### by Jeffrey M. Bale

#### I. Introduction

On 18 October 2003 President George W. Bush delivered a speech to the Philippine Congress, in the course of which he pledged that the United States and Philippine governments would "bring Abu Sayyaf to justice." He noted that the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was made up of "killers" who "torture and behead their victims, while acting – or claiming to act – in the name of God," but insisted that "murder has no home in any religious faith" and that "these terrorists must find no home in the Philippines." He then emphasized that "Philippine security forces have the right and the duty to protect local communities and to defeat terrorism in every form," since "there can be no compromise with terror." Bush summed up the portion of his speech devoted to terrorism by stating that he and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo had "agreed to update our defense cooperation" after completing "the comprehensive review of Philippine security requirements announced last May." He then said that the United States was willing to "provide technical assistance and field expertise and funding" in support of "a five-year plan to modernize and reform" the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

This was merely the latest indication of the willingness of the United States Government (USG) to support attempts by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) to suppress the ASG. These cooperative efforts commenced in earnest after American security personnel investigating the 1993 World Trade Center terrorist bombing learned that the suspected bombmaker, Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf, had subsequently spent time in Manila organizing a clandestine cell, manufacturing explosive devices, and planning other terrorist actions against the United States. After the Philippine security forces reported that al-Oa`ida operative Yusuf had met with leading members of the ASG, the US Department of State (DOS) was prompted to list the group on its initial 1997 list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), a list whose purpose is to facilitate the freezing of assets of the terrorist groups listed, the criminalization of material support for them, and the exclusion of aliens associated with them, and the ASG has since appeared on every updated annual FTO list. USG support for the GRP's anti-ASG actions was reaffirmed again in the wake of the 1998 bombings of two US embassies in Africa, in which some of Yusuf's associates were implicated, but renewed cooperation between the two governments did not reach its present levels until after the catastrophic al-Qa'idasponsored terrorist attacks on American soil on 11 September 2001.

On 24 September 2001, less than two weeks after those attacks, the ASG was one of the 27 organizations and individuals whose assets were officially frozen by the American government. Shortly thereafter, President Macapagal-Arroyo visited the US to meet with President Bush. She took the opportunity to emphasize the susceptibility of the Philippines to terrorism and to proclaim her vigorous support for American military

actions in Afghanistan. As a result, she obtained an extensive aid package of loans and grants, along with 92.2 million dollars worth of military aid, which was then equivalent to around 10 percent of the Philippine military budget. In February 2002 the US sent over 600 troops to the southern Philippines, including 160 Special Forces soldiers, to participate in the initial "Balikatan" ("Shoulder-to-Shoulder") exercises alongside select units of the AFP. The objectives of these exercises were 1) to improve the "interoperability" of Philippine and US forces against terrorism; 2) to enhance the combat capability of infantry battalions from the AFP's Southern Command (Southcom), based in Zamboanga City; 3) to ensure better quality in intelligence processing; and 4) to upgrade joint Philippine-American capabilities to wage effective civil, military, and psychological operations. The Terms of Reference for this exercise were as follows. US forces were to advise, assist, and train the AFP in connection with operations against the ASG, above all in Basilan and Zamboanga. This initial training exercise was to be conducted by 660 US and 3800 AFP troops over a period of six months, but only 160 American soldiers organized into 12-man Special Forces teams were to actually be deployed with the AFP in the field. They were not to participate actively in combat operations, but could engage the enemy to defend themselves. Even so, US forces have since been aiding Philippine troops in pursuing ASG hostage-takers, several of whom have been killed in firefights, and a handful of American soldiers have also died due to a helicopter accident and a terrorist attack. In 2003 the "Balikatan" exercises were further extended and widened in scope, to the point where they eventually involved additional US troops.

The increased levels of US financial and military assistance to the GRP and the carrying out of joint military operations directed against the ASG were justified on the basis that this particular terrorist group constituted an especially significant terrorist threat, not only to the Philippine government but also to the national security interests of the United States. The reputation of the ASG, as it appears in often sensationalistic media accounts, is indeed a fearsome one. Apart from the group's indiscriminate bombings, high-profile seizures of Filipino and Western hostages, and sometimes brutal treatment of those hostages, captured soldiers, and civilians in general, the ASG is widely portrayed as the local Philippine branch of 'Usama bin Ladin's transnational al-Qa`ida network. US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has gone so far as to suggest that it would be a serious blow to al-Qa`ida itself if the ASG was cleared from its stronghold on Basilan Island.

But just how dangerous is the ASG? Does it seriously threaten American national security interests, either at home or abroad? Is it, above all else, an operational component or affiliate of an extensive al-Qa'ida network in Southeast Asia? Is it likely to cause large numbers of casualties, possibly by means of the employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), in future terrorist actions? The purpose of this study is to shed light on these controversial matters by examining the origins, doctrines, and activities of the group in some detail in an effort to assess the real extent of threat it poses, particularly in the area of WMD terrorism. To some extent, the answers to these crucial questions depend upon the general perspective that one adopts. If one views the ASG primarily within the context of transnational Islamist terrorism, at first glance it does indeed seem to be a worrisome organization with documented prior ties to al-Qa'ida. On the other

hand, if one views the group primarily within the context of the modern Muslim secessionist movement in the southern Philippines, or even within the much narrower context of the small-scale violence that is perpetrated on an almost daily basis by diverse armed Tausug gangs on the islands of Basilan and Jolo, the ASG scarcely seems worthy of being singled out as a high-profile target in the worldwide "War on Terrorism."

II. Islam and the Moro Secessionist Movement in the Philippines

## The Roots of the "Moro Problem"

The above subheading is not meant to be willfully misleading but rather intentionally ironic, since any reference to the "Moro problem" echoes the short-sighted perspective that has all too often been adopted by Spanish governors, American colonial officials, and a succession of Catholic Filipino administrations, whereby the Moros – i.e., Philippine Muslims – are themselves viewed as the source of the problems in the southern regions of the country. Instead, this section will focus on the roots of the contemporary problems facing the Moros, problems that have existed for so long and remain so endemic that they served as the underlying basis – though not the immediate stimulus – for the emergence of the modern Muslim secessionist movement in the late 1960s.

The single most salient fact about the Moros is that they comprise only about 5% of the present-day population of the Philippines. The overwhelming majority of that nation's citizens are Christians, above all Roman Catholics, making the Philippines the only predominantly Christian country in Southeast Asia. In and of itself, this would not necessarily constitute a problem, but the historical process by which the Christians came to dominate the Moros politically, demographically, socially, economically, and to some extent culturally has created a legacy of bitterness that persists to this very day.

The term "Moro" has long been an appellation for the Islamized groups from the very same Malay racial group as both the Christian majority in the Philippines and the bulk of the inhabitants of nearby Indonesia and Malaysia. Hence the division between Christian "Filipinos" and Muslim "Moros" is neither ethnic nor predominantly social and cultural (in the broadest sense of that term), but rather historical and above all religio-cultural. Indeed, it is important to emphasize that the term "Moro" was originally applied by the Spaniards to Muslim occupants of the Iberian Peninsula, the descendants of a

succession of tribal invaders from Islamic North Africa, against whom they had fought a sometimes brutal seven-century struggle for supremacy – the so-called *Reconquista* – culminating in the capture of Granada in 1492. The very same name was then later applied to those recalcitrant Muslims that the Spaniards encountered in the Philippine Archipelago after Miguel López de Legazpi's fleet dropped anchor in Manila Bay in 1565, and it generally retained the same pejorative significance until Philippine Muslim nationalists appropriated it proudly for themselves, in the process transforming it into a positive appellation.

The Moros are currently subdivided into thirteen cultural-linguistic groups, of which the three largest are the Maranao and Maguindanao, who mainly inhabit the western and southern portions of the large island of Mindanao, and the Tausug, whose homeland lies in the Sulu Archipelago. Even so, all thirteen of these languages and dialects, several of which are mutually unintelligible, belong to what has been termed the "Central Philippine Subgroup of the Malayo-Polynesian (Austronesian) Linguistic Family," and they are also related in varying degrees to the languages spoken by the major Filipino Christian groups (Ilocano, Visayan, and Tagalog).

## Islam in the Philippines, from its Origins to the 1960s

The Malays, who are generally considered to be a subgroup within the larger

Mongolian racial group, first began to overrun the "island world of Southeast Asia" which has served as "a cultural crossroads for millennia" and been justly characterized as "the world's most diverse ethno-linguistic mosaic" - in the first millennium of the pre-Christian era. They apparently arrived in the area either by sea or after crossing over an earlier land bridge from continental Asia into the Indonesian archipelago. Their preexisting culture, about which little is known, gradually underwent a process of adaptation in this new geographical and ecological niche before falling under the influence, via traders and dynastic outposts, of the great civilizations of China and India. Some Chinese merchants had settled on the Luzon coast by the year 1000, and during the fifteenth century certain of these settlements were temporarily administered by Yüan Dynasty officials. Moreover, two Indianized imperial dynasties that had established a lucrative tributary relationship with China, the Buddhist, Sumutra-based Srivijayas in the ninth century and the Hindu, Java-based Majapahits in the fourteenth century, established temporary footholds in the Philippine Archipelago, especially along the western littorals of both Luzon and Mindanao. By the time the Muslims arrived in significant numbers to settle, they found local princes (rajas) and hereditary chieftains ruling small armed village communities (barangays), organized around extended families and cognatic descent groups, that fought amongst themselves, subsisted on agriculture, fishing, or trade, and worshipped a pantheon of ancestral and animistic gods, at the summit of which was Bathala, the Supreme Creator of Earth and Man. The pre-Islamic Malay social structure was a tripartite one consisting of the chieftains and their close retinues and relatives, their commoner subjects, and debt bondsmen with a theoretically temporary unfree status. It was into this cultural and political vacuum that Islam spread.

Geographically, the Philippines occupied a somewhat marginal position in

relation to the rest of Southeast Asia, and it was to some extent outside the major maritime trade routes linking the Middle East, South Asia, and China. Muslim traders first arrived in the region from Middle Eastern core countries during the eighth century, following in the footsteps of their pre-Islamic Persian and Arab counterparts, and between the ninth and the sixteenth centuries they largely controlled its maritime trade. They visited Borneo as early as the tenth century, and began settling in the Sulu Archipelago beginning in the thirteenth century. In the fourteenth century they were followed by Muslim preachers, many of whom were Sufis, who initiated the process of Islamization in both Sulu and Mindanao by erecting mosques and actively propagating the faith. This original trickle of Muslim settlers turned into a flood after the Portuguese seized control of Melaka (Malacca) in 1511, forcing many members of the Muslim elite to flee and take refuge elsewhere. Some reached as far as Luzon, where they began to spread northward and establish other local dynasties. Because of their superior military tactics and technology, these Muslim newcomers were quickly able to defeat or co-opt existing rulers and either displace or assume authority over previously established groups, especially in the desirable coastal and lowland regions. Those chieftains and inhabitants who were unwilling to submit to the authority of the interlopers withdrew into the difficult terrain of the hinterlands, which was both easier to defend and comparatively undesirable. The descendants of these displaced groups, who are now known as "tribal peoples," have survived up to the present day, albeit as marginalized elements within modern Philippine society.

All over the Malay region, including the Philippine Archipelago, "the fusion of itinerant Arab blood and with [that of] local royal stock had produced ruling dynasties." According to local genealogical accounts known as *tarsila*, written on paper in Malav using the Arabic script, the Muslims soon established three sultanates, one in Sulu and two in Mindanao. The Sultanate of Sulu, which developed into the most powerful and richest state in the region prior to the arrival of the Spaniards, was allegedly the product of a union between an Arab traveler named Sayyid Abu Bakr and the daughter of Baguinda, a local émigré princeling from Sumatra. The Sultanate of Maguindanao was supposedly founded by Sarip Kabungsuwan, the offspring of a royal family driven from Melaka and a Meccan dignitary (sharif), and through this latter individual was purportedly linked by ancestry to the Prophet Muhammad. The Sultanate of Buavan, located further upstream in Mindanao, apparently emerged when Kabungsuwan's daughter married the Buayan chieftain, but because its rulers were of lower royal status they adopted the title *raja*. In contrast to the pre-Islamic period, during which local chiefs only occasionally extended their power beyond the confines of their own cognatic descent groups (bangsas), the coming of Islam resulted in the establishment of a "separate, society-wide aristocracy" whose members claimed descent from common ancestors.

Within these regions Muslim religious laws, religious rituals, and social customs were gradually superimposed, often imperfectly, over the traditional substratum of customary law (*adat*) and pagan beliefs. However, the religion of Muhammad did not erase the pre-Islamic identities of the newly-Islamized Malays. The preexisting social structure comprised of local chieftains – now known as *datus* – commoners, and debt

bondsmen was essentially retained. The principal differences were that regional rulers were now called sultans, and that Islamized *datus* increasingly sought to buttress their political authority by tracing their ancestry to earlier sultans, if not the Prophet himself, and to secure their religious authority by appointing respected but loyal religious scholars ('ulama) to administer the shari'a and adjudicate other religious matters in the areas under their control. Also, slavery became a very important institution in Moro society, and the fact that most of the chattel slaves who were captured in battle or kidnapped were "infidels" gave all Muslims, even the lowliest debt bondsmen, a sense of social superiority vis-à-vis "outsiders" and a heightened degree of social solidarity that papered over their de facto intragroup differences in social status. At the same time, the establishment of Muslim sultanates in the Philippines helped integrate that region into the wider Islamic world by means of increased trade and the occasional forging of alliances. As W. K. Che Man has emphasized, the Islamization of Sulu and Mindanao "resulted in an ideological bond among different groups of people in the region which led to the emergence of a new sense of ethnic identity that distinguished Muslim from non-Muslim populations." This new sense of identity was further reinforced when the Moros were forced to contend with foreign colonization and incorporation into a single, Christiandominated national state.

The problems of today's "Moros" derive from three sources, the Spanish conquest and Hispanization of Luzon and the Visayas, the American colonial occupation of the Philippines and attitudes toward "Moroland," and the policies later adopted by the independent Philippine government that finally emerged in the wake of World War II. The Spaniards, profoundly traumatized by their own long historical struggle against Muslim invaders in Spain, brought their crusading mentality to the Philippines, where they soon transferred it to the Hispanized, Christianized inhabitants in Luzon and the

Visayas. De facto Spanish policy toward the Moros was succinctly spelled out as early as 1578 by Governor Francisco de Sande, who ordered the commander of the first military expedition sent to Mindanao and Sulu to force the Moros to accept Spanish suzerainty, reorient their trade in the interests of the Spaniards, end their piracy, and begin their Hispanization and Christianization, "in line with the pattern followed with respect to other Filipino groups." Given these objectives, it is not surprising that the Spanish then waged an intermittent succession of "Moro Wars" against the Muslims in the south for some 300 years. Cesar Majul argues that the effects of the "Moro Wars" instigated in the Philippines by the Spaniards "cannot be overemphasized," since they "contributed to the tensions and conflicts that exist today" between the country's Christians and Muslims. Indeed, this combination of successful subjugation and Hispanization in the north and failed attempts to subjugate and Hispanize the south created unprecedented political, social, religio-cultural, and economic distinctions between Christian Filipinos and Muslim Moros, despite their underlying ethno-cultural similarities. According to Majul, this circumstance thereby "helped to define [Moro] attitudes and relations to all non-Muslim foreigners as well as non-Muslim Filipinos," and eventually provided a basis and rationale for the modern Muslim nationalist and separatist myth that the Moros had always constituted a separate, unsubjugated people with respect to the Filipinos.

The Americans further exacerbated these historically-contingent distinctions. In

their efforts to prevent first the Spaniards and then Filipino nationalists from forging an anti-US alliance that included the Muslims, they initially promised not to interfere with Moro autonomy. Indeed, in August 1899 Brigadier General John C. Bates of the US Army signed a formal agreement to that effect with Jamal-ul Karim II, Sultan of Sulu, and for a few years thereafter followed a policy of strict non-interference in Moro affairs. After suppressing the nationalist insurrection in the north, however, the Americans began trying to extend their policy "to develop, to civilize, to educate, and to train [Filipinos] in the science of self-government" to Moroland, thereby precipitating a series of Muslim revolts that were not fully quelled until 1913. The fighting was fiercest, it should be noted, on the island of Jolo, a Tausug stronghold, where two major battles were fought. Although the Americans quickly initiated a series of beneficial development projects and honestly endeavored to accommodate Muslim customs and religious laws whenever possible, they inevitably ended up imposing – or at least superimposing – various "infidel" laws and customs on the Moros. Moreover, despite periodically encouraging the Muslims to see themselves as a separate people under US sovereignty and protection, usually for cynical political reasons, in the end they allowed the Muslim south to be incorporated *in toto* into an independent Philippine state dominated by Christians. Many Moros understandably felt like second-class citizens in this new state, controlled as it was by their historic enemies.

The independent Philippine Commonwealth (1935-1946) - and later the GRP (1946-Present) – although never motivated by religious zeal, bent on conversion, or determined to institutionalize formal religious discrimination, nonetheless adopted certain policies that adversely affected Muslims. This was perhaps inevitable, given that the Hispanized Filipinos who ran the new government had been imbued by the Spaniards with a hostile and condescending attitude toward the Moros, whom they generally regarded as backwards and troublesome. So it was that in their efforts to integrate the Muslims, government officials broke with more enlightened American colonial policies, which had aimed to mollify the Moros by amending the substantive application of civil and criminal law, and instead endeavored to impose a uniform system of "modern" laws that in many respects violated traditional Islamic laws and customs. Rather than according full legal recognition to these traditional practices, they initiated a series of piecemeal exemptions that satisfied no one. Moreover, every young person - including non-Christians – had to have a baptismal certificate to enroll in the new public schools, and Muslim students were not allowed to wear veils or take off from school on Muslim holidays. Finally, in the new national education system, textbooks and lessons employed Christianized examples that were insensitive to, or at least dismissive of, Muslims, and that inadvertently ignored or demeaned the south. To provide only a couple of illustrative examples, these texts glorified (Christian) nationalist heroes like José Rizal whilst ignoring Muslim warriors like Sultan Kudarat, and emphasized the post-1896 period and the geography of the north. Hence what might have become an effective tool of national integration ended up being an instrument of divisiveness.

Indeed, local government in the south continued to be run, if not by incompetent northern officials banished to "undesirable" frontier locales like Sulu, then by shrewd but often corrupt *datus* who opted to augment their traditional authority by accepting government posts. Most of the influential *datus* were friendly to Manila, which provided them with new bases of power and wealth, and relatively unconcerned about the wellbeing of their own people. As a result, the overwhelming majority of Muslims gained almost nothing substantive from independence. A series of isolated Muslim revolts in the 1950s, in particular those of Abdulmajid Panoniongan and Tawan-tawan in Lanao and the prolonged Tausug insurrection of Hadji Kamlon in Sulu, belatedly caused the GRP to create a Commission on National Integration (CNI) and sponsor new development projects in the south, but these were generally underfunded and poorly-designed.

Worse still, the nationalist government set in motion its own program of encouraging the internal migration of Christian settlers – including former Hukbalahap guerrillas who had agreed to surrender - from the overcrowded northern and central provinces to the so-called "land of promise" in Mindanao, a policy that had a disastrous demographic and political impact upon Muslims. The establishment of Christian "agricultural colonies" in Mindanao dated back to 1912, during the American period, but this process of north-to-south migration was continued under different guises and even accelerated after independence, and it was then resumed by the GRP after World War II. In 1903, 76% of the population of Mindanao was still Muslim, but by 1980 that proportion had been reduced to 23%. In short, Muslim ancestral lands were increasingly falling into the hands of Christian settlers and their descendants, in part due to rapid demographic change per se, which tilted the balance in local elections towards Christians, and in part due to the imposition of new government policies that effectively discriminated against Muslims (e.g., the requiring of new government-issued titles to all land, including Muslim ancestral holdings that had for centuries been handed down informally from one generation to the next). At the same time, traditional subsistence agriculture in the south was increasingly replaced with export-oriented production by large, foreign-owned corporate enterprises, which further drove the Moros to the economic periphery. This combination of built-in structural and cultural disenfranchisement provided the tinder of Muslim discontent that only a single spark of overt violence directed against Moros might serve to ignite.

# The Rise of the Modern Muslim Secessionist Movement, 1968-1972

The incident that did more than any other to precipitate the rise of the modern Muslim secessionist movement was the so-called "Jabidah Massacre" of March 1968. The standard version of the story is that dozens of Muslim conscripts who had been recruited and secretly trained by AFP special forces personnel in preparation for the launching of sabotage and guerrilla operations in the Malaysian province of Sabah, located on the northeastern tip of the island of Borneo, were executed in cold blood near their training base on Corregidor island after they had complained about shabby treatment and demanded to be allowed to return home. Many aspects of the firsthand account provided by the supposed lone survivor of the massacre, Jibin Arula, who some suspected of being a Malaysian secret agent, could not be verified by investigating Philippine congressmen such as Benigno Aquino. Yet it is generally accepted that between 28 and 64 of the disgruntled Muslim recruits from this Jabidah Unit were in fact killed, ostensibly to prevent them from leaking information about "Oplan Merdeka" ("Operation Freedom"), a secret project sponsored by President Ferdinand Marcos to destabilize Sabah. More importantly, and irrespective of the actual facts, the Moros were collectively outraged by this purported crime and almost universally viewed it as a prime example of the government's blatant disregard for their lives and interests. Nowhere was this more true than in Sulu, from whence the mostly Tausug recruits originated.

Furthermore, this incident infuriated the Malaysian government of Tengku Abdul Rahman, which understandably felt betrayed by its Philippine counterpart, with whom it was then negotiating over the status of resource-rich Sabah. Rahman therefore promised Moro leaders such as Rashid Lucman, a Congressman and member of the Muslim Association of the Philippines (MAP), that his government would help train and arm Moro youths willing to oppose the Marcos regime. Sabah state minister Tun Mustapha Harun, a Tausug, also set up a "special office" to train and provide logistical support to Muslim rebels. In May 1968 Datu Udtog Matalam, an influential traditional leader who was then governor of Cotabato province, founded the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM). The MIM, which in its political manifesto promoted the creation of an independent Islamic state and openly accused the GRP of the "systematic extermination" of Muslim youth, was the first openly secessionist organization to emerge in the postwar period. In 1969 the initial group of Muslims recruited by Lucman and the MIM were sent to Malaysia for military training, an event that established a pattern whereby foreign Muslim regimes and organizations intervened in Philippine domestic politics on behalf of the Moros, albeit not generally covertly. Yet the influence of the MIM remained limited because it revolved around a handful of older aristocratic leaders, and it disintegrated in all but name when Matalam met with Marcos and surrendered in December 1972. Other organizations controlled by established Muslim leaders also arose in the wake of the "Jabidah Massacre," including the Ansar El-Islam group founded in 1969 by ex-Senator Domocao Alonto.

In the meantime, however, a whole new generation of Muslim student leaders had been forged in Philippine universities during the late 1960s and early 1970s, in particular at the University of the Philippines (UP) in Manila. Ironically, many of these leaders had been the recipients of government scholarships that were intended to further the longterm development of the Muslim south by educating and training a new Moro elite. These student activists were not only influenced by the dramatic wave of student protests that crested throughout the world in 1968, but were also radicalized by dramatic international and national events that sorely troubled their consciences, such as the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the 1968 coup in Indonesia, the "Jabidah Massacre," and increasing incidents of vigilante violence against Muslims on the island of Mindanao. Originally, they had joined together with left-wing student activists from Catholic families to protest against government policies and economic exploitation, but in 1968 Moro students sent to welcome Indonesian General Abdul Harris Nasution at Manila airport were attacked by their Maoist counterparts from the Kabataang Makabayan (KM: Patriotic Youth) group, who had gone there to protest the arrival of a figure they considered to be a "US puppet." Shortly thereafter several new Muslim organizations were formed by Moro student leaders and professionals, including Macapanton Abbas' Union of Islamic Forces and Organizations (UIFO), Dr. Alunan C. Glang's Muslim Progress Movement (MPM), UP instructor and ex-KM member Nur Misuari's Philippine Muslim Nationalist League (PMNL), and many others. In May 1970, many of these activists convened the first Muslim Youth Assembly in Zamboanga City, at which they adopted an anti-government posture.

At around the same time, Lucman founded the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO), which at first brought together traditional leaders such as himself, Abbas, and Matalam with younger student leaders such as Misuari and Abul Khayr Alonto. The BMLO was the first group to organize itself along explicitly Islamic lines by establishing both a Consultative Assembly (in Arabic, Majlis al-Shura) of the Moro People and an Islamic judicial tribunal run by `ulama to enforce the shari`a. It was specifically intended to serve as an umbrella organization for all Muslim liberation forces, and in practice it also functioned for a time as the control mechanism for Muslim recruits being trained in Malaysia. However, it was not long before the growing rift between the older and younger generations of leaders – the latter, not without reason, viewed the former as "feudal" and a party to the oppression of the Moros - split the BMLO. Soon after, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) emerged openly to contest the leadership of the Moro secessionist movement, and it eventually managed to obtain the support of Libya and other Muslim countries at the expense of the BMLO. In response, the traditional BMLO leaders agreed to cooperate with the Marcos government. They argued that their revolt had been intended to force the GRP to acknowledge the legitimacy of Bangsamoro grievances. In 1973 Abbas, Gibril Ridha, Napis Bidin, and other BMLO figures joined the Presidential Task Force for the Reconstruction and Development of Mindanao (PTF-RDM, later incorporated into the Southern Philippines Development Administration), which had been established to restore peace and order in Moroland and rehabilitate rebels through selective amnesty. In May 1974 Marcos acknowledged Lucman to be "Paramount Sultan of Mindanao and Sulu," and the following month Sultan Lucman and other Moro leaders organized a GRP-funded conference at Mindanao State University on "Government Policies and Programs for Muslim Mindanao." This conference adopted a resolution demanding Moro autonomy, not armed struggle, secession, and independence. Hence many younger radicals viewed the BMLO as a cynical instrument used by the government to weaken and divide the Moro movement. Nevertheless, the autonomy resolution passed at this conference, signed by 20,000 Moros, was then attached to the report of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission (QMC) at that same month's meeting of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) in Kuala Lumpur, and it became the basis for Kuala Lumpur Resolution No. 18, which urged the GRP to undertake a peaceful political solution to the Moro problem by negotiating with established Moro leaders. Even this limited demand for autonomy was too much for Marcos, who labeled Lucman as an enemy. Lucman, Abbas, and Pendatun then left for Saudi Arabia, where they attempted without success to unite with the MNLF.

Meanwhile, by 1971 relations between Christians and Muslims had reached crisis proportions on the island of Mindanao, especially in the provinces of Lanao del Norte, Cotabato, and Lanao del Sur. Both Christian settlers and Muslims had formed vicious

paramilitary vigilante groups, the latter apparently in response to those of the former. The Christian vigilantes were known as Ilagas ("Rats"), and were allegedly linked to Governor Arsenio Quibranza of Lanao del Norte, Ilongo settlers, Tiruray tribal peoples, and Philippine Constabulary (PC) units in Cotabato. They began carrying out attacks on Muslim inhabitants in an effort to terrorize them and force them to leave their lands, which once abandoned could then be occupied by Christians, and in most cases the GRP took no action to curtail their depredations. Yet this strategy backfired in the south, unlike in Luzon where similar vigilantes were operating, since the Muslims created their own paramilitary squads in response. The two most famous were the Barracudas, who were purportedly linked to Nacionalista Party Congressman (and Quibranza's rival) Ali Dimaporo of Lanao del Norte, and the Blackshirts, who were allegedly linked to the MIM. Although ostensibly formed as self-defense groups, they too soon resorted to committing crimes and atrocities, in this case against Christians. By the end of 1970, growing vigilante violence had severely disrupted the economy of the region and displaced over 30,000 Muslims and Christians, and by the end of 1971 the number of evacuees had risen to 50,000. Several high-profile atrocities had by then been perpetrated, including the June 1971 "Manili massacre," in which the Ilagas murdered 65 Muslims inside a mosque compound in Barrio Manili, North Cotabato, an incident that was understandably viewed as a religious travesty by Muslims. Hostilities in the region escalated greatly on the eve of the November 1971 elections, as a result of which political power shifted further in favor of the Christians. This in turn stimulated further hostilities, and in 1972 there were sporadic clashes between the Ilagas and AFP, on the one side, and the Barracudas and Blackshirts, on the other. Moreover, the scale of anti-Moro violence increasingly attracted the attention of overseas Muslim states.

In 1971, after the visit of Libyan Foreign Minister Abu Yasir to Mindanao, the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP) was created by traditional Muslim leaders to serve as a center for receiving foreign aid destined for the Moros. Its chairman was Cesar Majul, and its leaders signed a declaration of unity proclaiming their readiness to "defend Islam, the Homeland, and their people against all forms of aggressions against the Ummah." Soon after several IDP organizers, including Sultan Lucman, Senator Domocao Alonto, and Senator Salipada Pendatun, visited Libya as representatives of the Moro people in an effort to secure Mu`ammar al-Qadhdhafi's aid. The Libvan leader promised to provide "all forms of assistance" to the Moro liberation movement. In September 1972, the increasing violence in Mindanao provided Marcos with a pretext to declare Martial Law, and shortly thereafter Abbas went to Jidda to present the Moro case to the Munazzamat al-Mu'tamar al-Islami (OIC: Organization of the Islamic Conference), where he turned over a 200-page report to the OIC Secretary-General at the time, Malaysian leader and Marcos foe Tengku Abdul Rahman. At around the same time, Misuari and Salamat Hashim went to Libya in order to follow up on that regime's aid promises and to introduce the MNLF publicly to both the Moros and overseas Muslims. Together they were able to convince Libyan officials, who shared their revolutionary zeal and had already visited Sabah to deliver financial assistance to the Moro movement, that Libyan aid should thereafter be provided to the MNLF rather than traditional elitist politicians. This caused the BMLO leaders to accuse Misuari and his colleagues of betraying them, and precipitated an open schism between them. In January 1975, having acknowledged this de facto transfer of leadership within the Moro movement, Marcos sent his own negotiator, Alejandro Melchor, to Jidda to negotiate with MNLF leaders. Finally, at the Sixth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in that same city in July 1975, the MNLF under the leadership of Misuari was given formal recognition by the OIC.

## The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

So it was that by the early 1970s the MNLF had become the principal Muslim movement promoting armed struggle, secession from the Philippines, and independence for Moroland. The nucleus of the MNLF was first formed in 1969 by a group of young, secular-educated Moros that were among the first recruits sent to Malaysia for military training, and who then established a seven-member committee with Misuari as Chairman and Abul Khayr Alonto as Vice-Chairman. Initially the existence of the group was kept secret, since younger leaders like Misuari, Otto Salahuddin, and Ali Alibon wanted to dissociate the MNLF from other organizations controlled by members of the compromised traditional elite. It was only in mid-1971, at a special Moro assembly convened by Misuari in Zamboanga City, that he and other "progressive elements" from the original "Group of 90" trainees in Sabah officially announced the establishment of their new organization. Several MNLF leaders then stood as candidates in local elections against traditional leaders in order to test their strength, but when they failed to win these electoral contests they committed themselves fully to armed struggle. Things quickly came to a head after Marcos' 21 September 1972 declaration of Martial Law, which by centralizing the regime's power and restricting the range of legitimate Muslim political activity only succeeded in precipitating an outright insurrection and open warfare. Just over one month later, on 24 October, several hundred Moros from groups led by both traditional and secular elites, including an 'ulama-led outfit called Iklas, attacked the headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary in Marawi City and temporarily seized control of the Mindanao State University campus. Although government troops quickly regained local control, the unrest subsequently spread into rural and urban areas throughout the Moro provinces, and the liberation struggle had begun. The MNLF was eventually able to convert these sporadic clashes between Moro rebels and the Marcos regime into a full-blown war, which developed into the most serious internal conflict since the Hukbalahap ("Huk") Rebellion of the later 1940s. At the height of this war, the MNLF fielded between 15,000 and 30,000 fighters.

The MNLF did not fully develop its secular-oriented organizational structure until 1974, when the group's leaders, then residing in Libya, formed a 13-member Central Committee headed by Misuari. This committee, which functioned as a de facto executive body or strategic directorate, directly oversaw various offices devoted to specialized tasks such as intelligence, propaganda, and finances. MNLF leaders also established a Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal, which functioned as the group's judicial branch, and a National Congress, which in theory served as a legislative branch but in practice almost never met. Underneath the Central Committee was the general staff of the MNLF's military wing,

the Bangsa Moro Army (BMA), and several Provincial Committees whose purpose was to manage the tasks of mobilization, recruitment, training, and waging war against GRP security forces in different areas of Moroland. The Provincial Committees in turn oversaw the activities of BMA units and lower-level Barrio Committees. However, it should be emphasized that the MNLF, despite its elaborate paper organization, was a "loosely knit" rather than a "well-structured" organization that never forged a clearly established chain of command, in large part because the Central Committee, based overseas, was unable to communicate effectively with the Provincial Committees and field units of the BMA that were ostensibly subordinate to it. Consequently, each Provincial Committee and its diverse Barrio Committees acted mainly on their own initiative, carrying out their recruitment, training, and combat activities without specific directions from the Central Committee or close interaction with their counterparts in other provinces. In some instances, the BMA forces operating under the direction of particular Provincial Committees combined forces with those of nearby provinces, but in spite of this the role of the Central Committee was generally limited to establishing broad policy guidelines and organizing external support. Most of the MNLF's financial support was made available by the secularized revolutionary regime of Libya and the Sabah state government of Tun Mustapha Harun, which also provided its fighters with supply bases, logistical aid, and training facilities, but some also reportedly came from the OICaffiliated Islamic Solidarity Fund (ISF) or from alms (zakat) collected from believers by Muslim government agencies, foundations, companies, and charities.

Ideologically, the MNLF was essentially a nationalist and separatist organization with an Islamic coloring rather than a group inspired primarily by religious sentiments. According to its own manifesto, the goal of the MNLF was to carry out a revolution to liberate "the five million oppressed Bangsa Moro people" from the "terror, oppression and tyranny of Filipino colonialism" and establish an independent Bangsa Moro Republik by means of armed struggle. It further emphasized that this revolution was a "revolution with a social conscience" that would be committed to "establishing a democratic system of government which shall never allow or tolerate any form of exploitation and oppression of any human being by another or of one nation by another." It would offer equal rights to all, presumably including Christians and pagans, provided that they "formally renounce[ed] their Filipino citizenship and wholeheartedly accept[ed] Bangsa Moro citizenship," and would adhere to international human rights norms and promote the principle of self-determination. In the entire manifesto, there are only a few perfunctory references to Islam. The MNLF claimed that it would resist those colonialists who "threaten[ed] Islam through wholesale destruction and desecration of its places of worship and its Holy Book [the Qur'an]," that it was committed to the preservation and growth of Islamic culture," and that the Bangsa Moro Republik would be "a part of the Islamic World as well as of the Third World and of the oppressed colonized humanity everywhere in the world." Thus the rhetoric in this manifesto had a distinctly leftist rather than an Islamic or Islamist coloration, which later led some critics of Misuari's policies to accuse him of being "un-Islamic" and a "communist." Despite this, along with some vague talk about "Islamic socialism," the MNLF publicly sought to distance itself from the communist New People's Army (NPA), and in 1975 reportedly spurned NPA efforts to forge a military alliance. This was because MNLF leaders felt that the two movements were ideologically incompatible, and that such an alliance might weaken the Front's relationship to key supporters in the Islamic world.

Shortly after entering the fray, the MNLF managed to consolidate many, though certainly not all, of the previously disparate Muslim forces then resisting crackdowns by the GRP's security forces and the depredations of Christian paramilitary groups. Between 1973 and 1976 the AFP waged a full-scale war against the MNLF and other rebel groups in an effort to suppress the Muslim secessionist movement in Moroland. After suffering serious losses in several pitched conventional battles, the MNLF shifted its tactics with the assistance of Libyan and Malaysian military experts and thence adopted a more mobile form of guerrilla warfare. Despite Marcos' deployment of ever-larger military forces in Mindanao, in the end the MNLF managed to fight the government to a virtual standstill. At this point both parties were willing to allow the Libyan regime to broker the so-called Tripoli Agreement of December 1976, which provided for the establishment of a Muslim autonomous region comprising Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Palawan, and the Muslim areas of Mindanao "within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." In exchange for a ceasefire and the renunciation of outright independence, Misuari and the Moros would be allowed to establish their own administrative, educational, and economic systems in the new autonomous zone, as well as have "the right to set up their own Courts which implement the Islamic Shari`a laws." Efforts to secure Muslim autonomy, as opposed to outright secession, were also supported by conservative Muslim governments and the international bodies they had founded, including both the Saudi-sponsored Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami (IWL: Islamic World League) and the Pakistan-based Mu'tamar al-'Alam al-Islami (IWC: Islamic World Congress).

Although both sides shrewdly signed the agreement to signal their reasonableness, profound disagreements remained over the terms of autonomy. On 24 March 1977 Marcos issued a decree formally proclaiming autonomy for the thirteen provinces listed in the Tripoli Agreement and calling for the establishment of a provisional government that consisted of a majority of MNLF members with Misuari at its head, but insisted that the process be ratified by the holding of a referendum in the affected provinces. Misuari, who was aware that Muslims constituted a majority only in Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Lanao del Sur and that Christians were unlikely to vote for autonomy in a referendum, rejected the GRP's offer and instead demanded that Marcos issue an executive decree placing the MNLF in charge of the autonomous region. The referendum was nevertheless held on 17 April 1977, and the result of the vote was a resounding defeat for the MNLF, which in turn led to a resumption of hit-and-run fighting and government offensives in 1977.

In that same year, cleavages within the MNLF came to a head and precipitated serious schisms within the group's Central Committee. These schisms were in part a reaction to Misuari's autocratic and secretive style, but they also reflected growing ideological and policy differences. The first member of the MNLF leadership to break with Misuari was co-founder, Central Committee member, and chairman of the organization's Foreign Affairs Committee, Salamat Hashim. At a December 1977 meeting during the annual Hajj (Pilgrimage) in Mecca, the aristocratic Hashim and 57 of

his supporters in the MNLF attempted to carry out an electoral coup against Misuari, who they accused of deviating from "Islamic" objectives and "evolving towards [a] Marxist-Maoist orientation," an attempt that was supported by other influential members of the traditional Moro political elite, including Rashid Lucman of the reformed BMLO, Domocao Alonto of Ansar El-Islam, and Salipada Pendatun of the MAP. This internal MNLF power grab also reflected broader intra-Arab disputes, since the anti-Misuari faction was supported by conservative states like Anwar al-Sadat's Egypt and Saudi Arabia, whereas Misuari was backed by revolutionary "Arab socialist" regimes such as those of Libya and Syria. Misuari not only refused to recognize the results of this "election," which resulted in Hashim declaring the creation of the New MNLF in December 1977, but managed to discredit and marginalize his rival by characterizing him as a traitor to the parent group. In March 1984, Hashim's New MNLF transformed itself into a separate organization with a pronounced Islamic orientation called the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Another MNLF co-founder, vice-chairman Abul Khayr Alonto, resigned and surrendered to the government in March 1978, together with many of his followers. He supposedly did so because he was increasingly unhappy with Misuari's ongoing maneuvering for complete independence, but some observers have also suggested that, as a descendant of Lanao sultans, he strongly opposed Misuari's belief in the need for a revolutionary transformation of traditional Moro society. Lastly, in March 1982 Dimas Pundato announced the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front-Reformist Group (MNLF-RG) after an MNLF organizational reform proposal he and others had submitted to Misuari was rejected and he and his supporters were dismissed from the MNLF. Three months later the Reformist Group met in Tawi-Tawi, where they rejected Misuari's leadership and called for autonomy rather than independence. The new organization, which received support from Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, promoted an explicitly Islamic ideology based upon the *Qur'an* and the accounts of the Prophet's sayings (hadith), and sought to establish an Islamic society throughout Moroland by gradually implementing the shari'a. Perhaps not coincidentally, the split between Misuari, Hashim, and Pundato also reflected and coincided with the three major Muslim ethno-cultural groups represented within the MNLF. According to Che Man, "[t]he Maguindanaos and the Maranaos, who incline towards the preservation of the Moro traditional system, are supporters of Salamat Hashim and Dimas Pundato respectively," whereas "the Suluanos, many of whom advocate egalitarianism, are behind Nur Misuari."

Misuari stubbornly broke off all negotiations with the GRP in April 1977, then resumed his struggle for Moro independence. This time, however, the government managed to get the upper hand militarily. Although the MNLF manifesto had demanded secession from the Philippine state and complete independence for the Bangsa Moro people, AFP successes in the field eventually compelled Misuari to modify his demands and accept autonomy. After the fall of the hated Marcos regime, he met personally with President Corazon Aquino in Jolo on 5 September 1986. The two sides agreed to cease hostilities and lay the groundwork for formal negotiations, but these too soon broke down. Finally, after protracted diplomatic wrangling between the GRP, the MNLF and other Moro groups, and diverse foreign interlocutors, a peace agreement was finally

signed on 2 September 1996 by the representative of Fidel Ramos, Aquino's successor as President, and Misuari himself, formally ending the 25-year MNLF armed struggle and authorizing the creation of a Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) to oversee development efforts within the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD). Following a three-year transitional period in which slow progress was made, Misuari was elected almost unopposed in 1999 as the head of a newly-formed regional government of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Perhaps not surprisingly, this series of compromises with the Philippine state precipitated a new round of intragroup conflict and caused dissident, radical factions within the MNLF to break away from the parent body and form their own separate organizations. Along with several autonomous MNLF formations that later became known as "lost commands," the chief beneficiaries of these splits ended up being the MILF and the ASG.

### The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

As noted above, the MILF originated as an anti-Misuari faction within the MNLF before its formal establishment as a separate organization in 1984. Its leader was Salamat Hashim, a Maranao aristocrat and scholar who had gone to Cairo in 1959 and studied for several years at al-Azhar University, the most prestigious center of Islamic learning in the world. There he was exposed to "Arab socialist," traditionalist, fundamentalist, and Islamist doctrines at a time when the pan-Islamic revolutionary ideas of Egyptian President Jamal `Abd al-Nasir (1954-1970) served to inspire innumerable Middle Eastern student activists, and he personally organized a clandestine anti-GRP resistance cell from among other Mindanao students based in Cairo that was "explicitly and exclusively Islamic in character." In 1967 or 1970 Hashim returned home and, using his government post as a provincial librarian as a cover, helped arrange for the training of batches of Moro recruits in Malaysia and thereafter became one of the co-founders of the MNLF. After Marcos' 1972 declaration of martial law the veteran activist went underground, and in 1974 he joined Misuari in Tripoli. During his 25-year sojourn overseas in various Middle Eastern and Asian Muslim countries, Hashim established close connections with many influential Islamic religious and political figures in his efforts to secure foreign support for the MNLF and later the MILF. It was not until 1987 that he surreptitiously returned - this time for good - to the Philippines. Nor was Hashim the only "Islamic student revolutionary" who later played a key role in the MILF. Several other MILF leaders were likewise scions of aristocratic Maranao families who had studied overseas at Islamic universities, usually in culturally and religiously conservative countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt (especially after the September 1970 death of Nasir), Pakistan, and various Gulf states. Given these circumstances, and their perceived need to distance themselves from the more secular orientation of the MNLF, it is not at all surprising that the MILF's leaders ended up espousing a socially conservative and explicitly Islamic worldview.

According to Hashim, the reconfiguration of the New MNLF into the MILF was carried out to "underscore Islam as the rallying point of the Bangsamoro struggle." In a

letter to the Secretary-General of the OIC, he elaborated further on this theme: "All Mujahideen under the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) adopt Islam as their way of life. Their ultimate objective in their Jihad is to make supreme the WORD of ALLAH and establish Islam in the Bangsamoro homeland." Yet it was not the MILF's declared intention at the outset to rise up against the Philippine government and wage an armed struggle in order to create an independent state, albeit perhaps only for tactical reasons. Instead, its leaders slowly and carefully built up their forces and gradually Islamized the "liberated" areas under their direct control in preparation for the future creation of an Islamic state in Moroland, whose establishment they viewed as a longer term process. Indeed, in an early 1980s MILF programmatic statement describing its four-point policy of Islamization, organizational strengthening, military build-up, and economic self-reliance, the group initially envisioned a three-phase strategy that its leaders expected would last for fifteen years, but this relatively short time frame was subsequently extended until the year 2050.

However that may be, as time wore on the group's underlying ideology became increasingly radical. This may have been due in large part to external influences rather than specific responses to internal developments within the Philippine archipelago. In the early 1980s, even before the formal establishment of the MILF, the New MNLF sent three batches of its carefully-selected field commanders to undergo military training at camps in Afghanistan, of whom at least 360 underwent a year-long course of military instruction and 180 eventually joined the *mujahidin* to fight. Part of their training apparently involved ideological indoctrination as well as hands-on military training, and given their exposure to this transnational jihadist milieu it is likely that many of these individuals returned with far more radical interpretations of Islam than they had when they departed. Moreover, by the mid-1990s key personnel associated with 'Usama bin Ladin's logistical network in the Philippines were collaborating closely with elements of the MILF, and by the end of the decade foreign members of al-Qa`ida were reportedly training fighters in the principal MILF camps. These Islamist radicals from overseas must have affected, whether directly or indirectly, the views of the MILF members and supporters with whom they were interacting. It is therefore not surprising to learn that more moderate Muslims, including traditional leaders, many younger professionals, "progressives," and the poor, were highly critical of the attempts by MILF leaders and the younger Islamist `ulama with which they were allied to impose stricter and more puritanical interpretations of Islam on the Moros residing in their camps and "liberated" zones, as some Philippine Muslims were secularized but most still practiced a syncretistic type of "folk Islam" that incorporated noticeable pagan and Sufi elements.

Even the MILF's organizational structure, which was considered more effective than that of Misuari's looser group, reflected its pronounced Islamic orientation. Like the MNLF the MILF established an executive body known as the Central Committee, but like the BMLO it formed both an Islamic judicial organ – in this case one dubbed the Supreme Islamic Revolutionary Tribunal – and a "legislative" Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura) where policies could be debated and discussed by the organization's leaders. Under the administrative authority of the Central Committee are a Secretariat subdivided into various functional offices and three (later more) vice chairmen, one for Political Affairs, one for Islamic Affairs, and one for Military Affairs. This last official is responsible for overseeing the operations of the group's armed wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF). A similar but somewhat less elaborate organizational structure was also set up by the MILF at the provincial level. The BIAF subsequently evolved from a loosely-organized guerrilla force into a 12,000-15,000 strong semiconventional army consisting of a regular infantry force operating under the direction of MILF Chief of Staff Al Haj Murad; an elite Internal Security Force (ISF) headed by Abdul Aziz Mimbantas, another graduate of al-Azhar, whose functions include policing MILF areas and ensuring that the *Qur*'an is properly observed; and a Special Operations Group (SOG), established in 1999, which in spite of the public denials of movement spokesmen is generally considered to be the terrorist section of the MILF.

On the ground, mainly on the island of Mindanao, the MILF operated what Hashim characterized as a "parallel government" in opposition to the "enemy administration" (i.e., the GRP bureaucracy) in the areas under its control, an apparatus that revolved around 13 major and 33 lesser camps in the countryside and also functioned inside Moro ghettos in urban areas (such as Campo Muslim in Cotabato City). Some of these were armed camps that functioned exclusively as military and logistical bases, such as Camp Omar in Maguindanao, but the two largest – Camp Abubakar in North Cotabato and Camp Bushra in Lanao del Sur – were extensive, economically self-sufficient entities that housed entire Muslim communities and were intended to serve as exemplars and living models of the "Islamic state" and Islamized society that the MILF eventually hoped to establish throughout Moroland. For example, prior to its partial July 2000 capture by the AFP Camp Abubakar had developed into a vast 5,000-10,000 hectare complex that extended for forty miles and included parts of seven villages, and within its confines the MILF had gathered together a self-contained Islamic community with a mosque, a religious school, a prison, a military training academy, an arms factory, a solar power source, sophisticated telecommunications equipment, family housing, markets, a fruit nursery, and agricultural plots. Ironically, some of these amenities were financed with development funds provided by the GRP, in part to co-opt the MILF and in part to help the security agencies monitor activities inside the camp itself.

This munificence on the part of the government may seem curious given that the MILF originated as an illegal underground armed movement whose members were subject to arrest and detention without trial. However, the MILF has in fact had a long, complex, and shifting history of interactions with the GRP. Initially, Hashim's New MNLF faction claimed to oppose Misuari's program of secession and outright independence and to be willing to accept "meaningful autonomy" within the bosom of the Philippine state. However, this may have been more of a stratagem to allow the new faction to appear more moderate and thereby gain the support of conservative Muslim regimes and international organizations, most of which had preferred to negotiate with the GRP in order to resolve the Moro problem peacefully and had thus generally sought to restrain the more radical demands of Misuari. Once it became clear that these foreign Muslim supporters were generally unwilling to transfer their support from the MNLF to the New MNLF, Hashim and his supporters bided their time and continued to adopt a moderate public position whilst secretly building up the organization, infrastructure, and

military strength of the MILF. Early on they quietly met with representatives of the Philippine state to make their concerns known and try to work out a viable policy concerning Moro autonomy, but the GRP was then pursuing a two-track strategy designed to further divide the two main rebel groups. Hence in January 1987, a few months after President Aquino had met separately with Misuari in 1986, thereby effectively marginalizing the MILF, the latter group launched a five-day military offensive in various regions of Mindanao to let the government know that it was a real force to be reckoned with. An informal truce was soon agreed upon, and negotiations

have since persisted intermittently until the present day.

At various points, however, very heavy fighting has broken out between the AFP and the MILF, which was unhappy about the terms of the 1996 peace agreement that the government had brokered with the MNLF - and even more so about their subsequent implementation. As a result, certain elements within the MILF began openly promoting the waging of an armed struggle against the GRP and the creation of a separate Bangsamoro Islamic state as soon as this was feasible. The relationship between the two parties was further complicated and strained due to the growing impact of radical Islamist doctrines on the MILF's leadership cadre, a process that was only accelerated by growing collaboration with al-Oa'ida and regional Southeast Asian Islamist networks like the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI: Islamic Community). Although the AFP has launched several partially successful major offensives against the MILF in recent years, at present an uneasy modus vivendi exists between the government of President Macapagal-Arroyo and the organization's leaders, who have prudently moderated their political demands, curtailed the SOG's violent actions, and publicly sought to distance themselves from al-Qa'ida and other foreign Islamist terrorist groups in the wake of the 11 September 2001 assaults on the United States. Indeed, as part of her ongoing efforts to reach a peaceful agreement with the MILF, the Philippine head of state has so far successfully lobbied President Bush not to have the MILF added to the DOS's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. During his recent visit to the Philippines, the American president even went so far as to praise the leaders of the MILF, in marked contrast to his overtly belligerent and hostile remarks about the ASG.

### III. The Abu Sayyaf Group

The origins of the Juma'a Abu Sayyaf (Abu Sayyaf Group), which has also supposedly been referred to by its members as Al Harakatul Islamiya (the Islamic Movement), can be traced back to 1989. In its earliest incarnation the organization was apparently known as the Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF), but it was later renamed Jundullah (Soldiers of God) and thence, in the early 1990s, the ASG. However one dubs it, it is this relatively small but active terrorist organization that has since become the *bête noire* of both the Philippine government and the Bush Administration.

## The Violence-Prone Culture of the Tausug

Before examining the origins, organization, ideology, and operations of the ASG, some preliminary remarks should be made about the underlying cultural values of the Tausug ethno-linguistic group from which the overwhelming majority of the organization's fighters have been recruited. One of the many important factors that are often overlooked by analysts trying to evaluate the threats posed by particular terrorist groups is the nature of the cultural context within which they operate. In order to obtain more information about those underlying contexts, which exert a significant influence on the values and actual behavior of terrorists, it is necessary to consult both historical and anthropological studies. Fortunately, anthropologist Thomas M. Kiefer has already carried out a detailed ethnographic study of the Tausug that sheds much light on their violence-prone culture.

Tausug culture is a "cultural system where violence is an everyday occurrence, where nearly every dispute escalates to violence..." According to Kiefer, the "everyday use of physical force on Jolo [and, by extension, in other Tausug areas] is so common" that "there is no Tausug word which can even approximately be translated as 'violence." Indeed, "[t]he only Tausug word which has some of the connotations of the English word 'violence' is *maisug*, literally 'very masculine' or brave." It is not that violence is perceived as an intrinsic moral good, but rather that its ready employment is seen as necessary to sustain each Tausug's self-image as a brave man:

Public cowardice or a refusal to respond to an insult or affront is shameful in the extreme. An insult calls for retaliation, a death must be avenged. Even what might appear to be a relatively minor offense or insult may lead to a killing: an inappropriate remark about a defect in the other, a theft of a chicken, a contemptuous glance, an unpaid debt, or an accidental brush against a person in the marketplace.

In short, everyday violent acts are generally carried out personally by individuals who either seek to avoid being publicly shamed by others or to avenge a prior humiliation or injustice. Hence in Tausug culture it is the "purposes of violence [that] determine its good or evil character, not the fact of violence itself." These are attitudes and behavior patterns that are very common in tribal societies, as well as within the "macho" confines of gang subcultures in modern Western societies.

Alas, such behavior is not restricted to the violence carried out by "victimized" individuals. In a region where the authority and coercive power of the state is weak or nonexistent, it is not surprising that both individuals and larger groups will rely on their own "private" resources to rectify perceived wrongs. Yet there is more to the pattern of

Tausug violence than obtaining personal justice, since when individuals seek to avenge a shameful situation they often turn to their close kinsmen and friends for help. Both kinship and friendship involve a reciprocal moral obligation to offer support and a customary pattern of providing mutual aid, not simply the expression of close emotional bonds. "The essence of friendship between two Tausug is a certain style of reciprocity, especially in relation to violent conflict," and as a result those who are very close kin and very close friends (bagay) will usually support one another in the event that fighting breaks out with other parties. Those further removed in terms of kinship and friendship ties will offer support only when it benefits them tangibly in some way or can be used to extract a debt of gratitude that must be repaid in the future. Hence Tausug society is made up, insofar as internal conflict is concerned, of a series of situation-centered "alliance groups," almost all of which are headed by charismatic leaders. Because they are situation-centered, the composition of the broader alliance groups is necessarily constantly shifting, and in that sense it may be better to think in terms of factionalized "networks' in which each man is connected to every other man by a complicated chain of personal ties" rather than stable political or military groups. The only alliance groups which have any real stability are those based upon very close kinship and friendship ties and concentrated within a single community, which Kiefer labels "minimal alliance groups" because they are the "smallest localized units for purposes of conducting military activity." These are the groups that participate in simple feuds carried on by aggrieved individuals, which are omnipresent in Tausug society.

However, larger forces made up of several minimal alliance groups may coalesce to form less stable "medial alliances" numbering hundreds of fighters and led by regional headmen so as to carry on more complicated feuds, even though each of the component groups retains its separate identity. Still larger military alliances may be temporarily forged when medial alliance groups join together in "maximal alliances" consisting of thousands of armed men, usually when rival headmen are involved in a feud or when Tausug resistance fighters are trying to fend off external threats. In this way, the Tausug "are able to construct large military alliances based upon friendship which go far beyond the bounds of the effective kinship group." Kiefer has labeled this fluid system of military and political alliances as "feudal," since it is normally based more on the personal lovalty that exists between leaders and followers than on any sense of collective loyalty to the group as such, much less to larger abstract entities. However, widely popular issues or causes, such as Moro secession from the hated Filipino state, ethnonationalist chauvinism, or Islamic solidarity, can sometimes help to mobilize and solidify larger constellations of alliance groups, at least for a time. This Tausug cultural propensity for violence, feuding, and forming alliance groups of kinsmen and friends must therefore be taken into consideration when assessing the ability of the AFP and Philippine National Police (PNP), first to isolate the ASG from the general population on the islands of Basilan and Jolo and then to suppress it, as well as when trying to make sense of the complex patterns of interaction between members of this terrorist group and other Moro rebel organizations, local units of the military and police, and rival armed gangs and pirates operating in the Sulu archipelago.

### Abdurrajak Janjalani and the Origins of the ASG

The ASG has been justly described as the "brainchild" of Abdurrajak Abubakar Janjalani, a Tausug born on Basilan island in 1963. Perhaps not coincidentally, his father was a Muslim and his mother was a Christian, and for several years he was educated at a Catholic high school established by the Spanish Claretian Order in Isabela, the island's capital. In 1981 he received a Saudi scholarship to study Islamic jurisprudence at 'Umm al-Qura' University in Mecca, and three years later the charismatic young man returned home to Basilan to preach Wahhabism in local mosques, where he soon built up a devoted following. At the same time, he became associated with the Philippine branch of the Pakistan-based Tabligh-i Jamaat (Association for the Propagation of the Faith) movement, which by then had already gained thousands of adherents in the Sulu archipelago.

Janjalani also became an active member of the MNLF at some point during the 1980s, and his uncompromising attitude, his eloquence, and his personal charisma seemed to mark him as a potential future leader of the group. In 1986 he began openly questioning Misuari's leadership, and the following year he traveled to Libya, ostensibly to continue his studies of Islam. After arriving in Tripoli he got to know other Moro students, some of whom were MNLF members in the process of receiving specialized military training from Libyan instructors. Although some have speculated that MNLF higher-ups had sent Janjalani there for similar training, his increasingly outspoken anti-Misuari agitation may have either prompted them to try and neutralize him by sending him overseas in the first place or, at least, to change their minds about providing him with advanced training once he got there.

However that may be, later in 1987 Janjalani went to Pakistan to join the anti-Soviet resistance movement. Upon arriving in Peshawar, he joined the so-called "Abu Sayyaf" Afghan guerilla group, the seventh and last of the foreign volunteer bands to be established. This particular unit had been founded in 1986 by a Pashtun Afghan professor named Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, who also operated his own guerrilla training school in the mountains nearby, the "University" of Da'wa al-Jihad (Call to Holy War), where 20,000 mujahidin are said to have received instruction in terrorist techniques. Janjalani's association with Abdul Sayyaf may be of considerable significance, since this latter figure was quite an anomaly amongst Afghan mujahidin leaders. He was a native of Paghman, a picturesque village west of Kabul, who obtained his doctorate at al-Azhar University in Cairo, where he had become associated with the Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Society of the Muslim Brothers, better known as the Muslim Brotherhood). He returned to Kabul and co-founded the Jamaat-i Islami (Islamic Association) along with other leading Afghan Islamists, but had then been temporarily arrested and compelled to flee from communist-ruled Afghanistan. He then resided for a period in Saudi Arabia, where he converted to Wahhabism. In the 1980s he was sent to Peshawar by the Saudi intelligence service to organize a Wahhabi Afghan political party, the Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Union for the Freedom of Afghanistan). As a follower of the puritanical but idiosyncratic doctrine developed by Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), which eventually became the official ideology of the Saudi

monarchy, Abdul Sayyaf was bitterly hostile both to Sufism and to traditional Afghan tribal politics. Although this made him highly unpopular among the bulk of the native Afghan *mujahidin*, he nonetheless ended up being one of the principal recipients of the aid provided to anti-Soviet resistance forces by an array of Saudi front organizations and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. At that stage 'Usama bin Ladin himself was reportedly influenced by Abdul Sayyaf, to whom he is later said to have deferred during a Summer 1996 meeting of Islamist leaders at a camp along the Afghan-Pakistan frontier. Both men subsequently denounced the Saudi regime after it invited American troops into the kingdom during the months leading up to the 1991 Gulf War, and this in turn seems to have prompted Abdul Sayyaf to make an ideological transition from Wahhabism proper to jihadist Salafism. The same doctrinal shift was apparently made by Janjalani, who was so inspired by his former Afghan trainer that he subsequently named his own armed Islamist group after him.

After completing his *mujahidin* training in Pakistan and returning home to Basilan, a fired up Janjalani and seven other men who were likewise disenchanted with the MNLF's moderation joined together to found the ASG and its predecessors. According to the reconstruction by Peter Chalk, in 1989 a small group of Islamist militants led by Janjalani broke away from the proselytizing Tabligh movement and formed a separate armed organization known as the MCFF. This group, the forerunner of the later ASG, originally consisted of a core group of about twenty members, mainly Moro volunteers who had gone to Afghanistan to wage *jihad*, but it soon managed to attract hundreds of additional recruits. Among the first adherents of the new organization were a local Muslim preacher named Wahab Muhammad Akbar, a Yakan who had also studied at al-Azhar; Abdul Asmad, a Sama from Tawi-Tawi and student leader at Western Mindanao State University in Zamboanga City; Amilhussin Jumaani, a professor from the same university; Edwin Angeles, a recently-converted Muslim who had adopted the name Ibrahim Yakub; and Juvenal Bruno, yet another Muslim convert. Initially Janjalani's group may have been regarded by both the MNLF and the AFP as a new youth arm of Misuari's parent organization, but within a relatively short period of time he had managed to recruit hundreds of men, including some provincial MNLF commanders, by persuading them that Misuari was not waging a real *jihad*.

# The Organizational Structure and Military Capabilities of the ASG

On paper, the ASG was said to be loosely organized into a cellular structure under the direction of an Executive Committee headed by a "Caliph" – Janjalani – and consisting of eight other religious leaders, who together constituted the so-called Minsupala Islamic Theocratic Shadow Government (MIT-SG). Although Akbar later broke with Janjalani and was elected in May 1998 as governor of Basilan, other members of this ASG core group subsequently assumed key posts within the bosom of the organization: Asmad served as its intelligence chief until his assassination in June 1994, whereas Angeles functioned as operations chief prior to his "defection" early the following year, after which he was replaced in that post by Bruno. In actual fact, however, the ASG does not appear to have ever created an elaborate, well-defined

organization with a clear chain of command, even though the Executive Committee may have established small subunits to handle specific functional responsibilities in addition to several elite strike forces and some lower-level, territorially-based units. On the basis of various accounts, including those provided by a few hostages seized by the group, in its home islands the ASG seems to have been divided either into distinct bandit gangs or separate kin-based groupings resembling the minimal and medial Tausug alliance groups described by Thomas Kiefer, in contradistinction to the types of cellular structures characteristic of most guerrilla and terrorist organizations. For example, it is clear from the published accounts of several former hostages that by 2000 - and most likely ever since 1993 – there were two primary ASG groups, one on Basilan initially headed by Janjalani, and one on Jolo led by Galib Andang ("Commander Robot") and his deputy Mujib Susukan. The Jolo group was seemingly subordinate to the Basilan group, at least when the two groups collaborated operationally in joint actions, but under normal circumstances both groups appear to have operated more or less independently on their home turf. In the wake of Janjalani's December 1998 death in a firefight with the AFP, the leadership of the Basilan group ended up in the hands of two men, his soft-spoken younger brother Kaddafy Janjalani and the belligerent Aldam Tilao ("Abu Sabaya"), who seem to have had a falling out with each other that led to a de facto internal schism. In any case, each of these two or three main forces seems to have been composed of a shifting number of Tausug alliance groups, since at various times the group leaders told their captives that they could not always exercise effective control over some of the men nominally under their command, which suggests that these fighters instead obeyed the orders of the lower-level charismatic headmen who had personally mobilized their support. It may well be the case, however, that when groups of ASG fighters operated outside of their island bases in urban locales like Manila or Zamboanga City, they organized themselves into standard terrorist-style cells and thereafter functioned in the clandestine and covert fashion typical of such cellular structures.

The number of ASG fighters has been variously estimated, and ranges from a minimum of around 100 to a maximum of perhaps 3000. In this case, as always, divergences in assessments of the numerical strength of particular paramilitary forces are in part attributable to the reliance of separate estimators upon different sources of information, and in part to the subsequent manipulation of that information by various interested parties in the service of particular political, military, and propaganda objectives. For example, it generally serves the purposes of the ASG itself to overestimate its own military strength, since doing so makes it appear more powerful than it actually is. In certain contexts it is also in the interest of Philippine security forces to exaggerate the military potential and overall dangerousness of the ASG, since this serves both to justify the requests by different intelligence, police, and military agencies for higher budgets and to provide a pretext for their recourse to the employment of harsh countermeasures. At other times, however, it may just as easily serve the government's interest to minimize the strength of various Moro rebel groups in order to make it appear that the military actions and political policies they have undertaken are effective.

In the case of the ASG, however, other factors have likewise contributed to the fluctuating estimates of the organization's fighting strength. First, its actual fighting

strength does seem to have fluctuated considerably over the years. Although these fluctuations are impossible to trace with any degree of precision, in general it can probably be said that the group experienced an initial surge of recruits after it carried out locally popular acts of anti-Christian violence in the early 1990s, then declined in strength in the mid-1990s when funding from al-Qa'ida and various Islamist "charitable" fronts subsided. The group's strength again seems to have increased - along with the general public's animosity towards it – in the wake of its high-profile hostage seizures around the turn of the millenium, if only because elements of the local population hoped to benefit personally from the ransom the ASG collected by joining its ranks. Yet in the wake of a series of offensives launched by the AFP from 2001 on, which first succeeded in driving the main Kaddafy Janjalani-Abu Sabaya group from its stronghold on Basilan to Jolo and eventually led to the overrunning of several ASG havens on the latter island, the group's fighting strength appears to have been significantly reduced. Second, most ASG fighters are not professional terrorists or full-time guerrillas. Many spend only a portion of their time participating in ASG actions, and then simply return home to resume their normal lives and economic activities. To some extent this seems to be a natural byproduct of their periodic mobilization into alliance groups in accordance with the Tausug kinship and friendship patterns discussed above, but at times it also appears to be the result of a shrewd tactical strategem adopted by ASG commanders whereby some of their men intentionally melt back into the "civilian" population when their forces come under serious attack, only to return and resume fighting later. On the other hand, the frequent shifts in ASG troop strength are likewise probably attributable in large part to the perceived self-interest of various half-hearted individual fighters, who not infrequently decide to go AWOL when the going gets particularly tough.

Irrespective of the group's actual numerical strength, full-time ASG fighters and terrorists have long been well-equipped with a wide range of small arms, including AK47, M14, and M16 assault rifles, M203 grenade launchers, machine guns, bazookas, 57mm and 90mm recoilless rifles, and 60mm mortars, although part-time recruits appear to have often relied on older rifles and pistols. Many of these weapons were originally supplied by foreign sources, transshipped via Malaysia, and paid for by Libya, other Muslim states, or al-Qa'ida. When foreign funding dried up in the mid-1990s, the ASG resorted more and more often to kidnappings for ransom, blackmail, extortion from Christians among the local populace, illegal smuggling, and even small-scale marijuana cultivation and sales. The group made a windfall profit from a succession of high-profile seizures of Western and Chinese hostages in the late 1990s and first two years of the twenty-first century, portions of which were used to purchase more modern weapons, ammunition, and advanced communications equipment such as satellite phones. The multimillion dollar ransoms demanded by the ASG were paid in part by well-off private families who wished to free their captive relatives, but mainly by blackmailed Western governments seeking to arrange for the release of their own citizens and the "helpful" Libyan regime of Qadhdhafi, whose emissaries served as the key intermediaries in the difficult negotiations leading to the release of several foreign hostages. More problematic still is that the ASG apparently purchased AFP weapons, albeit at inflated prices, with the help of corrupt local military officers. Yet despite the easy availability of sophisticated weaponry, and the general Tausug cultural obsession with acquiring guns as a status symbol, most members of the ASG were reportedly poor marksmen and weapons handlers who displayed very little fire discipline. They often fired wildly from the hip without aiming carefully, and frequently discharged their weapons without warning for a bewildering variety of ceremonial, ritualistic, or superstitious reasons.

# The Ideology of the ASG

It is hard to describe the underlying ideology of the ASG in any detail given the paucity of doctrinal tracts, treatises, and communiqués published by the group. The most that one can do is extrapolate on the basis of possibly unrepresentative snippets of information gleaned from media interviews with some of the group's spokesmen. In the beginning, at least, the ASG espoused an Islamist agenda that was far more radical than that associated with the MILF. Janjalani's primary objective was to unify "all sectors of the predominantly Muslim provinces in the South" and establish an Islamic state governed by the *shari'a* in that region, a state where "Muslims can follow Islam in its purest and strictest form as the only path to Allah." Moreover, he intended to accomplish this objective by means of armed struggle rather than through the gradual and peaceful process of proselytization (da'wa) embraced by Muslim evangelical groups like the Tabligh. As he further argued, the *Qur'an* says nothing about the "revolution" that secularized Moro leaders like Misuari had once advocated, but rather repeatedly urges the faithful to wage *jihad* in the defense of Islam and specifically authorizes it in cases – like in the GRP – where Muslims are presently ruled by unbelievers (kuffar). In this connection the following Janjalani quotes are particularly illustrative:

"The first difference is that revolution is not mentioned in the Holy Koran. But *jihad* is mentioned so many times. Second, the command of Allah is to wage *jihad*, not revolution. Third, and as a consequence, if you wage *jihad*, you must follow the law of Allah. You are not allowed to deviate to the right or to the left. If the Koran commands that negotiating is not allowed, there should be no negotiation. In a revolution, you are free to follow the thoughts of Mao Tse-Tung, Lenin, Stalin, Karl Marx, Che Guevara, Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro. It's up to you, since you are simply staging a revolution... Another difference is, in a revolution, you are free to select whatever law you want to establish...In *jihad*, this is not allowed. Upon winning, what you should establish should only be the Koran and the Hadith. These are the only ones to be followed. Nothing else. The objective of the *jihad* is not the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement. It is not the attainment of autonomy. It is not just independence. The objective of *jihad* is the attainment of independence as a means of establishing the supremacy of the Koran and the Hadith...In *jihad*, if you win, it should be the laws of the Koran from the beginning, to the middle, to the end...There are no ideas of men to be followed here."

It would be hard to find a clearer statement differentiating the fundamentalist and Islamist conceptions of Janjalani from the secularized and nationalist views of Misuari.

Apart from promoting the use of violence to achieve these rather vague and grandiose goals, Janjalani provided very few specifics about the precise nature of the Islamic state that he eventually intended to create. However, there is no doubt that his views were influenced both by his earlier religious studies in Mecca and his later sojourn

in Afghanistan as a *mujahid*, where he was probably exposed on a daily basis to the radical jihadist doctrines peddled by Afghan hardliners such as Abdul Sayyaf and their foreign "Afghan Arab" allies like Bin Ladin. Given Janjalani's own apparent adoption, first of Wahhabi and then of jihadist Salafi currents of thought, it is not surprising to learn that he and his associates were disgusted by the "impure" Muslim governments of Libya, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia, or that they later viewed the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as a model which Muslims in the Philippine archipelago might do well to emulate. According to hostage Gracia Burnham, a devout Christian, the ASG felt it necessary to establish harsh rules governing the conduct of believers in order to prevent them from being tempted by Western-inspired immorality.

There is nothing particularly distinctive about this, since efforts by Islamists to establish their own state and restore what they regard as pristine Islamic values are common, but within its own milieu the ASG was noticeably uncompromising by comparison with normal Moro rebel standards. Unlike the MNLF and the MILF, both of which had advocated more inclusive conceptions of the future Bangsamoro state, one of the ASG's specific goals was to rid Sulu and parts of Mindanao of all Christians and non-Muslims, by force if necessary, since according to Janjalani Islam permitted the killing of "our enemies" and "depriving them of their wealth." Indeed, anti-Christian animus seems to have been the principal motive underlying the group's initial wave of terrorist attacks, all of which specifically targeted "Crusaders," and such sentiments were thereafter consistently used as a rationale to justify its violent actions. Furthermore, there are indications that these extreme objectives were not confined exclusively to the borders of present-day Moroland. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States, one of Gracia Burnham's rapturous captors confided that the ASG would not be satisfied even if the GRP decided to return Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Jolo, Basilan, and southern Mindanao to the Muslims: "That would be only a beginning. Then we would be obligated to take all of Mindanao..." He added that afterwards they would seize control of the Visayas and Luzon, then move on to Thailand and other countries where Muslims were oppressed, since "Islam is for the whole world." This internationalist perspective may help to explain why ASG spokesmen sometimes included the freeing of captured al-Qa'ida-linked terrorists, such as 1993 World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yusuf and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group [Egypt]) spiritual leader Shaykh 'Umar ibn al-Rahman, among their demands in exchange for the release of their Western hostages. On other occasions, they complained bitterly about US support for Israel, the worldwide "oppression" of Muslims, the sanctions imposed by Western powers on Libya and Iraq, the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, and the general support of the West for the Philippine government.

In addition to these broader concerns and scarcely realizable objectives, the ASG also made a number of lesser political demands that reflected its members' own parochial local interests. Their most common complaints in this vein had to do with the ongoing problems caused by Christian settlement in Basilan and Sulu, Catholic and Protestant evangelization campaigns, and social and economic discrimination against local Muslims, complaints which were both legitimate and understandable given that by the 1990s Basilan was 30% Christian and that Christians were successfully engaging in land-

grabbing and otherwise assuming positions of economic dominance at the expense of the Moros. As ASG leader Abu Sabaya complained to the Christian teachers and students his group had seized at two remote Basilan villages on 20 March 2000:

"This place originally belonged to us Muslims. But we are being displaced. Even our religion is losing its hold on the island – all because of you Christians. Your Catholic schools have corrupted our children. Look at the way our women dress. You have influenced them with your distorted values."

Yet there were also other local issues that concerned the ASG. For example, at a 1993 press conference Asmad not only demanded the removal of all Catholic symbols in Basilan, but also the banning of foreign fishing vessels in the Sulu and Basilan seas and the involvement of more `*ulama* in hostage negotiations. In 2000, the ASG again demanded that the government safeguard the fishing rights of local Muslim fishermen and further insisted that the GRP establish a human rights committee to investigate allegations of abuses against Moro workers living in Sabah. During that same period, in exchange for the release of the hostages ASG spokesmen insisted that GRP provide the group with additional weapons.

Nevertheless, it is generally believed that the radical religio-political objectives promoted by the original ASG leadership cadre were gradually compromised and corrupted by material interests, and some observers have gone so far as to conclude that the ASG has transformed itself from an authentic rebel political group inspired by Islamist doctrines into a violent criminal gang that simply uses Islam as a convenient cover to conceal its mercenary aims. There can be little doubt that the principal concerns of the group have shifted over time, as is often the case with extremist organizations that are forced to adjust to changing circumstances, or that it has "grown in ruthlessness in its treatment of innocent victims." Long before his 1998 death, Janjalani had begun sanctioning violent actions that seemed to be designed primarily to fill the ASG's coffers, a process that was dramatically accelerated by his successors. Moreover, the firsthand accounts of embittered former hostages, however biased they may be, provide many examples of ASG fighters proudly proclaiming their higher morality but then turning around and violating basic Islamic prohibitions against stealing, adultery, and drinking alcohol. Their repeated failure to conform their actual patterns of behavior to their professed ideals can of course be viewed as a characteristically human flaw, and in fairness it should also be noted that many traditional Tausug customs themselves violate the stricter or more orthodox interpretations of Islamic law. Nevertheless, the levels of hypocrisy and blatant double standards displayed by certain ASG men were at times extraordinary. This phenomenon was even reflected in seemingly trivial contradictions and ambivalences. For example, notwithstanding their ostensible hatred for all so-called manifestations of Western "cultural imperialism," ASG leaders sometimes ironically chose nicknames that were derived from the tough-guy heroes of popular American action films (such as "Robocop" and "Van Damme"), sang Beatles' songs together with the hostages, and seemed to have imbibed and dispensed Coca Cola more frequently than any other beverage.

Yet despite the failure of most ASG fighters to adhere to puritanical Islamic strictures, it would be overly simplistic if not altogether incorrect to conclude that they were not inspired at all by extremist religious doctrines, especially since there is much evidence to the contrary. The problem with dualistic assessments of the ASG's "true" nature – to whit, either the group is religious or it is criminal – is that they do not begin to reflect the complexities (or absurdities) of the real world, especially in cases where alienated individuals immersed in a specific political, social, and cultural milieu consciously adopt a radically utopian vision that cannot be entirely reconciled with that milieu. The members of the ASG generally operate within an insular island micro-world in which violent and criminal behavior is not only commonplace but socially accepted and even admired, at least insofar as it conforms to certain traditional patterns and does not violate existing community standards. Given this peculiar environment, wherein contempt for government authorities and official law codes is rampant and in which severe poverty and frustration prompts many individuals to resort to illegal activities in order to survive and prosper, it would be absurd to expect that rebel political and religious groups would not indulge in some measure of violent and criminal behavior that was not motivated primarily by ideological concerns. After all, even larger mass-based guerrilla movements like the MNLF and MILF have frequently done so. Although the violent actions carried out by the ASG to obtain publicity and raise funds have sometimes been so excessive and brutal that they have even shocked the sensibilities of the warlike Tausug, not to mention devout Muslims throughout Moroland, this does not necessarily signify that the group's adherents had no underlying religious motives for taking those actions. Quite the contrary, since the historical record is replete with religious zealots of all stripes who, in the service of their "divinely-inspired" causes and relying on "divinelysanctioned" methods, have carried out shocking atrocities that transgressed accepted moral boundaries in their own societies. The same, alas, has been true of a multitude of secular revolutionaries who have assiduously pursued their own utopian schemes.

As far as the ASG is concerned, Sean L. Yom has perhaps summed up the situation best:

Navigating between these two polar positions – Abu Sayyaf as [criminal] terrorist group and Abu Sayyaf as Islamic movement – is difficult and politically charged, because very few Muslim leaders can acknowledge Abu Sayyaf's Islamic nature. Nonetheless, it would be hasty to categorically dismiss the claim that Abu Sayyaf, on a discursive or political level, is motivated by Islamic principles, or at least a particular interpretation of them. Conversely, it would be injudicious to ignore its "highly irrational and counterproductive" activities: death threats, bombings, assassinations, extortion, and kidnappings.

It is only necessary to add that by portraying the ASG as nothing more than a criminal gang, albeit a highly dangerous one, the GRP has likewise endeavored to de-legitimize the organization in the eyes of Christian Filipinos, disgruntled but moderate Moros, and potential foreign sponsors. Hence the most that one can say is that early on the ASG was more ideologically-driven, specifically by the jihadist Salafi doctrines typical of former Afghan *mujahidin* like Janjalani, even though it never eschewed criminal acts, but that as

time progressed the group became more and more concerned with its own continued survival and material well-being than with the active pursuit of a regional or transnational holy war. Its younger recruits nevertheless continued to be indoctrinated with an essentially Islamist worldview, and its leaders still employed explicitly Islamic rationales to justify their actions. The single most important factor in this shift of emphasis, apart from the possible machinations of the government's "deep penetration" agent inside the group (operations chief Edwin Angeles), was the suspension or curtailment of the funding provided to the ASG by al-Qa`ida and other pro-Islamist sources, mainly through international charitable fronts, in the wake of the 1995 dismantling of Ramzi Yusuf's terrorist cell in Manila. Thereafter the leaders of Janjalani's organization increasingly resorted to violent intimidation, extortion, and kidnapping as a way of obtaining needed funds.

## The Operational Methods of the ASG

Space and time do not permit a detailed consideration of the many operations, terrorist and otherwise, that have been undertaken by the ASG during the more than ten years of its existence. Fortunately, there is already a good deal of information in the public domain about its major operations, so all that is necessary here is to categorize the types of actions the group has undertaken, and then provide brief illustrative examples of each type. Essentially, the ASG has carried out the following sorts of operations:

relatively small-scale terrorist bombings in public places; small-scale raids and massacres; large-scale raids and massacres; small-scale kidnappings-for-ransom; and high-profile hostage seizures

Most of these categories are clear-cut, and it is not hard to find emblematic incidents of each.

As an example of small-scale terrorist bombings, one can mention the 1991 bomb-throwing attack on the M/V Doulos, a huge ocean-going passenger liner converted after World War II into a floating Christian bookstore, which was then berthed at the wharf of Zamboanga City. This attack, which the ASG later claimed was motivated by a series of insulting remarks made about Islam in the course of a lecture at Western Mindanao State University by Christian missionaries from the ship, resulted in the deaths of six people, including two foreign missionaries, and the wounding of eighteen others. Other such ASG attacks were the 23 August 1992 bombing of the open-air Roman Catholic shrine at Fort Pilar in Zamboanga City, which killed five people, and the 26 December 1993 bombing of the San Pedro Cathedral in Davao City, which killed seven.

Of the many small-scale massacres perpetrated by the ASG raiders, one that is sadly illustrative of the group's brutal methods was the unprovoked 14 February 1999 ambush of a jeep full of Christian catechists who had just left their village of Tumahubong in southern Basilan and were on their way to an Alay Kapwa seminar in Isabela. After opening fire on the driver and passengers, one ASG fighter approached the vehicle and hacked at the dead and wounded bodies with a bolo - a type of machete used in the region - so as to ensure that they were all dead. Even so, one young woman survived the attack.

The best example of a large-scale massacre in which ASG members participated was a raid on the predominantly Christian town of Ipil, which is located in a strategic position on the Zamboanga peninsula of Mindanao. On 4 April 1995 around 200 heavilyarmed men, some of whom were apparently disguised as soldiers or simple civilians, entered the town from all directions after arriving on trucks, buses, or motorized outriggers known as pumpboats. Having converged on the town's center, the raiders shot the police chief and began indiscriminately firing at passing civilians, killing 53 and wounding many others. They then proceeded to loot several banks and shops and set fire to the numerous buildings surrounding the central marketplace before seizing 30 hostages, including women and children, and withdrawing as suddenly as they had arrived. In the wake of this shocking rampage, the most extreme action carried out by Muslim separatists since the 1974 siege of Jolo, the AFP initially concluded that the raid had been carried out by the ASG, while the PNP added that Janjalani's men had probably been backed by foreign terrorists. However, after conducting more thorough investigations, both the military and the MNLF revealed that an action of this type had apparently been planned a couple of months earlier by the so-called National Islamic Command Council (NICC), an ad hoc coalition of disparate elements from Moro resistance groups that were bitterly opposed to Misuari's recent efforts to secure a negotiated peace with the GRP. The objective of the NICC, which was headed by the MNLF's sacked chief of staff Melham Alam, was to demonstrate to President Fidel Ramos that these peace initiatives were not supported by other Muslim rebels. In any case, the groups that actually seem to have taken part in the action were the ASG, ex-MNLF fighters affiliated with the NICC, "lost commands" of the MNLF, and members of local armed militias and criminal gangs whose main purpose was to steal money.

The ASG has also been responsible for many small-scale kidnappings, of which the following only constitute a few select examples. On 14 November 1993 the ASG seized American missionary Charles M. Watson, who was then working for the Summer Institute of Linguistics as a language teacher on Pangutaran Island, Sulu Batu. Less than one month later, on 7 December, Watson was released unharmed after the payment of an unknown amount of ransom by the Catholic Church. In 1996 another American missionary, Greg Williams, was forcibly abducted on Cebu by ASG fighters, who then brutally mistreated him for thirteen days at their jungle camp. After he was forced to witness the beheading of a Christian Filipino hostage who had been seized along with him, one of the ASG men with whom he had established a rapport helped him escape on the eve of his own projected execution. More recently Jeffrey Schilling, a black American who had converted to Islam, gone to the Philippines, and married Abu Sabaya's cousin Ivy Osani, was himself taken into custody by the group during a visit to their Jolo camp on 31 August 2000. After being repeatedly threatened with execution, he was freed by the AFP in the course of their April 2001 offensive against ASG rebels on that island.

Finally, the ASG has carried out several spectacular high-profile hostage seizures.

The most famous were two relatively recent seizures that victimized Western tourists, one on 23 April 2000 from the Sipadan Dive Resort on the tiny island of Sipadan off the coast of Sabah, Malaysia, the other on 28 May 2001 from the Dos Palmas Arrecife Island Resort on Honda Bay in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. In both cases, ASG gunmen traveled across local seas in pumpboats, suddenly disembarked at night along the beach, rounded up several stunned foreign tourists and resort workers, and whisked them away by sea to their strongholds on Basilan or Jolo. When the Philippine armed forces began pursuing them and engaging them in firefights, the captors and their captives moved around through very rough terrain from one camp or local village to another, and in some cases across the sea from one island to another. Meanwhile, difficult negotiations were undertaken between ASG leaders and various other parties, including national and local GRP officials, foreign government representatives, well-known personalities who agreed to serve as intermediaries, and select journalists, for the release of the hostages in exchange for the payment of a large ransom. Eventually, the Western hostages from Sipadan were all released when the Libyan government paid a substantial ransom through the Foundation headed by the dictator Mu'ammar's son, Sayf al-Qadhdhafi, whereas two of the three Americans seized at Dos Palmas were killed, one from a brutal beheading and another in the course of the firefight that resulted in the freeing of the third (along with a number of captive Southeast Asians).

The above examples of ASG operations, though only constituting a fraction of the total number of violent incidents its members have been involved in, nonetheless provide a good indication of the primary types of terrorist actions the organization has perpetrated. On the basis of this partial and not wholly representative sampling, it can be seen that very few of the ASG's acts of violence have involved sophisticated operational planning. The only exceptions are the Ipil raid, which was most likely organized by veteran ex-MNLF guerrillas and was in any case carried out by diverse forces, and the handful of high-profile hostage seizures, which did require some degree of advanced logistical planning. Even in these larger, more far-flung hostage operations, however, the ASG made a number of serious errors in its planning, and the general impression that one gets from the accounts of their hostages was that members of the group were anything but professional and well-organized. These factors need to be taken into account when trying to assess the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threat posed by this Philippine terrorist band.

#### IV) WMD Threat Assessment

Contrary to the opinion of some analysts, in particular mathematical modelers, there are no magic formulae that allow one to predict the course of human behavior. It may at times be possible in certain limited contexts to estimate the future behavior of particular aggregates of people with some degree of precision, as in the case of projections of voting behavior and electoral results in representative democracies, but one can rarely foresee the choices that will be made by particular individual human beings, much less calculate the broader consequences of their choices in advance. There is simply too much contingency governing human affairs, and a failure to recognize that "reallyexisting" individuals do not behave in the same predictable fashion as, say, chemical compounds subjected to external stimulae in laboratory settings, can only lead to gross errors in interpretation and an unwarranted confidence about the reliability of threat assessments. Moreover, despite the current academic hegemony of trendy rational choice theories, in the real world individuals rarely engage in calculated cost-benefit analyses before making decisions about what to do, even in regard to the most important decisions they make in life. As many episodes of the classic 1960's science fiction series "The Outer Limits" rightly emphasized, one can never afford to ignore the "human factor," i.e., the often intangible and largely irrational wellsprings of human behavior. Nor, arguably, can these ever-shifting and sometimes contradictory behavioral wellsprings be fully accounted for in even the most sophisticated quantitative models. Furthermore, when it comes to predicting the future actions of the unconventional, eccentric, and sometimes sociopathic individuals who tend to find their way into the ranks of violence-prone extremist groups, even more caution is in order. Hence all threat assessments concerning the future behavior of terrorists, whether in general or in reference to specific groups, can only be viewed as provisional. Having said that, it nonetheless seems highly unlikely that the ASG – as an organization – will carry out mass casualty attacks using WMD, a phrase here restricted to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

One of the approaches adopted by analysts at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies who are trying to assess future threats can be rendered as follows:

### LIKELIHOOD OF THREAT = MOTIVATIONS x CAPABILTIES

Like most pithy social science formulae, this one is overly schematic, at best pseudoscientific, and far too simplistic to reflect the complexities of reality. However that may be, if one examines both the motivations of the ASG and its actual technical and operational capabilities, there seems to be little reason to be concerned that the group will resort to WMD terrorism at any time in the foreseeable future.

### *Motivations*

As far as motivations are concerned, a good deal can be gleaned from the aforementioned description of the group's ideology. Indeed, much of what follows is implicitly suggested in the empirical narrative above, so all that remains is to draw out certain points and make them more explicit. The ASG is a terrorist group whose members are ostensibly inspired primarily by a politicized fundamentalist religious doctrine, specifically the jihadist Salafi current of Islamism. At the same time, like many other terrorist organizations, this particular Moro rebel outfit is a hybrid group that straddles several motivational categories, categories that are sometimes inadvertently but falsely depicted as being entirely discrete. Its strong separatist undercurrents mean that it also fits in part into the category of a nationalist/separatist group, and its increasing obsession with material gain suggests that it also falls into the category of a criminal group. In motivational terms, this makes it somewhat difficult to assess.

To the extent that ASG members are fanatically wedded to the waging of a transnational *jihad*, whether for the good of the Muslim *umma* or to facilitate their own personal fast track to Paradise, they could be said to exhibit some of the characteristics that are generally thought to make religious terrorist groups particularly susceptible to transgressing moral taboos against the use of WMD. There are, however, reasons to doubt whether most ASG fighters are primarily concerned with participating in a cosmic worldwide struggle against unbelievers, as opposed to fighting for more pedestrian, parochial, and indeed legitimate interests. As it happens, despite their sometimes overheated rhetoric, most of them seem to be fighting mainly for the establishment of an independent "Islamic" state in Basilan and Sulu, if not for material gain in one of the most impoverished regions of the Philippines. To the degree that they are focused on these practical matters, they are arguably less likely to resort to the use of WMD, especially within their home territory but also elsewhere, since such an action would likely elicit even heavier crackdowns on the group by the forces of order. As a matter of fact, no ASG leader or spokesman has ever publicly expressed an interest in acquiring, manufacturing, deploying, or actually using CBRN weapons, and the only allegation about the actual employment of poison in Sulu was attributed to the security forces rather than Moro rebels.

On the other hand, the ASG has never had any moral qualms about murdering civilians or causing mass casualties in the process of carrying out conventional terrorist attacks. After all, its very first actions were public bombings of high-profile Christian targets with the specific intent to kill attendees, and from the outset it has regularly treated civilians, captured soldiers, priests, and tourists, and even locals suspected of disloyalty with extreme brutality. The ASG considers all Christians to be fair game as targets for its violence, since Christians are demonized as "Crusaders" and held to be responsible for the dispossession and oppression of Muslims throughout the world, which has often sadly been true in the Philippine context. Nor has the ASG shied away from killing innocent Muslims in public bombing attacks, as the 3 January 1999 grenade attack on a crowd that had gathered to watch a fire on Jolo demonstrates. There is therefore no

reason to suppose that the organization's leaders would resist using WMD for strictly moral reasons. Their failure to do so up to this point seems to have less to do with moral qualms per se than to a perceived lack of need.

If the characteristics of the ASG are compared with the following eight factors identified by Jonathan Tucker as contributing to a terrorist group's propensity to employ WMD, the results are decidedly mixed.

In the past the group has in fact exhibited an *escalating pattern of violence*, albeit one that is episodic rather than steady and cumulative, and it could conceivably resort to using WMD if it believed that this was the only way to achieve its objectives. It is difficult to imagine circumstances where this would be the case, however.

As for *innovation in tactics and risk taking*, it can be said that the ASG has taken risks and employed some innovative small-scale tactics, but nothing beyond the normal methods used by effective guerrilla forces. However, the group has not displayed any real *innovation in the use of weapons*.

ASG leaders have displayed exaggerated fears and *paranoia* about the machinations of their Christian enemies, dehumanized their potential victims, and exhibited a marked *grandiosity* at times concerning both their capabilities and objectives, but not to an unusual degree by normal terrorist standards.

The ASG is in fact a *radical splinter group* that emerged from the MNLF, which might lead one to think that it would be more likely to embrace sectarian views and rationalize extreme acts of violence. However, this is mitigated by the following point.

Far from being *isolated from an outside constituency or community*, the ASG is in fact firmly embedded within its local milieu, not so much that of the Moros in general as that of the largely Tausug communities within which its fighters operate and from which they have been recruited and obtained considerable support.

The ASG's original chief, Abdurrajak Janjalani, was undoubtedly a *charismatic leader* in the Weberian sense of the term. According to all accounts, he had a magnetic personality, a persuasive manner of speaking, and a fiery commitment to Islam that together served to inspire both his followers and his audiences. Upon his death, however, the leadership of the group devolved upon several leaders, including his younger brother Kaddafy and the blustering Abu Sabaya, neither of whom was able to elicit the same degree of devotion or dedication.

There is no doubt that the ASG exhibits *defensive aggression*, in that its members frequently demonize Christians and Westerners, whom they accuse of seeking to destroy Islam and subjugate Muslims throughout the world. Again, however, not to an unusual degree by terrorist standards.

The ASG does not have a specifically *millenarian* or a narrowly *apocalyptic ideology*, as do certain Christian groups and religious cults, even though radical Islamism is rooted in a dualistic worldview wherein true Muslim believers are engaged in an ongoing struggle against both infidels and nominal Muslims who have either inadvertently fallen away from or, worse still, consciously abandoned

the true path set down by Allah. As noted above, however, the group's leaders and members are associated with a regional culture characterized by a heterodox, syncretistic form of "folk Islam" and do not themselves generally behave strictly in accordance with Qur`anic tenets. Hence they only sporadically display the extreme fanaticism that is often associated with Islamism.

On the basis of the above scheme, the most that can be said is that the ASG currently displays some of the characteristics – but even then often in a less acute form – that certain scholars have associated with a greater willingness by terrorist groups to carry out mass casualty attacks and/or cross the WMD threshold. Although these signals are clearly mixed, it nevertheless seems very unlikely that the ASG – as a collective organizational entity – will be motivated to carry out WMD attacks in the near future. This situation could certainly change, however, depending upon the course of future internal and external developments.

# Capabilities

In terms of capabilities, the ASG appears to have an unusually low level of technical competence in comparison with most other terrorist groups, be they Islamist or secular. The majority of the group's members are poor, uneducated, and illiterate, its religious leaders are at best knowledgeable about arcane matters such as Islamic law and theology, and only a few of its operational chiefs have had any advanced technical education. Hence it is not surprising to find, as indicated above, that firsthand observers have been singularly unimpressed with the group's operational methods, ranging from its fire discipline to its organizational security, command and control, logistical arrangements, and basic military tactics. One might suspect that their noticeable lack of a formal technical education could in large part have been offset by the hands-on training ASG members received from professional terrorists in Afghanistan and Mindanao and the actual combat experience some of them subsequently gained, and to some extent this is true. After all, the organization did carry out a series of successful if conventional bombing attacks. Yet the most damning verdict concerning their technical capacities was pronounced by terrorist professionals such as Ramzi Yusuf and other members of his Manila cell, who considered ASG personnel to be too incompetent and untrustworthy to be entrusted with serious operational matters and hence used them solely for logistical support.

If the real experts in dispensing violence considered ASG fighters to be inadequate from both a technical and professional standpoint, even after having personally provided them with some hands-on training in bombmaking and terrorist tradecraft, there is little or no reason for outside analysts to conclude otherwise. Given that telling circumstance from the mid-1990s, it is not likely that the ASG has since developed the technical capacity to carry out devastating attacks with BW or CW agents, which require careful manufacture, storage, and dissemination in order to generate large numbers of casualties. Nevertheless, assuming that its leaders were ever motivated to sponsor such an operation, which is by no means certain, one could conceive of a scenario in which one of the group's explosives technicians might be able to manufacture a crude radiological dispersal device (or "dirty bomb"), or another in which select members of the group might transport an actual nuclear device – presumably only after other parties had acquired it – to a targeted locale for detonation. Neither of these hypothetical scenarios appears at all likely, however.

# Likelihood of an ASG WMD Threat

Therefore, on the basis of both its motivations and its current capabilities, the ASG appears to be a terrorist group that is singularly unlikely to constitute a future WMD threat. Yet even though the organization per se will probably never sponsor or carry out such an attack, there are other potential dangers that could conceivably materialize.

First, it is possible that a radical faction within the group might emerge, split away from the parent body, and establish a new, more violent and ideologically committed *groupuscule* (grouplet). In this context it should not be forgotten that the ASG was itself the product of schisms within the MNLF, as was the MILF. The kaleidoscopic process of fission and fusion afflicting Moro rebel organizations is not only a common pattern in the Philippines, but in every other locale where extremist groups operate. Indeed, this peculiar process by which radical factions split off from larger parent organizations might be said to constitute the norm within all sorts of extremist milieus, wherein every compromise with reality or move toward moderation is immediately denounced by utopian hotheads and fanatical true believers as an intolerable "sell-out" of a given group's original or "authentic" principles.

Second, as will soon become clearer, individual members of the ASG may be willingly or unknowingly drawn into the orbit of other entities, including regional and transnational terrorist networks or even covert components of the GRP's security apparatus, which in certain circumstances might have both the desire and the operational capacity to carry out successful WMD attacks. Indeed, there is already a considerable amount of evidence suggesting that ASG cadres have actively collaborated with personnel affiliated with other terrorist groups, and that the ASG and AFP have periodically colluded with one another, not to mention that various Philippine intelligence agencies had infiltrated Janjalani's group. In order to understand how this might affect possible WMD scenarios, some examples of this sort of collaboration or collusion need to be highlighted.

### ASG Links to al-Qa`ida

The earliest financial dealings between al-Qa`ida and the ASG reportedly dated back to the group's establishment at the beginning of the 1990s. However, it is necessary to go back a few years earlier to trace the process by which this now notorious terrorist network first established an organizational beachhead in the Philippines. In 1988 'Usama bin Ladin sent his brother-in-law Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, a senior official of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, to the Philippines to recruit *mujahidin* for Afghanistan. In 1989 or 1990 Khalifa, who had previously headed the office of the Islamic World League (ILW) in Peshawar from 1985 to 1987, temporarily left the Philippines, but he returned again in 1991, married a local woman, and established several local businesses and charities in order to channel funds to Malay Muslim insurgents and terrorist cells. The most important of these latter was perhaps the International Relations and Information Center (IRIC). At the time Khalifa also happened to be the Southeast Asian representative of the Islamic International Relief Organization (IIRO), a Saudi-sponsored "charitable" organization that has long been implicated in the covert funding of Islamist extremists.

According to PNP intelligence documents, Abdurrajak Janjalani's links to al-Qa'ida went as far back as his period of study in Libya, which was supposedly financed by Khalifa. Later, Janjalani allegedly struck up a personal friendship in Peshawar with Bin Ladin, who then subsequently turned to the Tausug firebrand for help after making the decision to establish an al-Qa'ida cell in the Philippines. Janjalani apparently agreed in exchange for financial backing for his own attempts to establish an independent Islamic state in Moroland. So it was that in the summer of 1991 Ramzi Yusuf reportedly first accompanied Janjalani, whom he had met while training *mujahidin* in bombmaking techniques at a camp near Khost and may have originally encouraged to form the ASG to serve as his Philippine contact and support group, back home. Between December 1991 and February 1992, Yusuf returned to the Philippines again in order to serve as a "technical advisor" to help train ASG fighters in Basilan. Bin Ladin himself allegedly visited the Philippines in the winter of 1992 or 1993, posing as an interested foreign investor, and according to some sources made several trips to visit ASG strongholds in the South.

The upshot of all this was that al-Qa`ida provided considerable funding to the ASG, through the fronts set up by Khalifa, during the first half of the 1990s. For example, on 29 January 1992 the organization received 160,000 pesos from Khalifa, as well as large deliveries of weapons from Victor Bout, a Russian arms dealer linked by international investigators to al-Qa'ida. During this same five-year period, the ASG was allegedly responsible for carrying out 67 terrorist attacks, more than half of which were indiscriminate bombings, which killed 58 people and wounded 398. According to the PNP, when Yusuf returned to the Philippines in mid-1994 to set up a serious terrorist operational cell in Manila, he supposedly relied upon ASG contacts and intended to use ASG members to help him carry out his plans. Although the evidence for this claim is thin, especially since Yusuf soon apparently came to the conclusion that the members of the group were too amateurish to rely upon, Janjalani's group nonetheless took credit for Yusuf's 10 December 1994 test bombing of a Philippine Airlines (PAL) flight from Cebu to Tokyo, which resulted in the death of a Japanese businessman. Later, when Yusuf's plot to assassinate the visiting Pope John Paul II was exposed in January 1995, the ASG also took credit for organizing that, ostensibly in the name of the "Islamic liberation struggle against the Manila government and the Catholic Church."

Due to a fortuitous combination of circumstances, most notably a blunder committed by Murad and Yusuf in a Manila apartment while they were in the process of mixing chemicals destined for explosive devices, the spectacular terrorist operations planned by al-Qa`ida's Philippine cell – including the assassinations of both the Pope and President Bill Clinton, the simultaneous downing of multiple American airliners ("Oplan Bojinka"), and the flying of a hijacked plane laden with explosives into the headquarters of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Langley, Virginia – were exposed, disrupted, and ultimately prevented, and many of its members were then arrested, tried, and imprisoned. The sudden breakup of the Yusuf cell had a profound impact on the ASG, which was very quickly deprived of its principal source of external funding. It was this development, perhaps more than any other, which in the second half of the 1990s led to the devolution of Janjalani's organization from an ideologically-committed Islamist group into one that increasingly resorted to criminal activities to finance itself.

The ASG's earlier association with al-Qa`ida is nevertheless instructive in that it suggests that, if present circumstances were to change, the group might once again become associated with truly dangerous transnational or regional terrorist networks. Moreover, irrespective of whether the group as a whole ever forges new operational alliances with foreign terrorist organizations, it may well be that individual members of the ASG, or minimal alliance groups within it, will end up being recruited into broader terrorist networks with much more sophisticated operational capabilities than they themselves currently have. As late as 2000, a handful of Afghans and "Afghan Arabs" with apparent links to al-Qa`ida were observed providing training to ASG fighters in their Sulu camps, and according to one interrogated ASG man two al-Qa`ida members were actually inside the group's base camp on Basilan the day after the 9/11 attack. Hence security forces in the region and beyond cannot afford to overlook the potential danger that particular elements of the ASG might pose in the future.

## ASG Links to the Philippine Security Forces

Also problematic, though rarely appreciated, is the possibility that elements within the GRP's own security forces might employ infiltrators they have inserted into the ranks of the ASG, or provocateurs they have recruited from within those ranks, to instigate or actually carry out bloody terrorist attacks that are designed to discredit the group, if not the entire Moro separatist cause. After all, there is plenty of evidence of collusion between elements of the group and the AFP. This has already been noted above in connection with the illegal sales of weapons by soldiers to ASG fighters, but it also took other forms. On several occasions when the AFP seemed to have cornered ASG forces that were in the process of trying to escape with their hostages, military units inexplicably failed to press their pursuit. The most notorious case occurred when soldiers had surrounded a hospital in Lamitan where ASG members had taken refuge with their captives from the Dos Palmas Resort. To the astonishment of both the hostages themselves and local residents, the trapped group somehow managed to "escape" after a brief, desultory firefight, which caused many observers to accuse the troops of outright collusion. Nor was this all. ASG fighters often openly flaunted their ties to the military and the police, which might explain why some of them had official AFP identification cards with their own names listed. Apparently, certain corrupt generals - as well as Manila politicians - frequently took cuts of the ransom money obtained by the ASG in exchange for the release of captives, and on one occasion an AFP commander provided food to both the terrorists and their hostages after Abu Sabaya promised him a cut of the profits.

Among the more important aspects of terrorism that have been studied the least are so-called "false flag" operations, i.e., terrorist operations that are carried out by other parties, usually elements of the state's security forces and their agents, and specifically designed to make it appear as though hostile insurgent groups or states are responsible. Very few scholars have investigated these kinds of covert, manipulative operations, which are far more common than is generally recognized. Such "false flag" operations have taken several forms in the past, ranging from 1) intentionally blaming a terrorist attack on an innocent opposition group, to 2) creating a bogus opposition group from scratch that can then be used to carry out or claim responsibility for terrorist attacks, to 3) infiltrating and covertly manipulating a bona fide terrorist group into carrying out such attacks.

Lest anyone believe that the Philippine security forces would never resort to sordid covert operations of this sort, Arnold Molina Azurin has already cited evidence concerning one apparent action of this type. In early 1996, shortly after Misuari returned to the Philippines to negotiate the final terms of a peace agreement between the MNLF and the GRP, he was "welcomed" by a series of bombings at Catholic schools and utility companies in Zamboanga City that resulted in fourteen people being injured. Police intelligence units later analyzed the pattern of these terrorist bombings and prepared a report concluding that they had been carried out by AFP hardliners and former Marcos cronies who were opposed to a peace settlement they felt would be detrimental to their own political and economic interests. The specific purpose of these actions was to exploit renewed fears of terrorism in order to provide a pretext for the imposition of direct military rule in the region, which would offer opportunities for corrupt military officers to smuggle, grab land, run guns, and gamble, but above all to sabotage the peace process and portray the MNLF and the other Muslim groups to which they were officially attributed "in a bad light." Assuming that the PNP's assessment is accurate, these particular incidents constituted a small-scale version of the "strategy of tension" campaigns that had been covertly backed by the security forces to prevent the left from coming to power in countries like Greece, Italy, Belgium, Turkey, and Chile between the mid-1960s and the 1980s.

Nor does this case appear to be anomalous in the Philippine context. Since the time of the Ilagas, if not earlier, the AFP and police have helped to organize, finance, and equip civilian paramilitary groups that have then been officially portrayed as legitimate self-defense forces or, at worst, as "private" vigilante groups carrying out brutal vendettas on their own initiative. This sort of covert state sponsorship and manipulation of paramilitary forces became even more pronounced in the 1980s, as the Marcos dictatorship was collapsing, when a host of new "cultic" death squads such as Alsa Masa (Masses Arise!) emerged and began carrying out indiscriminate and often sadistic attacks on real and imagined communist sympathizers. In addition to these violent "cults," new semi-official self-defense groups known as Citizens Armed Force Geographical Units (CAGFUs) were established – the reorganized successor of the earlier Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) which had long disgraced themselves by their abusive behavior – ostensibly to defend local civilians from insurgent and terrorist attacks. Hence there are

surely reasons to suspect that some of the terrorist actions later blamed on the ASG and other Muslim rebel groups were in fact carried out by these state-sponsored vigilante groups. This possibility should certainly not be ruled out when one takes into consideration the often brutal campaigns waged against Moro insurgents by conventional Philippine military forces, which relied upon large-scale assaults and "slash and burn" tactics involving outright murder, rape, torture, illegal arrests, the forced evacuation of civilians, the creation of Vietnam-style "strategic hamlets," the burning of villages and farmlands, economic blockades, and perhaps even the use of napalm.

It is also possible that government provocateurs successfully manipulated the ASG into carrying out counterproductive actions that would only serve to discredit it, even in the eyes of Moro sympathizers who were inspired by its militant jihadist stance. This is all the more likely given that the security forces appear to have infiltrated the ASG from the very outset. The most notorious case is that of Edwin Angeles, one of the three co-founders of the group, who was reportedly a "deep penetration" agent for the Defense Intelligence Group of the Department of National Defense. Shortly after being appointed as the operations chief of the ASG, he allegedly began urging Janjalani to undertake kidnappings for ransom, activities that were bound to tarnish the group's devout reputation and damage its credibility in the eyes of many. Although it was later revealed that Angeles was providing information both to a special operations unit of the PNP and to officers of the Philippine Marines based in Basilan, in the final analysis it remains unclear just exactly who he was working for. All along he may have been essentially an unscrupulous, self-serving individual who was seeking to enrich himself by playing various parties off against each other. Or he may have been an ASG "double agent," since after his "cover" was blown in 1995 he went out of his way to expose GRP covert operations against purported Muslim "terrorists" in Metro Manila as well as discredit his handlers within the security forces by alleging that they had falsified evidence against innocent people and committed other egregious crimes. The truth may never be fully known, as he had made innumerable enemies over the years and was assassinated in cold blood by gunmen on 14 January 1999. There may also have been other infiltrators inside the ranks of the ASG, since one of the reasons why al-Qa`ida was said to have avoided renewing its collaboration with the group in the late 1990s was that they were convinced that it had been infiltrated by government operatives. Indeed, some conspiratoriallyminded leftist and Muslim journalists in the Philippines have gone so far as to suggest that all along the ASG was a creature of the GRP, one that had been secretly created and employed by the state's security forces – if not the ubiquitous CIA! – with the specific goal of damaging the image and credibility of Muslim resistance movements, as well as to provide a pretext for harsh military crackdowns. Even Basilan governor Abdulgani ("Gerry") Salapuddin believed that the compromised group was secretly working for the military and was being used to destroy Islam, a view that was seconded by both the MNLF and the MILF.

The purpose of recounting these troubling details here is not to indict the Philippine security forces as a whole, but simply to point out that one cannot rule out the possibility that special operations personnel within the AFP or PNP might decide, especially if under duress in the midst of an acute perceived crisis, to use infiltrators or

provocateurs within the ASG to manipulate the group into carrying out a spectacular terrorist attack, perhaps even one employing CBRN materials. Even in the most extraordinary circumstances their willingness to resort to something as catastrophic as a nuclear device can be ruled out a priori, but one can certainly imagine the most Machiavellian operatives inside the intelligence services encouraging fanatics within the ASG to carry out, say, a crude CW attack that would have a tremendous psychological impact on the Philippine populace but cause relatively little actual damage. Alternatively, they might carry out such an attack themselves and then simply blame it on the ASG. As with standard types of "false flag" operations, their aim in such hypothetical scenarios would be to discredit the ASG and prompt the public to accept, if not demand, the adoption of the most extreme and ruthless measures to suppress terrorism. Even these possibilities seem very remote, but they are nonetheless worth mentioning if only to point out that it is not only professional foreign terrorists who may acquire dangerous materials or possess the technical capacities needed to carry out a WMD attack. Nor, if push comes to shove, are they the only parties who might be motivated to do so. After all, the GRP's secret service counterparts in Italy and elsewhere in Europe were repeatedly implicated in the covert sponsorship of supposed "anarchist" bombings that were actually carried out by neo-fascists and ended up resulting in the deaths of dozens of innocent people.

#### V) Conclusions and Recommendations

When attempting to assess something as intangible, contingent, fluid, and hard to discern as the motivations of the leaders and members of terrorist groups, one must recognize that in the final analysis it is almost impossible to predict their potential future WMD use with any sort of mathematical precision. All efforts to this end which fail to take the stupefying complexity of the real world into account may well turn out to be more akin to this era's version of alchemy than anything else. Even more caution is warranted in the cases of terrorist outfits like the ASG than in the cases of, say, insular religious cults with apocalyptic millenarian worldviews, since the former conform only partially to the existing motivational models purporting to identify which terrorist groups

are most likely to resort to carrying out WMD attacks.

Nevertheless, one can draw three conclusions with some degree of confidence on the basis of the above analysis. First, the threat posed by the ASG has been consistently exaggerated, both by the GRP and the USG, despite the organization's present military weakness, absence of strong ties to dangerous terrorist networks, and relatively low technical capacity. As Zachary Abuza has put it, "there is something woefully disturbing about the U.S. government's obsession with a military defeat of the ASG," since despite the claims of Wolfowitz and others al-Qa`ida would probably remain active in the Philippines even if the Moro terrorist group was completely eliminated. Alas, even those elements of the Philippine security forces that do not share Washington's obsession have decided to play along "in return for massive amounts of aid from the United States." Although their behavior is all too understandable, the reasons for the Bush Administration's continued fixation on the ASG are not entirely clear.

Second, there are many potential pitfalls involved should the US decide to increase its current level of direct military support for GRP efforts to destroy the ASG in Sulu. In that isolated area there is a centuries-long history of fierce Moro resistance to colonial powers, including the US itself, which remains vividly etched in the collective consciousness and mythic imagination of the present-day inhabitants of the region. It would behoove the Bush Administration not to fan the flames of this proud and largely visceral anti-American tradition, since there is no doubt that local Tausug communities will be bitterly opposed to greater US intervention in their affairs, perhaps to the point of joining or at least providing more active support to the ASG. Moreover, as noted above the ASG is firmly enmeshed within these local communities, despite the mixed reception they receive from village to village, which is to a large extent a byproduct of their past treatment of the people there. The fact that ASG fighters can often simply melt into the general population and resume their normal day-to-day activities makes it particularly difficult to distinguish between actual terrorists and local civilians, as the AFP has often learned the hard way. Furthermore, ASG members are intimately familiar with the extraordinarily difficult jungle and mountainous terrain on the islands of Basilan and Jolo, which is particularly hard to navigate and provides extensive cover that severely limits the effectiveness of air surveillance and air support. In short, American involvement in the area should be limited to pressuring the GRP to take steps to address the legitimate grievances of the Moros, upgrading the professionalism of the AFP, and providing the security forces with more advanced equipment and training. Ultimately, the solution to local lawlessness and violence, which is endemic to the culture of the region, cannot be a short-term military one. No matter what the US does, it will not be able to eradicate these deep-rooted cultural patterns, which are greatly exacerbated by economic underdevelopment and long-standing government neglect. The best that can be hoped for is a significant curtailment of religiously-motivated violence of the sort that is likely to attract the support of foreign *mujahidin*.

Third, to the extent that the focus of US anti-terrorism efforts in the Philippines is exclusively on destroying the ASG's strongholds in Basilan and Sulu, there is a danger that the much greater potential threat posed by the MILF on Mindanao will continue to be overlooked. Indeed, the MILF threat has been consistently downplayed by both

governments, which seems odd given that organization's much greater military strength, its large popular base of support, its actual military control of "liberated" territories, and its far more intimate operational links with truly dangerous transnational terrorist networks, including al-Qa'ida and the regional Jemaah Islamiyah network. In this instance political considerations seem to be paramount. It is understandable that President Macapagal-Arroyo would prefer to negotiate a settlement with the MILF in order to avoid ongoing bloodshed and periodic military campaigning, which is why she has urged the American government not to designate the group as an FTO. Yet it is slightly unsettling to hear President Bush not only openly applauding her efforts to "establish a lasting peace" with the MILF, but also accepting at face value the recently-deceased Salamat Hashim's claim to have rejected terrorism, especially at a time when the group is collaborating more and more closely with dangerous international and regional terrorist networks, in particular the JI apparatus. The perceived need to appease allies, however important they may be, should not be allowed to take precedence over the imperative to destroy dangerous Islamist terrorist groups, as it has already done in Pakistan. Such a policy can only be countenanced if the tangible support provided by those allies is considered even more necessary to the successful long-term prosecution of the "War against Terrorism."

"Remarks by the President to the Philippine Congress," full text on White House website, 18 October 2003, at: HYPERLINK "http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/print/20031018-12.html" www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/print/20031018-12.html. See also Mike Allen, "Bush Strengthens Call for Help in Iraq," *Washington Post*, 19 October 2003.

In this paper, Arabic proper names and words will be rendered whenever possible in their accepted scholarly transliterations, minus diacritical marks, whereas Muslim Filipino corruptions of Arabic names and words will be left in their corrupted forms.

See, most recently, the DOS's 23 August 2003 list of FTOs, at: HYPERLINK "http://www.state.gov/s/ct/ rls/fs/2003/12389.htm" <u>www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2003/12389.htm</u>. A good discussion of the purposes and limitations of the FTO list is provided by Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001), pp. 150-6. There are indeed many problems with this list. Apart from being based on the misleading DOS definition of terrorism, in actual practice the FTO list is neither comprehensive nor free of political bias and manipulation.

Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), p. 99.

James Cotton, "Southeast Asia after 11 September," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15:1 (Spring 2003), p. 152, citing a 22 April 2002 article in the *Philippine Star*.

See, e.g., Ambassador Albert del Rosario, "A Progress Report on the Philippines: The Balikatan Exercises, the Abu Sayyaf, and Al-Qaeda," *Heritage [Foundation] Lectures* #738, 19 March 2002, pp. 1-2, at: www.heritage.org/library/lecture/hl738/htm.

Cotton, "Southeast Asia after 11 September," p. 153.

"Abu Sayyaf, Deadliest of the Muslim Separatists," Sydney Morning Herald, 15 July 2003.

The adjective "Islamist" must be carefully distinguished from the adjectives "Islamic" or "Muslim," which are neutral adjectives for the noun "Islam" that are equivalent to "Christian" or "Jewish." In marked contrast, the term "Islamist" is the adjectival form of "Islamism," a noun which refers to a particular current of Islamic political thought that first emerged after World War I – specifically, a radical anti-Western political ideology with both revolutionary and restorationist elements. (In that sense, it is basically equivalent, linguistically-speaking, to the adjectival forms for ideologies such as "fascism" and "communism," i.e., "fascist" and "communist.") The principal ideological characteristics of Islamism in all of its forms are a radical rejection of Western secular values, an intransigent resistance to Western political, economic, social, and cultural influence over the Muslim world, an extreme hostility towards less committed and militant Muslims (who are often denounced as "apostates"), and an affirmation of the importance of creating a truly Islamic state modeled on the strictest tenets of the *Qur`an* and the exemplary

actions taken by the Prophet Muhammad. Since this is an inherently uncompromising doctrine, it is misleading to speak of "moderate Islamism" and "radical Islamism" – the true distinction is between Islamists who are willing to adopt accomodationist political tactics such as participating in elections, however temporarily, and the "jihadists" who unceasingly advocate the waging of *jihad*, i.e., in the sense of an armed struggle against unbelievers. Obviously, al-Qa'ida and its terrorist allies fall into the latter category. See further Jeffrey M. Bale, "Islamism," in *Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense*, ed. by Richard F. Pilch and Raymond A. Zilinskas (New York: Wiley & Sons, 2004), forthcoming.

See, e.g., Thomas M. McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California, 1998), p. 2.

In the Philippines, as elsewhere, the Spaniards divided the colonial population into a hierarchy of distinct social strata: 1) *peninsulares* – persons born in Spain who later settled in the country; 2) *filipinos* – Spaniards born in the Philippines; 3) *indios* (a term earlier employed for the Indians in Spanish America) – the subjugated and Christianized inhabitants of the North and Center; 4) *infieles* – the pagan "tribal peoples" occupying the mountainous interior zones; and 5) *moros* – the Islamized inhabitants of the South who continued to resist Spanish suzerainty. See Cesar Adib Majul, *The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines* (Berkeley: Mizan, 1985), p. 17, note 1.

For an excellent historical overview of Muslim Iberia, see Hugh N. Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Political History of al-Andalus* (London and New York: Longman, 1996).

One can observe a parallel phenomenon in the relatively recent adoption of traditionally pejorative words for black Americans ("nigger") and homosexuals ("queer" and "faggot") by, respectively, gangster rappers and gay activists. Hence the increasing use by Muslim secessionist leaders of the phrase *Bangsa Moro* (the Islamized "Moro nation") since the late 1960s – in contradistinction to *Bangsa Pilipino* (the Christianized "Filipino Nation") – should not be viewed as having any negative connotations. Quite the contrary, in fact. See Peter Gordon Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos – Heritage and Horizon* (Quezon City: New Day, 1973), pp. ix-x.

Ibid, pp. 1-3.

For this phrase, see Robert Day McAmis, *Malay Muslims: The History and Challenge of Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2002), p. 5.

T. J. S. George, *Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University, 1980), p. 13.

Charles A. Fisher, *South-East Asia: A Social, Economic and Political Geography* (London: Methuen, 1966), pp. 64-5. The Malays were preceded in the region by Negrito Pygmies.

The term "Philippine Archipelago" refers to the geographic entity now encompassed by the Republic of the Philippines, which consists of over 7,100 separate islands, many of which are tiny and uninhabited. The country was first named the Philippines in 1542 by the leaders of a Spanish expeditionary force, in honor of the son of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V (1519-1558), who was soon to be crowned King Phillip II of Spain (1556-1598).

For more on the pre-Islamic era in the Philippines, see George, *Revolt in Mindanao*, pp. 13-16. Compare Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos*, pp. 12-13, who rightly emphasizes that before the Muslims arrived there was endemic warfare between rival *barangays*, as opposed to a single unified people living in peace and harmony.

Fisher, South-East Asia, p. 691.

For this early process of Muslim settlement and conquest, see the summaries provided by Majul, *Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*, pp. 15-16; and Salah Jubair, *Bangsamoro: A Nation Under Endless Tyranny* (Kuala Lumpur: IQ Marin, 1999), pp. 5-6. The author of the first-named work is not only a respected scholar but a moderate leader of the Moro movement, whereas the latter work reflects the views of the leadership of the armed Islamic secessionist movement, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), since "Salah Jubair" is the pen name of Mohagher Iqbal, the Vice Chairman for Information of that organization. See Marites Dañguilan Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao* (Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs/Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000), p. 122. Prior to his 13 July 2003 death at age 70 from cardiac arrest, Salamat Hashim was the chairman of the MILF.

George, Revolt in Mindanao, p. 17.

Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, pp. 18-24; Jubair, Bangsamoro, pp. 6-8.

McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels, p. 48.

Compare Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, pp. 45-55; McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels, pp. 50-1; Aijaz

Ahmad, "Class and Colony in Mindanao," in *Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in the Southern Philippines*, ed. by Eric Gutierrez et al (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000), pp. 10-11. *Datus* were divided into two categories, "datus-in-fact" and "datus-in-name," who wielded no actual power but were assigned honorary titles because they were born into aristocratic families.

McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*, p. 51. These non-Muslim chattel slaves were known as *baniaga*, in contrast to Muslim debt bondsmen (*olipon*). See Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos*, pp. 53-4.

W. K. Che Man, *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand* (Singapore: Oxford University, 1990), p. 22.

In general, see Nicholas P. Kushner, *Spain in the Philippines: From Conquest to Revolution* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 1971). For the initial process of Hispanization and Christianization, see John Leddy Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses*, 1565-1700 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1967).

Cited by Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, pp. 29-30.

Ibid, pp. 17-18.

Cesar Majul, "The Muslims in the Philippines: An Historical Perspective," in *The Muslim Filipinos*, ed. by Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis (Manila: Solidaridad, 1974), p. 7.

Note that this is largely a myth, in the sense of a romanticized fiction. Most Moros were in fact brought under effective colonial control during the American period after their most tenacious resistance forces had suffered a series of severe military defeats. Moreover, many leading *datus* have demonstrated their willingness to collaborate with non-Muslim powers and power brokers in order to preserve their own privileges, from the Spanish period on up to the present. For a skeptical if not cynical assessment of both Moro resistance myths and the role played by the *datus*, see Arnold Molina Azurin, *Beyond the Cult of Dissidence in Southern Philippines and Wartorn Zones of the Global Village* (Manila: University of the Philippines/Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 1996), pp. 5-12, 37-41.

For the American period of colonial rule in the Philippines, see Peter W. Stanley, *A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1974). For the American administration of the Moros, see Peter G. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1920* (Quezon City: Philippine Center for Advanced Studies, University of the Philippines, 1977).

Gowing, Muslim Filipinos, pp. 34-5.

Ibid, pp. 36-8, 168-71.

George, Revolt in Mindanao, pp. 43-5.

Dirk J. Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines: The Bloody Trail of Abu Sayyaf, Bin Laden's East Asian Connection* (San Jose, CA: Writer's Club, 2001), pp. 151-3, where these arrangements are referred to as examples of "silent discrimination" against the Moros.

Compare George, *Revolt in Mindanao*, pp. 88-94; and Majul, *Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*, pp. 29-30.

George, *Revolt in Mindanao*, pp. 94-5. For an excellent overview of the complex role of the *datus* within the modern Philippine state, see Patricio N. Abinales, "Muslim' Political Brokers and the Philippines Nation-State," in *Gangsters, Democracy, and the State in Southeast Asia*, ed. by Carl A. Trocki (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1998), pp. 81-94.

Ibid, pp. 95-8; Jubair, Bangsamoro, pp. 122-3.

Compare George, *Revolt in Mindanao*, pp. 107-21; Che Man, *Muslim Separatism*, pp. 24-5; Majul, *Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*, pp. 30-2; and Jubair, *Bangsamoro*, pp. 102-8, 119-21. See the chart in Che Man, *Muslim Separatism*, p. 25.

Majul, *Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*, p. 31; Jubair, *Bangsamoro*, pp. 95-7. Che Man, *Muslim Separatism*, pp. 25-8. Compare Azurin, *Beyond the Cult of Dissidence*, pp. 41-4. For overviews of the "Jabidah Massacre," see George, *Revolt in Mindanao*, pp. 123-7; and Majul, *Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*, pp. 40-2. The most detailed analysis of the incident is provided by Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, pp. 2-23. For a highly skeptical account, both of Arula's massacre claims and the official GRP version of events, see Azurin, *Beyond the Cult of Dissidence*, pp. 19-21, 75-7, 85-103. The Islamist author Salah Jubair (*Bangsamoro*, p. 132) claims that the primary cause of the mutiny was that the Moro recruits did not want to attack their Muslim "brothers" in Sabah, which contradicts other accounts indicating that many trainees were keen to undertake covert operations against Malaysian territory.. Che Man, Muslim Separatism, p. 75.

Azurin, *Beyond the Cult of Dissidence*, p. 76. Compare also Lela Garner Noble, "The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines," *Pacific Affairs* 49:3 (1976), p. 410, and the remarks of General Fortunato U. Abat, the commander of the AFP's Central Command who later conducted the GRP's campaigns against the Moros in Mindanao, in *The Day We Nearly Lost Mindanao: The CEMCOM Story* (Quezon City: Fortunato Abat, 1994), pp. xvi-xvii.

For more on the MIM, which was later renamed the Mindanao Independence Movement to make it appear less exclusionist and thereby attract the support of local anti-government Christians and tribal peoples, see McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*, pp. 144-9; George, *Revolt in Mindanao*, pp. 133-6; Eliseo R. Mercado, "Culture, Economics and Revolt in Mindanao: The Origins of the MNLF and the Politics of Moro Separatism," in *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia*, ed. by Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), pp. 156-7; Majul, *Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*, pp. 45-6; and Jubair, *Bangsamoro*, pp. 134-5. For the group's ideological manifesto, see Che Man, *Muslim Separatism*, pp. 189-90.

The KM, which was created in 1964 by José María Sison, was associated with the Maoist New People's Army (NPA). See Gregg R. Jones, *Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement* (Boulder: Westview, 1989), pp. 20-4.

For the new generation of Moro student activists, several of whom – including Misuari – sought to reconcile aspects of Marxism with Islam, see Jubair, *Bangsamoro*, pp. 145-9; and George, *Revolt in Mindanao*, pp. 194-9.

For the BMLO, see especially Jubair, *Bangsamoro*, pp. 151-2; and Che Man, *Muslim Separatism*, pp. 78-9 and 193-4 (for the group's Islamic organizational structure). Even before they became members of the BMLO, Misuari and Khayr Alonto were among the seven men who in 1969 had secretly formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MNLF) while undergoing training in Malaysia. See below for more on the MNLF.

Che Man, Muslim Separatism, p. 80; Jubair, Bangsamoro, p. 153.

The Philippine Constabulary was originally established by the US colonial administration and operated as a sort of gendarmerie or militarized police. It later played a prominent role in fighting both Moro and communist insurgents. On 1 January 1991, it was combined with the Integrated National Police, a regular police force created in 1975, to form the revamped Philippine National Police, which retained its counterinsurgency tasks. See Ronald E. Dolan, ed., *Philippines: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1993), pp. 269-71, 295-7.

For the Ilagas, see Aijaz Ahmad, "The War Against the Muslims," in *Rebels, Warlords and Ulama*, pp. 28-30, who argues that they operated with the covert assistance of the AFP and PC, were led by seven municipal mayors and three provincial governors, and may have been financially supported by timber merchants who wanted to gain control over vacated Moro lands for logging; George, *Revolt in Mindanao*, pp. 143-51; Majul, *Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*, pp. 46-50; and Jubair,

*Bangsamoro*, pp. 135-8, who also provides a listing of reported Ilaga massacres of Muslims (pp. 138-9). Compare Ahmad, "War Against the Muslims," pp. 29-30, citing a 21 March 1972 article in the *Manila Times;* and Che Man, *Muslim Separatism*, p. 75.

Che Man, Muslim Separatism, pp. 76-8.

For the OIC, see Saad S. Khan, *Reasserting International Islam: A Focus on the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Other Islamic Institutions* (Karachi: Oxford University, 2001); Abdullah al-Ahsan, *The Organization of the Islamic Conference: An Introduction to an Islamic Political Institution* (Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1988); and Ismail Suny, *The Organization of the Islamic Conference* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2000).

Che Man, *Muslim Separatism*, pp. 78-80; George, *Revolt in Mindanao*, pp. 247-51. For OIC relations with the MNLF, see *The Organization of Islamic Conference and the MNLF Issue: Background and Possible Scenarios* (Manila: no publisher, 1988).

For the official founding of the MNLF, see Mercado, "Culture, Economics and Revolt in Mindanao," pp. 159-60. Compare Azurin, *Beyond the Cult of Dissidence*, pp. 44-5.

For the Muslim reaction to the declaration of martial law, see George, *Revolt in Mindanao*, pp. 190-3. He concludes, however, that for the moment this new "war in Mindanao remained, blissfully, unholy." See *ibid*, p. 192.

For the Marawi uprising, see *ibid*, pp. 204-8; Mercado, "Culture, Economics and Revolt in Mindanao," p. 161.

For the Huks, see especially Benedict J. Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California, 1977).

For the MNLF's organization, see Noble, "Moro National Liberation Front," pp. 412-15; and Che Man, *Muslim Separatism*, pp. 81-4, 191-3 (Appendix 4). Interestingly, the MNLF"s provincial committees were combined into three larger groupings that corresponded to the three major Moro ethno-cultural groups, the Suluanos, Maguindanaos, and Maranaos, and its three principal leaders – Misuari, Salamat Hashim, and Abul Khayr Alonto – emanated, respectively, from those three groups.

Che Man, *Muslim Separatism*, pp. 83-4. According to its own statement, one of the three objectives of the ISF, an OIC subsidiary organization established in 1974 and likewise based in Jidda, is "to provide required material relief in case of emergencies such as natural catastrophes and man-made disasters, that may befall the Islamic States." See www.oic-oci.org/english/main/isf.htm. Note that the provision of alms to the needy is one of the most important duties incumbent upon Muslims, so much so that it is considered to be one of the "five pillars" of the faith. Unfortunately, a considerable portion of the money collected from believers in the form of *zakat* has at times been funneled by various institutions, directly or indirectly and generally without the knowledge of the providers, to Islamist terrorist groups.

The entire MNLF manifesto, along with these quotes, is reprinted in *ibid*, pp. 189-90.

Noble, "Moro National Liberation Front," pp. 416-17; George, *Revolt in Mindanao*, pp. 202-4. The latter (*ibid*, p. 202) recounts a fascinating incident in which a group of armed Muslims accosted and threatened to kill Misuari, who was forced to recite passages from the *Qur`an* to prove he was not a communist. However, there are indications that there may have been some degree of local cooperation between certain MNLF and NPA cadres. See Noble, "Moro National Liberation Front," p. 417; and Abat, *Day We Nearly Lost Mindanao*, p. 93.

For an overview of this costly, destructive, and often brutal war, see Jubair, *Bangsamoro*, pp. 158-67; and Mercado, "Culture, Economics and Revolt in Mindanao," pp. 161-3. For details of the campaigning on Mindanao, see Abat, *Day We Nearly Lost Mindanao*, pp. 1-183. However, as George notes (*Revolt in Mindanao*, pp. 209-18), the epicenter of the revolt was in the Sulu archipelago, specifically on Jolo island (which later, not coincidentally, became an ASG stronghold), where 2,500 insurgents had pinned down government forces.

The Tripoli Agreement is reprinted in Che Man, Muslim Separatism, pp. 183-6.

Majul, *Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*, pp. 82-3. For the IWL, see Reinhard Schultze, *Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Islamischen Weltliga* (Leiden: Brill, 1990). I know of no monographic studies of the IWC, but a brief history of the organization is provided on its website: www.motamaralalamalislami.org/history.html.

George, *Revolt in Mindanao*, pp. 254-8; Majul, *Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*, pp. 73-5; Jubair, *Bangsamoro*, pp. 167-71; Mercado, "Culture, Economics and Revolt in Mindanao," pp. 166-8. For the circumstances surrounding the Salamat-Misuari break, see Che Man, *Muslim Separatism*, pp. 84-5; Majul, *Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*, pp. 86-7; George, *Revolt in Mindanao*, pp. 261-3; Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, pp. 121-4; Eric Gutierrez and Abdulwahab Guialal, "The Unfinished Jihad: The Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Peace in Mindanao," in *Rebels, Warlords and Ulama*, p. 275; McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*, pp. 207-8; and Jubair, *Bangsamoro*, pp. 154-5, who notes that subsequent attempts by the OIC and IWL to reconcile the two men ended in failure. See Che Man, *Muslim Separatism*, pp. 85, 88, 197-9, Appendixes 5, 6 (text of MNLF-RG resolutions); and Jubair, *Bangsamoro*, pp. 156-7. Alonto later became a government official. See Majul, *Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*, p. 89.

Muslim Separatism, p. 89.

The astounding costs of the war between the Marcos government and the MNLF and its allies have been summarized by Thomas M. McKenna, "Murdered or Martyred?: Popular Evaluations of Violent Death in the Muslim Separatist Movement in the Philippines," in *Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror*, ed. by Jeffrey A. Sluka (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2000), p. 190: "At least 50,000 people were killed in the fighting, which also created one million internal refugees and caused more than 100,000 Philippine Muslims to flee by boat to Malaysia."

Jubair, *Bangsamoro*, pp. 183-6, 189-91. For the general history of negotiations between the GRP, MNLF, and foreign intermediaries, see Samuel K. Tan, *Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle* (Quezon City: Center for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines, 1993); and Mindanao State University, ed., *The MNLF-GRP Peace Process: Mindanao in Transition* (General Santos City: Research and Development Center, Mindanao State University, 1999).

McKenna, who also notes the Egyptian government provided more than 200 scholarships to Moro students between 1955 and 1978, uses this phrase to describe that entire phase of Moro student activism in Cairo. See *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*, pp. 143-4. Compare Jubair, *Bangsamoro*, pp. 153-4. According to one source, Hashim was especially influenced by the ideas of two leading Islamist thinkers, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) and the South Asian Mawlana Abu'l A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979). See Peter Chalk, "Militant Islamic Extremism in the Southern Philippines," in *Islam in Asia: Changing Political Realities*, ed. by Jason F. Isaacson and Colin Rubenstein (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2002), p. 195, citing a July 1998 conversation with Professor Aprodicio Lacquian of the University of British Columbia. For excellent introductions to these two crucial figures, see Ahmad S. Moussalli, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992); and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (New York: Oxford University, 1996).

For these details about Hashim's activities, especially abroad, see Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, pp. 133-4; and McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*, p. 144.

The phrase is that of Vitug and Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon, p. 122.

The above two quotes are cited by McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*, p. 208, who argues that these had been the goals of Hashim and his cohorts ever since their student days at al-Azhar, even though for a time they had deferred to Misuari concerning MNLF policies. See also Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, p. 122. Hence the name change appears not to have reflected a shift in their fundamental goals, but rather their recognition that Misuari had managed to retain firm control over the MNLF even in the face of bitter factional challenges they helped to launch.

Vitug and Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon, pp. 124-5. Compare Jubair, Bangsamoro, p. 187.

For this training of MILF cadres, see Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, pp. 90-1.

*Ibid*, pp. 95-99; Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Berkley, 2002), pp. 243-8.

Several authors have noted that moderate Muslims were often critical, at least privately, of the MILF's restrictive doctrines. Compare Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, pp. 128-31; and McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*, pp. 213-29. For the "folk Islam" of the Moros, see Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos*, especially pp. 44-102.

Che Man, *Muslim Separatism*, pp. 194-5 (Appendix 4). The BIAF was originally called the Bangsamoro Mujahideen Army (BMA).

For the MILF's military forces, see Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, pp.111-12. For the SOG, see Peter Chalk, "Al-Qaeda and its Links to Terrorist Groups in Asia," in *The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies*, ed. by Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2002), pp. 112-13; and idem, "Militant Islamic Extremism in the Southern Philippines," p. 197.

This "shadow" government was more or less clandestine, depending on the locale. See McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*, p. 209, where he also quotes a letter written by Hashim. For the number of MILF camps as of 1998, which apparently shifted over time, see Jubair, *Bangsamoro*, p. 216.

Che Man, *Muslim Separatism*, pp. 92-4; Maria A. Ressa, *Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia* (New York: Free Press, 2003), pp. 7-10; Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, pp. 113-14 (Abubakar only).

Ibid, pp. 106-11.

Ibid, p. 125; Jubair, Bangsamoro, pp. 193-4.

McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*, p. 209; Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, p. 125. For detailed overviews of these GRP-MILF negotiations, see Jubair, *Bangsamoro*, pp.184-7, 192-243; and Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, pp. 136-61.

Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, p. 99.

"Remarks by the President to the Philippine Congress," full text on White House website, 18 October 2003: HYPERLINK "http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/print/20031018-12.html" www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/print/20031018-12.html.

Chalk, "Militant Islamic Extremism in the Southern Philippines," p. 201, citing (among others) Philippine government sources. The name Abu Sayyaf reflects a Pashto or Malay corruption of the Arabic term for sword (*sayf*), either its singular form Abu Sayf ("Swordbearer") or its plural form Abu Suyuf ("Bearer of Swords"), just as Juma'a is a corruption of the Arabic word *jama'a*. The selection of this moniker seems also to have been Janjalani's way of rendering homage to his purported Afghan military trainer, Abdul

Rasul Sayyaf, about whom more will be said below. Other observers have expressed doubts that the ASG was ever officially named Al Harakatul Islamiya. See, e.g., Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, p. 238.

See Kiefer, *The Tausug: Violence and Law in a Philippine Moslem Society* (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 1972), a study based upon his doctoral research at Indiana University.

Ibid, p. v, from the Foreward by George and Louise Spindler.

For the above quotes, see *ibid*, pp. 54-5. Note as well that although the need to avenge an offense is almost invariably the idiom used to justify retaliation, it is often used to mask the pursuit of more material interests.

Ibid, pp. 59-65 (quote).

Ibid, pp. 71-2. Depending upon the situation, these minimal alliance groups are typically made up of 10 to 25 men.

*Ibid*, p. 67. Note, however, that these larger alliances are not formed on the basis of territorial contiguity. *Ibid*, p. 75.

Janjalani's second name Abubakar – as well as the name selected for major MILF and ASG camps – derives from that of the first of the four "rightly-guided" Caliphs who succeeded the Prophet Muhammad as head of the Muslim "community of believers" (*umma*), 'Abu Bakr (632-634). For basic information about Janjalani's early background, see Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, pp. 113-14; and Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, p. 211.

The Claretian Order, officially known as the Congregación de los Misioneros Hijos del Inmaculado Corazón de María (Congregation of the Missionary Sons of the Immaculate Heart of [the Virgin] Mary), was founded in 1849 by a Catalan "apostolic missionary" named Antonio María Claret (1807-1870). After serving as Archbishop of Santiago de Cuba he was appointed as the confessor of Queen Isabel II (1833-1868) of Spain, but following the Revolution of 1868 he was forced to flee with her to France, where he eventually took refuge in a Cistercian monastery. After his death the Claretian Order expanded its missionary activities throughout the world, and in 1950 Pope Pius XII (1939-1958) officially canonized him as Saint Claret. For more, see Juan María Lozano, *The Claretians: Their Mission and Spirit in the Church* (Chicago: Claret Center for Resources in Spirituality, 1980).

For a good overview of the Tabligh-i Jamaat movement, see Mumtaz Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat," in *Fundamentalisms Observed*, ed. by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appelby (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991), pp. 510-24. For the group's activities in the Philippines, see Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, pp. 209-10. *Ibid*, p. 205.

Ibid, pp. 211-12; Barreveld, Terrorism in the Philippines, pp. 115-16.

Compare ibid, pp. 119-20; John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism (London: Pluto, 2000), pp. 232, 237-8; Mary Anne Weaver, A Portrait of Egypt: A Journey Through the World of Militant Islam (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000), pp. 180, 210-12; and Terry McDermott et al, "The Plots and Designs of Al Qaeda's Engineer," Los Angeles Times, 22 December 2002. According to one account, Janjalani spent time there from 1989 to December 1990. See International Crisis Group, Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous (Jakarta and Brussels: ICG Asia Report No. 63, 26 August 2003), p. 6. Among the other trainees at Abdul Sayyaf's "university" was Bin Ladin's operations officer, Khalid Shavkh Muhammad. Ironically, despite his virulent anti-Americanism, the Afghan professor shrewdly joined the Northern Alliance coalition at the time of the 2001-2002 US military campaign against al-Qa`ida and the Taliban in Afghanistan. He is now a de facto warlord in southeastern Afghanistan, and also lectures on Islamic Law at Kabul University. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University, 2001), pp. 85, 131; Cooley, Unholy Wars, pp. 232, 238; Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan (London: Pluto, 2001), p. 20. The other main beneficiary of ISI and Saudi largesse was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, head of the extremist Hizb-i Islami (Islamic Party). Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: Free Press, 2001), pp. 52, 54; Roland Jacquard, In the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Ladin Brotherhood (Durham and London: Duke University, 2002), p. 44. Bin Ladin's other mentors were 'Abdullah 'Azzam, the Jordanian Palestinian Islamist who in 1984 established the Maktab al-Khidamat (Services Office) for foreign "Afghan Arabs" in Peshawar, and his later lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahiri, a leader of the Tanzim al-Jihad (Jihad Organization), one of the two principal Islamist terrorist groups in Egypt. For more on al-Zawahiri, see Lawrence Wright, "The Man Behind Bin Laden: How an Egyptian

Doctor Became a Master of Terror," New Yorker (16 September 2002), at: www.newyorker.com/fact/ content/?020916fa fact2a. For the Tanzim al-Jihad, see Nemat Guenena, The 'Jihad': An 'Islamic Alternative' in Egypt (Cairo: American University in Cairo, 1986). A good summary of the crucial role played by 'Azzam in promoting the Afghan jihad can be found in Bergen, Holy War, Inc., pp. 51-3. Note that 'Azzam's Maktab should not be confused or conflated, as it often is, with a similar support organization set up by bin Ladin in the same city for Arab volunteers, the Bayt al-Ansar (House of the Supporters). The term *ansar* has particular historical significance, in that it applies to the name of the original group of Muhammad's supporters in Medina, as opposed to those who had accompanied the Prophet on his 622 flight (*hijra*) from Mecca to Medina, who are known as al-Muhajirun (the Exiles). Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab promoted an unusually rigid but distinctive variant of the already very strict Hanbali school of Sunni jurisprudence, and then cleverly managed to ally himself to the House of Sa'ud. Nowadays Wahhabism is assiduously promoted by the official Saudi religious establishment, by Saudi-backed international organizations, and by ostensibly "private" Saudi charities. Salafism is a different reformist doctrine with political overtones, and the movement that inspired it was known as the Salafiyya movement. It was originally developed in the late nineteenth century as part of an effort by Egyptian intellectuals (above all Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida) to reconcile traditionalism with pragmatic reformism, but was gradually transformed into an extreme fundamentalist ideology and, ultimately, into one of the principal currents of contemporary Islamism. The name Salafi, which derives from the Arabic verb salafa (to precede), refers to the original companions of Muhammad, who are collectively known as al-Salaf al-Salih (the "virtuous forefathers" of the faith). In the present context, a Salafi is an uncompromising traditionalist who demands that all Muslims follow the exemplary, pious, and uncorrupted behavior of Muhammad and his trusted original companions. Unlike Wahhabism, it is not named after a specific person or associated directly with a particular regime. Indeed, extreme Salafi Islamists - like Bin Ladin and his jihadist followers – are generally bitter rivals and opponents of the Wahhabis, who they view as lackeys of the hypocritical, impious, US-backed Saudi monarchy.

Chalk, "Militant Islamic Extremism in the Southern Philippines," p. 201.

Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, pp. 121-2. According to Jumaani himself, skeptical journalists, and at least one senior intelligence officer, the claims – derived from PNP intelligence reports – that Jumaani was one of the ASG's co-founders were baseless. See Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, p. 209. *Ibid*, pp. 212-13.

Chalk, "Militant Islamic Extremism in the Southern Philippines," p. 201.

Barreveld, Terrorism in the Philippines, p. 121.

recognizable leadership."

See Mark Turner, "Terrorism and Secession in the Southern Philippines: The Rise of the Abu Sayaff [sic]," Contemporary Southeast Asia 17:1 (June 1995), pp. 15-16, who quotes from a 30 July 1995 article in the Philippine Daily Inquirer that in turn based its information on AFP intelligence sources: "Directly under Janjalani are the line units composed of the hit squad, demolition team, Young Moro Mujahideens (soldiers of the *iihad*) and recruitment team; the functional staff consisting of support, security, finance, operations office, supply, logistics recruitment and intelligence; and the territorial units based in Tubuan and Pilas Island in Basilan and Zamboanga City." However, Turner expresses some warranted skepticism about the extent and appropriateness of this alleged organizational scheme. Compare also Rohan Gunaratna, "The Evolution and Tactics of the Abu Sayyaf Group," Jane's Intelligence Review (1 July 2001), at: HYPERLINK "http://www.janes.com/K2/docprint.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history" www.janes.com/K2/docprint.jsp?K2DocKev=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history; Chalk ("Militant Islamic Extremism in the Southern Philippines," p.203), who claims that the ASG had "special urban units, composed of so-called Mollah and Mujaheedat forces that are trained in demolition and weapons handling;" and Sean L. Yom, "Abu Sayyaf: Criminal Group or Representative of Philippine Muslims' Quest for Autonomy," CSIS [Center for Strategic and International Studies] Briefing Notes on Islam, Society, and Politics 4:1 (September 2001), p. 8, who justly notes that the ASG "arranges itself through a decentralized system composed of numerous semi-independent, horizontal cells, while maintaining enough vertically coordinated hierarchy to qualify as an organized movement with

Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, pp. 125, 135, 137 (where he refers to this Tausug alliance mechanism as "an inbuilt system of rejuvenation" that may be impossible to suppress via conventional military means).

*Ibid*, pp. 165, 180. The same author also notes (p. 124) that the Jolo leaders of the ASG were first recruited by Janjalani in 1993 or 1994, after he and his followers were forced by a heavy AFP offensive to abandon

their base camp on Basilan and take refuge on Jolo. In addition to Robot and Mujib, the new recruits included Radulan Sajiran ("Commander Putol"), Gumbahali Jumdail ("Abu Doc"), and Nadzimi Sahadulla ("Commander Global"). All were former MNLF fighters. Compare Jose Torres, Jr., *Into the Mountain: Hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf* (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 2001), p. 38, where their recruitment is said to have occurred in the mid-1990s. Note, however, that Barreveld's rendering of certain ASG leaders' names is not always consistent (see, e.g., pp. 181-2).

See Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia*, p. 111. Some considered the leaders of the Jolo ASG group to be noticeably less brutal than those of the Basilan ASG group. See Callie and Monique Strydom, *Shooting the Moon: A Hostage Story* (Claremont: Spearhead, 2001), pp. 53, 60.

Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, p. 162; Chalk, "Militant Islamic Extremism in the Southern Philippines," p. 209.

This seems obvious, since on various occasions small groups of ASG men successfully carried out terrorist actions in these larger, Christian-dominated cities, where they first had to operate in secrecy so that their projected plans and actions were not uncovered or disrupted by the GRP's security forces.

Compare, e.g., Turner, "Terrorism and Secession in the Southern Philippines," p. 15; Chalk, "Militant Islamic Extremism in the Southern Philippines," p. 202; Torres, *Into the Mountain*, p. 38, whose upperrange figures are derived from an "escaped" ASG veteran using the pseudonym "Ahmad Sampang"; and Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, p. 178, who cites realistic 2001 AFP intelligence estimates of 450 ASG fighters on Basilan and 650 on Jolo.

Turner, "Terrorism and Secession in the Southern Philippines," p. 14; Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, pp. 207-8, 243; Azurin, *Beyond the Cult of Dissidence*, p. 167.

Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia*, pp. 101, 110-11. For more on the financial aid provided to the ASG by al-Qa`ida and Muslim "charities," see the section below on its links with transnational Islamist networks.

Chalk, "Militant Islamic Extremism in the Southern Philippines," p. 214; Torres, *Into the Mountain*, p. 68; Yom, "Abu Sayyaf: Criminal Gang or Representative of Philippine Muslims' Quest for Autonomy," p. 8. See especially Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, p. 150; and the hostage Marie Moarbès, *Mon père m'attendait à Manille* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2001), p. 92.

Barreveld, Terrorism in the Philippines, p. 109.

For illustrative cases, see Turner, "Terrorism and Secession in the Southern Philippines," p. 6 (during a June 1994 AFP attack on an ASG stronghold at Patikul in Jolo); and Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, p. 176 (in response to another massive AFP attack on Jolo in 2001). Compare Azurin, *Beyond the Cult of Dissidence*, p. 164, citing PNP Regional Special Action Force commander Roderick Minong. See, e.g., Burnham, *In the Presence of My Enemies*, p. 188. As one ASG fighter revealingly put it (*ibid*, p. 135): "I never wanted to be a soldier. I never wanted to be in jihad. But these guys said they needed me." Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, pp. 112, 163-4.

*Ibid*, p. 125; Chalk, "Militant Islamic Extremism in the Southern Philippines," pp. 202-3; Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia*, p. 112.

Moarbès, *Mon père m'attendait à Manille*, pp. 116, 168, 205; Burnham, *In the Presence of My Enemies*, p. 251. Barreveld notes that the ASG often appeared to be better equipped with modern weapons than the AFP itself. See *Terrorism in the Philippines*, p. 146.

Moarbès, Mon père m'attendait à Manille, pp. 115, 184-5.

Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, pp. 96, 125; Burnham, *In the Presence of My Enemies*, pp. 149-50; Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, p. 214, who report that both Abdul Asmad and a Janjalani aide stated that Southcom military commanders and corrupt soldiers were supplying their group with guns and ammo; and Torres, *Into the Mountain*, pp. 39-40, wherein ex-ASG hit man Sampang provides further details. According to him, the ASG purchased most of its firearms from government soldiers. Troops would unload the paid-for caches of weapons from military vehicles at a preset location along the roadside, and the ASG fighters would then cautiously retrieve them after the soldiers departed.

See, e.g., Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, pp. 96, 165; Moarbès, *Mon père m'attendait à Manille*, pp. 141, 148-9, 153.

The only scholarly attempt to evaluate the ASG's ideology on the basis of its own oral and written literature is that of Samuel K. Tan, "The Juma'a Abu Sayyap: A Brief Assessment of its Origin, Objectives, Ideology and Method of Struggle," at: www.apan-info.net/ndcp/occasional\_papers/HTML/TAN00.htm. Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, pp. 205-6, citing 1) an ASG statement issued after the 1991

bombing of a floating Christian bookstore, and 2) remarks by Janjalani himself.

See *ibid*, p. 206, for Janjalani's criticisms of Muslim states that had deviated from the true Islamic path. For ASG attitudes toward the Taliban, see Gracia Burnham, *In the Presence of My Enemies*, p. 16, who noted that Solaiman, one of the ASG men guarding the Dos Palmas resort captives, rhapsodized about Afghanistan, a place where, he said, Allah was the ruler and the *Qur*'an was the guidebook. As Soleiman put it (cited on pp. 16-17): "Afghanistan will show the world how great the truly Islamic state can be." *Ibid*, p. 153: "Temptation, in their view, was something to be eradicated from the world by rules, not something to resist through personal discipline. That's why they wanted an Islamic state. In such a place, there would be no bad movies, prostitutes, stealing, or cheating, because the rules would be so stringent that people would be afraid to do anything wrong. All the women would be dressed in such a way as to eliminate seduction. Thus, nobody would sin, and society would be perfect."

Cited by Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, p. 206. See further the quotes from an ASG *fatwa* cited by Gunaratna, "Evolution and Tactics of the Abu Sayyaf Group." Among the passages in this *fatwa* are the following revelatory statements: "It is a sin to befriend Christians...Killing will not stop as long as religions other than Islam exist...The conduct of any form of criminal acts such as kidnap-for-ransom, arson, and robbery against Christians is justified in the pursuit of religion...To die in a suicide attack against the enemy is the highest form of self-sacrifice."

As one specialist put it, the ASG began as "a form of extremist reaction against Christian evangelism in Muslim areas." See Eric Gutierrez, "New Faces of Violence in Muslim Mindanao," in *Rebels, Warlords and Ulama*, p. 354. For ASG members' expressions of anti-Christian animosity, see Burnham, *In the Presence of My Enemies*, pp. 112-13, 150, 170; Torres, *Into the Mountain*, pp. 49, 55; and Greg Williams, *13 Days of Terror: Held Hostage by al Qaeda Linked Extremists – A True Story* (Far Hills, NJ: New Horizon, 2003), pp. 181-3.

Burnham, *In the Presence of My Enemies*, p. 170, though it should be emphasized that this may have been a bit of exuberant bravado that did not reflect the views of the group's leaders. Compare also the possibly exaggerated claims of GRP Interior Secretary Rafael Alunan III, cited in Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, p. 242.

Burnham, In the Presence of My Enemies, p. 186.

Cited by Torres, *Into the Mountain*, wherein a detailed account of this particular ASG hostage operation is provided. Compare also Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, p. 143, who quotes slightly different wording by Abu Sabaya.

For these local demands, see *ibid*, pp. 124, 163; Moarbès, *Mon père m'attendait à Manille*, pp. 155-6. On one occasion the ASG even kidnapped a Japanese fisherman and detained him at Indanan. See *ibid*, p. 167. Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, pp. 108-9, 135, 137 (where the ASG is described as a "pure criminal syndicate based on greed"); Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, pp. 205, 210 (citing Bishop Romeo de la Cruz of Basilan); Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia*, pp. 112-13; and Gutierrez, "New Faces of Violence in Muslim Mindanao," p. 353, who argues that the ASG, unlike the MNLF and the MILF, is not a political movement with a serious political agenda, but is instead made up of "specialists in violence" with suspect loyalties.

For this latter point, see Alfredo L. Filler, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Growing Menace to Civil Society," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14:4 (Winter 2002), p. 140. This is not to say, however, that earlier on the group had serious moral qualms about maiming and murdering civilians or that it adhered to the Geneva Convention in its treatment of captives.

For some examples of ASG behavior that blatantly conflicted with Qur`anic injunctions, see Moarbès, *Mon père m'attendait à Manille*, pp. 113, 134,171-4; Burnham, *In the Presence of My Enemies*, pp. 16, 85, 161-2, 181, 191-5, 246-7; Torres, *Into the Mountain*, pp. 65-6; Williams, *13 Days of Terror*, p. 177, 271-3,

282-3; and Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, pp. 144, 162.

As Moarbès put it (in *Mon père m'attendait à Manille*, p. 111): "These kidnappers are really strange. Can you imagine an armed Islamist terrorist offering a Coke to his hostages?"

For illustrative examples of ASG members' Islamic beliefs and practices, however flawed, see Moarbès, *Mon père m'attendait à Manille*, pp. 33-4, 38, 41, 45, 56-7, 60, 129, 162; Burnham, *In the Presence of My Enemies*, pp. 73, 75, 114-15, 152-3, 164, 167, 242, 246, 279; Williams, *13 Days of Terror*, pp. 245-6. For recent examples, see Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California, 2003).

Yom, "Abu Sayyaf: Criminal Group or Representative of Philippine Muslims' Quest for Autonomy," p. 7. According to Filler ("The Abu Sayyaf Group," p. 140), the GRP has mistakenly characterized the ASG as a criminal group rather than that which it really is, i.e., a terrorist group, but this seems to be a considerable

overstatement. In the mid-1990s the group was often portrayed as the local branch of al-Qa`ida's terrorist network, and even today there are probably few Philippine officials who would claim that, however criminal its behavior, it is not a terrorist group.

For a brief reference to the attack, see Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, p. 123. For information about the *M/V Doulos* and its mission, see Brenda Plonis, "OM and Mercy Ships Dock Together," at:

HYPERLINK "http://www.geocities.com/anastasiscom/sierra\_leone.htm" www.geocities.com/

<u>anastasiscom/sierra\_leone.htm</u>. OM refers to Operation Mobilization, a Christian missionary organization which "seeks to help plant and strengthen churches, especially in areas of the world where Christ is least known." In this same article, it is revealed that the ship is owned by Good Books for All, "a non-profit charity organization based in Germany," that it has a crew of 300 volunteers from 40 countries and carries over 6,000 different book titles on a variety of subjects, and that it "has visited more than 473 ports in over 92 countries over the past 25 years." For the ASG's rationale for bombing it, see Tan, "The Juma'a Abu Sayyap," section 1.

See the brief references to these events in Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, p. 123; Filler, "The Abu Sayyaf Group," p. 160. More detailed descriptions can no doubt be found in the issues of various Philippine newspapers from those dates.

A brief description of this attack can be found in Torres, *Into the Mountain*, pp. 1-2; and Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, pp. 134-5. Alay Kapwa is a local Catholic evangelical and humanitarian group.

The most detailed account of the Ipil massacre is provided by Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, pp. 192-204. Two further points should be noted. First, Alam later claimed that the NICC did not authorize this specific raid, even though some of its members may have participated in it. Second, many observers believe that the AFP and PNP were likewise involved in it somehow, either through benign neglect – the AFP base was only 40 miles away from Ipil, and the local police tactical squad was conveniently gone at the time – or as the covert sponsors of a "false flag" operation designed to sabotage the peace plan and/or discredit recalcitrant Moro rebels.

Barreveld, Terrorism in the Philippines, p. 124.

For an account of this hostage seizure, see Williams, 13 Days of Terror, pp. 119-297.

See, e.g., "U.S. Hostage Freed in Philippines," CBS News, 12 April 2001, at: HYPERLINK "http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/04/02/world/printable283170.shtml" www.cbsnews.com/stories/

<u>2001/04/02/world/printable283170.shtml</u>. Interestingly, the Libyan dictator's son Sayf al-Qadhdhafi, whose foundation played a key role in subsidizing the release of other Western hostages held by the ASG, claimed prior to Schilling's release that the American was involved in smuggling arms to the group. Indeed, some still doubt that Schilling was really being held against his will. See "Qadhafi's Son Accuses US Hostage of Selling Arms to Abu Sayyaf," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 23 September 2000. Summaries of these two hostage seizures are provided by Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, pp. 156-209. There are several firsthand accounts of the Sipadan operation by former hostages, including those of Stéphane Loisy, *Otage à Jolo: Journal de captivité, 23 avril-9 septembre 2000* (Paris: Denoël, 2001); Moarbès, *Mon père m'attendait à Manille*; Strydom, *Shooting the Moon*; and Werner Wallert, *Horror im Tropenparadies: Das Tagebuch einer Entführung* (Munich: Goldmann, 2000). The only book-length account of the Dos Palmas operation is that of Burnham, *In the Presence of My Enemies*.

See, e.g., Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, pp. 171-3, who among other examples provides details of a botched 21 May 2001 attempt to seize hostages at the Barcelo Pearl Farm Resort Hotel on Samal Island. Compare Moarbès, *Mon père m'attendait à Manille*, pp. 33, 44, 80, 186-7; and Burnham, *In the Presence of My Enemies*, pp. 13, 155.

Should any readers seriously doubt this, they should immediately reflect on their own past decisions about what school to attend, where to live, what career to pursue, what partner to marry, or even what products to buy.

This is itself a complex issue. For contrasting views on the relationship between religious extremism and the willingness to carry out mass casualty or WMD terrorist attacks, see Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*, pp. 119-22; Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University, 1998), pp. 94-5, 199-205; Jonathan B. Tucker, "Lessons from the Case Studies," in *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, ed. by idem (Cambridge: MIT, 2000), pp. 261-2; David C. Rapoport, "Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse," *National Security Studies Quarterly* 6:3 (Summer 1999), pp. 49-65; and Adam Dolnik, "All God's Poisons: Re-Evaluating the Threat of Religious Terrorism with

Respect to Non-Conventional Weapons," unpublished CNS research report.

Burnham, *In the Presence of My Enemies*, p. 212, where it is claimed that the AFP poisoned Abu Sabaya and his companions by adding a toxin to their fish. This reportedly made them very ill, but did not kill them.

Barreveld, Terrorism in the Philippines, p. 133.

Tucker, "Lessons from the Case Studies," pp. 255-63.

See above, note 161. Compare also the harsh judgement of CNN's Jakarta Bureau Chief Maria Ressa, who notes that the impoverished area in which the ASG operates "is not an ideal source for the sophisticated, educated terrorists needed by al-Qaeda." See *Seeds of Terror*, p. 26.

In this context, it would be very useful to know just what types of explosive devices the ASG used in its various bombings, and whether there was a noticeable increase in the organization's technical efficiency over time. This is information that the Philippine authorities surely possess.

Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia*, p. 110; Ressa, *Seeds of Terror*, pp. 25-6. The latter author cites a 12 February 1995 police interrogation report of Yusuf: "...he saw the problem that the Abu Sayyaf Group's members only know about their 'assault rifles' and nothing more. He called them illiterates." More specifically, Yusuf didn't think that ASG fighters would understand the complexity of his chemical mixtures, and felt that he would have to set certain bombs himself.

Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia*, pp. 91-2. Compare Ressa, *Seeds of Terror*, p. 10. Perhaps not coincidentally, Khalifa married Alice Yabo, the sister of a student at Mindanao State University and MILF activist named Ahmed Hamwi ("Abu Omar"), who he had met at an IIRO conference in 1988. In 1994, Hamwi became the director of the IRIC. Ressa claims (*ibid*, p. 20), apparently on the basis of testimony from one of the Filipina bar girls manipulated by members of Yusuf's cell, that Hamwi was from Turkey rather than the Philippines, which is probably incorrect.

See, e.g., Lucy Komisar, "Funding Terror: Investigating the Role of Saudi Banks," *In These Times*, 20 December 2002; Glenn Simpson, "U.S. Officials Knew of Ties Between Terror, Charities," *Wall Street Journal*, 9 May 2003; Matthew Levitt, "Tackling the Financing of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia," *Policy Watch* [Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy] 609 (11 March 2002), at:

www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/policywatch/policywatch2002/609.htm; and Rita Katz and James Mitre, "Collaborating Financiers of Terror," *National Review*, 16 December 2002.

Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia*, p. 100, citing PNP intelligence reports; Simon Reeve, *The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism* (Boston: Northeastern University, 1999), pp. 136, 156-8, citing both the testimony of Edwin Angeles, who said Yusuf was known as "the Chemist" and that he was identified as Bin Ladin's "emissary," and unnamed Pakistani intelligence sources. Compare Jacquard, *In the Name of Osama bin Laden*, p. 121.

Yossef Bodansky, *Bin Laden: The Man who Declared War on America* (Roseville, CA: Prima, 2001), p. 112; Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia*, p. 94.

For more on Bout, see Peter Landesman, "Arms and the Man," *New York Times Magazine*, 17 August 2003; Matthew Brunwasser, "Victor Anatoliyevich Bout. The Embargo Buster: Fueling Bloody Civil Wars," PBS Frontline, May 2002, at: HYPERLINK "http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/sierraleone/bout.html" <u>www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/sierraleone/bout.html</u>; and Times Staff Writers, "On the Trail of a Man behind Taliban's Air Fleet," *Los Angeles Times*, 19 May 2002. For other examples of al-Qa'ida payments to the ASG, see Ressa, *Seeds of Terror*, pp. 26-7.

Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia*, p. 101. Yusuf's cell consisted of al-Qa'ida operations officer Khalid Shaykh Muhammad ("Salim Ali"), logistics expert and Bin Ladin associate Wali Amin Shah, Yusuf's Pakistani friend Abdul Hakim Murad, MILF man and Khalifa's brother-in-law Hamwi, Saudi financial expert Munir Ibrahim, and three local businessmen, a man named Amin Muhammad, who has been variously identified as either a Pakistani or a Yemeni, and two others of unknown origin, Adel Annon and Mustafa al-Zaynab, and its members also employed several Filipina bar girls who unwittingly performed various minor tasks.

Ibid, pp. 101, 106; Bodansky, Bin Laden, p. 113.

Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia*, pp. 110-12. There are many other examples of the gradual "criminalization" of ideological terrorist groups, such as that of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia).

Ibid, p. 113 (2000); Ressa, Seeds of Terror, pp. 27-8 (post-9/11).

Burnham, *In the Presence of My Enemies*, pp. 90, 92, 128, 179. But see Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, pp. 203-7, who suggests that the ASG escape may have been the product of a series of military

#### blunders.

Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, p. 204; Moarbès, *Mon père m'attendait à Manille*, p. 80. Burnham, *In the Presence of My Enemies*, pp. 199, 222-3.

On infiltrators and provocateurs, see Gary Marx, "Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant: The Agent Provocateur and the Informant," American Journal of Sociology 80:2 (September 1974), pp. 402-42; Nurit Schleifman, Undercover Agents in the Russian Revolutionary Movement: The SR Party, 1902-1914 (Basingstoke: Macmillan/St. Anthony's College, 1988); Jean-Paul Brunet, La police de l'ombre: Indicateurs et provocateurs dans la France contemporaine (Paris: Seuil, 1990); and Frederick A. Hoffman, "Secret Roles and Provocation: Covert Operations in Movements for Social Change" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation: UCLA Sociology Department, 1979). For "false flag" terrorist operations, see Philip Jenkins, "Under Two Flags: Provocation and Deception in European Terrorism," Terrorism 11:4 (1988), pp. 275-87; idem, "Strategy of Tension: The Belgian Terrorist Crisis, 1982-1986," Terrorism 13:4-5 (1990), pp. 299-309; Jeffrey M. Bale, "The May 1973 Terrorist Attack at Milan Police Headquarters: Anarchist 'Propaganda of the Deed' or 'False Flag' Provocation?," Terrorism and Political Violence 8:1 (Spring 1996), pp. 132-66; idem, "The 'Black' Terrorist International: Neo-Fascist Paramilitary Networks and the 'Strategy of Tension' in Italy, 1968-1974" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation: UC Berkeley History Department, 1994). There are many more journalistic than scholarly treatments, e.g., Frédéric Laurent, L'orchestre noir (Paris: Stock, 1977); and Gianni Flamini, Il partito del golpe: Le strategie della tensione e del terrore dal primo centrosinistra organico al sequestro Moro (Ferrara: Bovolenta, 1981-5), four volumes in six parts.

Bale, "The May 1973 Terrorist Attack at Milan Police Headquarters," pp. 134-5 and 156-7, note 5. Other examples are provided in idem, "Black' Terrorist International," passim. A good example of the establishment of phony "enemy" guerrilla or terrorist groups was the formation of Mau-Mau "pseudo-gangs" by the British Army in Kenya. See [Brigadier-General] Frank Kitson, *Gangs and Counter-Gangs* (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960).

Azurin, *Beyond the Cult of Dissidence*, pp. 1-3, citing an article by Raymond Burgos in the *Philippine Daily Inquirer* that summarizes the PNP intelligence report. Rightly or wrongly, many Moro civilians are convinced that certain particularly bloody terrorist attacks were in fact "the work of Philippine army operatives attempting to discredit the Muslim separatist movement." See McKenna, "Murdered or Martyred?," p. 197 (in relation to three grenade explosions in crowded Cotabato movie theaters between 1978 and 1982).

See, among many studies, Eva-Lotta Hedman, "State of Siege: Political Violence and Vigilante Mobilization in the Philippines," in *Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability*, ed. by Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner (New York: St. Martin's, 2000), pp. 125-51; Roland James May and Belinda Aquino, *Vigilantes in the Philippines: From Fanatical Cults to Citizens' Organizations* (Manoa: Center for Philippine Studies, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1992); Erik Guyot, *Alsa Masa:* 

*"Freedom Fighters" or "Death Squads"?* (Hanover, NH: Institute of Current World Affairs, 1988); Amnesty International, *Philippines: Unlawful Killings by Military and Paramilitary Forces* (New York: Amnesty International, 1988); and Enrique Delacruz et al, *Death Squads in the Philippines* (San Francisco: Alliance for Philippine Concerns, 1987).

For an overview of the tactics employed against Moro secessionists by regular AFP forces, which resulted in an estimated 100,000 to 980,000 internal refugees, see Richard J. Kessler, *Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines* (New Haven: Yale University, 1989), p. 144. Compare Ahmad, "War Against the Muslims," pp. 25-6.

For more on the Angeles case, see Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, pp. 214-17; and Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines*, pp. 133-4.

Jacquard, *In the Name of Osama bin Laden*, p.121. Compare also Moarbès, *Mon père m'attendait à Manille*, p. 80, who noted that infiltration seemed to move in both directions between the AFP and the ASG.

See, e.g., Edmundo Santuario III, "Abu Sayyaf: The CIA's Monster Gone Berserk," at: HYPERLINK "http://www.bulatlat.com/archive/016abu\_us.htm" www.bulatlat.com/archive/016abu\_us.htm;

Carlos H. Conde, "Abu Sayyaf's Links to Police, Military Traced," at: HYPERLINK "http:// www.bulatlat.com/archive/061abu\_caloy.htm" www.bulatlat.com/archive/061abu\_caloy.htm; and Nash Maulana, "Abu Sayyaf – CIA's Baby?," in *Mindanaw*, 2 October 2000, at: HYPERLINK "http://

www.mindanaw.com/2000/10/02sayyaf.html" www.mindanaw.com/2000/10/02sayyaf.html. For a

specific recent case involving the 4 March 2003 bombing at the Davao City airport, see Joel Garduce, "Bush, Arroyo Concealing CIA-Abu Sayyaf Link in Davao Bombing?," at: HYPERLINK "http:// www.bulatlat.com/news/3-7/3-7\_ciaabbu.html" <u>www.bulatlat.com/news/3-7/3-7\_ciaabbu.html</u>; and Teddy Casi, "Whodunit?," at: www.yonip.com/main/articles/americanbombing.html. One of the reasons for these suspicions is that a mysterious 65-year old American "treasure hunter" named Michael Terrence Meiring, who apparently had links to American and Philippine intelligence as well as the NPA, MNLF, MILF, and ASG, had accidentally blown his legs off while tinkering with a bomb at the Evergreen Hotel in Davao City on 16 May 2002. Afterwards he was whisked away, first to the hospital and then to a US military base, by Philippine National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel. Critics of US policy suspect that he was in the process of making a bomb that was intended to be used in a terrorist provocation.

Vitug and Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon*, pp. 210-11; Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia*, p. 112. Of course, it was in their own political interest to deny that the ASG was an authentic Muslim terrorist group.

See Franco Ferraresi, *Threats to Democracy: The Radical Right in Italy after the War* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1996); Philip Willan, *Puppetmasters: The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy* (London: Constable, 1991); and the works by Bale cited above in note 183.

Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, p. 114.

McKenna, "Murdered or Martyred?," pp. 192-3, who notes that contemporary Moro notions of martyrdom (*sabil* and *pagsabil*) in Cotabato were "powerfully charged with associations to" earlier Muslim liberation struggles against the Spaniards and Americans.

For the different receptions ASG fighters received from the local population at various locales, which ranged from outright resistance to mass flight to the willing provision of assistance, compare Burnham, *In the Presence of My Enemies*, pp. 95, 111-12, 163, 171, 188, 192; and Moarbès, *Mon père m'attendait à Manille*, pp. 69-70; Torres, *Into the Mountain*, pp. 36, 39 (citing the testimony of ex-ASG fighter Sampang).

"Remarks by the President to the Philippine Congress," full text on White House website, 18 October 2003, at: HYPERLINK "http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/print/20031018-12.html" www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/print/20031018-12.html.

For the MILF's links to JI, al-Qa'ida, and other foreign terrorist organizations, see Ressa, *Seeds of Terror*, pp. 124, 129-40; Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia*, pp. 136-8; and International Crisis Group, *Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia*, pp. 16-23. Ressa believes (*ibid*, p. 10) that the GRP is making the same myopic mistake as its Indonesian counterpart prior to the 12 October 2002 Bali bombing, i.e., "playing political gamesmanship – courting moderate Muslims by ignoring extremists."

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