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# **Seeds of Extremism: Ecofascism and Militant Accelerationism in a Warming World**

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## Introduction

Climate change and violent extremism represent two of the most significant challenges confronting contemporary global security. Yet their intersection, and particularly the specific mechanisms through which extremist ideologies exploit environmental crises for recruitment, mobilization, and justification of violence, has received insufficient integrated analysis connecting ideological, tactical, and structural dimensions. This gap carries significant consequences: as climate impacts accelerate and environmental anxieties intensify, movements positioned to exploit these dynamics gain expanded opportunities for radicalization, while counterterrorism and conflict transformation efforts operate without an adequate understanding of the ideological architectures they confront.

This paper examines the convergence of two distinct but increasingly intertwined extremist currents: ecofascism and militant accelerationism. While these ideologies emerged from separate intellectual traditions—ecofascism from early twentieth-century fascist appropriations of environmental concern, accelerationism from debates within radical political philosophy—their fusion in contemporary far-right networks produces a synthesis more dangerous than either alone. Environmental catastrophe becomes simultaneously the justification for violence, the target of violence, and the anticipated consequence of violence. Understanding this convergence, its mechanisms, and its operational manifestations constitutes the central objective of the present analysis.

The analysis proceeds from the foundational premise that climate change operates not as a direct cause of extremism but as a threat multiplier, creating conditions that ideologically motivated actors subsequently exploit. Section 1 develops this framework in detail, synthesizing climate-conflict scholarship to identify the specific pathways through which environmental stress generates opportunities for extremist recruitment and mobilization: resource scarcity, displacement, and governance failure. This structural analysis provides the context within which the ideological examination that follows gains explanatory power; extremist movements do not create these vulnerabilities but systematically exploit them.

The analysis builds systematically across eight sections. Section 1 establishes the climate-conflict framework. Sections 2 and 3 examine accelerationism and ecofascism as distinct ideological traditions, tracing their intellectual foundations, rhetorical strategies, and digital infrastructure before Section 4 demonstrates how their convergence produces a hybrid threat greater than its components. Sections 5 and



6 ground the theoretical framework through case studies: the 2019 El Paso Walmart shooting, where a gunman's manifesto synthesized environmental collapse narratives with eliminationist violence, and the Pine Tree Party, a digital ecofascist network illustrating the organizational infrastructure through which such ideologies propagate. Section 7 conducts cross-case analysis, while Section 8 develops policy recommendations drawing on empirical research regarding radicalization drivers, platform governance, environmental peacebuilding, and proportionality principles.

Both case studies emerge from Western contexts where this specific convergence has predominantly manifested. The analysis acknowledges this scope limitation while Section 7 examines conditions for potential spread and distinguishes the Western ecofascist-accelerationist phenomenon from other forms of climate-extremism nexus globally, including the dynamics operating in climate-stressed regions of the Global South where groups leverage environmental degradation through different ideological frameworks.

Throughout, this analysis employs a conflict transformation framework that emphasizes changing the conditions that produce violence rather than simply suppressing its symptoms. Effective response to the ecofascist-accelerationist convergence requires working simultaneously at multiple levels: addressing the structural vulnerabilities that extremist movements exploit, while disrupting the specific mechanisms through which exploitation occurs. Neither structural intervention nor counter-extremism efforts alone suffice; sustainable prevention demands attention to both conditions and actors. The analysis that follows attempts to hold these dual imperatives in productive tension, providing the empirical foundation and theoretical architecture necessary for responses that address root causes while countering immediate threats.

## **Section 1: Climate Change as a Driver of Conflict and Extremist Opportunity**

Climate change operates as a threat multiplier, acting upon existing social fault lines such as ethnic tensions, weak governance, and economic inequality, while aggravating underlying vulnerabilities and elevating the risk of violent conflict. The relationship between climate and conflict is neither simple nor deterministic; environmental stress creates circumstances that human actors, including extremist movements, subsequently exploit for political and ideological purposes. This section establishes the



mechanisms through which environmental degradation generates such opportunities, enabling a focused examination of how accelerationist and ecofascist actors leverage these dynamics.

The mechanisms linking climate change to conflict operate through multiple pathways, each characterized by distinct yet interconnected dynamics. This analysis organizes the broad climate-conflict literature around the three primary channels of resource scarcity and competition, climate-induced displacement, and governance failure. This tripartite framework synthesizes multiple scholarly traditions, integrating Reuveny's work on resource stress and migration, Van Baalen and Mobjörk's climate security pathways, Burke et al.'s economic channels linking temperature to conflict, and broader institutional analyses of state fragility under environmental pressure. Each pathway operates through particular mechanisms but rarely in isolation; the three channels interact in ways that Section 1.5 synthesizes.

Empirical evidence for direct climate-conflict linkages remains contested. Mach et al. found that while climate has influenced armed conflict within countries, experts ranked it as substantially less influential than other drivers, such as low socioeconomic development and weak state capacity, placing it 14th out of 16 conflict risk factors.<sup>1</sup> Sakaguchi, Varughese, and Auld's systematic review yields similarly mixed results, with findings highly sensitive to methodological choices and the specific variables examined.<sup>2</sup> This evidence underscores that climate functions as a threat multiplier, amplifying existing vulnerabilities rather than generating conflict independently. This contested empirical terrain does not undermine the present analysis; rather, it reframes its contribution. The framework's utility lies not in claiming direct causation, but in identifying how extremist actors target specific vulnerabilities at each stage. For such movements, contested causality is irrelevant. The perception of environmental crisis furnishes narratives for mobilization, whether or not climate directly causes conflict.

### **1.1 Resource Scarcity and Competition**

Resource scarcity constitutes the first major pathway from climate stress to violent conflict. Climate change disrupts the availability and distribution of critical resources, such as water, arable land, grazing areas, fisheries, creating both absolute shortages and distributional conflicts over access and control.

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<sup>1</sup>Mach, Katharine J., et al. "Climate as a Risk Factor for Armed Conflict." *Nature* 571 (2019): 193–197. <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1300-6>.

<sup>2</sup>Sakaguchi, Kendra, Arun Varughese, and Graeme Auld. "Climate Wars? A Systematic Review of Empirical Analyses on the Links Between Climate Change and Violent Conflict." *International Studies Review* 19, no. 4 (2017): 622–645. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48557271?seq=1>.



Scarcity, however, is not merely physical in nature; it also encompasses power dynamics, governance capacity, and the political economy of distribution. Reuveny's analysis demonstrates that resource stress generates grievances and desperation precisely when institutions fail to manage distribution equitably or when powerful actors monopolize access, producing circumstances conducive to violent competition over diminishing resources.<sup>3</sup>

Contemporary resource competition manifests across multiple domains. Water scarcity drives conflict in transboundary river basins and over depleting aquifers. Food insecurity from crop failures, livestock losses, and price volatility undermines livelihoods and breeds resentment.<sup>4</sup> Desertification, sea-level rise, and salinization reduce arable land, forcing communities into competition over shrinking productive areas. These pressures generate both intra-group tensions over allocation and intergroup conflicts, particularly when resource stress intersects with ethnic, religious, or clan-based identities.

Burke et al.'s analysis of African conflict demonstrates that temperature increases correlate with elevated conflict risk: a 1°C warming is associated with an approximate 4.5% increase in civil war incidence, operating primarily through economic channels as agricultural productivity declines and rural livelihoods become unsustainable.<sup>5</sup> Resource competition generates the desperation and discontent that extremist movements require for recruitment, providing both material motivation for violence and ideological fodder for narratives of scarcity and existential threat.

## 1.2 Climate-Induced Displacement

Beyond resource competition localized to specific geographic areas, a second major pathway emerges when environmental degradation forces populations to migrate. The scale of climate displacement is substantial and accelerating; the International Displacement Monitoring Centre reports that 56% of the 46.9 million new internal displacements in 2023 were triggered by disasters, with 7.7 million people

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<sup>3</sup>Reuveny, Rafael. "Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict." *Political Geography*, 26, no. 6 (2007): 656-673. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.05.001>.

<sup>4</sup>Scheffran, Jürgen and Michael Brzoska. "Climate Change and Violent Conflict." *Science*, 336, 869-871 (2012). <https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.1221339>.

<sup>5</sup>Burke, Marshall B., Edward Miguel, Shanker Satyanath, John A. Dykema, and David B. Lobell. "Warming Increases the Risk of Civil War in Africa." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 106, no. 49 (2009): 20670–20674. <https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.0907998106?doi=10.1073%2Fpnas.0907998106>.



living in displacement as of December 31, 2023.<sup>6</sup> This movement takes multiple forms, including sudden-onset events such as hurricanes and floods, slow-onset processes such as desertification, sea-level rise, and prolonged drought. The distinction between internal displacement and cross-border migration is worthy of note, as each generates distinct political dynamics and opportunities for extremist mobilization.

Migration itself does not inherently cause conflict, but it generates friction that extremist actors can leverage. Reuveny's analysis identifies several mechanisms through which climate-induced migration elevates conflict risk. These mechanisms include competition over resources in destination areas, ethnic and identity tensions between newcomers and hosts, strain on public services, and political actors' manipulation of migration anxieties.<sup>7</sup> Examples including the Syrian crisis, forced displacement in the Sahel region, and Central American migration highlight how climate-driven movement can generate environments prone to violence, particularly when compounded by political unrest, economic stress, and ethnic divisions.

Extremist movements capitalize on displacement dynamics from both directions. Displaced populations face economic desperation, social dislocation, and resentment toward governments perceived as having failed them, making them recruitment pools for armed groups. Simultaneously, host communities experiencing resource pressure and cultural anxieties become susceptible to radicalization through anti-immigrant sentiment and exclusionary nationalism.<sup>8</sup> Far-right actors instrumentalize these dynamics by framing climate-induced migration as an invasion, a replacement, or a civilizational threat, interpreting environmental displacement as an existential crisis that justifies violence.<sup>9</sup> Climate displacement thus produces both desperate migrants vulnerable to recruitment and resentful hosts susceptible to anti-migrant radicalization, providing extremist entities with opportunities on both sides of the migration dynamic.

### **1.3 Governance Failure and Institutional Collapse**

The displacement pressures documented above compound a third pathway of governance failure. Mass population movements strain state capacity through demands on services, infrastructure, and security

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<sup>6</sup>Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). *Global Report on Internal Displacement 2024*. 2024. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2024/>.

<sup>7</sup>Reuveny (2007).

<sup>8</sup>Reuveny (2007).

<sup>9</sup>Macklin, G. (2022). "The Extreme Right, Climate Change and Terrorism." *Terrorism & Political Violence* 34, no. 5 (2022): 979-96. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2022.2069928>.





apparatus; when these strains coincide with the direct impacts of climate disasters, even capable states struggle to respond effectively. Weak or fragile states can experience complete collapse when overwhelmed by climate shocks. Van Baalen and Mobjörk's analysis of climate security pathways in East Africa identifies several mechanisms through which this occurs: worsening livelihood conditions breed discontent; increased migration and shifting pastoral mobility patterns intensify resource competition; armed groups exploit weather conditions for tactical advantage; and elites manipulate climate-related frustrations for political gain.<sup>10</sup> Extreme weather events overwhelm response capacity, destroy infrastructure, disrupt economic activity, and force resource diversion from other government functions. Compound disasters (multiple events occurring simultaneously, or cascading failures where one disaster triggers others) can paralyze even relatively capable governments.

Governance failure in the face of climate disasters erodes state legitimacy and opens political space for non-state actors to provide services, establish authority, and challenge state control. Extremist movements position themselves as alternative providers of security, order, and meaning, offering competing narratives that explain suffering, identify enemies, and promise solutions. Competition over aid intensifies, conspiracy theories about disaster response proliferate, and armed groups leverage governance failures to expand their support base.

The Sahel exemplifies this pattern: prolonged drought and desertification have contributed to governance collapse, enabling groups including Boko Haram and affiliates of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State to harness popular discontent, recruit from desperate populations, and establish control over ungoverned territories.<sup>11</sup> Syria's pre-war drought illustrates similar dynamics, with climate stress exacerbating existing governance failures and contributing to the circumstances that enabled both popular uprising and extremist mobilization.<sup>12</sup>

#### 1.4 The Climate-Extremism Nexus

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<sup>10</sup>Van Baalen, Sebastian, and Malin Mobjörk. "Climate Change and Violent Conflict in East Africa: Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Research to Probe the Mechanisms." *International Studies Review* 20, no. 4 (2018): 547–575.

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320994410\\_Climate\\_Change\\_and\\_Violent\\_Conflict\\_in\\_East\\_Africa\\_Integrating\\_Qualitative\\_and\\_Quantitative\\_Research\\_to\\_Probe\\_the\\_Mechanisms](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320994410_Climate_Change_and_Violent_Conflict_in_East_Africa_Integrating_Qualitative_and_Quantitative_Research_to_Probe_the_Mechanisms).

<sup>11</sup>Scheffran and Brzoska (2012).

<sup>12</sup>Scheffran and Brzoska (2012).



Climate disasters function as recruitment opportunities. Displacement, scarcity, and governance failure generate resentments that armed groups leverage to build support. Disinformation campaigns during and after disasters amplify public anger, undermine trust in institutions, and position extremist movements as credible alternatives to failed governments. Climate anxiety itself becomes a mobilization narrative; far-right movements, for instance, frame environmental collapse as evidence of civilizational decay requiring radical transformation.<sup>13</sup>

The convergence of climate stress and extremism is not hypothetical, but actively unfolding. Climate-stressed regions with weak governance have become safe havens where armed groups leverage environmental vulnerabilities to establish control, recruit fighters, and generate revenue. The Sahel demonstrates this feedback loop: climate stress undermines livelihoods and governance capacity, creating opportunities for recruitment and territorial control, which further degrades governance and security, deepening vulnerability to both climate impacts and violent exploitation.

Critical to this analysis is the recognition that climate does not directly cause extremism. Buhaug's critique of climate determinism emphasizes that political, economic, and social factors often overwhelm climate variables in explaining conflict outcomes; attributing violence primarily to climate change risks obscuring the agency of political actors and the culpability of governance failures.<sup>14</sup> Boas et al. challenge alarmist narratives about climate migration, arguing that deterministic predictions often lack empirical support and can generate policy responses that harm vulnerable populations rather than protecting them.<sup>15</sup> The contested nature of climate-conflict research demands analytical precision: climate operates as an amplifying factor, acting on existing vulnerabilities rather than as an independent cause of violence. Human agency and ideology remain central to understanding violence in climate-stressed contexts; climate provides the context, while extremist actors provide intent, organization, and justification.

### 1.5 From Climate Stress to Extremist Exploitation

Three pathways connect climate stress to violent conflict: resource scarcity generates competition and discontent; displacement creates both desperate migrants and anti-migrant backlash; and governance

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<sup>13</sup>Macklin (2022).

<sup>14</sup>Buhaug, Halvard. "Climate Not to Blame for African Civil Wars." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 107, no. 38 (2010): 16477–16482. <https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.1005739107>.

<sup>15</sup>Boas, Ingrid, Carol Farbotko, Helen Adams et al. "Climate migration myths." *Nature Climate Change* 9, 901-903 (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-019-0633-3>.



failure opens space for non-state armed groups. These pathways often operate simultaneously, with resource competition driving displacement, displacement straining governance, and governance failure exacerbating resource conflicts in compounding cycles. Climate change produces instability, resentment, and institutional weakness that ideologically motivated actors harness for recruitment, radicalization, and mobilization.

Two extremist ideologies have emerged to interpret and amplify climate-driven instability. Militant accelerationists view climate collapse as validation of their predictions about inevitable societal breakdown, treating environmental catastrophe as evidence that the system must be hastened toward total collapse through violence and sabotage. Ecofascists instrumentalize climate anxiety as justification for exclusion and violence, framing environmental degradation as the fault of racialized “others” who must be eliminated or expelled to restore ecological balance. Both ideologies seize upon the chaos, fear, and governance failures that climate change engenders, transforming environmental vulnerability into revolutionary or eliminationist opportunities. Understanding how these ideologies operate, recruit, and justify violence requires examining their distinct origins, tactics, and convergence points—the focus of the sections that follow.

## **Section 2: Accelerationism**

The convergence of extremist ideologies with environmental crisis narratives represents a significant challenge for contemporary conflict transformation efforts.<sup>16</sup> To understand this nexus, we must first examine accelerationism, an ideology that has evolved from obscure theoretical debates into a template for violent action across the far-right extremist landscape. Accelerationism, in its militant form, advocates for the deliberate hastening of societal collapse through violence, sabotage, and disruption, rejecting incremental political change in favor of catastrophic breakdown that will enable the emergence of a new social order. While accelerationist thought spans both far-left and far-right variants, this research centers on militant far-right accelerationism, which has become embedded in white supremacist and neofascist networks and increasingly intersects with environmental collapse narratives. Understanding accelerationism's ideological foundations, operational tactics, and digital mobilization strategies is essential for analyzing its convergence with ecofascist thought.

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<sup>16</sup>ADL Center on Extremism. "Accelerationism." *Anti-Defamation League, Center on Extremism* (2025). <https://www.adl.org/resources/background/accelerationism>.



## 2.1 Defining Accelerationism

Accelerationism as a concept originated in critical theory and radical political philosophy, but has transformed substantially as far-right extremist movements have co-opted it. At its core, accelerationism posits that existing social, political, and economic systems are irredeemably corrupt and that their collapse, whether inevitable or deliberately provoked, is necessary for fundamental transformation. The ADL traces white supremacist accelerationism to the 1990s writings of American neo-Nazi James Mason, whose work provided operational blueprints for terrorism that subsequent groups like Atomwaffen Division adopted and distributed.<sup>17</sup> Far-left accelerationism envisions hastening capitalism's contradictions to enable postcapitalist futures, while far-right accelerationism seeks to accelerate the collapse of liberal democratic, multicultural societies to establish ethnostates organized around racial hierarchy.

Among far-right accelerationist variants, militant accelerationism represents the translation of these theoretical positions into violent practice. The Institute for Strategic Dialogue characterizes militant accelerationism as driven by the desire to hasten societal collapse as it currently exists, viewing violence as the necessary catalyst.<sup>18</sup> This ideology rejects electoral politics, activism, and institutional reform as ineffective or counterproductive, instead embracing total war against the existing system.<sup>19</sup> The goal is not protest or resistance, but a complete systemic breakdown through the targeting of infrastructure, the elimination of political enemies, and the generation of cascading failures that overwhelm governmental capacity and trigger societal disintegration.<sup>20</sup>

The ideology's operational logic centers on the concept of “the system,” a totalizing construct encompassing governmental institutions, economic structures, cultural norms, and demographic patterns that accelerationists view as fundamentally hostile to their objectives. Miller's analysis of accelerationism within the white power movement illustrates how this framing functions: the system cannot be reformed because it is designed to perpetuate conditions accelerationists oppose; therefore, only complete

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<sup>17</sup>ADL Center on Extremism (2025).

<sup>18</sup>Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD). "Accelerationism: An Overview of Extremist Narratives About the Need for Societal Collapse to Preserve the White Race." 2022. <https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Accelerationism-ISD-External-August2022.pdf>.

<sup>19</sup>ISD (2022).

<sup>20</sup>ISD (2022).



destruction enables the construction of alternatives.<sup>21</sup> This rejection of reform distinguishes militant accelerationism from other far-right currents that pursue electoral strategies or policy influence, positioning it as an explicitly revolutionary tendency committed to violence as the primary means of political change.

Foundational texts circulate within militant accelerationist networks, providing ideological coherence and tactical guidance for adherents.<sup>22</sup> For instance, James Mason's *Siege*, originally published as a newsletter in the 1980s and subsequently compiled and distributed by groups like Atomwaffen Division, represents the most influential militant accelerationist text, advocating for leaderless resistance, lone-wolf terrorism, and infrastructure sabotage as means to hasten collapse.<sup>23</sup> Mason's work explicitly rejects organized political activity in favor of decentralized violence, arguing that exemplary acts of violence by individuals or small cells can inspire emulation, demoralize opponents, and demonstrate the system's vulnerability.<sup>24</sup> The text's republication and digital circulation beginning in 2017 marked a significant inflection point, introducing militant accelerationist ideas to a new generation of actors and establishing the template that subsequent individuals have adopted and adapted.<sup>25</sup>

## 2.2 Militant Accelerationism and Violence: From Theory to Praxis

Militant accelerationists do not merely predict societal collapse, as more philosophical accelerationists do. Instead, they actively work to precipitate it through targeted violence, infrastructure sabotage, and propaganda designed to heighten social tensions and erode institutional legitimacy.<sup>26</sup> Militant accelerationism rests on several assumptions: that modern societies are fragile systems vulnerable to disruption; that spectacular violence can inspire emulation and trigger cascading failures; that racial and

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<sup>21</sup>Miller, Cassie. "'There Is No Political Solution': Accelerationism in the White Power Movement." *Southern Poverty Law Center* (2020).

<sup>22</sup>Newhouse, Alex. "The Threat Is the Network: The Multi-Node Structure of Neo-Fascist Accelerationism." *CTC Sentinel* 14, no. 5 (2021).

<sup>23</sup>Beauchamp, Zack. "Accelerationism: The Obscure Idea Inspiring White Supremacist Killers Around the World." *Vox* (2019).  
<https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/11/11/20882005/accelerationism-white-supremacy-christchurch>.

<sup>24</sup>ISD (2022).

<sup>25</sup>Miller (2020).

<sup>26</sup>Johnson, Bethan and Matthew Feldman. "Siege Culture After Siege: Anatomy of a Neo-Nazi Terrorist Doctrine." *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)* (2021).  
<https://icct.nl/publication/siege-culture-after-siege-anatomy-neo-nazi-terrorist-doctrine>.



ethnic tensions can be inflamed to generate civil conflict; and that governance structures will buckle under sufficient pressure, creating opportunities for revolutionary transformation.

Consistent with these assumptions, lone-actor terrorism constitutes the primary tactical modality of militant accelerationism. Lone-actor terrorism explicitly endorses the leaderless resistance model, a strategy in which autonomous individuals or small cells conduct attacks without formal organizational direction, inspired instead by manifestos, online propaganda, and the example of previous attackers.<sup>27</sup> This approach offers operational security advantages, as there is no organizational hierarchy to infiltrate or disrupt, while maintaining ideological coherence through shared narratives and goals. Miller's analysis of accelerationism within the white power movement traces how the concept of leaderless resistance evolved from earlier white supremacist strategy into a core accelerationist tactic, with militants explicitly calling for autonomous attacks to hasten system collapse.<sup>28</sup>

Under this model of leaderless resistance, the manifestos of militant accelerationist attackers serve as both explanations of violence and as recruitment tools, circulating widely within far-right networks and explicitly calling for others to follow their example.<sup>29</sup> The manifestos produced by attackers in Christchurch, El Paso, and Buffalo exemplify this pattern: each document explains the attacker's motivations, provides ideological justification for violence, and explicitly encourages readers to conduct their own attacks.<sup>30</sup> These texts function as strategic communications that attempt to inspire copycat terrorism while providing ideological frameworks that future attackers can adopt and adapt.

Target selection within militant accelerationist violence reflects the ideology's core objectives and strategic assumptions.<sup>31</sup> Mass-casualty attacks targeting racial, ethnic, or religious minorities aim to inflame intergroup tensions, provoke government overreach, and generate retaliatory violence that accelerates societal polarization. Infrastructure attacks targeting power grids, communications networks, water systems, and transportation hubs seek to demonstrate governmental incompetence, degrade public confidence, and create chaos conducive to extremist mobilization. Political violence targeting government

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<sup>27</sup>Dittrich, Miro, Jan Rathje, Thilo Manemann, and Frank Müller. "Militant Accelerationism: Origins and Developments in Germany." CeMAS, September 15, 2022. <https://cemas.io/en/publications/militant-accelerationism/>

<sup>28</sup>Miller (2020).

<sup>29</sup>Dittrich et al. (2022).

<sup>30</sup>Dittrich et al. (2022).

<sup>31</sup>Beauchamp (2019).



officials, law enforcement, and perceived enablers of multiculturalism aims to eliminate opposition and intimidate potential resistors. Each form of violence serves the overarching goal of accelerating collapse, whether through direct system disruption or through secondary effects that compound the initial attack, such as intergroup conflict, governance failure, or public panic.

### **2.3 Operational Tactics: Infrastructure as Vulnerability**

The operational repertoire of militant accelerationists reflects the strategic calculation that small-scale but high-impact actions can trigger cascading failures within complex social and technological systems. Infrastructure targeting emerges as a central tactic, with militant accelerationists viewing critical systems, such as energy grids, communication networks, water supplies, and transportation hubs, as vulnerable nodes whose disruption can amplify chaos and undermine public confidence in governmental capacity. Loadenthal's analysis of accelerationist communities on Telegram reveals extensive discussion of infrastructure vulnerabilities, with users sharing tactical guidance on sabotage techniques alongside target selection criteria emphasizing accessible, ungarded sites whose disruption would generate cascading systemic effects.<sup>32</sup>

This emphasis on infrastructure reflects the tactical principle of force multiplication through target selection. Rather than attacking hardened military or governmental facilities, accelerationists target civilian systems whose disruption generates disproportionate psychological and social effects. A successful attack on electrical infrastructure, for example, not only disrupts power supply but cascades into failures of water treatment, telecommunications, food distribution, and medical services, generating widespread panic and demonstrating state incapacity. The principle of force multiplication extends to symbolic targeting as well: attacks on places of worship, schools, and community centers are valued among militant accelerationists not merely for the casualties they inflict, but for their capacity to generate terror, inflame intergroup tensions, and provoke overreactions that further polarize society.<sup>33</sup>

Coordination within militant accelerationist networks occurs primarily through decentralized digital platforms. Despite minimal formal organizational structure, substantial ideological alignment and tactical knowledge-sharing persist online. Newhouse's analysis of neo-fascist accelerationist coalition-building

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<sup>32</sup>Loadenthal, Michael. "Feral Fascists and Deep Green Guerrillas: Infrastructural Attack and Accelerationist Terror." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 15, no. 1 (2022): 169–208. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2022.2031129>.

<sup>33</sup>Loadenthal (2022)





demonstrates how extremists share operational guides, celebrate successful attacks, and provide tactical feedback to would-be attackers, creating a distributed support network that enables lone actors while maintaining operational security.<sup>34</sup> This decentralized structure renders traditional counterterrorism approaches, which are primarily focused on disrupting organizational hierarchies, less effective; the network persists even as individual nodes are neutralized.

## **2.4 Online Ecosystems: Digital Infrastructure for Radicalization**

The rise of militant accelerationism cannot be separated from the digital ecosystems that enable its spread, coordinate its tactics, and forge its collective identity. Online platforms such as Telegram have served as infrastructure for accelerationist radicalization, enabling the circulation of propaganda, tactical guides, and ideological manifestos while celebrating past acts of violence and encouraging future attacks.<sup>35</sup> Newhouse's multi-node network analysis demonstrates how these networks function as distributed systems where membership flows fluidly across groups, creating organizational redundancies that make suppression difficult; when one group is disrupted, members migrate to successor organizations or rebrand under new names.<sup>36</sup>

Beyond structural resilience, the aesthetic culture of accelerationist online spaces plays a significant role in recruitment and identity formation. Content within these spaces blends violence, absurdism, and political messaging in ways that simultaneously attract adherents and provide plausible deniability.<sup>37</sup> This aesthetic serves multiple functions: it creates opportunities to claim content is ironic or satirical; it lowers psychological barriers to violence through gradual desensitization; and it establishes a subcultural identity that bonds participants through shared transgression. Manifestos from previous attackers circulate widely within these networks and are often annotated with commentary and praise, providing scripts for future violence.<sup>38</sup> This circulation transforms terrorism into a narrative and martyrdom into a model—each attack becomes a chapter in an ongoing story that future attackers are invited to continue

Recruitment within these digital spaces operates through gradual radicalization rather than through abrupt conversion. Individuals enter militant accelerationist networks through exposure to broader far-right

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<sup>34</sup>Newhouse (2021).

<sup>35</sup>Beauchamp (2019); Johnson (2021).

<sup>36</sup>Newhouse (2021).

<sup>37</sup>Loadenthal (2022).

<sup>38</sup> Newhouse (2021).





content, progressively engage with more extreme material, adopt increasingly militant positions, and eventually view violence as necessary and heroic. External political events can serve as mobilization catalysts; Hughes and Miller-Idriss document how the January 6, 2021 Capitol attack functioned as a significant mobilization moment for militant accelerationist networks, interpreted within these circles as evidence that system collapse was imminent and that revolutionary violence was both justified and achievable.<sup>39</sup> Platform moderation efforts have had limited success, as accelerationist networks migrate to encrypted platforms, decentralize across multiple services, and develop operational security practices that frustrate surveillance.<sup>40</sup>

Parker's analysis of accelerationist threat perceptions reveals that militants view their violence not as random terrorism but as a strategic intervention in what they perceive as inevitable societal collapse.<sup>41</sup> This self-conception as revolutionary vanguard rather than criminal terrorist enables moral disengagement and justifies extreme violence as necessary for civilizational preservation. The convergence of accelerationist ideology with environmental collapse narratives occurs extensively within these digital spaces, with climate change increasingly invoked as evidence of system failure and as justification for accelerating collapse.

## 2.5 An Operational Logic Seeking Ideological Substance

Militant accelerationism thus represents a comprehensive ideological and operational system that is committed to societal collapse as both inevitable and necessary, tactically focused on cascading disruptions through infrastructure and symbolic targeting, and digitally networked for resilience and recruitment. The ideology requires substantive content—specific grievances, identified enemies, and moral justifications—to mobilize adherents toward violent action. Increasingly, environmental collapse narratives, particularly those filtered through ecofascist ideology, fill this role. Ecofascism offers accelerationists a seemingly rational justification for violence; to understand this synthesis and assess its implications for emerging extremist threats, ecofascism must first be examined as a distinct ideological tradition before analyzing its convergence with accelerationist praxis.

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<sup>39</sup>Hughes, Brian, and Cynthia Miller-Idriss. "Uniting for Total Collapse: The January 6 Boost to Accelerationism." *CTC Sentinel* 14, no. 4 (2021): 12–18. <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/uniting-for-total-collapse-the-january-6-boost-to-accelerationism/>.

<sup>40</sup>Dittrich et al. (2022).

<sup>41</sup>Parker, Jade. "Accelerationism in America: Threat Perceptions." *Global Network on Extremism and Technology* (2020). <https://gnet-research.org/2020/02/04/accelerationism-in-america-threat-perceptions/>.



### Section 3: Ecofascism

As established in Section 2, militant accelerationist movements seek ideological content to justify their violent tactics. Ecofascism has emerged as a framework that merges environmental concern with exclusionary, authoritarian, and racist politics, filling this void. Ecofascism is not a new phenomenon; its roots extend to early twentieth-century fascist movements that instrumentalized nature, land, and ecological purity to legitimize racial hierarchies and nationalist expansion. However, contemporary ecofascism has experienced a revival in the context of accelerating climate change, mass migration, and resource competition.

Ecofascism exploits the climate-conflict dynamics established in Section 1—resource scarcity, displacement, and governance failure—and reinterprets each pathway as a justification for violence. The ideology frames environmental degradation as the fault of specific racialized populations who must be eliminated to restore balance, offering accelerationists a seemingly rational justification for violence: the planet is dying, conventional politics have failed, and only radical action can usher in a new age. Yet ecofascism is not merely an auxiliary ideology grafted onto militant accelerationist tactics; it represents a distinct ideological tradition with historical roots, rhetorical strategies, and digital infrastructure. Understanding ecofascism's conceptual foundations, historical evolution, and operational manifestations is essential for analyzing how it converges with militant accelerationist praxis. This section examines ecofascism as an independent phenomenon before analyzing its fusion with militant accelerationism.

#### 3.1 Defining Ecofascism: When Environmentalism Becomes Eliminationism

Ecofascism represents a longstanding but evolving ideological current that fuses environmental concern with authoritarian, ethnonationalist, and exclusionary politics. Defining the term presents both analytical and political challenges, as ecofascism encompasses a range of ideological positions and has been variously deployed in scholarly literature and activist discourse. At its core, ecofascism refers to the fusion of ecological or environmental rhetoric with fascist, ethnonationalist, or authoritarian political ideologies. However, the term risks imprecision; Macklin notes that ecofascism can function as an overly broad category, potentially conflating diverse phenomena ranging from authoritarian environmentalism to violent extremism.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup>Macklin (2022).



For the purposes of this analysis, ecofascism is understood as a specific ideological configuration in which environmental concerns are harnessed to exclusionary political objectives: environmental protection becomes synonymous with border defense; resource scarcity justifies population control targeting specific ethnic or national groups; and ecological collapse narratives serve as calls for authoritarian renewal instead of for collective action toward sustainability. Where Section 1 established climate change as a threat multiplier that extremist actors exploit, ecofascism represents the ideological framework through which that exploitation operates, transforming environmental stress into eliminationist justification. This definition distinguishes ecofascism from mainstream environmentalism through its instrumental relationship to ecology; where mainstream movements advocate environmental protection as the primary objective, ecofascist movements treat environmental concerns as vehicles for exclusionary political goals.

Central to ecofascist ideology is the framework of palingenetic ultranationalism, the fascist belief that society must collapse and be reborn through radical (and often violent) transformation. Within ecofascist discourse, environmental collapse serves as the new palingenetic myth, where ecological crises become both evidence of civilizational decay and justification for authoritarian renewal. This framework positions environmental degradation not as a shared crisis requiring collective action, but as a threat to specific racial or national groups that must be defended through exclusion and violence. The palingenetic logic operates identically whether the trigger is framed as racial demographic change, a cultural decadence, or an environmental catastrophe: societal death must precede rebirth; destruction enables renewal; and violence becomes the mechanism for transformation.

Contemporary ecofascism is not merely a marginal or symbolic ideology, but a digital subculture that blends ecological anxieties with extremist activism.<sup>43</sup> The ideological synthesis merges nostalgic anti-modern environmentalism with far-right militant tropes, creating a distinct subculture where nature, race, technology, and violence converge. This convergence produces a worldview that acknowledges ecological crises while rejecting democratic, egalitarian, or humanitarian responses in favor of coercive population control, violent border enforcement, and authoritarian governance justified as ecological necessity.

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<sup>43</sup>Shanaah, Sadi, Immo Fritsche, and Mathias Osmundsen. "Support for Pro-Climate and Ecofascist Extremism: Correlates and Intersections." *Democracy and Security* 20, no. 1 (2024): 46–68. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2023.2220111>.



The conceptual architecture of ecofascism rests on several interconnected elements, each reinterpreting the climate-conflict pathways documented in Section 1. First, the racialization of environmental problems transforms climate change from a global justice issue into a demographic threat requiring the elimination of specific populations, instrumentalizing resource scarcity as a justification for violence rather than cooperation. This targeting is highly context-specific: the Christchurch attacker blamed Muslims, the El Paso attacker targeted Hispanic immigrants, and the Buffalo attacker focused on Black Americans, yet all employed similar logic: framing their particular targets as environmental threats while positioning themselves as defenders of land and resources. Second, the biologization of hierarchy positions inequality as biologically determined and ecologically necessary as opposed to socially constructed and politically contested. Third, the aestheticization of nature deploys pastoral imagery, romantic primitivism, and organic metaphors to create affective bonds between land, blood, and belonging, each of which serve to legitimize exclusion and violence. Fourth, the exploitation of crises exploits environmental disasters and climate anxiety as opportunities for authoritarian mobilization and violent action. These elements combine to produce an ideology that instrumentalizes environmental concern for fascist ends.

### 3.2 Blood and Soil Reborn: The Nazi Roots of Contemporary Ecofascism

Contemporary ecofascism's ideological architecture traces to foundations established during the rise of European fascism in the early twentieth century, particularly within Nazi Germany's "Blood and Soil" (Blut und Boden) mythology.<sup>44</sup><sup>45</sup><sup>46</sup> Understanding this lineage is essential, as current ecofascist movements explicitly draw upon, revive, and adapt these historical precedents. The Nazi regime intertwined ecological rhetoric with racial purity narratives, using environmental protection language to advance nationalist goals and consolidate totalitarian power. Figures like Richard Walther Darré promoted organic agriculture and land conservation, but always within a framework that positioned German peasants as carriers of racially pure blood and linked environmental health to ethnic homogeneity.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>44</sup>Hughes, Brian, Dave Jones, and Amarnath Amarasingam. "Ecofascism: An Examination of the Far-Right/Ecology Nexus in the Online Space." *Terrorism & Political Violence* 34, no. 5 (2022): 997-1023. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361296753\\_Ecofascism\\_An\\_Examination\\_of\\_the\\_Far-RightEcology\\_Nexus\\_in\\_the\\_Online\\_Space](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361296753_Ecofascism_An_Examination_of_the_Far-RightEcology_Nexus_in_the_Online_Space).

<sup>45</sup>Staudenmaier, Peter. "Ecofascism Past and Present." *Ecology Contested: Environmental Politics between Left and Right* (2021): 13-16. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/355793421\\_Ecofascism\\_Past\\_and\\_Present](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/355793421_Ecofascism_Past_and_Present).

<sup>46</sup>Kuran, Hikmet. "The Ecofascist Legacy of the Nazis: Historical Roots of Far-Right Ecologies." *Cappadocia Journal of Area Studies* 4, no. 2 (2022): 136-151. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/367284005\\_The\\_Ecofascist\\_Legacy\\_of\\_the\\_Nazis\\_Historical\\_Roots\\_of\\_Far-right\\_Ecologies](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/367284005_The_Ecofascist_Legacy_of_the_Nazis_Historical_Roots_of_Far-right_Ecologies).

<sup>47</sup>Bramwell, Anna. "Blood and Soil: Richard Walther Darré and Hitler's 'Green Party.'" *Kensal Press* (1985).



Nazi environmental policy was characterized by what Kuran and Staudenmaier describe as the instrumentalization of ecological sensibilities: the regime promoted organic agriculture, established nature protection laws, and cultivated romantic imagery of rural landscapes and peasant life, but always in service of racist ideology and authoritarian control instead of environmental stewardship.<sup>48</sup> The Animal Protection Law of 1933 and the Nature Protection Law of 1935 served primarily as propaganda tools that generated popular support while allowing sweeping exceptions for military and industrial expansion.<sup>49</sup> This instrumentalization—using environmental concern as legitimation for fundamentally anti-ecological fascist projects—established patterns that persist in contemporary ecofascist movements.

The ideological through-line connecting Nazi ecology to contemporary ecofascism is the palingenetic framework introduced above: Nazi ideology framed Weimar Germany as corrupted by industrialization, urbanization, and racial mixing, with return to agrarian rootedness and racial purity presented as a pathway to national rebirth. Contemporary ecofascism deploys nearly identical logic, substituting climate change and immigration for the specific crises emphasized by historical fascism while maintaining the core structure: civilization is dying, certain populations are responsible, and violent renewal is necessary.

The evolution from historical to contemporary ecofascism has been marked by what Champion describes as a transition from "Brownshirts to Greenshirts," a strategic rebranding where far-right movements adopt environmental themes not from ecological concern but as a rhetorical façade to soften their image, gain legitimacy, and expand their appeal.<sup>50</sup> This rebranding exploits growing public anxiety over climate change, allowing movements to position themselves as defenders of nature while advancing racist and authoritarian agendas. The appropriation is strategic, with environmental themes providing entry points for radicalization, offering moral legitimation for exclusionary politics, and enabling recruitment among individuals who might reject overt fascist symbolism but accept environmentally framed nationalism.

The Nazi naturalization of hierarchy, the second element of ecofascist conceptual architecture identified in Section 3.1, positioned inequality as biologically determined and ecologically necessary. Darré's agricultural romanticism was explicitly hierarchical rather than egalitarian. German peasants were defined as a homogeneous Nordic racial group who formed the cultural and racial core of the nation, while Polish

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<sup>48</sup>Kuran (2022); Staudenmaier (2021), 14-15.

<sup>49</sup>Kuran (2022).

<sup>50</sup>Champion, Kristy. "From Brownshirts to Greenshirts: Understanding Ecofascism in a Time of Climate Crisis." *C-REX* (2022).



farmers were dismissed as backward and their land as exhausted—justifying plans for expropriation and resettlement by “good German peasants.” This biological determinism extended to gender, with women classified into four categories based on their suitability for reproduction, and to class, with Darré proposing a “Chamber of Nobles” selected from a breeding pool of Nordic peasants.<sup>51</sup> Contemporary ecofascism inherits this logic virtually intact: hierarchies of race, nation, and consumption are portrayed as ecological facts rather than social constructions, with inequality reframed as a sustainable differentiation necessary for planetary survival.

This historical pattern operated across all three climate-conflict pathways that contemporary ecofascism now exploits. Resource competition was naturalized as a racial struggle for living space (*Lebensraum*), with Slavic populations framed as competitors for German agricultural land who must be eliminated to secure resources for the racially superior German people. Population displacement was reframed as an invasion requiring violent defense, with refugee movements from Eastern Europe portrayed as demographic threats contaminating German blood and soil. Governance failures were attributed to Weimar democracy's supposed inability to protect German environmental and racial purity, justifying authoritarian renewal through Nazi consolidation of power. Contemporary ecofascism inherits these interpretive frameworks, substituting climate refugees for displaced populations, environmental collapse for Weimar decay, and climate governance failures for democratic weakness. The pathways remain identical; only the specific crises change.

The historical lineage reveals several persistent features that structure contemporary practice. First, ecofascism consistently instrumentalizes environmental concern rather than protecting ecosystems; environmental rhetoric serves political goals, not ecological ones. Second, it biologizes social hierarchies by framing inequality as biologically determined and ecologically necessary rather than socially constructed. Third, it links Nazi “Blood and Soil” narratives through metaphors of rootedness, purity, and belonging that justify territorial control and population elimination. Fourth, it positions authoritarian violence as a regenerative force that will restore balance between people, land, and nature. These historical patterns structure contemporary ecofascist ideology and operational practice.

### **3.3 The Snakeoil Strategy: Recruiting Through Environmental Concern**

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<sup>51</sup>Bramwell (1985).



Ecofascism's contemporary appeal and its capacity to recruit adherents depend not merely on ideological content, but on rhetorical and aesthetic strategies that normalize extremist ideas by embedding them within seemingly benign environmental concern. These strategies function as soft entry points that lower barriers to radicalization by first establishing common ground around ecological anxieties before gradually introducing exclusionary and violent solutions.

The primary rhetorical mechanism operates through what can be understood as a "snakeoil strategy," building on Shifflett's analysis of ecofascist rhetoric that presents false "cures" for environmental problems disguised as legitimate solutions.<sup>52</sup> This strategy operates by first establishing the environment as a universal good, then subtly redefining that good in racial terms.<sup>53</sup> This rhetorical progression exploits environmental concerns to legitimize racist and authoritarian conclusions, presenting exclusion and violence as logical responses to ecological crises rather than as ideological choices. The strategy proceeds through staged progression: first, audiences are invited to agree that environmental protection is necessary and urgent. Second, environmental problems are gradually linked to specific populations, with the particular targets varying by context (Muslims, immigrants, refugees, populations in the Global South), using metaphors of invasion, infestation, and contamination. Third, exclusionary solutions such as border closure, population reduction, and elimination of those deemed expendable are presented as environmentally necessary rather than ideologically motivated.

Once audiences accept the premise of an environmental crisis, the transition to exclusionary policy or racialized blame appears logical rather than ideological.<sup>54</sup> Frames of purity, restoration, and crisis are deployed to link the restoration of nature with the purification of the racial or national body politic, framing environmental protection as inseparable from ethnic or national preservation.<sup>55</sup> This rhetorical structure transforms ecofascism from an explicitly extremist position to a seemingly rational response to perceived threats; if one accepts the premise that environmental collapse threatens survival, and if one accepts the racialized explanation for that collapse, then exclusionary violence appears not as hatred but as a necessary defense.

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<sup>52</sup>Shifflett, Lindsey. "Ecofascist 'Snakeoil' and the Imperative of Racializing Environmental Justice for the 21st Century." Master's thesis, James Madison University (2020). <https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/masters202029/107/>.

<sup>53</sup>Shifflett (2020).

<sup>54</sup>Shifflett (2020).

<sup>55</sup>Shifflett (2020), 35.





The racialization of environmental problems works through a distinctive mechanism whereby ecofascist narratives frame environmental degradation as the fault of racialized others, transforming climate change from a global justice issue into a demographic threat requiring border defense.<sup>56,57</sup> This rhetorical move conflates immigration with ecological destruction through metaphors that brand targeted populations as "invading foreigners" or "parasites." Within this logic, the invasion of non-native species threatening ecosystems becomes synonymous with human migration, environmental protection becomes conflated with border protection, and environmental cleansing merges with ethnic cleansing.

Far-right online communities frequently frame immigration as a form of environmental destruction itself, arguing that migrant populations threaten both native ecology and national identity.<sup>58</sup> Richards, Jones, and Brinn's analysis of climate change discussions on Stormfront reveals how ecological crisis rhetoric is consistently linked to the "Great Replacement" and "white genocide" conspiracy theories, frequently incorporating antisemitic elements by framing Jews as orchestrating demographic change through corporate capitalism and immigration policy. The narrative recasts migrants as a "foreign species" or "pollutant," transforming migration policy into what ecofascists portray as ecological protection.<sup>59</sup>

This environmental racism operates through what Szenes examines as a form of "ecobordering": the framing of migration control and border fortification as necessary environmental protection measures.<sup>60</sup> The ideology recognizes environmental crises, but deliberately shifts focus away from overconsumption and structural inequality in high-income regions toward demographic arguments and coercive population control targeting specific racialized groups.<sup>61</sup> By establishing environmental crisis as a universal concern but then defining culprits in racial, ethnic, or national terms, ecofascist discourse advances solutions that appear benign or beneficial but conceal deeply exclusionary ideology.

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<sup>56</sup>Marin, Diego, and Marguerite Culot. "Green Supremacy: When Far-Right Politics Co-opts Environmentalism." *Green European Journal* (2023).

<https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/green-supremacy-when-far-right-politics-co-opts-environmentalism/>

<sup>57</sup>Szenes (2024).

<sup>58</sup>Hughes, Jones, and Amarasingam (2022).

<sup>59</sup>Richards, Imogen, Callum Jones, and Gearóid Brinn. "Eco-Fascism Online: Conceptualizing Far-Right Actors' Response to Climate Change on Stormfront." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2022.2156036>.

<sup>60</sup>Szenes, Eszter. "Building Resiliency to Ecofascist Radicalisation: Preventing an Emerging Threat." *ICCT Policy Brief* (2023): <https://icct.nl/publication/building-resiliency-ecofascist-radicalisation-preventing-emerging-threat>.

<sup>61</sup>Marin and Culot (2023).





These rhetorical strategies are amplified through aesthetic dimensions that Section 3.4 examines in detail: the deployment of pastoral imagery, nature photography, and 'cute' animal content that softens barriers to radicalization by packaging exclusionary ideology within seemingly benign environmental appreciation.<sup>62</sup> Visual propaganda creates affective pathways from environmental concern to violent extremism, establishing subcultural identity while providing plausible deniability.<sup>63</sup> The mechanisms through which digital platforms operationalize these aesthetics require separate analysis; first, however, the snakeoil strategy must be traced across each climate-conflict pathway.

The snakeoil strategy and its aesthetic amplifications operate differently across each climate-conflict pathway established in Section 1, transforming empirical phenomena into radicalization opportunities. Resource scarcity dynamics are reinterpreted: ecofascist rhetoric acknowledges competition over water, land, and food, but systematically racializes the culprits, framing water shortages as caused by immigrant consumption rather than structural inequality and agricultural strain as caused by overpopulation in the Global South rather than overconsumption in high-income regions. Climate-induced displacement is reframed from humanitarian crises requiring coordinated response to environmental invasion demanding violent border defense, with climate refugees portrayed as ecological parasites set to deplete receiving communities' resources and degrade their environments. Governance failures become evidence not of needed institutional strengthening and climate adaptation, but of diversity policies weakening response capacity and multiculturalism undermining social cohesion necessary for effective action. Each pathway provides recruitment opportunities where legitimate grievances generated by climate impacts are channeled toward eliminationist conclusions.

The instrumentalization of crisis, the fourth element of ecofascist conceptual architecture, operates through this opportunistic exploitation of climate-conflict pathways. These rhetorical and aesthetic strategies are effective because they exploit the gap between environmental crisis reality and inadequate governmental response. When climate disasters occur, resource scarcity intensifies, or migration increases (the conditions documented in Section 1), ecofascist narratives offer seemingly coherent explanations and decisive solutions. The rhetoric instrumentalizes grievances generated by climate impacts while directing blame toward specific racialized populations rather than structural causes, transforming environmental

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<sup>62</sup>Darwish, Maria. "Fascism, Nature and Communication: A Discursive-Affective Analysis of Cuteness in Ecofascist Propaganda." *Feminist Media Studies* 25, no. 2 (2025): 443–463. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14680777.2024.2313006>.

<sup>63</sup>Darwish (2025).



victims into scapegoats and climate anxiety into eliminationist ideology. Disasters become not tragedies revealing need for solidarity and institutional capacity-building, but confirmations of extremist worldview and recruitment opportunities for movements positioning themselves as alternative sources of meaning and action in the face of system failure.

### **3.4 From Cute Animals to Terrorism: Digital Radicalization Infrastructure**

Section 2.4 established how militant accelerationist networks utilize digital platforms for radicalization, tactical coordination, and celebrating violence through decentralized infrastructure on platforms like Terrorgram. Ecofascist digital spaces share this technological architecture, operating on the same platforms, employing similar encryption and decentralization strategies, and circulating content that glorifies terrorism. However, they also introduce distinctive elements that expand recruitment reach and lower psychological barriers to entry. Where purely militant accelerationist content emphasizes destruction, collapse, and militant action, ecofascist aesthetics provide gateway mechanisms through environmental concern, pastoral imagery, and romantic primitivism that appear benign. Where accelerationist channels explicitly celebrate terrorist "saints" like Breivik and Tarrant, ecofascist spaces valorize anti-technology figures like Kaczynski and ecological preservation narratives that provide seemingly rational justifications for violence. This aesthetic expansion enables the radicalization of individuals who might reject explicit neo-Nazi symbolism or militant accelerationism, but resonate with environmental themes and anti-modern sentiment, gradually introducing them to militant accelerationist praxis through ecological justification and nature-based identity formation.

These rhetorical and aesthetic strategies, while effective in themselves, achieve their full operational potential when deployed through digital infrastructure that enables rapid dissemination, decentralized coordination, and progressive radicalization. Digital platforms transform aesthetic signaling into operational planning. Platforms such as Telegram, particularly within decentralized networks, have become sites where ecofascist ideology is not merely discussed but operationalized,<sup>64</sup> and where aesthetic signaling transitions into tactical planning.

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<sup>64</sup>Farrell-Molloy, Joshua. "Understanding Eco-Fascism: A Thematic Analysis of the Eco-Fascist Subculture on Telegram." *Global Network on Extremism & Technology* (2022). <https://gnet-research.org/2022/11/02/understanding-eco-fascism-a-thematic-analysis-of-the-eco-fascist-subculture-on-telegram/>.



Analysis of ecofascist Telegram channels reveals that environmental themes are integral to far-right digital spaces' aesthetic and tactical identity.<sup>65</sup> These digital ecosystems are characterized by four recurring thematic clusters: anti-technology radicalism influenced by figures like Ted Kaczynski; anti-urbanism and rural idealization presenting cities as sites of racial mixing and environmental degradation; atavistic masculinity tied to warrior myths and ancestral heritage; and neo-völkisch pagan spirituality linking race, land, and blood.<sup>66</sup> These themes function simultaneously as identity markers, aesthetic signals, and ideological bridges connecting environmental concern to violent extremism.

The platforms operate not as isolated communities but as nodes within broader far-right networks, with frequent cross-posting of content celebrating terrorism and lone-actor violence.<sup>67</sup> This networked structure enables ecofascist content to circulate widely while evading centralized moderation, as material removed from one channel resurfaces in others. The decentralized architecture creates resilience that makes suppression difficult while maintaining ideological coherence through shared narratives, symbols, and goals. Content flows horizontally across channels rather than hierarchically from leadership, creating distributed systems where no single node is essential, and the network persists.

The radicalization pathway enabled by these digital spaces proceeds via gradual progression rather than abrupt conversion.<sup>68</sup> Initial engagement often occurs through aesthetic content that appears relatively benign and establishes environmental concern as a shared value and identity marker. This content performs a critical gateway function, attracting individuals who might reject overt fascist symbolism but resonate with environmental themes. Subsequent exposure introduces more explicitly racial and nationalist framings, subtly linking environmental degradation to demographic change, immigration, and multiculturalism. The progression continues with increasingly explicit themes framing violence and infrastructural sabotage as necessary responses to both environmental and civilizational crises.

Disinformation campaigns play roles in this radicalization pathway. Ecofascist propaganda deploys deliberate efforts to spread false, misleading, or manipulated content about environmental threats,

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<sup>65</sup>Molloy (2022).

<sup>66</sup>Molloy (2022).

<sup>67</sup>Szenes (2023).

<sup>68</sup>Szenes, Esther. "Investigating the Role of Disinformation in the Rise of Eco-Fascism," *CORDIS: EU Research Results*, European Commission (2024).  
<https://cordis.europa.eu/article/id/448724-investigating-the-role-of-disinformation-in-the-rise-of-eco-fascism>.



demographic change, and governmental failures.<sup>69</sup> These campaigns employ linguistic strategies, using recurring patterns that legitimize ecofascist ideology by framing environmental protection as defense of land and specific ethnic or national groups. Szenes's EU-funded research on ecofascist propaganda demonstrates how such rhetoric systematically conflates environmental and demographic threats, branding minority populations as invasive species and merging the protection of ecosystems with the defense of borders<sup>70</sup> When climate disasters occur, ecofascist channels rapidly circulate content attributing inadequate response to diversity policies or immigration, framing climate impacts as evidence that collapse is underway and violence is justified.

Digital platforms instrumentalize each climate-conflict pathway from Section 1 for radicalization and mobilization. When resource scarcity intensifies, such as through water restrictions in drought-affected regions, food price spikes, or energy shortages, networks rapidly circulate content blaming immigrants and refugees for consumption patterns. When climate-induced displacement occurs, such as through hurricanes generating refugee flows, sea-level rise forcing migration, or agricultural collapse driving movement, propaganda frames it as an invasion requiring violent border defense, with climate migrants portrayed as environmental threats who will deplete receiving communities' resources. When governance failures manifest, such as through inadequate disaster response, infrastructure collapse, or delayed aid distribution, adherents attribute failures to multiculturalism weakening social cohesion and diversity policies undermining governmental capacity. The digital infrastructure transforms each empirical climate-conflict pathway into a radicalization opportunity, exploiting real grievances to advance extremist narratives and recruit adherents to violent movements.

The aesthetic culture within these spaces creates synergistic effects where environmental and extremist content mutually reinforce rather than merely coexist.<sup>71</sup> Pastoral imagery, pagan symbolism, and anti-modern romanticism provide a cultural branding that makes violent extremism appear less nihilistic and more purposeful. Nature imagery depicting idyllic landscapes, mysticism, and “return to land” motifs functions as both an identity marker and a mobilization tool, transmitting simultaneous messages of nostalgia, loss, and imagined utopian futures.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>69</sup>Szenes (2023).

<sup>70</sup>Szenes (2024).

<sup>71</sup>Molloy (2022).

<sup>72</sup> Macklin (2022).



Much content operates at the level of aesthetic participation without explicit calls for violence: adherents share nature photography, post anti-technology memes, and express nostalgia for pre-industrial society.<sup>73</sup> However, this aesthetic participation serves several functions. It normalizes the presence of environmental themes within extremist spaces, creates plausible deniability for more explicit content, and establishes pathways along which aesthetic participants can progress toward operational militancy. The malleability of ecofascist themes, and in particular their capacity to function as both benign environmental concerns and violent extremist ideologies, makes them effective tools for recruitment and radicalization.

The far-right/ecology nexus flourishes in these digital spaces, producing hybrid discourse that appeals simultaneously to nature romantics and radical political actors.<sup>74</sup> While the proportion of individuals engaging with ecofascist rhetoric who move toward violent action remains unclear, the overlap with militant accelerationist subcultures and the glorification of terrorism create mobilization potential.<sup>75</sup> The pathways connecting environmental grievance to violent action are increasingly established within these online ecosystems, with each climate disaster providing fresh opportunities for propaganda that exploits public fear, undermines institutional legitimacy, and positions extremist narratives as explanatory frameworks.

Digital platforms thus create a complete radicalization infrastructure: ideological justification through environmental collapse narratives, aesthetic culture that establishes identity and lowers psychological barriers, tactical knowledge circulating through guides and discussions, operational security through encryption and decentralization, and event exploitation leveraging disasters for recruitment.<sup>76</sup> Building resilience to ecofascist radicalization requires addressing the specific linguistic patterns and visual strategies operating within these spaces and equipping individuals with knowledge to identify how these resources function in radicalization strategies and disinformation campaigns.

### **3.5 From Ideology to Violence: Bridging Ecofascism and Accelerationism**

The examination of ecofascism reveals an ideology with historical roots in fascist appropriations of environmental concern, rhetorical strategies that exploit climate anxiety for racist mobilization, and

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<sup>73</sup>Hughes, Jones, and Amarasingam (2022).

<sup>74</sup>Hughes, Jones, and Amarasingam (2022).

<sup>75</sup>Hughes, Jones, and Amarasingam (2022).

<sup>76</sup>Szenes (2023).



digital infrastructure that transforms aesthetic participation into pathways toward violence. Ecofascism operates through the instrumental use of environmental rhetoric, subordinating ecological concern to exclusionary political objectives while presenting racist violence as planetary defense. The “snakeoil strategy” recruits through universal environmental values before racializing problems and solutions. The ecobordering framework transforms migration control into environmental protection. The affective aesthetics deploy “cute” and pastoral imagery to soften extremist content. The digital ecosystems create distributed networks where environmental themes integrate seamlessly with violent extremism. Across all dimensions, ecofascism systematically reinterprets the three climate-conflict pathways from Section 1—resource scarcity, displacement, and governance failure—transforming each from empirical phenomenon into ideological justification for eliminationist violence.

Yet ecofascism does not exist in isolation. Its contemporary significance lies precisely in its convergence with other extremist ideologies, most notably militant accelerationism. Where ecofascism provides environmental narratives and moral justifications, explaining why collapse is necessary and who must be eliminated, militant accelerationism supplies tactical frameworks and operational logics, identifying vulnerabilities, selecting targets, and coordinating attacks. This convergence transforms both ideologies: accelerationism gains substantive content and ethical legitimation through environmental collapse narratives, while ecofascism gains tactical coherence and violent urgency through accelerationist methods. The result is a hybrid ideology in which environmental catastrophe becomes both the justification for and the method of achieving societal collapse. Section 4 analyzes this convergence through three systematic dimensions: ideological fusion, tactical alignment, and digital operationalization.

## **Section 4: Convergence of Ecofascism and Accelerationism**

The convergence of ecofascist and accelerationist ideologies produces a distinct synthesis that leverages environmental collapse narratives to justify and direct violent action toward systemic breakdown. This convergence operates primarily at the level of ideology, tactics, and digital infrastructure rather than formal organizational integration. The movements remain distinct subcultures, but their compatibility enables individuals to synthesize both frameworks and networks to circulate both ideologies through shared channels. The result is hybridization without unification, a synthetic flexibility that may prove more resilient than traditional organizational structures precisely because it lacks the hierarchical vulnerabilities that conventional counterterrorism approaches target.



This fusion systematically weaponizes the climate-conflict pathways established in earlier sections. Where Section 1 documented how resource scarcity, climate-induced displacement, and governance failures create conditions that extremist actors exploit, and the ecofascism analysis demonstrated how that ideology reinterprets each pathway as justification for eliminationist violence, this section demonstrates how convergence transforms these pathways into operational frameworks for coordinated attacks. As Farrell-Molloy observes, ecofascist movements celebrate environmental collapse in ways that align with accelerationism's conviction that destruction must precede renewal.<sup>77</sup> This section examines that synthesis in detail, tracing how environmental crises simultaneously become the justification for violence, the target of violence, and the anticipated consequence of violence. The analysis demonstrates that this convergence operates not merely as an ideological overlap but as a force multiplier where accelerationism gains moral legitimation through environmental narratives and ecofascism gains operational coherence through accelerationist methods.

#### **4.1 Ideological Fusion: Collapse as Opportunity**

At the ideological level, ecofascism and accelerationism share a foundational commitment to societal collapse as both inevitable and necessary for transformation. Both operate within a palingenetic framework, as discussed in Section 3: the conviction that societal death must precede rebirth, and that the old order must be destroyed before a new one can emerge. For accelerationists, collapse represents the failure of liberal democracy, multiculturalism, and technological modernity. For ecofascists, it represents the failure of industrial civilization to live within planetary boundaries and the demographic transformations that are perceived to threaten racial purity. When these frameworks converge, environmental degradation and climate change are interpreted not as problems requiring collective solutions, but as symptoms of civilizational decay and opportunities for radical transformation.

Richards, Jones, and Brinn's analysis of far-right forums reveals that climate change is consistently framed as an unavoidable process whose consequences validate accelerationist predictions, with environmental collapse serving as evidence that existing systems must be hastened toward breakdown rather than reformed or sustained.<sup>78</sup> Farrell-Molloy terms this synthesis "green accelerationism": environmental collapse narratives provide moral legitimation for accelerationist tactics, transforming what

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<sup>77</sup>Farrell-Molloy, Joshua. "'Natural' Connection: An Analysis of Eco-Fascism on Terrorgram." *Accelerationism Research Consortium* (2024).

<sup>78</sup>Richards, Jones, and Brinn (2022).





might otherwise appear as nihilistic terrorism into acts framed as planetary defense, while accelerationist methods supply the operational coherence that ecofascist ideology otherwise lacks.<sup>79</sup> Whether the catalyst is framed as racial demographic change, technological alienation, or environmental catastrophe, the palingenetic logic functions identically, with destruction being a prerequisite for renewal, and violence a mechanism of transformation.

This convergence fundamentally reinterprets and weaponizes the three climate-conflict pathways discussed in Section 1, transforming each from a condition requiring humanitarian response into opportunity for revolutionary violence. The ideological fusion operates distinctly across all three pathways, adding operational dimension to ecofascism's reinterpretation of environmental dynamics.

For resource scarcity and competition, the converged ideology transforms the identification of resource stress generating grievances and violence into a militant accelerationist targeting framework. Where resource scarcity analysis documented how water scarcity, food insecurity, and competition over diminishing resources create conflict conditions, and ecofascism racializes these dynamics to blame specific populations, convergence adds the operational question: how can resource competition be deliberately intensified to hasten collapse? The ecobordering logic provides ideological justification by acknowledging environmental crises while racializing responsibility and proposing eliminationist solutions. Militant accelerationist tactics then supply the operational methods. Infrastructure attacks targeting water systems during droughts, sabotage of agricultural supply chains during food crises, and violence against climate migrants framed as competition over scarce resources all exemplify how this convergence weaponizes resource scarcity. The ideology positions such actions not as exacerbating humanitarian crises but as hastening an inevitable societal collapse, while controlling who survives the resource scarcity through eliminationist violence.

For climate-induced displacement, the convergence reframes migration as a conflict driver into a recruitment and radicalization opportunity while simultaneously justifying violent border defense. Displacement analysis established how population movements generate resource pressure, social tensions between displaced and host communities, and political exploitation of migration anxieties; ecofascism's snakeoil strategy recruits through universal environmental concern before channeling it toward anti-migrant violence; and convergence operationalizes both: real displacement pressures provide the

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<sup>79</sup>Farrell-Molloy (2024).





material conditions that ecofascist rhetoric exploits and redirects toward eliminationist ends. Further, accelerationist networks exploit displacement by spreading propaganda in disaster-affected regions to recruit desperate populations while simultaneously radicalizing host communities experiencing resource pressure to conduct violent attacks against migrants. The framing is strategic: climate refugees are portrayed as invaders whose elimination serves both racial preservation and environmental protection, while attacks against them are celebrated as defensive actions hastening system collapse and revolutionary transformation.

For governance failures in the face of climate disasters, the convergence interprets the documentation of state capacity overwhelmed by environmental shocks as validation of accelerationist predictions and an opportunity for tactical exploitation. Where climate-conflict analysis showed how extreme weather events can paralyze even capable governments and ecofascism attributes such failures to diversity and multiculturalism rather than systemic issues, convergence adds the operational imperative to compound disasters and maximize governmental collapse. Infrastructure sabotage timed to coincide with climate disasters, such as attacking power grids during heat waves, disrupting water systems during droughts, and destroying communication networks during hurricanes exemplifies this tactical exploitation. The ideology frames such actions as exposing system fragility and accelerating an inevitable breakdown, with each compounded disaster simultaneously validating the worldview that the system cannot respond effectively and providing recruitment opportunities.

Each pathway generates not concern for humanitarian impact, but vindication of ideological premises and operational opportunities for violent action. The ideological synthesis operates through environmental nihilism, acknowledging ecological crises while rejecting any collective, reformist, or humanitarian response in favor of accelerating breakdown and violently controlling who survives the collapse. Environmental degradation functions simultaneously as evidence (the system has failed), catalyst (for hastening its demise), and justification (violence presented as planetary defense). Every new climate impact validates this worldview, provides recruitment opportunities, and justifies tactical operations. This worldview provides a diagnosis, a prognosis, and a prescription: civilizational decay manifests in environmental collapse; inevitable breakdown is hastened by intentional action; and collapse must be hastened through violence, while eliminating populations deemed responsible or expendable. The philosophical alignment creates tactical synergies, particularly around infrastructure as both a symbolic target and a practical vulnerability.



#### 4.2 Tactical Convergence: Infrastructure as Ecological Warfare

This philosophical fusion translates into an operational overlap centered on infrastructure. Ecofascists target infrastructure to dismantle industrial modernity, while militant accelerationists target it to hasten systemic societal collapse. Ultimately, the target is shared, and the rationales converge: destroying power grids or supply chains serves both the ecofascist vision of pre-industrial return and the accelerationist goal of civilizational breakdown. Through this overlap, infrastructure sabotage is reframed as ecological warfare, and violence against technological systems is presented as planetary defense. This tactical alignment reflects a shared assessment of societal vulnerabilities and a shared conviction that small-scale disruptions can trigger cascading failures with disproportionate effects.

Loadenthal's analysis of "feral fascists and deep green guerrillas" demonstrates how accelerationist tactics such as the targeting of energy, water, communication, and transportation infrastructure are increasingly justified through ecofascist rhetoric that frames these systems as instruments of environmental destruction.<sup>80</sup> Infrastructure targeting, previously justified within accelerationist networks primarily as means to demonstrate state incapacity and generate chaos, gains additional moral legitimization when reframed as attacks on "ecocidal" systems. Farrell-Molloy documents how ecofascist networks have fused pro-environmental and anti-civilisational narratives to their calls for sabotage actions, with Telegram channels celebrating attacks on industrial facilities, advocating for destruction of infrastructure deemed environmentally destructive, and framing such violence as defensive actions to protect nature from certain human populations.<sup>81</sup>

Ted Kaczynski's anti-technology manifesto exemplifies this tactical fusion and serves as a critical bridge figure connecting the ideologies. Despite Kaczynski's explicit rejection of racism and his critique of industrial society rather than specific demographic groups, his detailed analysis of technological systems' vulnerabilities and his advocacy for dismantling industrial infrastructure provide what Farrell-Molloy and Macklin term a "green accelerationist pathway."<sup>82</sup> Kaczynski's writings offer operational templates, including the identification of critical infrastructure nodes, an assessment of system vulnerabilities, justifications for attacking technological rather than primarily human targets, and a philosophical

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<sup>80</sup>Loadenthal (2022).

<sup>81</sup>Farrell-Molloy (2024).

<sup>82</sup>Farrell-Molloy, Joshua, and Graham Macklin. "Ted Kaczynski, Anti-Technology Radicalism and Eco-Fascism." International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (2022). <https://icct.nl/publication/ted-kaczynski-anti-technology-radicalism-and-eco-fascism>.



framework presenting anti-technology violence as a rational response to such an existential threat. Far-right networks selectively appropriate these tactical and analytical elements while discarding or reinterpreting Kaczynski's egalitarian and anti-racist positions, grafting his infrastructure critique onto their own racial and nationalist ideologies. This appropriation operates through strategic selectivity: far-right networks extract Kaczynski's tactical analysis (infrastructure vulnerabilities, target selection, operational methods) and philosophical framework (anti-technology critique, civilizational collapse) while systematically ignoring or reinterpreting his explicit anti-racist statements and egalitarian positions. Farrell-Molloy and Macklin document how movements treat Kaczynski as providing an operational blueprint and intellectual legitimacy through academic credentials, a perceived coherent analysis, and a moral framework, while discarding ideological elements incompatible with racial nationalism.<sup>83</sup> The contradiction is resolved not through engagement with Kaczynski's actual positions, but through selective reading that treats his anti-technology manifesto as a tactical manual separable from his political philosophy.

This tactical convergence operates distinctly across the three climate-conflict pathways, demonstrating how the targeting of critical infrastructure simultaneously exploits and compounds the dynamics documented in earlier sections.

For resource scarcity, infrastructure attacks target systems that manage and distribute critical resources, deliberately intensifying competition and generating cascading humanitarian crises. Energy infrastructure represents a particularly strategic target: attacks on electrical grids during heat waves compound temperature-related stress; attacks on power systems supporting water treatment create immediate scarcity and potential disease outbreaks; and attacks on agricultural infrastructure during growing seasons threaten food security. The tactical logic weaponizes the documentation of how resource stress generates grievances and violence: by deliberately creating or intensifying scarcity through infrastructure sabotage, converged movements both hasten systemic collapse and create conditions that can be exploited for recruitment among desperate populations. The environmental framing provides moral justification in portraying attacks as targeting systems of overconsumption and environmental destruction, while the accelerationist framework provides tactical sophistication in identifying vulnerabilities and maximizing cascading effects.

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<sup>83</sup>Farrell-Molloy and Macklin (2022).



For climate-induced displacement, infrastructure targeting focuses on border systems, transportation networks, and migrant support infrastructure. Sabotage of refugee processing facilities, attacks on NGO operations providing humanitarian assistance to displaced populations, and destruction of transportation infrastructure used by climate migrants all exemplify how convergence targets displacement dynamics. The dual framing is strategic: such attacks are justified both as defending borders against “invasion” and as hastening governmental collapse by overwhelming response capacity. When infrastructure attacks coincide with mass displacement events, such as destroying bridges during flood-induced evacuations or attacking border facilities during climate refugee surges, the compounded crisis serves multiple ideological objectives simultaneously: it slows or prevents migration, it demonstrates state incapacity, and it generates publicity and propaganda opportunities.

For governance failure, infrastructure targeting deliberately compounds climate disasters to maximize governmental collapse and demonstrate state incapacity. Attacks timed to coincide with or immediately follow extreme weather events demonstrate temporal coordination patterns, including the sabotage of emergency communication systems during hurricanes, the destruction of backup power systems during heat waves, and attacks on water infrastructure during droughts. These compound disasters serve the converged ideology by simultaneously validating predictions of systemic fragility, overwhelming response capacity, and generating grievances that movements exploit for recruitment. The tactical sophistication reflects militant accelerationist analysis identifying infrastructure as vulnerable nodes whose disruption generates disproportionate effects, while the moral justification draws on ecofascist framing that presents governmental failures as evidence of diversity and multiculturalism weakening response capacity rather than examining systemic underfunding or institutional weakness.

Beyond infrastructure, tactical convergence manifests in how both movements frame eliminationist violence. Mass casualty attacks targeting racial, ethnic, or religious minorities gain additional justification when perpetrators frame their violence as a response to overpopulation or environmental crises allegedly caused by non-white reproduction rates or immigration.<sup>84</sup> The manifestos produced by the attackers in Christchurch, El Paso, and Buffalo exemplify this pattern, with perpetrators presenting eliminationist violence not merely as racial preservation but as an environmental necessity, framing murdered victims as environmental burdens whose elimination would reduce resource consumption and carbon emissions.

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<sup>84</sup>Staudenmaier (2021).



This evolution of justification represents a significant tactical advantage. Where terrorism justified purely through white supremacist or neo-Nazi ideology might be dismissed as atavistic hatred, violence reframed as an environmental response gains a veneer of rationality and urgency. The environmental framing exploits broader public anxieties about climate change, resource scarcity, and ecological collapse, allowing adherents to position themselves not as hate criminals but as vanguard actors taking necessary but difficult actions that others lack courage to contemplate.

Target categories reflect both movements' strategic priorities and systematic exploitation of climate-conflict pathways. Energy infrastructure represents both the technological backbone of modern society and a major source of carbon emissions. Water systems function both as critical infrastructure whose disruption generates cascading failures, and as symbols of human domination over nature. Communication networks enable governmental coordination, while simultaneously representing technological mediation that ecofascists view as alienating humans from natural existence. Transportation infrastructure facilitates both state power projection that accelerationists seek to undermine and the mass movement of people that ecofascists frame as demographic threat and environmental burden. Each target category serves multiple ideological objectives simultaneously, demonstrating how convergence creates force multiplication through layered justifications and reinforcing operational goals.

This tactical convergence manifests and spreads within digital ecosystems where abstract ideology transforms into operational planning, where philosophical alignment becomes tactical coordination, and where isolated adherents become networked militants sharing strategies, celebrating attacks, and encouraging escalation.

#### **4.3 Digital Operationalization: Terrorgram as Convergence Space**

Within Terrorgram and affiliated networks, ecofascist-accelerationist convergence moves from an abstract ideological overlap to concrete operational coordination. The digital ecosystems provide infrastructure through which both ideologies integrate seamlessly, creating unified radicalization pathways where environmental aesthetics lower barriers to accelerationist praxis and where accelerationist tactical content provides operational coherence to ecofascist mobilization. The accelerationism analysis established how those networks use decentralized platforms for celebrating violence, sharing tactical knowledge, and coordinating leaderless resistance. The ecofascism analysis demonstrated how ecofascist spaces introduce distinctive aesthetic elements (pastoral imagery, anti-technology romanticism, environmental concern)



that expand recruitment reach beyond individuals attracted to explicit neo-Nazism. Convergence within these digital spaces produces synergistic effects where the sum exceeds component parts: a hybrid radicalization ecosystem that simultaneously recruits through environmental concern and mobilizes toward accelerationist violence.

Ecofascist content operates within these networks not as a separate ideological stream but as an integrated enhancement of accelerationist messaging. Farrell-Molloy's analysis of ecofascist Telegram channels reveals that within Terrorgram's ecosystem, ecofascist themes are integral to the network's aesthetic and tactical identity, with content consistently merging nature imagery, anti-modern rhetoric, and militant accelerationism.<sup>85</sup> The four thematic clusters identified in the ecofascist digital infrastructure analysis—anti-technology radicalism influenced by figures like Kaczynski, anti-urbanism and rural idealization, atavistic masculinity tied to warrior myths, and neo-völkisch pagan spirituality linking race, land, and blood—function not merely as ecofascist markers but as shared vocabulary bridging environmental extremism and accelerationist violence. This integration operates across the climate-conflict pathways, showing how digital infrastructure weaponizes each dynamic for radicalization and operational coordination.

For resource scarcity dynamics, digital platforms provide infrastructure for spreading disinformation that racializes resource competition while simultaneously coordinating tactical responses. When droughts intensify, food prices spike, or water restrictions are imposed, converged networks rapidly circulate propaganda attributing shortages to immigrant consumption, refugee populations, or diversity policies rather than structural causes. This propaganda serves dual functions: it radicalizes host populations experiencing resource pressure toward viewing migrants as environmental threats requiring elimination (ecofascist radicalization pathway), while simultaneously identifying infrastructure vulnerabilities and discussing tactical methods for intensifying scarcity through sabotage (accelerationist operational coordination). Networks share detailed analysis of water system vulnerabilities during droughts, electrical grid weak points during heat waves, and agricultural supply chain disruptions during food crises: operational intelligence that transforms resource scarcity from crisis condition into a targeting framework.

For climate-induced displacement, digital infrastructure enables the exploitation of migration dynamics on multiple levels simultaneously. Propaganda circulates in both disaster-affected regions (recruiting

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<sup>85</sup>Farrell-Molloy (2024).



desperate displaced populations) and receiving communities (radicalizing residents experiencing resource pressure and cultural anxiety). When hurricanes generate refugee flows, sea-level rise forces migration, or agricultural collapse drives movement, converged networks frame these dynamics as invasions requiring violent defense while providing tactical guidance for attacks against migrants, refugee infrastructure, and humanitarian organizations. The digital operationalization shows how displacement becomes simultaneously a recruitment opportunity (desperate populations seeking meaning), a radicalization catalyst (host communities experiencing pressure), and a targeting framework (infrastructure supporting migration identified for sabotage). Aesthetic content functions as a key mechanism: pastoral imagery and environmental concern provide entry points for individuals who might reject overt racism but resonate with anti-immigrant sentiment framed as environmental protection.

For governance failures, digital platforms enable the rapid exploitation of climate disasters for propaganda, recruitment, and operational coordination. When extreme weather events overwhelm response capacity, infrastructure collapses, or aid distribution fails, converged networks immediately circulate content attributing failures to diversity, immigration, and multiculturalism rather than examining systemic issues. This opportunistic propaganda operates on compressed timelines, with content appearing within hours of disasters and spreading rapidly across decentralized networks. The digital infrastructure enables force multiplication: a single propaganda piece can be reposted across dozens of channels within minutes, reaching thousands of adherents simultaneously and creating the appearance of coordinated response that validates the worldview. Simultaneously, channels discuss tactical opportunities created by governance failures, such as which infrastructure remained vulnerable during disasters, how security was degraded during response efforts, and where future attacks might compound crisis conditions most effectively.

The aesthetic dimension identified in the ecofascist digital analysis functions as the central mechanism within convergence spaces. Where purely accelerationist content, such as manifestos celebrating terrorism, tactical guides for attacks, or explicit calls for violence, might repel potential recruits or trigger platform moderation, ecofascist imagery provides softer entry points that gradually introduce militant content. The “cute” nature imagery and pastoral aesthetics create affective responses that lower psychological barriers to violence. By staging nature as beautiful, vulnerable, and threatened, propaganda invites emotional investment that is redirected from environmental concern to racial anxiety, from desire





to protect ecosystems to willingness to eliminate human populations framed as ecological threats.<sup>86</sup> Darwish's analysis shows how this aesthetic strategy enables extremist themes to circulate under guise of environmental appreciation, creating plausible deniability while establishing pathways from benign content to violent extremism.<sup>87</sup>

The radicalization pathway within convergence spaces operates through gradual progression compressed by simultaneous exposure to multiple ideological streams. Accelerationist radicalization moves through stages from exposure to broader far-right content toward increasingly militant positions. Ecofascist radicalization begins with environmental aesthetics before introducing racial framings. Convergence within online spaces collapses these timelines: users encounter pastoral imagery and environmental concern, explicit celebration of terrorist attacks, tactical infrastructure analysis, and conspiratorial rhetoric linking minorities to climate change and migration all within the same channels and often within the same content streams. This compressed, multi-stream radicalization is highly effective because it provides multiple entry points—environmental concern, anti-technology sentiment, anti-immigrant anxiety, and civilizational decline narratives—while channeling all pathways toward a shared commitment to hastening collapse through violence.

The convergence is strengthened by overlapping symbolic references that bridge ideologies. Ecofascist accelerationist spaces celebrate figures like Timothy McVeigh as “saints,” demonstrating continuities with broader accelerationist subcultures like Siege culture.<sup>88</sup> This lionization operates on multiple levels: McVeigh's 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, which killed 168 people including 19 children, is reframed within ecofascist-accelerationist networks not as domestic terrorism but as an infrastructural attack against governmental tyranny and symbolic strike against industrial civilization. The appropriation of Kaczynski provides additional connective tissue, with his image and writings circulating as both environmental prophet and tactical inspiration despite his own rejection of the movements claiming him.<sup>89</sup> These bridge figures enable ideological flexibility, with adherents able to emphasize racial preservation or environmental defense depending on context and audience, while maintaining operational focus on violence and collapse acceleration.

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<sup>86</sup>Darwish (2025).

<sup>87</sup>Darwish (2025).

<sup>88</sup>Molloy (2022).

<sup>89</sup>Farrell-Molloy and Macklin (2022).



The digital operationalization also manifests in how networks respond to real-world events, exploiting climate-conflict pathways for propaganda and recruitment. When resource scarcity intensifies through events such as water restrictions, food price spikes, or energy shortages, channels rapidly circulate content blaming immigrants while discussing infrastructure vulnerabilities. When displacement occurs through hurricanes generating refugee flows or agricultural collapse driving migration, propaganda frames it as invasion while providing tactical analysis of border systems and migrant support infrastructure. When governance failures manifest through inadequate disaster response, infrastructure collapse, or delayed aid, channels attribute failures to diversity and multiculturalism while identifying compounding opportunities for sabotage. This opportunistic exploitation, compressed by digital infrastructure's rapid dissemination capacity, transforms each climate impact from humanitarian crisis into a mobilization catalyst for movements positioned to provide explanatory narratives and operational direction.

The convergence within digital spaces thus creates complete radicalization and operational ecosystem: ideological justification through environmental collapse narratives merged with accelerationist predictions of systemic breakdown, aesthetic culture that establishes identity through nature imagery while celebrating violence, tactical knowledge circulating through infrastructure guides and vulnerability analysis, operational security through encryption and decentralized architecture, and event exploitation leveraging each climate disaster for propaganda and recruitment. This comprehensive system enables transformation of environmental anxiety into extremist violence, translating philosophical convergence into concrete operational capacity while maintaining resilience through distributed structure that frustrates traditional counterterrorism approaches focused on disrupting organizational hierarchies.

#### **4.4 Operational Implications: Three Threat Vectors**

The ecofascist-accelerationist synthesis produces three distinct but interconnected threat vectors, each exploiting different climate-conflict pathways while sharing underlying ideological justification and tactical approaches. These vectors represent the operational reality of convergence: how theory becomes terrorism, and how digital rhetoric manifests as real-world violence. Understanding these vectors requires an examination of how each weaponizes the specific dynamics established in the climate-conflict analysis through the ideological frameworks developed in Sections 2 and 3.

The first threat vector—mass casualty attacks with environmental justification—constitutes the most visible and lethal manifestation of convergence. These attacks are typically perpetrated by lone actors



targeting racial, ethnic, or religious minorities. The terror attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand (2019), El Paso, Texas (2019), and Buffalo, New York (2022) exemplify this pattern, with perpetrators explicitly citing environmental collapse, overpopulation, and resource scarcity as justifications for racist violence. Staudenmaier notes that these attacks continued the tradition of ecofascist violence, demonstrating that many of the same basic ideas run through the contemporary far-right scene.<sup>90</sup> The manifestos reveal synthesis: perpetrators frame violence as response to demographic threats presented as environmental crises, position mass murder as population control necessary for planetary survival, and explicitly call for others to conduct similar attacks to hasten societal collapse.

This vector directly exploits the climate-induced displacement pathway, particularly anti-migrant backlash generated by climate-related population movements. The displacement dynamics documented earlier (resource pressure in receiving areas, social tensions between displaced and host communities, and political grievances that extremists exploit) become radicalization opportunities. Ecofascist rhetoric's snakeoil strategy establishes environmental concern as a universal value before channeling it toward anti-immigrant violence through metaphors of invasion and infestation. Convergence adds the accelerationist operational imperative: attacks are framed not merely as defending territory but as catalyzing cascading violence that will hasten systemic collapse and trigger broader racial conflict. By framing immigration as an environmental invasion and presenting eliminationist violence as an ecological defense, attackers transform racist terrorism into a rational response to resource competition and a civilizational threat. The environmental rhetoric serves multiple tactical functions: it provides moral legitimization for violence that might otherwise appear as mere hatred, it exploits widespread climate anxiety to recruit sympathizers, and it positions perpetrators as vanguard actors taking necessary actions rather than criminals. The manifestos function as propaganda of the deed, attempting to inspire copycat terrorism while providing ideological frameworks that future attackers can adopt and adapt.

The scale and frequency of such attacks remain limited by individual capacity, law enforcement interdiction, and psychological barriers to conducting mass violence. However, the ideological framework supporting them continues to spread through digital networks as documented in Section 4.3, creating an ongoing risk of additional lone-actor terrorism. Each successful attack validates the worldview within extremist networks, provides martyrs for glorification, and potentially inspires emulation through

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<sup>90</sup>Staudenmaier (2021).



propaganda of the deed logic. The convergence creates force multiplication: environmental framing potentially attracts individuals who might reject explicit neo-Nazi ideology but accept violence framed as ecological necessity, while accelerationist tactics provide operational sophistication and security practices that increase attack success probability.

The second threat vector—infrastructure sabotage justified as ecological warfare and tactical acceleration of systemic collapse—aims at direct system disruption rather than primarily targeting individuals. While fewer attacks of this type have occurred compared to mass casualty violence, tactical discussions within ecofascist-accelerationist networks suggest growing interest and capability development. Loadenthal's analysis identifies infrastructural attacks as central to the ecofascist-accelerationist operational repertoire, with militants framing the sabotage of industrial systems as both tactically effective and as a morally justified environmental action.<sup>91</sup> Unlike mass casualty attacks that primarily inflame intergroup tensions, infrastructure targeting aims at direct system disruption, seeking to demonstrate state incapacity, generate cascading failures, and create chaos conducive to broader collapse.

This vector exploits the governance failure pathway, deliberately compounding climate disasters to overwhelm state capacity and demonstrate systemic fragility. Climate-conflict analysis established how extreme weather events can paralyze even capable governments, while ecofascism attributes such failures to diversity and multiculturalism rather than structural causes. Convergence operationalizes this interpretation: infrastructure attacks timed to coincide with or immediately follow climate disasters compound response challenges, multiply cascading failures, and intensify public perception of governmental incompetence. The targeting logic reflects an understanding of system vulnerabilities central to accelerationist tactics: militants identify nodes whose disruption generates disproportionate effects, such as electrical substations whose failure cascades across regional grids, water treatment facilities serving large populations, communication hubs coordinating emergency response, and transportation infrastructure essential for aid distribution. The sabotage of backup power systems during heat waves, the destruction of water infrastructure during droughts, and attacks on emergency communication networks during hurricanes each exemplify how convergence weaponizes governance vulnerability.

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<sup>91</sup>Loadenthal (2022).



The justification evolution from terrorism to environmental protection provides an operational advantage, potentially attracting individuals who might reject explicitly racist violence but accept sabotage framed as ecological necessity and system collapse acceleration. The dual framing serves recruitment efforts: environmental justification appeals to individuals concerned about climate change but skeptical of collective action, while accelerationist justification appeals to militants focused on civilizational collapse regardless of specific ideological content. Infrastructure targeting also offers tactical advantages over mass casualty attacks: lower psychological barriers (attacking systems rather than people), greater plausible deniability (environmental activism versus terrorism), and potential for force multiplication through cascading effects that exceed direct damage. These factors make infrastructure sabotage an attractive option within converged networks, particularly as tactical knowledge circulates through the digital channels documented in Section 4.3.

The resource scarcity pathway provides an additional targeting framework: infrastructure that manages and distributes critical resources becomes a priority target for deliberately intensifying competition and generating humanitarian crises that accelerate collapse. Attacks on agricultural infrastructure during growing seasons threaten food security, sabotage of water systems during droughts creates immediate scarcity, destruction of energy infrastructure during temperature extremes compounds climate stress. Each attack serves the converged ideology by simultaneously demonstrating system fragility, creating crises that can be blamed on immigration and diversity, and hastening the collapse that both movements embrace. The environmental framing transforms infrastructure sabotage from terrorism into a defensive action against “ecocidal” systems, while accelerationist logic positions such attacks as catalyzing the inevitable breakdown of an unsustainable industrial civilization.

The third threat vector—systematic exploitation of climate disasters for recruitment, radicalization, and mobilization—operates through propaganda and narrative control rather than direct violence. Rather than conducting attacks, this vector involves leveraging environmental crises to spread disinformation, undermine institutional legitimacy, and position extremist narratives as explanatory frameworks. During and after disasters, ecofascist-accelerationist networks circulate propaganda attributing inadequate response to diversity policies, immigration, or governmental incompetence, while framing climate impacts as evidence that collapse is underway and radical action is necessary. This opportunistic exploitation weaponizes the grievances generated by all three climate-conflict pathways simultaneously.



For resource scarcity, networks circulate content blaming immigrants and refugees for consumption patterns during shortages, framing competition as demographic invasion rather than examining structural inequality or distribution failures. For displacement, propaganda portrays climate refugees as parasites who will deplete receiving communities' resources while contaminating racial and cultural homogeneity. For governance failures, disasters become evidence not of needed institutional capacity-building but of diversity weakening response effectiveness and multiculturalism undermining social cohesion necessary for collective action. This exploitation operates across the digital infrastructure documented in Section 4.3, with content spreading rapidly through decentralized networks and reaching diverse audiences through aesthetic packaging that varies by platform and community.

Macklin warns that climate change provides the Far Right with narratives framing environmental degradation as an existential threat to racial and national survival.<sup>92</sup> This narrative framing transforms each climate disaster into confirmation of extremist worldviews and recruitment opportunities for movements positioning themselves as alternative sources of meaning, community, and action in face of institutional failure. The exploitation operates on multiple levels simultaneously, including the direct recruitment of disaster-affected populations experiencing economic loss, social dislocation, and grievances against governments perceived as having failed them, which makes these populations vulnerable to movements offering explanatory narratives and community belonging; the radicalization of host communities receiving climate migrants and experiencing resource pressure, channeling legitimate concerns about infrastructure strain toward anti-immigrant violence framed as environmental defense; and broader audience cultivation among individuals experiencing climate anxiety and seeking explanatory narratives for environmental crisis, providing entry points through environmental concern that gradually introduce eliminationist ideologies.

This vector operates through sustained psychological influence rather than episodic kinetic violence, accumulating effect through persistent propaganda. Every drought, flood, hurricane, or wildfire provides fresh opportunities for content exploitation. Every governance failure, resource shortage, or migration surge validates the narrative and potentially recruits additional adherents. The cumulative effect creates an expanding audience for more extreme content and operational activity: individuals radicalized through disaster exploitation may progress from propaganda consumption to active participation in attacks or

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<sup>92</sup>Macklin (2022).



infrastructure targeting. The force multiplication occurs through network effects: a single piece of disaster propaganda can be reposted across dozens of channels, reaching thousands of individuals, some portion of whom will be primed for further radicalization or operational mobilization.

These three vectors differ significantly in their evidentiary basis. Mass casualty attacks have produced documented cases with explicit manifestos linking violence to ecofascist-accelerationist ideology. Infrastructure sabotage has fewer documented events, being extensively discussed in tactical channels but rarely executed. Propaganda exploitation is pervasive but diffuse, with its radicalizing impact difficult to measure through available methodologies. This asymmetry suggests that while the ideological synthesis is well-established, its translation into operational infrastructure targeting remains less demonstrative of current capability at scale. The assessment that follows accounts for this differential evidence base.

The operational convergence creates synergistic effects across all three vectors. The ideological synthesis provides multiple entry points for radicalization, including environmental concern, anti-technology sentiment, anti-immigrant anxiety, civilizational decline narratives, and infrastructure vulnerability analysis; each of these entry points eventually converges on a shared commitment to hastening collapse through violence or undermining institutional legitimacy through propaganda. The tactical alignment enables knowledge transfer and operational learning, with infrastructure targeting skills, security practices, attack methods, and propaganda techniques circulating across networks regardless of whether individual militants emphasize racial preservation, environmental defense, or system collapse as primary motivation. The digital infrastructure facilitates rapid adaptation, allowing networks to exploit emerging opportunities, respond to counter-terrorism pressure through platform migration and tactical evolution, and maintain ideological coherence despite a decentralized structure that lacks a formal organizational hierarchy.

The operational analysis must account for malleability and adaptive capacity. Szenes notes that ecofascism functions as a melting pot of ideas rather than a coherent ideological movement, enabling it to absorb various extremist currents and respond flexibly to changing contexts.<sup>93</sup> This fluidity makes the movement difficult to map using traditional extremist typologies focused on formal organizations and

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<sup>93</sup>Szenes, Eszter (2023).





explicit ideological positions, while simultaneously increasing its resilience and appeal across different audiences with varied entry points and motivations. The convergence of environmental stress and extremist exploitation creates feedback loops where climate impacts generate grievances that facilitate radicalization, which produces violence and sabotage that compounds climate impacts, which generates additional grievances that fuel further radicalization in escalating cycles of vulnerability and violence.

#### **4.5 Synthesizing the Framework: Toward Empirical Manifestations**

The convergence analysis reveals a three-dimensional synthesis that transforms abstract ideological compatibility into concrete operational patterns. Ideological fusion provides shared worldview and moral justification, with collapse-as-opportunity serving as philosophical foundation while ecofascism supplies environmental narratives that legitimize what might otherwise appear as nihilistic terrorism. Tactical alignment produces operational coherence around infrastructure targeting and eliminationist violence, with accelerationist vulnerability analysis providing targeting frameworks while ecofascist rhetoric provides moral legitimation framing sabotage as ecological warfare and mass violence as population control necessary for planetary survival. Digital operationalization creates a networked infrastructure for radicalization and coordination, with decentralized platforms enabling rapid dissemination of propaganda, circulation of tactical knowledge, celebration of attacks, and exploitation of climate disasters for recruitment.

This converged ideology reinterprets each climate-conflict pathway—resource scarcity, displacement, and governance failure—not as a humanitarian crisis demanding collective response, but as a revolutionary opportunity justifying violence and hastening collapse. Where Section 1 documented empirical dynamics of how climate stress creates conflict conditions, Section 2 established tactics for exploiting instability, and Section 3 demonstrated frameworks for racializing environmental problems, this section has shown how convergence weaponizes all three elements simultaneously. Resource scarcity becomes a targeting framework for infrastructure attacks that intensify competition; displacement becomes a recruitment opportunity exploiting both desperate migrants and anxious host communities; and governance failures become propaganda opportunities demonstrating system fragility while providing tactical windows for compounding disasters. The synthesis operates across all three pathways simultaneously, creating a force multiplication where environmental crisis, extremist ideology, and operational capability reinforce each other in escalating cycles.



The theoretical frameworks and operational patterns documented here are not hypothetical, but empirically observable phenomena. Mass casualty attacks in Christchurch, El Paso, and Buffalo provide empirical evidence of eliminationist violence justified through environmental narratives. Tactical discussions within Terrorgram demonstrate ongoing infrastructure targeting planning and vulnerability analysis. Propaganda exploitation during climate disasters shows continuous opportunistic mobilization that expands extremist influence and primes audiences for operational participation. The patterns are manifest in attacks already conducted, networks actively coordinating, and conditions intensifying as climate impacts accelerate.

Yet theory alone cannot capture how this convergence operates in practice. The ideological frameworks and tactical patterns require empirical grounding through an examination of how extremist actors exploit specific climate events to spread propaganda, recruit adherents, and justify violence. Abstract analysis, however rigorous, risks obscuring operational reality: specifically, how movements translate environmental crises into mobilization opportunity, how disasters become radicalization catalysts, how digital rhetoric manifests as real-world violence, and how propaganda exploitation during specific events demonstrates the mechanisms documented theoretically.

The following case studies examine two specific incidents where climate-related events provided opportunities for extremist mobilization, documenting how accelerationist and ecofascist actors leveraged environmental conditions to spread disinformation, recruit adherents, and justify violence. Section 5 analyzes a case of mass casualty terrorism being explicitly justified through environmental collapse narratives and overpopulation rhetoric, exemplifying the fusion of racist violence with ecological justification. Section 6 examines a case of extremist groups exploiting climate anxiety and anti-technology sentiment to recruit adherents and normalize infrastructure targeting as environmental defense. Together, these cases demonstrate how the ideological fusion, tactical convergence, and digital operationalization documented in this section translate into concrete extremist activity, offering analytical insights for conflict transformation efforts and informing policy responses to the emerging phenomenon of climate-weaponized extremism. The cases reveal operational mechanisms, propaganda strategies, recruitment pathways, and tactical adaptations that ground the theoretical analysis in empirical reality.



## Section 5: Case Study: The El Paso Walmart Shooting

On August 3, 2019, a gunman opened fire at a Walmart in El Paso, Texas, killing twenty-three people and wounding twenty-two others in the deadliest mass shooting targeting Latinos in modern American history.<sup>94</sup> Minutes before the attack, the shooter posted a manifesto to 8chan that synthesized environmental collapse narratives, anti-immigrant rhetoric, and explicit endorsement of accelerationist violence. The Texas House of Representatives subsequently memorialized the attack as a “racially motivated shooting rampage,”<sup>95</sup> and federal prosecutors secured ninety consecutive life sentences on hate crime and firearms charges.<sup>96</sup> The ideological dimensions of the attack extend beyond conventional hate crime frameworks into the convergence territory mapped in preceding sections. This case study examines how the climate-conflict dynamics of Section 1, the accelerationist tactics of Section 2, the ecofascist ideology of Section 3, and the operational synthesis of Section 4 combined to produce a single act of mass casualty terrorism.

### 5.1 The Manifesto: Ideological Synthesis in Practice

The shooter's manifesto, titled “The Inconvenient Truth About Me” in a presumed appropriation of Al Gore's climate documentary, opens with a declaration of ideological affiliation: “In general, I support the Christchurch shooter and his manifesto.”<sup>97</sup> This opening sentence situates the document within the transnational network of militant accelerationist violence documented in Section 2, positioning the El Paso attack as the next node in an escalating series designed to inspire emulation. The manifesto functions simultaneously as justification for the imminent attack and as recruitment tool for future attackers, implementing the leaderless resistance logic in which each attack generates propaganda to catalyze subsequent operations.

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<sup>94</sup>U.S. Department of Justice. “Texas Man Sentenced to 90 Consecutive Life Sentences for 2019 Mass Shooting at Walmart in El Paso, Texas, Killing 23 People and Injuring 22 Others.” Press Release (2023). <https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/texas-man-sentenced-90-consecutive-life-sentences-2019-mass-shooting-walmart-el-paso-texas>

<sup>95</sup>Texas House of Representatives. House Resolution 585, 87th Legislature, Regular Session. <https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/87R/billtext/html/HR00585I.htm>

<sup>96</sup>U.S. Department of Justice (2023).

<sup>97</sup>Crusius, Patrick Wood. “An Inconvenient Truth.” Manifesto. August 3, 2019.



The manifesto's account of radicalization is explicit. The shooter states that “the Hispanic community was not my target before I read *The Great Replacement*,”<sup>98</sup> directly attributing his targeting decision to the Christchurch shooter’s manifesto by the same title, as well as to the demographic conspiracy theory that Section 3 identified as central to ecofascist ideology, and that the Christchurch shooter’s manifesto endorsed. This admission documents how exposure to ideological content within far-right digital ecosystems translates into operational targeting decisions. The materials circulating through the networks analyzed in Section 4 function not as abstract propaganda but as targeting frameworks that shape the concrete manifestation of violence.

The manifesto's environmental content operates as the ecofascist rhetorical strategy outlined in Section 3: establishing legitimate ecological concern before channeling it toward eliminationist conclusions. It catalogs environmental grievances at length, lamenting “the decimation of the environment,” “urban sprawl” consuming natural landscapes, threats to water security, and plastic and electronic waste accumulating in ecosystems.<sup>99</sup> The shooter invokes Dr. Seuss's *The Lorax*, observing that “our lifestyle is destroying the environment of our country” and attributing ecological degradation to corporate interests and consumer culture.<sup>100</sup> This environmental litany establishes common ground with widespread ecological anxiety before the argument pivots toward demographic targeting.

That pivot occurs through a passage articulating the eliminationist logic that defines ecofascist convergence with accelerationist violence: “So the next logical step is to decrease the number of people in America using resources. If we can get rid of enough people, then our way of life can become more sustainable.”<sup>101</sup> This formulation demonstrates how environmental concern becomes subordinated to demographic targeting through the racialization of resource consumption that Section 3 identified as ecofascism's defining operation. The “logical step” from ecological crisis to mass murder proceeds through an interpretive framework in which immigration constitutes environmental invasion and population elimination constitutes sustainability policy. The manifesto transforms mass shooting from hate crime into environmental intervention, providing moral legitimization for violence that might otherwise appear as hatred alone.

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<sup>98</sup>Crusius (2019).

<sup>99</sup>Crusius (2019).

<sup>100</sup>Crusius (2019).

<sup>101</sup>Crusius (2019).



This synthesis of environmental concern with eliminationist violence extends beyond the El Paso case. Owen's analysis notes that the El Paso manifesto shares with the Christchurch document a common ecofascist framework attributing environmental degradation to immigration and population growth among non-white peoples.<sup>102</sup> Achenbach observes that both attacks deployed environmentalist rhetoric to legitimize racial violence,<sup>103</sup> representing a synthesis that had remained largely theoretical within academic analysis of far-right ideology until these attacks translated it into operational practice. The El Paso manifesto thus provides primary source evidence for the ideological convergence that Section 4 documented through analysis of online discourse, demonstrating that the synthesis observable in digital spaces produces concrete violence when individuals act on its prescriptions.

## 5.2 Accelerationist Dimensions: Leaderless Resistance and Networked Violence

The manifesto expresses deep pessimism about conventional political remedies, suggesting that peaceful means of addressing demographic change are nearly impossible and that leaders of both major parties have failed for decades, thereby positioning violence as strategic intervention to accelerate societal conflict.<sup>104</sup> This framing directly implements the accelerationist operational logic documented in Section 2: the attack is conceived not as endpoint but as catalyst, designed to inspire emulation, terrorize the targeted community, provoke governmental overreaction, and accelerate the intergroup conflict that militants believe will hasten systemic collapse.

The manifesto additionally includes explicit guidance for future attackers, advising them to select low-security targets rather than engaging well-equipped security personnel or law enforcement, and cautioning against sacrificing one's life on unnecessarily dangerous objectives.<sup>105</sup> These instructions exemplify the leaderless resistance model analyzed in Section 2, in which manifestos circulate through decentralized networks to provide both ideological justification and operational frameworks for

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<sup>102</sup>Owen, Tess. "Eco-Fascism: the Racist Theory That Inspired the El Paso and Christchurch Shooters." *Vice*, August 6, 2019. <https://www.vice.com/en/article/eco-fascism-the-racist-theory-that-inspired-the-el-paso-and-christchurch-shooters-and-is-gaining-followers/>

<sup>103</sup>Achenbach, Joel. "Two Mass Killings a World Apart Share a Common Theme: 'Ecofascism.'" *Washington Post*, August 18, 2019. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/two-mass-murders-a-world-apart-share-a-common-theme-ecofascism/2019/08/18/0079a676-bec4-11e9-b873-63ace636af08\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/two-mass-murders-a-world-apart-share-a-common-theme-ecofascism/2019/08/18/0079a676-bec4-11e9-b873-63ace636af08_story.html).

<sup>104</sup>Crusius (2019).

<sup>105</sup>Crusius (2019).



individuals who never have direct contact with the original author or with organized groups. The explicit Christchurch endorsement and tactical guidance position the El Paso shooting within the transnational pattern of accelerationist terrorism, each attack building upon predecessors while calling for successors.

The El Paso attack occurred within a concentrated period of 8chan-linked violence that Evans characterizes as exhibiting the “gamification of terror.”<sup>106</sup> Evans documents how platform architecture and community norms created incentive structures rewarding attacks with attention, celebration, and elevated status, establishing body counts as metrics of success and transforming perpetrators into figures of veneration.<sup>107</sup> The El Paso shooting was the third major 8chan-announced attack of 2019, following Christchurch in March and Poway in April, demonstrating the temporal clustering and ideological cross-referencing that characterize networked accelerationist violence.

The platform's role in facilitating this violence prompted Cloudflare to terminate its services to 8chan on August 5, 2019, two days after the El Paso attack. Cloudflare CEO Matthew Prince described 8chan as a “cesspool of hate” that had “proven [itself] to be lawless,” acknowledging that the site had “caused multiple tragic deaths.”<sup>108</sup> This corporate intervention underscores the degree to which digital infrastructure enabled the networked radicalization and attack coordination that Section 4 documented.

### 5.3 Analytical Implications

The El Paso case demonstrates how the theoretical framework developed in preceding sections operates in practice, but it also reveals dimensions that theoretical analysis alone cannot capture. The manifesto's structure follows the ecofascist pattern Section 3 identified: environmental crisis diagnosed, demographic groups blamed, elimination presented as solution. Yet the manifesto also reveals the psychological function this structure serves. By framing mass murder as environmental policy, the shooter could understand himself not as perpetrator of hatred but as rational actor responding to ecological necessity. The ideological synthesis does not merely justify violence; it transforms the perpetrator's self-conception.

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<sup>106</sup>Evans, Robert. “The El Paso Shooting and the Gamification of Terror.” *Bellingcat*, August 4, 2019. <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/americas/2019/08/04/the-el-paso-shooting-and-the-gamification-of-terror/>

<sup>107</sup>Evans (2019).

<sup>108</sup>Prince, Matthew. “Terminating Service for 8Chan.” *Cloudflare Blog*, August 5, 2019. <https://blog.cloudflare.com/terminating-service-for-8chan/>.



The case also illuminates how accelerationist and ecofascist frameworks reinforce each other operationally. Ecofascism provides the moral architecture: environmental collapse demands radical action, and demographic targeting constitutes that action. Accelerationism provides the strategic logic: individual attacks serve a collective revolutionary project, and manifestos ensure that each attack propagates the ideology to future actors. Neither framework alone fully explains the El Paso shooting; their synthesis produced both the motivation and the method.

The gap between the attack's ideological complexity and the legal system's response points to a challenge for counterterrorism efforts. Hate crime frameworks captured the racial targeting but not the environmental legitimization that structured it. This matters for prevention: individuals may encounter ecofascist arguments through environmental content before those arguments channel toward demographic targeting. Intervention strategies focused solely on racial hatred may miss earlier inflection points where ecological concern transforms into eliminationist ideology.

Twenty-three people died because ecofascist-accelerationist ideology framed Hispanic individuals in a border community as both demographic and ecological threats whose elimination would constitute a step toward sustainability. The platform, the manifesto, the targeting, and the aftermath together demonstrate how the ideological synthesis analyzed in Section 4 translates into mass casualty terrorism. Understanding how similar dynamics operate across varied contexts requires examining how extremist movements exploit climate-related events for propaganda and recruitment even in the absence of direct violence.

## **Section 6: The Pine Tree Party: Digital Ecofascism and Accelerationist Radicalization**

### **6.1 Formation and Ideological Foundations**

If the El Paso attack demonstrated how ecofascist ideology could inspire mass violence against perceived demographic threats, with Crusius explicitly linking immigration to environmental sustainability in his manifesto, the emergence of the Pine Tree Party illustrates the organizational infrastructure through which such ideologies metastasize in digital spaces. Founded on November 3, 2017 by Mike Mahoney (known online as “Mike Ma”), the Pine Tree Party began as an Instagram account featuring the Revolutionary War-era “An Appeal to Heaven” pine tree flag alongside a caption declaring the movement’s intent to





reject centralized government, arm followers with weapons, and oust “illegal immigrants with zero mercy.”<sup>109</sup> The visual symbol, a pine tree against a white background, would become the movement's primary identifier, with followers using pine tree emojis across social media platforms to signal affiliation.<sup>110</sup> These digital ecosystems, which Section 4 documented as a unified radicalization infrastructure, transformed the Pine Tree Party from an aspirational movement into an operational network capable of inspiring real-world terrorism.

The movement's migration from Instagram to Telegram on August 20, 2020 marked an escalation from aspirational rhetoric to operational coordination. The channel's inaugural message featured a dark figure holding a bomb, the same image found on the cover of Ma's 2019 novel *Harassment Architecture*, signaling the movement's accelerationist orientation from its inception. The channel rapidly accumulated over 1,300 subscribers, later overlapping with the broader 'Terrorgram' ecosystem of extreme right-wing channels advocating violence and societal collapse.<sup>111</sup> The content mix exhibited distinct characteristics: quotes from Adolf Hitler, Savitri Devi, Oswald Mosley, and Ted Kaczynski appeared alongside Nazi symbolism used across ecofascist-accelerationist spaces, including the numbers 14/88, the Algiz Rune, and the Black Sun (Sonnenrad). Propaganda materials featured armed masked figures and slogans declaring ‘No Political Solution.’ The channel administrator continually called on followers to surround themselves with their men, to train, and to be prepared for an inevitable call to action, reflecting the synthesis of pastoral romanticism and revolutionary violence that defines contemporary ecofascist mobilization.<sup>112</sup> This migration exemplified the leaderless resistance model that Section 2 analyzed: autonomous actors coordinating through shared ideology rather than organizational hierarchy.

This ideological synthesis draws on three primary intellectual currents within far-right environmentalism: the misanthropic Finnish environmentalist Pentti Linkola, whose advocacy for radical population

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<sup>109</sup>Ahmed, Mohamed, Allison McDowell-Smith, and Ardian Shajkovci. "Eco-Fascist 'Pine Tree Party' Growing as a Violent Extremism Threat." *Homeland Security Today*, September 27, 2020. <https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/eco-fascist-pine-tree-party-growing-as-a-violent-extremism-threat/>.

<sup>110</sup>Hughes, Brian. "'Pine Tree Twitter' and the Shifting Ideological Foundations of Eco-Extremism." *Interventionen: Zeitschrift für Verantwortungspädagogik* 14 (2019): 18–25. [https://violence-prevention-network.de/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Interventionen\\_14-2019.pdf](https://violence-prevention-network.de/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Interventionen_14-2019.pdf).

<sup>111</sup>Ahmed, McDowell-Smith, and Shajkovci (2020); Blanchard, Aline. "EcoFascism and Green Accelerationism: Ghosts of the Past or a Present Danger?" *Global Network on Extremism and Technology* (GNET), April 30, 2025. <https://gnet-research.org/2025/04/30/ecofascism-and-green-accelerationism-ghosts-of-the-past-or-a-present-danger/>.

<sup>112</sup>Ahmed, McDowell-Smith, and Shajkovci (2020).



reduction through forced abortions, sterilization, and acceptance of mass death exemplifies the movement's anti-human stance; Savitri Devi, a French-Greek esoteric Hitlerite whose synthesis of Hinduism, Aryan supremacism, and animal rights contributed to a post-war redefinition of Nazism as a 'religion of nature'; and Ted Kaczynski, whose anti-technological manifesto and seventeen-year bombing campaign against industrial society has been embraced by accelerationist networks despite his own rejection of Nazism.<sup>113</sup> Linkola's infamous lifeboat ethics metaphor, arguing that when a ship carrying one hundred passengers capsizes and there is one lifeboat that can hold only ten, "those who love and respect life will take the ship's axe and sever the extra hands that cling to the sides," reappeared throughout Pine Tree Party discourse as justification for eliminating "excess" human populations to preserve environmental resources.<sup>114</sup> Savitri Devi's writings, particularly *The Impeachment of Man* (1959), provided the movement's antihumanist ethical framework. The work attacked anthropocentric religious and philosophical traditions that placed human welfare above other forms of life, advocating instead for a fundamentally biocentric worldview that positioned animal rights and ecological preservation as morally superior to human interests.<sup>115</sup> Goodrick-Clarke argues that Devi's synthesis of Aryan supremacism, animal rights, and ecology served as the basis for a post-war redefinition of Nazism as a "religion of nature," and that her legacy constitutes an important influence on the neo-Nazi overlap with deep ecology.<sup>116</sup> This influence is directly evident in Pine Tree Party propaganda, which has incorporated quotes from Devi alongside those of Hitler and Oswald Mosley.<sup>117</sup>

This ideological synthesis exemplified the ecofascist appropriation that Section 3 traced, extracting Kaczynski's infrastructure critique while discarding its egalitarian foundation. Kaczynski's image and ideology achieved cult status within the Pine Tree Party ecosystem, with his visage appearing in hundreds of memes, propaganda materials, and educational posts across the network. His 1995 manifesto *Industrial Society and Its Future*, which opened with the declaration that "the Industrial Revolution and its

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<sup>113</sup>Macklin, (2022), 982.

<sup>114</sup>Pentti Linkola, *Can Life Prevail? A Radical Approach to the Environmental Crisis* (Helsinki: Tammi, 2004; English translation, 2009), quoted in Macklin (2022), 10.

<sup>115</sup>Kaplan, Jeffrey. "Savitri Devi and the National Socialist Religion of Nature." *The Pomegranate: The International Journal of Pagan Studies*, no. 7 (1999): 4–12. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276914009\\_Savitri\\_Devi\\_and\\_the\\_National\\_Socialist\\_Religion\\_of\\_Nature](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276914009_Savitri_Devi_and_the_National_Socialist_Religion_of_Nature).

<sup>116</sup>Goodrick-Clarke, Nicholas. *Hitler's Priestess: Savitri Devi, the Hindu-Aryan Myth, and Neo-Nazism*. New York: New York University Press, 1998. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qg323>.

<sup>117</sup>Ahmed, McDowell-Smith, and Shajkovci (2020).



consequences have been a disaster for the human race,”<sup>118</sup> provided the movement’s foundational critique of technological civilization. The manifesto’s argument that industrial-technological society was irreformable and could only be destroyed through revolutionary violence resonated with accelerationist tendencies already present in adjacent neo-Nazi spaces like Atomwaffen Division and The Base. Across the broader Terrorgram community on Telegram, which provided a digital home to Siege-culture following the removal of neo-Nazi forums Iron March and Fascist Forge, Kaczynski is venerated as one of a “holy trinity” alongside Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh and Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik.<sup>119</sup> Within the Pine Tree Party, Kaczynski was venerated as “Uncle Ted” and “Saint Ted,” his cabin in rural Montana depicted in terrorwave-style edits overlaid with far-right symbols including swastikas, Sonnenrads, and skull masks associated with Siege-culture groups. As Michael Loadenthal’s analysis of ecofascist discourse notes, this “Siege-ification of the deep green” or “Kaczynski-ization of the neo-Nazi” represented the complete ideological merger of anti-technological radicalism with accelerationist white supremacy.<sup>120</sup>

## 6.2 Mike Ma as Intellectual Architect

Mike Ma’s role as the movement’s intellectual architect was central to this synthesis. His novel *Harassment Architecture*, written in a style reminiscent of Chuck Palahniuk’s *Fight Club* exhorted readers to become “an engine of chaos, an accelerationist” while outlining specific violent tactics against infrastructure. The book’s widely circulated passage employed what might be termed a ‘faux prohibition,’ or explicit tactical guidance framed as a list of actions readers should not take: “Please note: Do not do any of these things. Especially do not cover your face and destroy the many and largely unprotected power stations and cell towers. Electricity is a ghost, but one you can catch and kill. Do not do that. Do not become the sort of person who gets really good at blowing power stations up while never getting caught.”<sup>121</sup> This disclaimer, transparently encouraging the very actions it claimed to prohibit, established a template for operational guidance that circulated extensively across Telegram channels. The novel’s protagonist declares that “the entire presence of industrialized man has been a violent preface to his looming and inescapable consequence. The final consequence,” before proclaiming that “the solution is

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<sup>118</sup>Kaczynski, Theodore. “Industrial Society and Its Future.” Manifesto. (1995).

<sup>119</sup>Farrell-Molloy and Macklin (2022).

<sup>120</sup>Loadenthal (2022).

<sup>121</sup>Ma, Mike, *Harassment Architecture* (self-published, 2019), as quoted in Macklin (2022), 985-986.



always found in nature. Nature always wins. It has never lost, and I pray it never will.”<sup>122</sup> These passages demonstrated Ma’s capacity for wedding Kaczynskian critique of techno-industrial civilization to accelerationist calls for systemic collapse through targeted violence.

Ma’s influence extended beyond literary production to direct organizational activity and ideological dissemination. A May 31, 2019, speech at Portland State University, documented by student journalist Chloe Dysart, revealed the movement’s fusion of conspiracy theory, dietary extremism, and accelerationist politics. Ma’s discourse ranged from claiming the U.S. government deliberately weakened citizens through food regulation (“There’s a reason that the government has banned raw dairy in [almost] every state. They want you weak because the weak rely on them; the weak don’t revolt; the weak pay their salaries”) to advocating for the “radicalization” of women and the pursuit of “a hard reset” as “our grand solution” to irreparable civilizational decay.<sup>123</sup> When pressed about his ideal form of government, Ma responded that there would be “no government, but obviously that would require a way smaller population,” explicitly linking anarcho-primitivist political theory to neo-Malthusian population control.<sup>124</sup> This same eliminationist logic suffused his 2021 follow-up novel *Gothic Violence*, which concluded with a “nutrition addendum” warning against fluoridated water, packaged foods, and seed oils while promoting consumption of raw meat and raw milk: dietary prescriptions that positioned bodily purity and masculine vitality as prerequisites for revolutionary action against the “globalist agenda.”<sup>125</sup>

### 6.3 Operational Evolution: The Green Brigade

The movement’s operational trajectory moved from aspirational rhetoric to documented violence with the formation of the Green Brigade, an ecofascist network that emerged on Discord before migrating to Telegram in late 2019. Initially encompassing approximately thirty adherents ranging from socialists to anarchists to fascists united by their commitment to using force to protect nature, the group underwent ideological consolidation when its co-founder, an Oregon high school student, aligned it with The Base, a neo-Nazi accelerationist organization.<sup>126</sup> This alignment manifested in the Green Brigade’s visual propaganda, which adapted imagery from earlier white supremacist groups including the 1970s National

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<sup>122</sup>Ma (2019), as quoted in Macklin (2022).

<sup>123</sup>Dysart, Chloe. “A World on Fire.” PSU Vanguard, June 3, 2019. <https://psuvanguard.com/a-world-on-fire/>.

<sup>124</sup>Dysart (2019).

<sup>125</sup>Ma, Mike. *Gothic Violence* (self-published, 2021).

<sup>126</sup>Lamoureux, Mack, Ben Makuch, and Zachary Kamel. “How a Terror Group Recruited Budding Neo-Nazis,” *Vice*, November 24, 2020, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/inside-how-a-terror-group-recruited-budding-neo-nazis/>.



Socialist Liberation Front, reconfiguring their slogan “The Future Belongs to the Few of Us Still Willing to Get Our Hands Dirty: Political Terror It’s the Only Thing They Understand” to read “The Soil Belongs to the Few Still Willing to Get Their Hands Dirty: Eco Terrorism. Direct Action is the Only Reaction.”<sup>127</sup> The group similarly modified white supremacist David Lane’s “Fourteen Words” to declare “We Must Secure the Existence of Our People and a Future for Mother Nature,” exhibiting the seamless integration of racial preservation with environmental defense.<sup>128</sup> This alignment demonstrated the tactical convergence that Section 4 analyzed—coordination across ideological boundaries through shared targeting priorities.

The Green Brigade’s Telegram channel accumulated 1,156 subscribers between its November 6, 2019, launch and its March 19, 2020, dissolution.<sup>129</sup> The movement’s capacity for real-world violence had already been demonstrated months earlier in October 2019, when two Swedish activists—one affiliated with the Green Brigade, the other recently joined to The Base—attempted to liberate mink from a farm near Sölvesborg in southern Sweden. Finding no animals present, they instead committed arson, causing 800,000 Swedish kronor in damage.<sup>130</sup> The Green Brigade’s U.S.-based leader subsequently posted video footage of the destruction to iFunny, a platform for memes and viral videos, both celebrating the action and serving as proof-of-concept for the movement’s capacity to inspire real-world violence.<sup>131</sup> The attack served to demonstrate that online radicalization within ecofascist networks could generate offline attacks. The incident paralleled the radicalization pathway documented in Section 5, whereby Crusius’s months-long immersion in 8chan’s /pol/ board and exposure to accelerationist content ultimately culminated in the El Paso massacre. Both cases exemplified the leaderless resistance model outlined in Section 2: autonomous actors inspired by online propaganda conducting attacks without formal organizational direction. They simultaneously demonstrate that prolonged engagement with extremist online communities systematically lowers barriers to violence, regardless of ideological specifics.

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<sup>127</sup>Macklin (2022), 990-991.

<sup>128</sup>Macklin (2022), 990-991.

<sup>129</sup>Blanchard (2025).

<sup>130</sup>Lamoureux, Mack, Ben Makuch, and Zachary Kamel. “‘Eco-fascist’ Arm of Neo-Nazi Terror Group, The Base, Linked to Swedish Arson,” *Vice*, January 29, 2020,

<https://www.vice.com/en/article/eco-fascist-arm-of-neo-nazi-terror-group-the-base-linked-to-swedish-arson/>; .

Macklin (2022), 990-991.

<sup>131</sup>Macklin (2022), 991.



## 6.4 Cultural Mechanisms, Recruitment, and Synthesis

The movement's visual culture was equally central to radicalization processes. The Pine Tree Party's visual propaganda incorporated Nazi symbology including the Algiz Rune, Black Sun, and 14/88 numerology.<sup>132</sup> One widely circulated image depicted a masked man holding a gun captioned "No Political Solution," accompanied by direct calls for radicalization.<sup>133</sup> The channel's founder, Mike Ma, sold "Kaczynski Electric" merchandise featuring a fist clasp a bolt of lightning in front of a pine tree, branding accelerationist violence with the Unabomber's iconography.<sup>134</sup> Such content exemplified what researchers identify as 'memetic irony' whereby humor and aesthetic appeal serve as recruitment vectors that simultaneously desensitize viewers to violence and construct an in-group identity through shared participation in transgressive visual culture.<sup>135</sup>

The movement's mainstreaming potential became evident through its exploitation of algorithmic blind spots and coded communication. Research by Ciarán O'Connor for the Institute for Strategic Dialogue documented how ecofascist content proliferated on TikTok despite platform policies against extremism, with 312 of 1,030 sampled videos (30.3 percent) promoting white supremacy and 246 (23.9 percent) supporting extremist individuals or organizations, including thirty videos celebrating Brenton Tarrant and thirteen containing his original attack footage.<sup>136</sup> Research by Joshua Farrell-Molloy and Eviane Leidig for the Global Network on Extremism and Technology similarly documented how conspiracy theories about "Great Reset" initiatives, which cast efforts to transition away from industrial agriculture and meat production as globalist plots to force populations to consume insects and synthetic foods, provide entry points to broader audiences by tapping into pre-existing health-conscious communities and positioning "traditional or natural" diets as rebellion against elite control.<sup>137</sup> Ma's emphasis on raw milk consumption, anti-xenoestrogen activism, and rejection of modern food processing thus functioned not merely as

<sup>132</sup>Ahmed, McDowell-Smith, and Shajkovci (2020).

<sup>133</sup>Ahmed, McDowell-Smith, and Shajkovci (2020).

<sup>134</sup>Macklin (2022).

<sup>135</sup>Crawford, Blyth, Florence Keen, and Guillermo Suarez-Tangil. "Memetic Irony and the Promotion of Violence Within Chan Cultures." *Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST)*, December 2020. <https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/memetic-irony-and-the-promotion-of-violence-within-chan-cultures/>.

<sup>136</sup>O'Connor, Ciarán. "Hatescape: An In-Depth Analysis of Extremism and Hate Speech on TikTok." *Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD)*, 24 August 2021. <https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/hatescape-an-in-depth-analysis-of-extremism-and-hate-speech-on-tiktok/>.

<sup>137</sup>Joshua Farrell-Molloy and Eviane Leidig, "The Emerging Raw Food Movement and the 'Great Reset,'" *Global Network on Extremism and Technology*, October 10, 2022, <https://gnet-research.org/2022/10/10/the-emerging-raw-food-movement-and-the-great-reset/>.





lifestyle prescriptions but as political wedges capable of appealing to health-conscious audiences while smuggling in eliminationist ideology.

The recruitment pathway from environmental concern to genocidal ideology follows a trajectory documented across multiple analyses. Individuals expressing legitimate anxiety about climate change encounter content that reframes ecological crisis as demographic crisis, attributing resource depletion and pollution to overpopulation in the Global South and immigration to Western nations.<sup>138</sup> This narrative, exemplified by Tarrant's assertion that "the invaders are the ones overpopulating the world. Kill the invaders, kill the overpopulation and by doing so save the environment," offers reductive solutions to complex problems while presenting adherents as possessing forbidden knowledge allegedly suppressed by elites.<sup>139</sup> As Brian Hughes and colleagues observe, this process benefits from ecofascism's distinctive aesthetics, which package exclusionary ideology in accessible imagery of mountains, forests, and wildlife, encoding racial claims to territory within content that appears to celebrate natural beauty.<sup>140</sup> The movement's emphasis on masculine self-improvement through dietary purity, physical fitness, and mastery of survival skills (themes prominent in both Ma's novels and broader Pine Tree Party discourse) provides concrete practices through which adherents can perform commitment to the ideology while preparing for anticipated collapse.

Paolini's critical discourse analysis of Facebook and Telegram channels revealed a divided movement: a "shrinking climate-denialist mainstream" associated with outlets like Fox News and Breitbart, and a "growing traditionalist/esoteric niche" characterized by "metapolitical strategies" and possessing "potential for violence."<sup>141</sup> The latter tendency, exemplified by the Pine Tree Party and its adjacent networks, exhibits what Paolini characterizes as "apocalyptic hopes," viewing climate catastrophe not as a crisis to be averted but as an opportunity for civilizational rebirth through collapse. This apocalyptic orientation distinguishes contemporary ecofascism from both mainstream environmentalism and historical fascist movements' relationship to ecology, positioning adherents as vanguards who will survive collapse through what they present as superior fitness, knowledge, and racial solidarity.

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<sup>138</sup>Wegener, Friederike. "Eco-Fascism: More than Tree-Loving Terrorists." *Global Network on Extremism & Technology*, January 6, 2021, <https://gnet-research.org/2021/01/06/eco-fascism-more-than-tree-loving-terrorists/>

<sup>139</sup>Tarrant, Brenton. "The Great Replacement" (2019), as quoted in Macklin (2022).

<sup>140</sup>Hughes, Jones, and Amarasingam (2022).

<sup>141</sup>Paolini, Christian. "Yankee Cyberborea: Contemporary Expressions of American Far Right Ecologism on Facebook and Telegram." (MA thesis, Central European University, 2022). [https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2022/paolini\\_christian.pdf](https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2022/paolini_christian.pdf).





The continuity from Christchurch to El Paso to Buffalo demonstrates this doctrine's operational maturation. Payton Gendron's 180-page manifesto, posted before his May 14, 2022, massacre of ten African Americans in Buffalo, plagiarized extensively from Tarrant's text, including passages linking immigration to environmental degradation, while also quoting Kaczynski's manifesto verbatim.<sup>142</sup> The incorporation of explicit ecofascist rhetoric into these manifestos, even when environmental themes remain secondary to racial grievance, signals the ideology's penetration into the broader accelerationist milieu.

The Pine Tree Party's evolution synthesizes the dynamics documented across preceding sections. It weaponizes the climate-conflict pathways established in Section 1: exploiting resource scarcity anxieties through survival discourse, instrumentalizing displacement fears through anti-immigrant rhetoric, and leveraging governance failures through conspiracy narratives about institutional weakness. It implements the accelerationist tactics analyzed in Section 2: leaderless resistance through lone-actor terrorism, infrastructure targeting as force multiplication, and digital coordination through decentralized networks. It embodies the ecofascist ideology traced in Section 3: instrumentalizing environmental concern for exclusionary ends, deploying the "snakeoil strategy" to recruit through universal values before introducing eliminationist solutions, and normalizing violence through pastoral aesthetics and anti-modern romanticism. And it manifests the convergence documented in Section 4: fusing collapse-as-opportunity ideology with infrastructure-as-ecological-warfare tactics through digital operationalization that transforms environmental anxiety into revolutionary violence.

Where the El Paso attack demonstrated how this convergence inspires lone-actor terrorism, the Pine Tree Party ecosystem reveals the organizational infrastructure enabling its systematic propagation and tactical refinement. The movement's persistence despite periodic deplatforming, with channels dissolving and reconstituting across Telegram, alternative social media platforms, and encrypted communications networks, suggests that absent comprehensive policy responses addressing both the climate-conflict vulnerabilities that Section 1 identified and the radicalization pathways that Sections 2 through 4 documented, the threat may intensify as the ecological and demographic pressures analyzed throughout this research accelerate in coming decades.

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<sup>142</sup>Amarasingam, Amarnath, Marc-André Argentino, and Graham Macklin. "The Buffalo Attack: The Cumulative Momentum of Far-Right Terror." CTC Sentinel 15, no. 7 (July 2022): 1–13. <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-buffalo-attack-the-cumulative-momentum-of-far-right-terror/>.



## **Section 7: Cross-Case Analysis and Implications**

The preceding case studies examined two distinct manifestations of the ecofascist-accelerationist convergence documented in Section 4: a mass casualty terrorist attack in El Paso, Texas, and the organizational ecosystem of the Pine Tree Party. While differing in form, with the former representing an endpoint of radicalization, the latter revealing infrastructure that produces such endpoints, both cases instantiate the ideological fusion, tactical alignment, and digital operationalization that characterize this emergent threat. This section synthesizes findings across both cases to identify convergent and divergent patterns, assess how the theoretical framework developed in Sections 1 through 4 operates in practice, examine conditions enabling this convergence, and consider implications for the threat trajectory. The analysis concludes by distinguishing the Western ecofascist-accelerationist phenomenon from other forms of climate-extremism nexus, particularly those operating in climate-stressed regions of the Global South.

### **7.1 Comparative Logic and Case Selection**

The two cases were selected to illuminate different dimensions of the convergence phenomenon. The El Paso attack exemplifies the first threat vector identified in Section 4.4: mass casualty terrorism targeting racial and ethnic minorities, justified through environmental collapse narratives and overpopulation rhetoric. The attack represents what the leaderless resistance model anticipates: an autonomous actor, radicalized through digital exposure to extremist content, conducting violence without formal organizational direction while producing a manifesto designed to inspire emulation. The Pine Tree Party, by contrast, reveals the organizational and cultural infrastructure enabling such radicalization. It exemplifies the second and third threat vectors from Section 4.4: infrastructure sabotage framed as ecological warfare, and systematic exploitation of climate anxiety for recruitment and mobilization. Where the El Paso case captures a single lethal event, the Pine Tree Party case exposes the sustained processes through which individuals progress from environmental concern to eliminationist ideology.

Together, the cases demonstrate that the ecofascist-accelerationist convergence operates across multiple registers simultaneously. It produces both spectacular violence and the conditions for its perpetuation; it functions through both individual action and networked coordination; it manifests as both immediate terrorism and long-term cultural transformation. Analyzing the cases comparatively reveals patterns that neither case alone could establish, while their differences illuminate the breadth of the threat landscape.



## 7.2 Convergent Patterns

Despite their distinct forms, the cases exhibit significant convergence across several dimensions. Both operate within an ecosystem where the Christchurch attacker serves as a central reference point. The El Paso manifesto opens with explicit endorsement of the Christchurch shooter and adopts the “Great Replacement” framework that Section 3 identified as central to contemporary ecofascist mobilization. The Pine Tree Party venerated Ted Kaczynski as “Uncle Ted” and “Saint Ted,” while operating within a broader ecosystem where adjacent organizations such as Atomwaffen Division and The Base canonized Kaczynski alongside Timothy McVeigh and Anders Breivik. These shared reference points provide ideological coherence across otherwise decentralized networks, establishing common ground that enables coordination without formal organizational structure.

Both cases demonstrate the snakeoil strategy that Section 3.3 analyzed as ecofascism's primary recruitment mechanism. The El Paso manifesto's structure implements this strategy in compressed form: environmental grievances catalogued at length—aquifer depletion, urban sprawl, industrial pollution—before the argument pivots toward demographic targeting through the claim that reducing population constitutes sustainability policy. The Pine Tree Party operationalizes the same logic across extended recruitment timelines, with individuals encountering environmental content, survivalist discourse, and dietary purity messaging before these concerns channel toward eliminationist conclusions. In both cases, legitimate ecological anxiety serves as an entry point for radicalization, with environmental concern subordinated to exclusionary political objectives through the interpretive frameworks Section 3 documented.

Digital platforms function as essential infrastructure in both cases, confirming the analysis of Section 4.3. The El Paso shooter posted his manifesto to 8chan minutes before the attack, situating his violence within the transnational network of accelerationist terrorism that platform had facilitated throughout 2019. The Pine Tree Party migrated from Instagram to Telegram, utilizing the encrypted platform architecture that Section 2.4 identified as enabling accelerationist coordination while frustrating surveillance and moderation. Both cases demonstrate how digital ecosystems transform ideology into operation: 8chan's gamification dynamics provided incentive structures rewarding violence with status, while Telegram's channel architecture enabled the Pine Tree Party to disseminate tactical knowledge, celebrate attacks, and cultivate collective identity through shared transgression.



The leaderless resistance model, analyzed in Section 2.2 as accelerationism's primary tactical modality, structures both cases. The El Paso shooter acted autonomously, without formal organizational membership, inspired by manifestos and online content rather than directed by hierarchical leadership. His own manifesto explicitly provides guidance for future attackers, implementing the logic whereby each attack generates propaganda to catalyze subsequent operations. The Pine Tree Party's ecosystem similarly emphasizes autonomous action over organizational membership, with Mike Ma's writings providing operational templates while maintaining plausible deniability. The Green Brigade's Swedish arson attack further demonstrates this model: adherents inspired by online content conducting violence without centralized direction.

### **7.3 Divergent Patterns and the Threat Spectrum**

The cases diverge in ways that reveal the threat landscape's breadth. Most significantly, they occupy different positions on the spectrum from radicalization to violence. The El Paso attack represents the culmination of radicalization: months of exposure to extremist content culminating in mass murder. The Pine Tree Party represents the infrastructure producing such endpoints: the sustained organizational activity, cultural production, and tactical dissemination that enables individuals to progress along radicalization pathways. This distinction carries operational implications. Disrupting lone-actor terrorism requires intervention before radicalization completes; disrupting ecosystems like the Pine Tree Party requires addressing the cultural and organizational structures that make radicalization possible.

Target emphasis also diverges across cases. The El Paso attack targeted people: specifically, Hispanic individuals in a border community framed as both demographic and ecological threats. This aligns with the first threat vector from Section 4.4, where mass casualty violence aims to inflame intergroup tensions, terrorize targeted communities, and potentially provoke governmental overreaction that accelerates societal polarization. The Pine Tree Party, while operating within networks that celebrated such attacks, placed greater emphasis on infrastructure targeting. Ma's writings detailed electrical grid vulnerabilities; channels within the broader ecosystem circulated guides on sabotaging power stations and communication networks. This emphasis aligns with the second threat vector, where infrastructure attacks aim at direct system disruption rather than primarily inflaming intergroup conflict.



The temporal dimension of radicalization also differs. The El Paso shooter's progression from exposure to the Christchurch manifesto to conducting his own attack occurred over a period of months, reflecting a compressed timeline characteristic of lone-actor terrorism. The Pine Tree Party's recruitment model operates across extended periods, with the movement cultivating adherents through sustained engagement with environmental content, lifestyle practices, and community participation before introducing explicitly eliminationist ideology. This extended timeline creates more intervention opportunities but also produces deeper ideological commitment among those who complete the progression.

Finally, the cases differ in their relationship to aesthetic culture. The El Paso manifesto, while referencing *The Lorax* and appropriating Al Gore's documentary title, functions primarily as ideological document rather than cultural artifact. The Pine Tree Party, by contrast, invested heavily in aesthetic production: terrorwave imagery, nature photography, meme culture, and the literary output of Mike Ma. This aesthetic dimension, analyzed in Sections 3.4 and 4.3, serves multiple functions: establishing subcultural identity, providing plausible deniability, and lowering psychological barriers to violence through gradual desensitization. The Pine Tree Party's aesthetic investment suggests that sustained radicalization infrastructure may depend on cultural production in ways that lone-actor terrorism does not.

#### **7.4 The Theoretical Framework in Practice**

The cases validate and extend the theoretical framework developed in Sections 1 through 4. Most significantly, they confirm that the ecofascist-accelerationist convergence documented in Section 4 produces concrete operational activity rather than remaining confined to online rhetoric. The El Paso attack demonstrates that individuals do act on this ideology's prescriptions, conducting mass casualty terrorism with explicit environmental justification. The Pine Tree Party's Green Brigade demonstrates that networked coordination produces real-world violence, as the Swedish arson attack established.

The cases also reveal which climate-conflict pathways from Section 1 feature most prominently in these two Western manifestations of this convergence. Displacement and anti-migrant dynamics dominate both cases. The El Paso manifesto frames Hispanic immigration as an environmental invasion requiring eliminationist response; the Pine Tree Party's founding declaration promised to oust "illegal immigrants with zero mercy." Resource scarcity appears in both cases' rhetoric as a legitimating frame; the El Paso manifesto invokes aquifer depletion and environmental degradation, while the Pine Tree Party



emphasized survivalist preparation for resource competition. Governance failure appears primarily as a narrative resource: both cases position governmental inadequacy as evidence that conventional politics cannot address environmental or demographic crises, justifying extra-institutional violence.

The cases extend the theoretical framework by revealing dimensions that abstract analysis cannot fully capture. The El Paso manifesto demonstrates the psychological function that environmental framing serves: by framing mass murder as sustainability policy, the shooter constructed an ideological framework in which elimination of targeted populations constituted rational response to ecological necessity rather than expression of hatred alone. This self-conception transformation from hate criminal to environmental defender represents an operational advantage that Section 4 identified theoretically but that the case material renders concrete. Similarly, the Pine Tree Party case reveals how aesthetic culture functions in sustained radicalization. The terrorwave imagery, nature photography, and dietary discourse documented in Section 6 do not merely accompany ideological content but actively enable its absorption by constructing identity, community, and practice around extremist commitment.

### **7.5 Conditions for Emergence and Potential Spread**

Both cases emerged within specific conditions whose confluence enabled the ecofascist-accelerationist convergence to develop. Identifying these conditions illuminates where similar dynamics might manifest while establishing the scope limitations of the present analysis.

The cases share several enabling conditions. First, widespread climate anxiety provided the environmental concern that ecofascist recruitment strategies exploit. Both cases emerged during a period of intensifying public awareness of climate change, creating audiences receptive to ecological messaging that could subsequently channel toward exclusionary conclusions. Second, digital infrastructure with inadequate content moderation enabled radicalization and coordination. The platforms central to both cases (8chan for El Paso, Instagram and Telegram for the Pine Tree Party) either lacked effective moderation or, in Telegram's case, explicitly prioritized encryption over content control. Third, existing far-right networks provided ideological resources and community structures that the convergence could appropriate and extend. Both cases drew upon white nationalist frameworks, militant accelerationist tactical repertoires, and extremist reference points that predated the specific ecofascist synthesis. Fourth, perceived governmental inadequacy, whether regarding climate policy, immigration enforcement, or broader



institutional legitimacy, provided narrative resources positioning extra-institutional violence as a necessary response to system failure.

These conditions cluster most densely in Western democracies with significant far-right movements, high digital penetration, climate-aware publics, and political contestation over immigration. The cases' Western focus reflects the geographic locations in which the specific ecofascist-accelerationist convergence examined in this analysis has predominantly emerged. This carries implications for assessing potential spread: similar dynamics are most likely to manifest in comparable contexts, with other Western democracies exhibiting the same confluence of conditions.

Whether this convergence could adapt to non-Western contexts remains uncertain. The ideology's core architecture depends on white nationalist frameworks: the "Great Replacement" narrative, blood-and-soil mythology traced to Nazi antecedents in Section 3.2, and racial hierarchies positioning non-white populations as environmental threats. These frameworks do not translate straightforwardly to contexts lacking white nationalist movements or where the relevant demographic anxieties take different forms. The question of ideological adaptation, and specifically whether ecofascist-accelerationist synthesis could be reconfigured around non-racial exclusionary frameworks, exceeds what the present cases can establish and represents a direction for future research.

The Western ecofascist-accelerationist convergence represents one form of climate-extremism nexus rather than its totality. Section 1 documented how climate stress enables extremist exploitation in regions like the Sahel, where groups including Boko Haram and affiliates of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State leverage environmental degradation for recruitment, territorial control, and revenue generation. These dynamics operate through different ideological frameworks (Islamist rather than white nationalist) and different mechanisms. The distinction underscores that climate-weaponized extremism takes multiple forms globally, with the ecofascist-accelerationist convergence constituting the specifically Western manifestation examined here. A comprehensive understanding of the climate-extremism nexus would require parallel analysis of how climate stress enables mobilization across diverse ideological formations and geographic contexts: analysis that exceeds the present scope but that the theoretical framework of Section 1 could support.

## **7.6 Implications for Threat Trajectory**





The cases suggest several implications for how the ecofascist-accelerationist threat may evolve. First, the relationship between ecosystems such as that of the Pine Tree Party's and attacks like El Paso indicates a potential escalation pathway: radicalization infrastructure produces lone actors who conduct violence, generating propaganda that further validates the infrastructure and potentially inspires additional attacks. This cyclical dynamic, characteristic of the leaderless resistance model, suggests that the threat may continue absent intervention at multiple points, both disrupting radicalization ecosystems and interdicting individuals progressing toward violence.

Second, the cases demonstrate that the convergence operates across all three threat vectors identified in Section 4.4 simultaneously. Mass casualty terrorism, infrastructure sabotage, and propaganda exploitation of climate events are not alternative manifestations but concurrent activities within the same networks. Policy responses targeting only one vector—for instance, focusing on lone-actor terrorism while neglecting infrastructure targeting or recruitment exploitation—may prove insufficient given the threat's multi-dimensional character.

Third, the cases suggest that climate impacts will provide ongoing mobilization opportunities. Each drought, flood, hurricane, or wildfire provides material that can validate the worldview that ecological collapse is underway while generating grievances and anxieties that extremist recruitment can exploit. As climate impacts continue, the material for ecofascist mobilization may expand. The feedback dynamics Section 4 documented, whereby climate stress enables extremist activity that compounds vulnerability to both climate and violence, may continue.

Fourth, the gap between the attacks' ideological complexity and institutional responses, as documented in Section 5.3's analysis of how legal frameworks captured racial targeting but not environmental legitimation, suggests that existing counterterrorism and hate crime frameworks may not fully address the convergence phenomenon. Interventions addressing racial hatred without engaging the environmental framing that structures and legitimates it may miss earlier radicalization stages where ecological concern first channels toward demographic targeting.

The analysis presented here has focused on ideological content, tactical repertoires, and digital infrastructure rather than individual-level radicalization pathways. Questions of who joins these movements, what social circumstances precede recruitment, and what distinguishes those who progress to



violence from those who remain at the level of aesthetic participation require different methodological approaches that exceed the present scope, to include longitudinal studies, interview-based research, and quantitative analysis of radicalization predictors. Similarly, measuring the actual radicalizing impact of propaganda exploitation, as distinct from its pervasiveness, would require outcome-focused research designs not employed here. The findings from Shanaah, Fritsche, and Osmundsen discussed in Section 8, which identify authoritarian orientations rather than environmental concern as the primary predictor of ecofascist support, suggest one productive direction for such research. These scope boundaries do not undermine the present contribution but rather delimit it: this analysis establishes what these movements believe, how they operate, and where they recruit, providing the foundation upon which individual-level research can build.

These implications inform the policy recommendations that follow. Effective response requires addressing the climate vulnerabilities that extremists exploit, the digital infrastructure enabling radicalization and coordination, the ideological synthesis that transforms environmental concern into eliminationist violence, and the multiple threat vectors through which the convergence manifests. Section 8 develops recommendations addressing each dimension, grounded in the operational patterns the cases reveal.

## **Section 8: Policy Recommendations and Conflict Transformation Applications**

The preceding analysis has traced the convergence of ecofascism and militant accelerationism from ideological foundations through operational manifestation, demonstrating how these movements systematically exploit the climate-conflict pathways established in Section 1: resource scarcity that intensifies intergroup competition, climate-induced displacement that activates demographic anxieties, and governance failures that erode institutional legitimacy. The case studies of El Paso and the Pine Tree Party, examined in Sections 5 and 6, illustrated both the lethal consequences of this convergence and the digital infrastructure (from 8chan manifestos to Telegram operational networks) enabling its spread. The cross-case analysis in Section 7 identified the mechanisms through which ecological concern is instrumentalized for fascist mobilization, and particularly the "snakeoil" strategy documented in Section 3.3 whereby environmental rhetoric serves as an entry point for radicalization rather than expression of genuine ecological commitment. This final section transitions the paper from analysis to application, examining how policymakers and practitioners can address the threats posed by ecofascist-accelerationist movements while avoiding interventions that may inadvertently reinforce extremist narratives or



undermine legitimate environmental and peacebuilding efforts. The task is not merely technical, but fundamentally one of conflict transformation: changing the conditions that produce violence rather than simply suppressing its symptoms.

The conflict transformation framework that has organized this analysis carries particular implications for policy response. As established in Section 1, climate stress operates not as a direct cause but as a threat multiplier that human actors subsequently exploit; policy responses must therefore address both the exploitation and the underlying conditions that render populations vulnerable to radicalization. The three climate-conflict pathways (resource scarcity, displacement, and governance failure) provide the structural context within which ecofascist-accelerationist recruitment gains traction; interventions that fail to address these pathways treat symptoms while leaving causes intact. At the same time, the ideological analysis in Sections 2 through 4 revealed that ecofascist movements instrumentalize environmental concern for purposes fundamentally unrelated to ecological protection, suggesting that counter-narratives must target the authoritarian and ethnocentric orientations driving recruitment rather than engaging primarily with environmental claims that function as rhetorical facade. The recommendations that follow attempt to hold these dual imperatives in productive tension, addressing structural vulnerabilities while disrupting the specific mechanisms through which ecofascist-accelerationist movements exploit them. Effective response requires working simultaneously at both levels; neither alone suffices.

### **8.1 Counter-Narrative Strategies: Targeting Normative Environments**

Effective counter-narrative strategies must be grounded in an empirical understanding of what drives support for extremist action, and here the research of Shanaah, Fritsche, and Osmundsen provides critical insights that challenge conventional assumptions about radicalization pathways while confirming the ideological dynamics documented throughout Sections 2 and 3.<sup>143</sup> Their study of pro-climate and ecofascist extremism support among the UK white population reveals that supporters of ecofascist extremism are driven primarily by fascist rather than ecological concerns; high scores on right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and ethnocentrism predict ecofascist support, while environmental identification and climate concern show low or no correlation.<sup>144</sup> This pattern confirms what scholars have termed the "avocado politics" thesis (green on the outside, brown on the inside) and

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<sup>143</sup>Shanaah, Fritsche, and Osmundsen (2023), 46–68.

<sup>144</sup>Shanaah, Fritsche, and Osmundsen (2023), 52–54.



validates the instrumentalization analysis developed in Section 3.3: environmental rhetoric serves as an entry point for radicalization rather than an expression of genuine ecological commitment. The implication for counter-narrative design is fundamental: engaging ecofascist environmental claims on their own terms mistakes the facade for the structure. Thus, counter-narratives must target the authoritarian and ethnocentric orientations that actually drive recruitment, and not merely the ecological rhetoric that facilitates it.

The same research identifies social norms as more predictive of extremism support than individual grievances. Specifically, Shanaah and colleagues found that approximately 4 to 6 percent of their sample expressed support for pro-climate extremism, while 19 percent supported ecofascist action and 15 percent agreed with ecofascist ideology, figures that establish the empirical base from which these movements recruit.<sup>145</sup> Support for both pro-climate and ecofascist extremist action correlates strongly with perceived ingroup norms: individuals who believe their social environment endorses radical action are significantly more likely to support such action themselves.<sup>146</sup> For ecofascist extremism specifically, support correlates negatively with pro-immigrant norms within an individual's ingroup, suggesting that communities with strong inclusive norms provide protective effects against ecofascist radicalization. This normative dimension indicates that counter-narratives must operate not merely at the level of individual attitude change but at the level of community norm construction. Changing individuals without changing their normative environment produces fragile results, while changing the environment transforms the context within which individual choices are made.

A further finding carries direct implications for the governance failure pathway established in Section 1: external political efficacy (the belief that the political system is responsive to citizens' concerns) correlates negatively with support for extremist action across both pro-climate and ecofascist variants.<sup>147</sup> Individuals who perceive political institutions as unresponsive to their concerns prove more susceptible to radicalization narratives that position violence as the only remaining avenue for change. The ecofascist-accelerationist narrative that conventional politics have failed and only radical action can address environmental crises, as documented throughout Sections 4 and 5, gains traction precisely where governmental response appears inadequate. Demonstrable political efficacy on climate issues thus directly

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<sup>145</sup>Shanaah, Fritsche, and Osmundsen (2023), 55.

<sup>146</sup>Shanaah, Fritsche, and Osmundsen (2023), 56–58.

<sup>147</sup>Shanaah, Fritsche, and Osmundsen (2023), 59.



undermines this recruitment appeal, transforming the governance failure pathway from vulnerability into resilience. Visible, meaningful governmental action on climate adaptation and mitigation serves dual purposes: addressing material conditions that create stress while simultaneously undercutting the systemic failure framing through which movements recruit. The policy implication is clear: climate governance is counter-extremism governance.

Counter-narrative efforts must also account for the distinct psychological profiles associated with different forms of extremism support. Shanaah and colleagues identify a small but significant population (approximately 3 to 4 percent of their sample) that simultaneously endorses both pro-climate and ecofascist extremist action despite the ideological inconsistency of these positions.<sup>148</sup> High neuroticism scores characterize this group, pointing to mental health and personality dimensions that require different intervention approaches than ideologically motivated extremism. For this subset of potential extremists, counter-narratives addressing ideological content may prove less relevant than interventions addressing underlying psychological vulnerabilities, a differentiation that has implications for the targeting and design of prevention programming. The finding underscores the heterogeneity of radicalization pathways: the synthetic flexibility of the convergence that Section 4 examined produces correspondingly diverse populations requiring differentiated response strategies. One size fits none; effective counter-narrative work must be as adaptive as the movements it opposes.

## **8.2 Platform Governance and Content Moderation**

The digital infrastructure enabling ecofascist-accelerationist radicalization, documented extensively in Sections 2.4, 3.4, and 4.3, requires platform governance responses tailored to the distinctive characteristics of ecofascist content. Blanchard's research on ecofascism's online presence identifies several operational recommendations for technology companies and content moderators that address the specific mechanisms through which these movements exploit digital spaces.<sup>149</sup> Algorithm adjustments represent a first-order intervention: platforms can deploy systems trained on ecofascist keywords, imagery, and symbols to identify and de-prioritize ecofascist content while appending fact-checking labels that disrupt the seamless consumption of radicalization material. This approach recognizes a critical dynamic: outright removal of content may prove counterproductive by driving adherents to less

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<sup>148</sup>Shanaah, Fritsche, and Osmundsen (2023), 60–61.

<sup>149</sup>Blanchard (2025)



moderated platforms while generating persecution narratives that reinforce movement cohesion. The accelerationist logic from Section 4.2 actively seeks to provoke such overreaction. Deprioritization combined with contextual labeling offers an alternative that reduces content visibility and reach without creating the censorship grievances that extremist movements exploit for recruitment.

Ecofascist content presents particular challenges for automated moderation systems because of its relatively low profile compared to other extremist material. Where explicitly violent content or recognized hate symbols trigger existing detection systems, ecofascist propaganda frequently operates through naturalistic imagery, pastoral aesthetics, and coded language that evades algorithmic removal. Richards, Jones, and Brinn's analysis of climate change discussions on Stormfront demonstrates how these dynamics function in practice: the aesthetic strategies utilized to create a soft entrypoint to ideological content that Section 3.4 analyzed exemplify this evasion technique.<sup>150</sup> Enhanced human moderation through collaboration between platforms and researchers specializing in far-right ecology becomes essential for identifying the evolving visual and linguistic strategies through which ecofascist content circulates.<sup>151</sup> Researchers provide platforms with updated intelligence on emerging terminology, visual motifs, and cross-platform migration patterns; platforms share data enabling researchers to track content evolution and network dynamics. The relationship must be reciprocal: neither technical systems nor human expertise alone can address content designed to evade both.

Image-based propaganda detection requires particular attention given the centrality of visual aesthetics to ecofascist radicalization, a dynamic that the propaganda analysis in Section 3.4 established as fundamental to movement communication strategy. The meme culture documented throughout this analysis, from subverted environmental slogans to pastoral imagery juxtaposed with calls for violence, operates primarily through images that convey ideological content without the textual markers that text-based moderation systems are capable of detecting. Computer vision systems trained on ecofascist visual repertoires can identify propaganda that would otherwise circulate undetected, though the rapid evolution of visual strategies requires ongoing collaboration between technical systems and human analysts who can identify emerging aesthetic patterns. Automated systems cannot reliably make such determinations without human oversight informed by subject-matter expertise. The challenge is interpretive, not merely technical.

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<sup>150</sup>Richards, Jones, and Brinn (2022).

<sup>151</sup>Blanchard (2025).



Analysis of white nationalist platforms reveals a mainstreaming pathway through which individuals progress from public, pseudo-democratic spaces toward increasingly extreme environments, the radicalization pipeline that the case studies in Sections 5 and 6 illustrated in operation. Richards, Jones, and Brinn's Stormfront analysis demonstrates how these platforms function as entry points where disparate voices converge, with debate emerging among users about the meaning and utility of concepts like ecofascism even as a minority of prolific posters drive ideological consensus.<sup>152</sup> From these relatively public spaces, users migrate toward platforms with less moderation (Telegram channels, dark web forums, and encrypted communication networks) where tactical content and operational planning occur with minimal oversight. This pathway suggests that platform governance must address not only individual platforms but the ecosystem through which radicalization progresses. Intervention at gateway communities disrupts recruitment before commitment hardens; exclusive focus on operational endpoints addresses only those already lost to radicalization. Effective governance works the entire pipeline, not merely its terminus.

### 8.3 Integrating Climate Adaptation with Conflict Transformation

Environmental peacebuilding—the use of environmental cooperation to prevent conflict, build peace, and sustain post-conflict recovery—offers a framework for addressing the climate-conflict pathways that ecofascist-accelerationist movements exploit, directly engaging the structural conditions that Section 1 identified as creating vulnerability to radicalization. However, Ide's analysis of environmental peacebuilding's adverse effects provides essential guidance for avoiding interventions that inadvertently create openings for extremist recruitment.<sup>153</sup> The “Six Ds” framework identifies six categories of potential harm: depoliticization, displacement, discrimination, deterioration into conflict, delegitimization of the state, and degradation of the environment.<sup>154</sup> Each category represents a pathway through which well-intentioned environmental interventions can generate grievances, undermine institutional legitimacy, or exacerbate the very conditions that the climate-conflict nexus literature has established as enabling extremist mobilization.

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<sup>152</sup>Richards, Jones, and Brinn (2022).

<sup>153</sup>Ide, Tobias. "The Dark Side of Environmental Peacebuilding." *World Development* 127 (2020): 104777. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X19304267>.

<sup>154</sup>Ide (2020), 4–7.





Depoliticization occurs when technical or scientific approaches to environmental problems obscure their political causes and structural dimensions, a dynamic that creates space for alternative political framings of precisely the sort ecofascism offers. When climate adaptation initiatives frame resource scarcity as purely technical challenges requiring engineering solutions, they render invisible the power dynamics, governance failures, and distributional inequalities that determine who bears the costs of environmental stress. This depoliticization creates space for ecofascist narratives that offer alternative political explanations, attributing scarcity to demographic invasion rather than structural inequality, while appearing to address issues that governmental responses have treated as purely technical rather than political.<sup>155</sup> The snakeoil strategy documented in Section 3.3 thrives in precisely this vacuum: where legitimate political channels fail to address distributional dimensions of environmental crises, illegitimate channels offering simple explanations and radical solutions gain appeal. Environmental peacebuilding that acknowledges and addresses political dimensions of resource conflicts, including questions of sovereignty, historical injustice, and distributional equity, provides less fertile ground for movements that position themselves as the only actors willing to name political causes of environmental crises. Technocratic silence invites extremist speech.

Displacement and discrimination represent particularly acute risks given the centrality of migration and population dynamics to ecofascist ideology, as the ideological analysis in Section 2 established. Large-scale environmental projects like dams, protected areas, and climate-resilient infrastructure frequently displace populations without adequate consent or compensation, generating precisely the grievances that extremist movements exploit. When displacement occurs along ethnic or social lines, or when benefits and costs of environmental interventions are distributed unequally across groups, the resulting discrimination provides empirical validation for narratives of victimization that radicalization entrepreneurs amplify.<sup>156</sup> The climate-induced displacement pathway that Section 1 traced, wherein population movements activate demographic anxieties and create openings for ethnonationalist mobilization, is thus not only a natural phenomenon that ecofascist accelerationism exploits but potentially a policy-created phenomenon that environmental interventions can generate. Inclusive consultation processes, environmental and social impact assessments, and national laws against improperly compensated relocation represent mitigation measures that reduce displacement and

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<sup>155</sup>Ide, (2020), 6.

<sup>156</sup>Ide (2020) 7–8.



discrimination harms while simultaneously reducing the grievance pools from which extremist movements recruit. Prevention costs less than remediation, in lives as in resources.

The delegitimization of the state, whether indirectly through complicity in other harms or directly through neoliberal hollowing out as international actors provide services the state cannot, creates governance vacuums that non-state actors including extremist movements fill, directly activating the governance failure pathway that Section 1 identified as central to climate-conflict dynamics. When environmental adaptation fails, when disaster response proves inadequate, or when climate services are provided by NGOs and international organizations rather than governmental institutions, state legitimacy erodes and alternative sources of authority gain appeal. ecofascist-accelerationist movements explicitly seek to compound this delegitimization, framing governmental failures as evidence of systemic collapse requiring violent intervention, the accelerationist logic from Section 4.2 that positions system failure as opportunity rather than threat.<sup>157</sup> Environmental peacebuilding that strengthens rather than substitutes for state capacity, that builds governmental legitimacy through effective service delivery, and that avoids creating parallel structures undermining state authority directly counters this delegitimization dynamic. The conflict transformation imperative is clear: build legitimate institutions capable of addressing grievances before illegitimate alternatives capture the space.

#### **8.4 Proportionate Response and the Risk of Over-Securitization**

Policy responses to ecofascist-accelerationist threats must navigate between inadequate attention and excessive securitization, with the latter risk carrying particular salience given the ideological structure of the movements in question. Lubrano's analysis of anti-technology extremism across insurrectionary anarchist, eco-extremist, and ecofascist milieus identifies a critical caution: over-securitizing these movements risks reinforcing the very narratives they explicitly support.<sup>158</sup> The accelerationist logic that Section 4 analyzed, which actively seeks to provoke disproportionate state response as means of delegitimizing institutions and radicalizing potential recruits, means that heavy-handed security measures can become unwitting contributors to movement objectives. Movements that frame themselves as persecuted truth-tellers challenging an oppressive system gain validation when governmental responses appear disproportionate, repressive, or indiscriminate. Such responses provide recruitment material,

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<sup>157</sup>Ide (2020), 9–10.

<sup>158</sup>Lubrano, Mauro. "Stop the Machines: The Rise of Anti-Technology Extremism." *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)*, May 30, 2025. <https://icct.nl/publication/stop-machines-rise-anti-technology-extremism>.



confirm persecution narratives, and push individuals toward more extreme positions as they perceive themselves under attack. Overreaction serves the adversary; restraint denies them the response they seek.

The assessment of current threat levels informs proportionality calculations and must be grounded in the empirical evidence this analysis has compiled. While the lethal potential of ecofascist-accelerationist violence has been demonstrated through attacks such as those in Christchurch, El Paso, and Buffalo (case studies that Sections 5 and 6 examined in detail) and while digital networks continue to spread ideology and tactical knowledge as Section 4.3 showed, these movements remain relatively fringe phenomena that should not be treated as existential threats to state security. Lubrano explicitly argues against inflating the threat assessment, noting that while anti-technology extremists present real dangers, they remain a fringe movement unlikely to pose existential threats to society. He cautions that disproportionate response risks validating extremist narratives, advocating instead for proportionate intelligence and law enforcement measures.<sup>159</sup> Intelligence and law enforcement interventions should be calibrated to actual threat levels, targeting operational planning for violence while avoiding broad surveillance of environmental advocacy or anti-technology sentiment that does not cross thresholds into incitement or operational preparation. Precision protects both security and liberty; indiscriminate response sacrifices both.

Proportionate response requires addressing root causes alongside security measures, a principle that follows directly from the conflict transformation framework organizing this analysis. The underlying anxieties that ecofascist-accelerationist movements exploit, including economic precarity, cultural displacement, environmental degradation, and technological alienation, do not disappear through security interventions; they require policy responses that address material conditions while providing meaning and community through constructive rather than destructive channels.<sup>160</sup> The climate-conflict pathways established in Section 1 (resource scarcity, displacement, and governance failure) identify the structural conditions within which these anxieties arise; security responses that leave these pathways unaddressed while adding grievances about surveillance and repression may prove not merely ineffective but counterproductive. Conflict transformation scholarship teaches that sustainable peace requires transforming the conditions that produce violence, not merely suppressing violent actors. The same principle applies here: monitoring for operational indicators, such as the acquisition of weapons or materials, target reconnaissance, and coordination of timing and logistics, while investing in the structural

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<sup>159</sup>Lubrano (2025).

<sup>160</sup>Lubrano (2025).



conditions that reduce vulnerability to radicalization. Security and transformation must proceed together, with neither substituting for the other.

## **8.5 Recommendations for Policymakers and Practitioners**

The analysis presented throughout this paper yields several categories of recommendations for those working at the intersection of climate adaptation, conflict transformation, and countering violent extremism. These recommendations synthesize the empirical findings on radicalization drivers outlined in Section 8.1, the platform governance strategies presented in Section 8.2, the environmental peacebuilding frameworks examined in Section 8.3, and the proportionality principles established in Section 8.4 into actionable guidance for policy and practice. Throughout, the recommendations maintain the dual focus that the conflict transformation framework requires: addressing the structural conditions that create vulnerability to radicalization while disrupting the specific mechanisms through which ecofascist-accelerationist movements exploit these vulnerabilities. The conflict transformation literature emphasizes that interventions targeting only one level (structural or agential, material or ideological) produce incomplete and often unstable results. The recommendations below therefore work across levels, recognizing that sustainable prevention requires simultaneous attention to conditions and actors.

For governments and international organizations engaged in climate adaptation, the imperative is to strengthen political efficacy and institutional legitimacy in climate-vulnerable regions, directly addressing the governance failure pathway that Section 1 identified as central to climate-conflict dynamics. Visible, meaningful governmental action on climate issues directly undermines ecofascist-accelerationist narratives that position systemic collapse as inevitable and violent intervention as the only remaining response; the Shanaah, Fritsche, and Osmundsen findings on political efficacy establish this connection empirically.<sup>161</sup> Adaptation programs should be designed with attention to Ide's Six Ds framework, incorporating environmental and social impact assessments, inclusive consultation processes, and mechanisms for equitable distribution of benefits and costs.<sup>162</sup> Programs that displace populations, discriminate between groups, or delegate state functions to non-governmental actors create the grievances and legitimacy deficits that extremist movements exploit; programs that strengthen state capacity, build community cohesion, and address distributional equity build resilience against radicalization while

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<sup>161</sup>Shanaah, Fritsche, and Osmundsen (2023), 61–62.

<sup>162</sup>Ide (2020), 10–11.



achieving climate objectives. This integration of climate adaptation with conflict transformation represents the practical application of the theoretical framework that has organized this analysis. Climate policy is peace policy; the two cannot be separated.

For technology companies and platform governance bodies, the recommendations center on tailored approaches to ecofascist content that account for the distinctive characteristics detailed in Section 3.4. Investment in detection systems trained on ecofascist visual repertoires, terminology, and symbols enables identification of content that evades text-based moderation; deprioritization combined with contextual labeling offers an alternative to removal that reduces reach without generating censorship grievances that extremist movements exploit.<sup>163</sup> Collaboration with researchers provides the subject-matter expertise necessary for identifying evolving aesthetic and linguistic strategies, while data-sharing arrangements enable tracking of cross-platform migration and network dynamics. Particular attention to the mainstreaming pathway (from public platforms through gateway communities toward operational networks) allows for intervention at multiple points in the radicalization pipeline. Disruption upstream prevents consolidation downstream; early intervention is more effective and less costly than late response.

For practitioners in countering violent extremism, the empirical findings on radicalization drivers indicate strategic priorities that the conflict transformation framework illuminates. Counter-narrative efforts should target normative environments rather than isolated individuals, working to strengthen inclusive community norms that provide protective effects against ecofascist recruitment, the approach that conflict transformation scholarship identifies as essential for sustainable attitude change. Interventions should address the authoritarian and ethnocentric orientations that predict ecofascist support rather than engaging primarily with environmental rhetoric that serves, as Section 3.3 documented, as instrumental facade. Recognition that a subset of extremism supporters is driven by psychological vulnerabilities rather than ideological conviction points toward differentiated approaches that combine ideological counter-narratives with mental health and social support interventions. Coordination with governmental actors on demonstrating political responsiveness to climate concerns complements direct counter-narrative work by undermining the systemic failure framing through which ecofascist-accelerationist movements recruit. The work is relational, not merely informational; changing beliefs requires changing the social contexts within which beliefs form.

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<sup>163</sup>Blanchard (2025).



For civil society organizations working on environmental issues, awareness of co-optation risks enables protective measures against the infiltration dynamics that Section 3.4 documented. Ecofascist-accelerationist movements explicitly target environmental spaces for recruitment, seeking to channel genuine ecological concern toward exclusionary and violent ends through the snakeoil strategy that presents ethnonationalist solutions to climate crises. Organizations can build resilience through clear articulation of inclusive values, attention to infiltration attempts, and proactive counter-messaging that distinguishes environmental justice approaches from ecofascist framings. Engagement with climate-anxious youth, a demographic that Section 3.4 identified as specifically targeted by ecofascist-accelerationist movements, should offer constructive pathways for action that satisfy desires for meaningful response to environmental crises without channeling energy toward destructive ends. The gap between climate crisis severity and governmental response creates the opening that extremist movements exploit; civil society organizations that provide meaningful collective action opportunities help close this gap while building the community bonds that the Shanaah, Fritsche, and Osmundsen findings identify as providing resilience against radicalization. Where constructive channels exist, destructive alternatives lose appeal.

The convergence of ecofascism and accelerationism examined throughout this analysis represents an adaptive, evolving threat that will likely intensify as climate impacts accelerate. Each drought, flood, wildfire, and hurricane provides fresh material for propaganda exploitation; each governmental failure validates narratives of systemic collapse; each wave of climate-induced migration activates the demographic anxieties that ecofascist recruitment channels toward violence. The three climate-conflict pathways established in Section 1 (resource scarcity, displacement, and governance failure) are likely become more acute as global temperatures rise, expanding the structural conditions within which ecofascist-accelerationist mobilization gains traction. Policy and practice must therefore be equally adaptive, evolving in response to changing tactics and contexts while maintaining the principled commitments (to proportionality, to addressing root causes, to inclusive and equitable climate response) that distinguish legitimate intervention from counterproductive overreaction. The frameworks and recommendations presented here provide orientation for this ongoing work, grounded in the empirical analysis of how these movements operate and the conditions under which they gain traction, while recognizing that specific applications will require continued attention to local contexts, emerging threats, and the dynamic interplay between climate stress, political response, and extremist exploitation. The



convergence documented in this analysis is not static; neither can be the response. Conflict transformation is not a destination but a practice—one that must continue as long as the conditions producing violence persist.

## **Conclusion**

This analysis has traced the convergence of ecofascism and militant accelerationism from ideological foundations through operational manifestation. The synthesis produces a distinctive threat: environmental catastrophe becomes simultaneously the justification for violence, the target of violence, and the anticipated consequence of violence.

The El Paso attack and Pine Tree Party case studies grounded these frameworks in empirical reality, demonstrating that individuals do act on this ideology's prescriptions and that organizational infrastructure exists to propagate radicalization. The cross-case analysis identified patterns—shared reference points, the snakeoil strategy's implementation, digital coordination, and the leaderless resistance model—that structure both lone-actor terrorism and networked violence.

Several scope boundaries delimit the present contribution and indicate directions for future research. This analysis focused on ideological content, tactical repertoires, and digital infrastructure rather than individual-level radicalization pathways; questions of who joins these movements, what social circumstances precede recruitment, and what distinguishes those who progress to violence from those who remain at the level of aesthetic participation require different methodological approaches that exceed the present scope. The Western focus of the case studies reflects where the specific ecofascist-accelerationist convergence examined here has predominantly emerged; whether this convergence could adapt to non-Western contexts, and particularly whether its core architecture (which depends on white nationalist frameworks including the “Great Replacement” narrative and blood-and-soil mythology) could be reconfigured around non-racial exclusionary frameworks, remains uncertain and represents a question for future investigation. The distinction between the Western ecofascist-accelerationist phenomenon and other forms of climate-extremism nexus, particularly the dynamics operating in climate-stressed regions of the Global South where groups leverage environmental degradation through different ideological frameworks, underscores that climate-weaponized extremism





takes multiple forms globally; a comprehensive understanding would require parallel analysis across diverse ideological formations and geographic contexts.

The evidence assembled throughout this analysis establishes that the ecofascist-accelerationist convergence does constitute a threat. Mass casualty attacks in Christchurch, El Paso, and Buffalo demonstrated the lethal potential of this ideological synthesis; tactical discussions within digital networks indicate ongoing interest in infrastructure targeting; and propaganda exploitation of climate disasters represents a continuous mobilization activity that expands extremist influence while priming audiences for operational participation. Yet the threat assessment must remain calibrated; these movements present real dangers without constituting existential threats, and the proportionality principles outlined in Section 8.4 caution against responses that inadvertently validate persecution narratives or provide recruitment material. The challenge for policy and practice lies in maintaining this calibration while recognizing that the structural conditions enabling recruitment will likely intensify as climate impacts accelerate. As climate impacts intensify, the material conditions enabling this recruitment will expand rather than contract.

The conflict transformation framework organizing this analysis carries a final implication: sustainable prevention requires transforming the conditions that produce violence, not merely suppressing violent actors. The three climate-conflict pathways documented in Section 1 identify structural vulnerabilities that will persist and likely deepen absent policy responses addressing climate adaptation, institutional capacity, and equitable distribution of environmental costs and benefits. Extremist movements did not create these vulnerabilities; they have exploited them. Responses that leave the pathways unaddressed while focusing exclusively on counter-extremism treat symptoms while leaving causes intact, an approach that conflict transformation scholarship identifies as producing unstable and unsustainable results. This analysis has attempted to provide both the empirical foundation for understanding this threat and the theoretical architecture for responding to it. The specific manifestations of climate-weaponized extremism will evolve as environmental conditions, political contexts, and digital infrastructures change; scholarship and policy must evolve correspondingly. Neither scholarship nor policy can afford complacency; the work of understanding and countering this threat must continue as long as the conditions producing it persist.



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