, or swap the existing terminal for another compromised terminal.

Warning!
Do NOT drill into terminals to connect cables, as this triggers security mechanisms inside the terminals, which will cause them to stop working.
Criminals will often try to steal a terminal to allow them more time to compromise it, and will later return it.
**Individual Terminal Data**

An essential step in protecting your POS terminals and ATMs is recording the number, type, and location of each of your devices. Such details will allow you to easily determine whether you have been targeted. See Appendix B for an example checklist on how to track and manage this data. For each terminal:

- Take multiple photographs of each terminal front and back, including any labels, serial numbers, and hardware identifiers when reviewing the device.
- Make the photographs available for a comparison review in the future. Comparing new photographs with old photographs makes it easier to spot differences.
- Record its location in the store (unless the terminals are removed and secured when the store is closed).
- Record the condition and location of any labels.
- Record the exact details of any security labels.
- For POI payment card devices connected to an electronic cash register or separate host system, record how the terminal is connected.
- Record how many connections (leads, plugs, aerials, etc.) are normally associated with each terminal. Record the style, type, and color of each connector, or take a photograph to show the number and the type of connectors used.
- Mark each terminal with an ultra-violet (UV) security pen to provide a unique identifier for that terminal.

Additionally:

- Use PCI SSC security standards to support your overall terminal security program.
- Replace older (weaker) terminals with PCI PTS approved terminals.
- Mount or use locking terminal stands.
- Do not allow unannounced service visits or accept unannounced upgrades (both hardware and software) without checking with your service provider.

**Terminal Reviews**

Use the sample forms in Appendix B to track and monitor terminal assets. Ensure these are reviewed on an ongoing basis by merchant or security staff.

- Build these terminal reviews into your shift changes, security guard tours of your facility, and/or when a terminal service call is initiated. Make it habit and a daily procedure to document and monitor your terminal environment, and train your staff to the importance of terminal and terminal infrastructure security. Use photographs to validate the terminal and serial number.
Terminal Purchases and Updates

It may be necessary at certain points throughout the lifetime of the terminal to update the software of the terminal or import new keys. Any process that involves changes to the terminal introduces increased risks. Before commencing any changes, modifications, or updates, ensure that you obtain the correct authorizations, and that only legitimate personnel are involved in the process.

When performing updates, especially the loading of new keys, it is essential that you:

- Maintain dual control at all stages.
- Complete and retain proper logs and control sheets.

When purchasing new terminals, make sure they have been approved and meet the requirements of the PCI PTS Security Evaluation Program and the DSS. Check the particular model numbers, including the hardware version and the firmware version, to ensure that the model is compliant.

Refer to the PCI-approved terminals website for a list of approved devices:

https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/approved_companies_providers/approved_pin_transaction_security.php

Terminal Disposal

Merchants need to dispose of old terminals in a secure and consistent manner. Some items to consider:

- Return old terminals to authorized dealers via secure shipping or direct pick-up when new terminals are installed. This may make business sense for the merchant, in addition to providing a secure manner to dispose of old terminals.
- Clear terminal operating system and application data from all memory or trigger a tamper response when possible. Check with the terminal manufacturer to help determine requirements.
- Remove all tags and store or business identifiers.
- If possible, develop a contract with an authorized vendor who can help dispose of electronic materials and components in a secure and environmentally friendly manner.
- If possible, do not dispose of terminals in trash containers or dumpsters associated with your store, eliminating the ability of the criminal to easily target your business.
- Do not allow your terminals to be sold on-line as aftermarket devices (i.e., eBay or craigslist), especially if the device still has your application and data in the device.

**PIN Protection**

As well as capturing the Track 2 data containing details of the cardholder’s account number, the criminals will also wish to obtain the PIN to maximize the compromise. The PIN, once entered, is encrypted throughout the data chain so the criminal must either compromise the terminal to allow PIN capture during entry, or—more commonly—insert a miniature camera to observe and record the PIN as it is entered.

Digital technology has enabled cameras to become significantly smaller. Criminals can hide the devices in numerous ingenious ways, so their presence may not be obvious to staff or customers. Criminals have been known to hide cameras in:

- False ceilings above PIN pads
- Boxes used to hold leaflets
- Overlays or plastics
- Charity boxes next to PIN pads

Understanding how and where criminals can hide cameras helps to reduce such threats. While the area around a cash desk is a prime location for merchandise, it is essential that stands containing goods, leaflets, or even charity boxes must not be situated next to, or near, PIN pads, ATMs, or POS terminals. Train staff to be aware of any changes to the area around the till, especially any new boxes that appear, which could house a covert camera.

As part of the ongoing check of your merchant location, staff should also pay close attention to the ceiling area, especially where there is a false ceiling. It is very difficult to spot the very small hole required for the camera, so look for the more obvious signs of entry or change, such as a tile that has been lifted, moved, or handled. Refer to Chapter 1, Image 6 in “Examples of Terminal Fraud,” for a visual example of such a camera.

**Wireless Terminals**

Many payment terminals can offer various methods of wireless connectivity. This may offer those merchants without access to a dedicated telephone network the ability to accept debit and credit transactions or to provide a better service to cardholders.

Wireless connectivity allows the terminal to be removed from the cash desk, such as in a restaurant where the terminal can be taken to a table to allow the customer to pay their bill without losing sight of their payment card.

While this offers benefits to the cardholder and further limits the exposure to employee skimming activity, the risk to the merchant is that it is very easy for a criminal to steal such a terminal, modify it, and return it without anyone realizing it has gone.
It is therefore essential that you know how many terminals are in use each day and devise a method to identify quickly who has the terminal at any particular time. For example, you could give each staff member a token, which they must leave at the cash desk whenever they take the terminal away.

The types of terminals mentioned above are usually either “Bluetooth” or “Wi-Fi” enabled. You must be aware that, although designed to operate over short ranges, criminals can intercept Bluetooth and Wi-Fi signals over significant distances, and certainly beyond the walls of your merchant location. (See “Examples of Terminal Fraud,” Image 11, in Chapter 1.) It is therefore essential that you enable all proper security functions on the terminal and, where necessary, apply all security updates and patches.

Some terminals connect to their host system via the GPRS (mobile phone) network. This allows merchants who are not at fixed locations, such as music concerts or art festivals, to accept credit and debit card payments. As there is no fixed location, it is you, the merchant, who is responsible for ensuring the integrity and security of the terminal and that you store it securely when it is not in use.

Another type of terminal collects card data and then connects to a mobile phone or tablet for transport. These mPOS devices are becoming more popular and can connect either physically (via the headphone jack or USB interface) or wirelessly via Bluetooth. These devices can support card swipe and some have been designed to support chip data and PIN entry. The card data and PIN are entered into an mPOS (s/b validated to the PCI PTS secure reading and exchange of data (SRED) POI module) device, encrypted, and sent to the phone or tablet. The mPOS devices can be inexpensive and easily stolen or replaced. In addition, malware can trick the user to enter their PIN on the tablet or mobile phone, thus capturing their information. The PIN should never be entered into a tablet or mobile phone, but on the connected device that has been tested and listed by PCI on the PCI-approved terminals website.

Staff and Service Access to Payment Devices

The topic of staff in relation to criminal activity is very sensitive. Naturally most employers consider their staff to be loyal, hardworking, and trustworthy. But that trust needs to be validated and established at the time of hire, and then proven over time by appropriate behavior. We need to recognize that all businesses need to measure an employee’s level of responsibility and protect access to sensitive data and payments on an ongoing basis.

It is important to be aware that employees may have a criminal background at the time of hire or develop criminal intent over their time of employment. Internal fraud committed by staff is a very difficult subject to address but we need to recognize it can be the most insidious and damaging type of theft that a business encounters. Unfortunately, it is a fact that employees hired into certain types of business have conducted skimming.
Staff as Targets

Staff members may be considered prime targets for criminals using either bribery or coercion, especially in high-risk merchants where the number of staff on duty at any one time is limited. Criminals may offer up to a year’s salary to a sales assistant to “look the other way,” or even to help with skimming cards. They may also target the employee’s family in order to coerce the employee to carry out its fraudulent work. Therefore:

- Your company must have a specific policy covering these issues to allow staff to report any kind of inappropriate approach to them by criminals.
- Staff must be able to report to senior management anonymously, as it has been known for criminals to target store managers.
- Train your staff to be aware of the types of fraud attacks criminals may attempt and the risk to them. The staff needs to understand the necessity of completing regular terminal and terminal infrastructure checks, and learn how to spot any changes that could indicate that an attack has taken place.
- Rotate staff responsibilities.

Hiring and Staff Awareness

When hiring new staff, the merchant should always conduct a background check where allowed by law. These background checks help protect the merchant and the consumer and allow the merchant to make an informed decision on an applicant at the time of hire.

- Background checks should include validation of employee data as supplied in the hiring process, a criminal check, a financial/credit check, and an education check. Previous employment history should also be in scope when applicable. This is the best way to validate a new employee’s statements and ensure you are hiring the best possible candidate.

If background checks are not allowed by law, or not available, the merchant should have at least the following data on the employee:

- Full name
- Full address and telephone number
- Date of birth
- Photo
- Previous work history
- References
- National ID, Social Security Number, etc.

It is essential to train all new staff to ensure that they know how to protect the terminal environment by being aware of what to look out for. In addition, all staff should understand:
- The notification and escalation process to report an event
- The procedure for escalating concerns about a terminal
- Who to contact if they have concerns about terminal security
- How to contact senior management if they discover a compromise
- How management or the employee should contact local law enforcement if someone threatens or attempts to bribe them to compromise terminals or payment data

Outside Personnel and Service Providers

In addition, there are personnel that support payment terminals or terminal infrastructure who are not directly controlled by the merchant. These personnel can range from terminal-service technicians, security officers, facility maintenance personnel, telephone personnel, mall staff, etc. Though such individuals are not directly controlled or managed by the merchant, merchants can indicate the type of service and behavior they expect on their premises and in the service of their equipment, and should also communicate how incidents should be reported to merchant management when discovered by these personnel. Merchants should insist on background checks for these personnel from your service providers.

- Service level agreements can and should be leveraged by the merchant to get additional checks and controls from these service providers for terminal checks, terminal infrastructure support, and physical security controls when applicable.

- If it becomes necessary to call a service engineer, you must have a clear agreement of a time and date for the service call and, if possible, confirm the name of the service engineer who is to conduct the service.

- If a service engineer, or someone purporting to be a service engineer, arrives at your merchant location unannounced, you must not allow any access to any terminals until you have verified that person's credentials. This must include contacting the vendor, or service company, to confirm their identity.

- All work undertaken by the service engineer must be recorded in a report, which is retained for at least six months.
Terminal Characteristics Form

This are designed to verify the integrity of your terminals and terminal environment.

Complete one copy of this form for each terminal (card swipe device) used at your location.

Use photographs to validate the device** Recommendation Only**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terminal Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Functional Area:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Member completing form:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terminal Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Make:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Number:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serial number (on printed label):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serial number (on screen, if applicable):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General condition and appearance: (color, existing marks, scratches, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of manufacturer’s security seals or labels:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Details of manufacturer’s security markings or reference numbers:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Details of any UV markings applied to the terminal:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is this terminal connected to its host device?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connection #1: Connector type, color of lead:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connection #2: Connector type, color of lead:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connection #3: Connector type, color of lead:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many connections in total (all leads, plugs,)?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This Terminal Characteristics Form was completed by:

__________________________________________________________________________

Sign name please _______________________________ Date ____________________________
**Monthly Physical Inspection Checklist**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Area:</th>
<th>Date of Inspection:</th>
<th>Staff Member Performing Inspection(s):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Complete a copy of this checklist, on a monthly basis, to evaluate your terminals and terminal environment. (This form assumes there are five terminals deployed, T1–T5.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>With reference to the relevant Terminal Characteristics Form, for each terminal:</th>
<th>ID#</th>
<th>ID#</th>
<th>ID#</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is the terminal in its usual location?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the manufacturer’s name correct?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the model number correct?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the serial number printed on the label correct?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the serial number displayed on screen correct?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are the color and general condition of the terminal as described, with no additional marks or scratches (especially around the seams)?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are the manufacturer’s security seals and labels present, with no signs of peeling or tampering?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are the manufacturer’s security markings and reference numbers as described?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are any expected ultra-violet markings present, and as described?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are all connections to the terminal as described, using the same type and color of cables, and with no loose wires or broken connectors?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count the number of connections to the terminal. Does this agree with the number stated?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are all display stands, charity boxes, or other merchandising within the vicinity of this terminal as described, with no additional boxes or display materials near to the terminal?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the condition of the ceiling above the terminal the same as described, with no additional marks, fingerprints, or holes?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the total number of terminals in use the same as the number of terminals officially installed?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where surveillance cameras are used, is the total number of cameras in use the same as the number of cameras officially installed?</td>
<td>N/A—Middlebury Does Not Utilize Surveillance Camera’s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This Monthly Physical Inspection Checklist was completed by:

_______________________________  __________________
Sign name please                Date

Foundation for this document taken from the PCI SSC Skimming Prevention Best Practices for Merchants September 2014