

LOSING THE “WAR OF IDEAS” IN EUROPE: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

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I. Introduction

In recent years policymakers, pundits, academicians, and intelligence analysts have all become increasingly concerned about how to conduct and eventually win the supposedly “new,” post-9/11 “War of Ideas,” i.e., the struggle for influence, especially within the Islamic world, between the paradigmatic worldviews and core values associated with the United States and the West, on the one hand, and those of its jihadist enemies and their sympathizers, on the other. Almost every knowledgeable observer agrees that such an ideological struggle is an integral component, perhaps even the most important component, of the so-called “Global War on Terrorism,” and most commentators have likewise concurred that the U.S. and its allies are not doing nearly enough to ensure that they will ultimately emerge victorious in this struggle to influence the “hearts and minds” of Muslim communities, whether it be occurring in important Muslim-majority countries or in other nations with substantial Muslim minorities. Indeed, many specialists believe that the West is already going down to defeat in this era’s most vital ideological conflict, both within and outside of the confines of the Islamic world. I am sorry to say that I myself share this highly pessimistic view, including with respect to Muslim communities in Europe. Beyond this general consensus, however, there are considerable differences of opinion about how best to conduct or wage this ideological struggle.

In the essay that follows, I intend to proceed by briefly discussing various aspects of U.S. national strategy as they relate specifically to the “War of Ideas,” then highlight some of the problematic policies and attitudes adopted by European elites towards Muslim communities in both their own countries and, under the auspices of the European Union, throughout much of the continent, and conclude by suggesting some new approaches to defending and promoting our values, both at home and in the Islamic world, which requires touching upon the potential merits or demerits of certain Western ideological themes. Note that this essay constitutes nothing more than a preliminary and indeed somewhat impromptu analysis in response to the specific request of the conference sponsors, and that much more time and effort would have been required in order to carry out additional research or even flesh out certain key arguments. Hence, despite being informed by research on various matters that I have been concerned with for several years – the nature of Islamist and jihadist ideologies, the objectives of jihadist terrorist groups with a global agenda, the often subversive activities of diverse Islamist networks operating in Europe, and the astonishingly short-sighted and self-defeating

measures that have often been adopted by European elites in response to Islamist agitation, the discussion below should be regarded as being more or less “off the top of my head” (albeit augmented with much “cutting and pasting” of bibliographic references). At times I have intentionally adopted a mildly combative tone, since apart from being something of a contrarian I think it is important to squarely confront certain important but contentious issues which may impinge directly on the future conduct of the ideological struggle against global jihadist networks – it may, after all, be useful heuristically to have a mini-war of ideas about how best to wage the “War of Ideas” – but I hope that I will at least manage to provoke thought instead of ire.

II. The “War of Ideas” in U.S. National Strategy

In a September 20, 2001 address to a joint session of Congress, President George W. Bush rightly insisted that the jihadists who sponsored and carried out the 9/11 attacks were “the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century,” and that they were thus comparable to the fascists and other prior totalitarians who were destined to end up “in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies.” One might therefore have been led to assume that a key part of the administration’s strategy for waging the “war on terrorism” would, from the very outset, be focused on countering that new totalitarian ideology. In actual fact, however, there were only scattered, perfunctory references to ideology and the “War of Ideas” in the administration’s February 2003 strategic statement, the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Moreover, the emphasis therein was primarily on winning that war by diminishing the so-called “underlying conditions” that “terrorists seek to exploit” through, e.g., finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, so as to “reverse the spread of extremist ideology.” However helpful promoting a solution to that conflict would be in dampening the general levels of Muslim frustration and hostility, attitudes that Islamist terrorists do in fact systematically seek to exploit in order to radicalize the Muslim majority and obtain new recruits, the standard arguments about the supposedly objective “underlying causes” of terrorism are seriously problematic. In any event, the 2003 strategy statement confined itself to making a few vague references to waging and winning the war of ideas.

Fortunately, by September 2006, that initial failure to pay sufficient attention to ideological matters seemed to have been rectified, when the Bush administration published an updated version of its earlier strategic policy guidelines. In the very first sentence, it proclaimed that “America is at war with a transnational terrorist movement fueled by a radical ideology of hatred, oppression, and murder.” It then characterized the “War on Terror [sic]” as “a different kind of war,” argued that from the outset it had been “both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas,” and concluded that in addition to fighting on the battlefield, the United States must “promote freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists’ perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule.”

In short, this new strategy was based on two premises. First, that the ideology of the jihadist enemy, which “justifies the use of violence against innocents in the name of religion,” must be confronted. This point was emphasized at various junctures throughout the document. Given the assumption that the transnational jihadist movement, although

“not monolithic,” was united by “a common vision, a common set of ideas about the nature of the world, and a common goal of ushering in totalitarian rule,” it followed that it was necessary to fight against both the terrorists and their “murderous ideology,” and that in “the long run, winning the War on Terror [sic] means winning the battle of ideas.” Why? Because [i]deas can transform the embittered and disillusioned either into murderers willing to kill innocents, or into free peoples living harmoniously in a diverse society.” Elsewhere, in one of the most persuasive parts of the document, it was argued that terrorism springs from a combination of “[p]olitical alienation,” “[g]rievances that can be blamed on others,” “[s]ubcultures of conspiracy and misinformation,” and “[a]n ideology that justifies murder,” and that “[d]efeating terrorism in the long run requires that each of these factors be addressed.” All of this seems more or less incontestable, since Qa‘idat al-Jihad’s ideology must in fact be effectively countered, neutralized, and discredited if the U.S. ever hopes to reduce the number of potential future recruits into jihadist organizations.

Second, the document argued that the so-called “freedom agenda” was the “best long-term answer” to al-Qa‘ida’s goals due to “the freedom and dignity that comes when human liberty is protected by effective democratic institutions.” Later, this theme was reprised: “The long-term solution for winning the War on Terror [sic] is the advancement of freedom and dignity through effective democracy,” where “freedom is indivisible,” since “effective democracies” are the “antidote to the ideology of terrorism today.” Indeed, it was argued therein that effective democracy provides the solution to each of the four factors identified above as being crucial in motivating today’s terrorism. In the end, it was asserted that, even though democracies “are not immune to terrorism,” democracy was “the antithesis of terrorist tyranny, which is why the terrorists denounce it and are willing to kill the innocent to stop it.” Alas, as will be discussed below, these claims about the intrinsic value and miraculous curative powers of promoting democracy are far more problematic. It was rightly emphasized, however, that while elections “are the most visible sign of a free society and can play a critical role in advancing effective democracy,” these “alone are not enough.”

Unfortunately, the actual measures taken by the Bush administration to wage this “War of Ideas” have thus far fallen terribly short. In the words of William Rosenau, “the United States has so far failed to conduct anything approaching an effective counterideological campaign against al-Qaida,” and what used to be referred to as “political warfare” is “today not a significant part of the ‘global war on terrorism.’” One problem is that the amount of resources devoted to this ideological struggle has been relatively paltry. As many observers have pointed out, the vast Cold War apparatus that had been created to wage a multifaceted ideological struggle against the Soviet Bloc using a variety of overt and covert techniques was largely dismantled after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and its few remaining components were often carelessly incorporated into other agencies whose agendas were not necessarily compatible with the various approaches to waging such struggles. Despite President Bush’s periodic references to “ideological struggle,” the State Department’s budget for public diplomacy “remains stuck at its pre-9/11 level of \$1 billion per year, a mere 0.3 percent of the U.S. defense budget.” Indeed, in a 2003 State Department Advisory Commission report, former

Ambassador Edward Djerjerian called for “an immediate end to the absurd and dangerous underfunding of public diplomacy in a time of peril.”

However, America’s failure in this context has not been due solely to the relative lack of resources that the government has expended after 9/11. It is also a result of the misguided media strategies initiated by the Bush administration to conduct this vital ideological struggle. Essentially, the general approach adopted so far has been characterized by the launching of blatant public relations campaigns, devised primarily by American advertising agencies, which are designed to improve America’s rapidly deteriorating image abroad, above all in the Islamic world. Apart from the absurd belief that P.R. campaigns can somehow succeed in winning over Muslim “hearts and minds” at a time when American foreign policies are bitterly resented throughout most of the Arab and Islamic worlds, the management and content of these campaigns have both left much to be desired. One example of poor planning was the “Shared Values” media campaign, in which a select group of “happy” Muslim Americans recorded statements for TV commercials that were designed to be broadcast throughout the Islamic world; yet in the end, many major Arab television networks (such as al-Jazira) refused to air them. Moreover, to some observers even the contents of the “Shared Values” campaigns were misguided inasmuch as they were designed primarily to demonstrate American tolerance. As Robert Reilly has emphasized, “[t]he fact that Islam is tolerated here is not a particularly persuasive message to Muslims who think that Islam is true”; furthermore, “a demonstration of tolerance is not a convincing message to those who do not think tolerance is a virtue, but a sign of moral decline.” He is also highly critical of the MTV-style approach to public diplomacy, in which Arab and American pop music are broadcast to the Muslim world on stations such as Radio Sawa and Radio Farda in a manner that, unlike at the Voice of America during the Cold War, has been largely divorced from “news, editorials, and features” that provide information which can serve to illustrate “the character of the American people in such a way that the underlying principles of American life are revealed.” He then bitterly concludes that on these stations the “war of ideas has been demoted to the battle of the bands.”

The general failure of the Bush administration’s efforts to wage a “war of ideas” need not be further detailed. What is important here is that most experts agree that the U.S. is losing this crucial ideological struggle, since our country’s image may have reached its nadir throughout the Muslim world. This is not to say that many individual Muslims are not still attracted to fundamental American values (as they are enunciated in our founding documents like the Declaration of Independence) or to other aspects of free Western societies, but even those who are must be painfully aware of the vast gulf that exists between our professed concerns for freedom and human rights and the more sordid aspects of our actual politics and behavior – arrests and detentions without trial, “renditions,” the abuse and torture of some detainees, the inadvertent causing of “collateral damage” in the course of military operations, etc. – however necessary these actions may sometimes be. When high-minded U.S. rhetoric is so often at variance with our actions, widespread accusations of hypocrisy and imperialism are probably inevitable.

II. Muslims and Islamists in Europe

The current situation with respect to the “war for the minds” of Muslim communities in Europe is particularly worrisome and dangerous. It is one thing for the U.S. and its Western and Muslim allies to lose the “War of Ideas” in relatively distant Muslim-majority countries, which is bad enough, but another thing altogether to fail to successfully integrate and thereby alienate the potential loyalty of significant numbers of second- and third-generation Muslim citizens within Western countries. Whatever the evolving views of the “silent majority” of European Muslims may be, something that cannot always be readily determined on the basis of survey research, there is no doubt that younger generations of Muslims with European citizenship are increasingly disaffected from the societies within which they live. This disaffection in turn offers a vast and diverse array of Islamist networks, including jihadist groups, a golden opportunity to further radicalize and thence mobilize Western-born Muslims in support of their extremist agendas.

There is by now a vast social science and journalistic literature in numerous languages on the historical development and current status of Muslim communities in various European countries. Although much of it, sadly, is biased if not politically *engagé* insofar as it falsely pins the blame for Muslim disaffection exclusively on Western attitudes and behavior, one can make at least one general proposition that virtually everyone can agree upon: European societies have done a very bad job integrating Muslim immigrants, be it socially, culturally, or economically. This should not come as a great surprise, given that most of the Muslim immigrants who flowed into Europe in the decades after World War II were originally encouraged to come there in order to compensate for war-related labor shortages in the host countries and, in the process, perform various semi-skilled and unskilled jobs that many Europeans preferred not to do. Initially, it was intended that these economic émigrés would come to Europe, work there for several years, save money, and then return home to their families and countries of origin. For that very reason, European elites made minimal efforts to assimilate those émigrés into their respective host societies, either socially or culturally. However, at certain junctures, most European governments eventually decided to allow these immigrant workers to bring their families from the homeland to join them, a policy that virtually insured that they would never return home. The predictable consequence of this decision was a dramatic increase in the number of non-European residents, who as usual tended to congregate with their co-nationals and co-religionists in the poorer, less desirable neighborhoods in and around major European cities or in towns within various industrial belts, where they were increasingly ghettoized. The sudden influx of new family members, coupled with the ongoing arrival of new groups of economic immigrants and asylum seekers – mainly South Asians in Britain, North Africans in Spain and France, and Turks in Germany and the Scandinavian countries – inevitably led to intensifying socio-cultural clashes with native Europeans. In short, in Europe as elsewhere, newly-arrived and poorly-assimilated immigrants generally remained socially and culturally segregated, often voluntarily so, from the surrounding host societies.

Had European governments acted decisively to assimilate, or at least to

acculturate and integrate, the growing number of immigrants who had by now become permanent residents (if not always officially citizens), it might still have been possible to alleviate culture shock, ongoing socio-cultural strife, and the mutual resentments that inevitably resulted. Instead, however, during the 1960s and 1970s *bien-pensant* European political elites, apparently feeling increasingly and perhaps even pathologically (as opposed to justifiably) guilty on a collective level about their respective nations' embarrassing histories of colonialism and/or (in the cases of Germany and Italy) fascism, rushed headlong to embrace various well-intentioned but debilitating anti-Western ideological doctrines such as "Third Worldism" and "multiculturalism." In practice, this has led to those elites' systematic exaggeration of the supposed "evils" or "crimes" of the West and the wholesale denigration of certain key Western traditions and values – effectively a form of self-flagellation – coupled with the misplaced romanticization of real or imagined features of non-Western cultures and societies, no matter how regressive their customs and values might in fact be.

In the context of immigrants, Muslim or otherwise, this soon led "self-hating" European elites to ascribe all of the problems associated with immigrant communities – underemployment and unemployment, disproportionately high rates of crime and welfare fraud, cliquishness and xenophobia, high birth rates – to the failures and flaws of the host society, above all to the socio-economic discrimination that in part served to keep Muslims in poverty, which was blamed first on racism and later on "Islamophobia," and to view all members of immigrant groups – as per the dogma of multiculturalism – as mere representatives of their respective communities rather than as individuals with their own independent minds and distinctive personal interests. This in turn led to the ever-increasing distribution of political, social, and economic rewards by European states, be they in the form of financial benefits, privileges in hiring, or acceding to the demands of self-appointed community spokesmen, primarily on the basis of membership in various communities that were officially designated as "oppressed." Originally, individuals from Muslim communities had been identified primarily as members of ethnic minority groups (e.g., as Arabs or Turks) who were victims of racism, but as time has gone on there has been a shift towards viewing them as representatives of the Muslim religious community who are now victims of "Islamophobia." In short, the misguided policies adopted by European governments to accommodate immigrants have often had the detrimental effect of encouraging European Muslims to view themselves as Muslims first and European citizens second, instead of vice versa, which in turn has only increased their pre-existing tendencies towards self-segregation and the perception of themselves as "victims."

Not surprisingly, these self-defeating tendencies were welcomed, exploited instrumentally, and intentionally exacerbated by a host of Islamist organizations that had been established in Europe for awhile but had never ceased viewing "infidel" Western societies as inherently and irredeemably "corrupt," "decadent," "un-Islamic," and "satanic." Among these organizations the most important by far was the Muslim Brotherhood, which began to implant itself in Europe in the 1950s in the wake of Nasir's crackdown on the group in Egypt. Unlike other Islamist groups, the Brotherhood not only set up a variety of "front groups" for students, youths, women, and "educational" and "charitable" purposes, but also eventually managed to create an elaborate financial

network that included banks and other entities. Moreover, from the outset the Brotherhood began devising long-term plans to colonize and eventually achieve hegemony over Muslim civil society inside Europe, and ultimately to Islamize the hated Western host societies, and today the group's unofficial "spiritual leader," Yusuf al-Qaradawi, exerts a powerful influence on the thinking of impressionable and devout Muslims alike. Indeed, despite the deceptive efforts of Tariq Ramadhan (who has often been falsely characterized by Western intellectuals as a "moderate" or even a "liberal," which is only true in relation to others who are far more extreme) to portray the Brotherhood as a moderate reformist organization, it is in fact a very radical organization with an intrinsically anti-Western agenda. Another international Islamist group is Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (the Islamic Liberation Party), which was originally founded in Jordan in the 1950s but is nowadays headquartered in London and has branches throughout Europe. Although this cult-like group claims to be non-violent, its ultimate agenda is even more radical: to re-establish the Caliphate and thence complete the Islamization of the *dar al-harb* (the "Realm of War," i.e., those portions of the world not ruled in accordance with the *shari'a*) through a combination of *da'wa* (missionary work) and armed *jihad*. Two other important groups are the Turkish Islamist organizations Avrupa Milli Görüş Teşkilatları (National Vision Organizations of Europe), an offshoot of the series of Islamist political parties in Turkey headed by Necmettin Erbakan that constituted the forerunners of today's ostensibly more moderate and now ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP: Justice and Development Party), and the recently-banned İslami Cemaatler Birliği (League of Islamic Associations), also known as Hilafet Devleti (Caliphate State), of Cemaleddin and Metin Kaplan. One can also find an extensive array of Mawdudist organizations operating in Europe, primarily in Britain given Mawdudi's particularly strong influence among South Asian Muslims. Over time, the Mawdudists have also adopted an increasingly adversarial attitude towards their "infidel" host societies. Finally, there is an enormous international Islamic fundamentalist organization known as the Tabligh-i Jama'at (Association for the Propagation of the [Islamic] Faith), which has ensconced itself in various European countries and has been successfully encouraging and supervising the "re-Islamization" of many resident Muslims. All of these Sunni movements and organizations effectively function as Islamist (or, in the case of the Tabligh, as an activist fundamentalist) "Trojan horses" operating within Western societies, and have long played a pernicious role in fueling the alienation of Muslims living in the West.

Meanwhile, in the late 1970s and 1980s the growing influence of Islamism in the wider Islamic world also began to make itself felt within Muslim communities in Europe. This was primarily the result of the psychological impact of a series of dramatic political events taking place outside Europe, specifically the successful 1979 Iranian Revolution headed by the Ayatullah Khomeini, the valiant struggle of the Afghan *mujahidin* against the invading Soviet forces throughout the 1980s, and the first Palestinian uprising (*intifada*) against Israeli "occupation," all of which served to inspire many Muslims and cause them to identify with the larger Islamic *umma* and its struggles. Subsequent external developments, such as the first Gulf War in 1990-1, Serbian ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo in the early to mid-1990s, and the Russian invasion of Chechnya,

continued to fan the sense of pan-Islamic solidarity and fuel the frustration and anger of Muslims, including many who lived in the West. At the same time, Muslims who felt more and more alienated from the Western host societies in which they were born or resided increasingly began, typically under the influence of Islamist agitators, to mobilize on a communal basis and protest against what they perceived to be “anti-Islamic” activities or policies in Europe, such as the publication of Salman Rushdie’s satirical book, *The Satanic Verses*, and the measures taken in France to ban the wearing of headscarves in public schools. Indeed, as Anthony McRoy and others have noted, the growing militancy of European Muslims was often initially precipitated by these “offensive” domestic developments, then further augmented by anger over the real or imagined mistreatment of their co-religionists in places like the Balkans, Chechnya, Kashmir, “Eastern Turkestan,” and the Philippines – not the other way around.

It was in the midst of this increasingly tense social, political, and psychological atmosphere that groups of influential Arab radicals, including veterans of the Afghan *jihad* against the Soviets (the so-called “Afghan Arabs”), itinerant imams and shaykhs, and even wanted members of Islamist terrorist organizations, began arriving in Europe in ever larger numbers, above all in Britain, where they settled primarily in the London area. Taking advantage of the extraordinarily liberal and indeed lax British political asylum laws – and a secret “Covenant of Security” brokered with elements of the security services – many of these anti-Western extremists immediately began collecting generous social service benefits from the government even as they busily formed jihadist support networks and aggressively disseminated their militant “jihadist Salafist” ideology to native British and continental European Muslims through various old and new communications media. The influence and cachet of these new arrivals was buttressed by many factors, including their command of Arabic and European languages, their apparently deeper knowledge of Islam, their reputation as brave *mujahidin*, and their personal charisma. In effect, several of these émigrés poured gasoline on the tinderbox of European Muslim disaffection and tried to light the fuse. Unfortunately, given the unwillingness of “multiculturalist” European governments and elites to vigorously defend core Western values, and their persistent and often fawning adoption of conciliatory, apologetic, and even appeasing attitudes in the face of the Islamist threat – a stance that has only served to embolden the Islamists, caused them to view the West as irremediably weak, and encouraged them to make more and more unreasonable and uncompromising demands – these extremists largely succeeded in radicalizing significant numbers of Muslims living in Europe. Even more astonishingly, several European states have even hastened to appoint leaders from Islamist front groups, especially (but not exclusively) those associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, as the official representatives of, and their privileged interlocutors with, the Muslim community, an extraordinarily short-sighted strategy that has left genuine moderates in the lurch and allowed Islamist agitators to frame “Muslim” political issues in such a way as to further their own subversive agendas.

Islamist agitation and propaganda were more easily able to influence alienated second- and third-generation Muslim citizens precisely because they already felt psychologically “betwixt and between” – culturally and physically removed from their parents’ countries of origin, repelled by their parents’ traditionalism and passivity, and yet

often unable (even if they genuinely desired this) to become fully integrated into the European societies in which they resided. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that many of them began to suffer an acute “identity crisis.” It was at this critical juncture that the Islamists and jihadists stepped into the breach and filled the psychological vacuum, first by providing disillusioned, anomic, and often secularized but culturally conflicted European Muslims with a new identity as “born again” members of the worldwide *umma*, and then by inculcating them with a new sense of purpose by convincing them to defend Islam actively at a time when the *dar al-Islam* (Realm of Islam) was allegedly under attack by its “infidel” enemies led by Western powers. This new sense of identity might be largely “virtual,” i.e., created and reinforced anonymously through cyberspace, or more tangible, i.e., strengthened through the forging of social bonds with groups of like-minded co-religionists in nearby mosques, Qur’anic study centers, or soccer fields. These troubling trends and developments were all proceeding apace long before the 9/11 attacks or the launching of the U.S. “war on terrorism,” and even longer before the highly controversial U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, although they have since been greatly intensified by angry reactions to the foreign and military policies adopted by the Bush administration. As per usual, then, those who were more or less profoundly alienated from the social and political status quo once again proved to be much more susceptible to the siren song of ideological radicalism that was being peddled by extremist groups that would normally have been consigned to the political fringes. Hence it is not surprising that surveys of the attitudes of European Muslims have increasingly revealed dangerous levels of hostility to Western values and societies, nor that jihadist cells have formed and carried out terrorist attacks in major European cities, a danger that only seems likely to grow in the near future.

III. “What Is To Be Done” to Win the War of Ideas (in Europe and Elsewhere)?

What, if anything, can America do to win the “War of Ideas” against Islamist extremism? Even this way of formulating the question is problematic. First, it implies that the U.S. itself is primarily responsible for carrying out this difficult, long term task, which seemingly ignores the obvious fact that the real struggle for the “soul of Islam” must be waged and won by anti-Islamist Muslims if the Islamic world is ever to emerge from its torpor, adapt successfully to the “really-existing” modern world, resolve its seemingly intractable political, social, economic, and cultural problems, and once again become an important center of, and contributor to, the world’s civilization, as it had been for centuries during the medieval and early modern periods. Whether we wish to acknowledge it or not, there is in fact a fundamental clash between the Enlightenment values underlying modern Western civilization and the values that are currently animating much of the Islamic world, but the real struggle is – and will remain – between Muslims who want to transform and adapt their societies to the modern world and the Islamists who, despite their willingness to borrow modern organizational techniques, certain revolutionary ideas, and advanced technologies from the West, essentially look to the past and are seeking to restore the imagined pristine purity of the foundational period that they regard as Islam’s “golden age,” the era of Muhammad and his companions and their

immediate successors, the “pious forefathers” (*al-salaf al-salih*) of the faith. Like other political reactionaries and religious fundamentalists, the Islamists’ struggle is an intrinsically futile one that will ultimately fail, and Islamism is one day destined to be consigned to the proverbial “dustbin of history.” In the meantime, unfortunately, the Islamists will seriously impede broader Muslim efforts to cope effectively with a multitude of problems besetting Islamic societies, as well as to adapt successfully to the fast-changing challenges posed by contemporary life. Moreover, Islamism’s violent jihadist wing is likely to be capable of causing serious physical harm and psychological damage to its proclaimed enemies – be they “infidels,” “heretics,” or “apostate” Muslims – for the foreseeable future.

Second, given the astonishingly low current standing of America and its Western allies in the Islamic world, there is little or nothing we can do in the short term to convince the majority of Muslims that we mean them well. All of the U.S.-sponsored public relations, political warfare, propaganda, and influence operations in the world, no matter how well these initiatives may be crafted (which itself presents very severe challenges), cannot begin to compensate for our current pursuit of foreign and military policies that are often foolish, counterproductive, and widely hated (and not only by Muslims, but also by other denizens of the Third World, our old enemies and current rivals in Russia and China, and even the majority of citizens in most European countries with which we have long had close, fraternal relationships). The sad truth is that actions always speak louder than words, at least in the long run. As such, no amount of smooth, slick talk can manage to convince those who are consistently appalled and angered by our actions that we are their friends: only a modification of our misguided policies and periodic reprehensible behavior can do so. By adopting problematic foreign policies that most Muslims hate – invading Islamic territories militarily, uncritically supporting Israel, backing corrupt, authoritarian Muslim regimes – we have drastically weakened the influence of genuinely moderate, pro-Western, secularized intellectuals throughout the Islamic world, to the point where their influence on Muslim public opinion is practically nil. Moreover, we have become so “radioactive” that any individual or group that we publicly support will instantly lose all of their credibility and ability to influence their fellow Muslims.

Third, in the context of our increasingly globalized world, with its plethora of communications links and digital technologies, even the provision of *covert* support to secular, democratic, or moderate individuals and groups within the Islamic world is probably unlikely to work in the long run, or perhaps even in the short run. Why? Because it is virtually certain that such covert support, whatever form it takes, will be revealed at some point, and when it is those who we have sponsored will be instantly discredited. Here one should be mindful of the often harmful impact of revelations, even decades later, about the intelligence community’s covert support for a vast array of organizations during the Cold War (harmful both to the reputation of the USG itself and to that of the people and organizations receiving our support). These operations ranged from perfectly reasonable and indeed laudable schemes such as funding the Congress of Cultural Freedom and other liberal or social democratic anti-communist groups, to arguably necessary but potentially more worrisome ventures like setting up paramilitary

stay/behind networks in Europe (which were all too often staffed with right-wing extremists) to resist a potential Soviet invasion, to politically dubious and morally corrosive actions like the provision of training to Latin American military personnel who then (with or without our knowledge and tacit or active support) organized “death squads” and carried out brutal campaigns of state terrorism in their respective countries. Even today, investigative journalists and academicians are churning out exposés concerning these secret activities, however necessary and justifiable many of them may have seemed to be at the height of the Cold War. Now imagine how much more damaging it would be today if select groups of liberal, morally decent pluralists in the Islamic world that we secretly supported were suddenly exposed and labeled as “stooges” or “lackeys” of the “Great Satan.” Not only would they be forever tarred with the brush of being “collaborators,” but their lives would immediately be placed at risk, since the jihadists and perhaps even other anti-American insurgents might well specifically target them for violence.

Fourth, Americans tend to lack sufficient knowledge of world history, foreign cultures, and foreign languages to be able to understand the intellectual worldviews, moral values, social structures and customs, and behavioral complexities associated with other cultures, especially those that are non-Western. Indeed, if surveys can be trusted, most Americans are abysmally ignorant of the most basic facts of history and geography, even those concerning their own country, and all too many display little or no interest in other regions of the world. Sadly, this astonishing level of ignorance is not confined to those who live and work outside the Beltway, as, e.g., the repeated inability of high-ranking government officials (and even presidential candidates) to distinguish between Sunni and Shi‘i Islam makes painfully clear. Worse still, even those who have received specialized training in academia often appear surprisingly ill-prepared to understand the complex processes taking place in the Islamic world, including the nature of Islamism itself, because they have been indoctrinated with, and effectively blinded by, a variety of faddish intellectual perspectives, trendy but questionable methodological approaches, and partisan political agendas, not to mention imbued with “Islamist-ophilia” and some very peculiar notions about the inherent rationality of people. Among the many signs of the wishful thinking so prevalent among influential members of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), e.g., were the views a) that states in the Middle East are in the process of “withering away” in the face of an increasingly robust Muslim civil society; b) that Islamism is a “democratic” movement and impulse “from below” (rather than a totalitarian and intrinsically anti-democratic extremist ideology comparable to, though radically different in its content from, Marxism-Leninism and fascism); and c) that the threat of “Islamic terrorism” (placed in quotes, no less) has been greatly exaggerated if not intentionally hyped. This toxic combination of widespread public ignorance and the hegemony of fashionable orthodoxies in academia virtually ensures that any “influence operations” we attempt to launch to win over Muslims and turn them against the Islamists and jihadists will be doomed to failure.

In sum, despite its vast resources and the urgent need to counter jihadist and Islamist propaganda, the U.S. is in many ways singularly ill-equipped to wage a successful “War of Ideas” at this particular juncture. The continued failure to recognize

these built-in limitations can only lead to the commission of further mistakes, mistakes which may well end up working to the advantage of the enemy.

Nevertheless, despite my general pessimism, I will offer a few tentative suggestions below that might at least help to point the way forward:

A. Abandon altogether the term “War of Ideas,” a military metaphor that can only have the effect of reinforcing Muslim perceptions that we are waging a war against them, if not against Islam itself, as the jihadists have long insisted. Why provide our enemies with more ammunition for their propaganda? Perhaps something less bellicose should be substituted, e.g., the contest between competing interpretations of reality (although that is obviously too long-winded).

B. Dramatically increase funding for the provision of academic training in vital disciplines in the humanities such as area studies, world history, cultural anthropology, religious studies, political theory (with a focus on extremist ideologies), terrorism, international security, and foreign languages, especially concerning critically important areas of the world about which such specialized knowledge is currently in short supply. Funding has been significantly increased in this area since 9/11, but it is vital that there be careful oversight, not so much in a narrowly fiscal sense but, more importantly, with respect to what the contents of that training are, so that the USG can ensure that those receiving training will really be equipped to understand the world.

C. “Know thy enemy” – Islamism – and do not hesitate to name it. As every great military strategist and commander has recognized, no conflict can be won decisively if the ideological worldviews, motives, agendas, objectives, and behavior of the enemy are consistently misconstrued. This is all the more true in the context of asymmetrical conflicts than it is for conventional warfare between the standing armies of nation-states. Unfortunately, in recent decades a considerable amount of misinformation has arguably been disseminated by “Islamism-ophiles” about the nature of Islamism, so the first desideratum is to further clarify its meaning. The common tendency is to simplistically conflate “Islamic fundamentalism,” “political Islam,” and “Islamism,” and then – even more surprisingly – to go on to claim that many Islamist groups are “moderate” rather than “radical.” If by “moderates” one is simply referring to Islamist groups that do not employ violence, i.e., those that display *relative* moderation in terms of *means*, fair enough (though even that could easily be misleading if the unstated implication is that they are also “moderate” in terms of their ideological agendas and ultimate goals). If, however, the claim is being made that such groups are ideologically “moderate” rather than radical, or even genuinely “democratic,” then egregious blunders have arguably been committed.

In my opinion, the first thing that needs to be done is to draw finer distinctions between the concepts “Islamic fundamentalism,” “political Islam,” and “Islamism” instead of lumping them all together into one undifferentiated category. I have already developed a categorization scheme that endeavors to do just that. First, I think that the term “political Islam” should be applied to all of the diverse ideologies and movements

that seek, in one way or another, to “politicize Islam” and/or “Islamize politics.” Used in this way, the term “political Islam” applies to a very broad spectrum of groups, ranging – left to right – from “Islamic socialism” (not to be confused with Western utopian or Marxian socialism, since it endeavors to reconcile Islam’s traditional emphases on social justice and egalitarianism with modern socialism) of the sort promoted by Iranian thinker ‘Ali Shari‘ati and later adopted by the Sazeman-e Mujhahidin-e Khalq (MEK: Peoples’ Mujahidin Organization), to “Islamic liberalism” (not to be confused with “bourgeois” Western liberalism, since its proponents seek to reconcile Western notions of democracy with traditional Islamic – really pre-Islamic tribal – institutions [like the *majlis al-shura* or consultative council] and customs [such as *ijma‘* or consensus]), to “moderate Islamic reformism” (of the sort advocated by Muhammad ‘Abduh, before the Salafiyya movement was transformed into a puritanical current of Islamism by Muhammad Rashid Rida), to the Islamic right. (If one wanted to create a Christian analogy, the “political Christianity” spectrum would encompass “liberation theology” on the left, liberal “social gospel” activism, moderately conservative mainstream Christian groups that regularly engage in politics, and the Christian right.) Rather than using the term “Islamism” as a synonym for “political Islam,” especially in this broader sense, I use that term to refer solely to the Islamic far right. From that standpoint, it is not “political Islam” in general but rather the Islamic radical right – what I label as “Islamism,” but call it whatever you like – that is our principal enemy nowadays.

What, then, is the relationship between “Islamism” in this narrower sense and “Islamic fundamentalism”? Like all types of fundamentalists, Islamic fundamentalists seek to revive and restore what they consider to be the pristine foundational tenets of their faith, specifically those enshrined in the Qur’an and embodied in the exemplary behavior (*sunna*) of the Prophet and his closest companions – before Islam had supposedly been sullied and corrupted by their unrighteous successors over the course of time. However, fundamentalists can respond in one of two ways to perceived external corruption, “sinfulness,” and “evil,” either as “quietists” whose primary concern is to insulate themselves from the external society so that they can practice a “purer” personal form of their faith, or as “activists” who feel that it is their personal duty and obligation to transform that corrupt external world through various means, ranging from aggressive missionary work to the waging of armed *jihad*. From this point of view, “Islamism” is one of the subcategories of “activist Islamic fundamentalism” (which means that not all activist fundamentalists are Islamists, but that all Islamists are activist fundamentalists).

In short, in my scheme “Islamism” is a term that is applicable only to the diverse currents of the Islamic radical right, whether Sunni (e.g., Salafi, Wahhabi, Deobandi) or Shi‘i (e.g., different doctrinal currents associated with leading clerical scholars and “sources of inspiration”). It can therefore be defined as a radical anti-secular and anti-“infidel” Islamic political ideology with both revolutionary and revivalist features. More specifically, the principal ideological characteristics of Islamism (defined thusly) in all of its diverse and often sectarian forms are an outright rejection of Western secular values, an intransigent resistance to “infidel” political, economic, social, and cultural influence over the Muslim world, a pronounced hostility towards less committed and militant Muslims (who are often denounced as “apostates” or even “unbelievers” [the process of

takfir]), and an insistent demand for the establishment of an Islamic state governed by a rigid, puritanical application of the *shari'a*. Since these particular ideas are inherently radical, one cannot legitimately draw a meaningful distinction between “moderate” and “radical” Islamists, at least not in terms of their ultimate objectives.

Of course, further distinctions do have to be drawn between Islamists based on the methods that they choose to pursue in order to come to power. Some employ what can be referred to as the “gradual Islamization from below” strategy, which involves slowly colonizing and Islamizing civil society by establishing a host of interventionist front groups and “making a long march through the institutions” by infiltrating the state apparatus (a strategy that the Muslim Brotherhood refined and resorted primarily to), others on what can be characterized as the “violent Islamization from above” strategy, which involves seizing state power via an armed putsch and thence forcibly establishing an authoritarian Islamic state (which is favored, almost by definition, by jihadist groups), and still others alternate between both strategies (e.g., certain Islamist groups with distinct “political” and “military” wings, like HAMAS and Hizballah), which are therefore not mutually exclusive. In all cases, however, the Islamist objective is to establish an Islamic state (*al-dawla al-islamiyya*) or an Islamic order (*al-nizam al-islami*) governed in accordance with a strict, puritanical interpretation of the *shari'a*, a goal that is certainly not “moderate” regardless of the means employed to achieve it. Finally, one must distinguish between jihadist groups with a local or national focus, i.e., those that are fighting the “near enemy” (*al-'adu al-qarib*), whether they be “infidels” ruling Muslim-majority territories or “apostate” Muslim regimes in their own countries, and those with a global agenda that are determined to attack the West, such as Qa'idat al-Jihad and its affiliates.

It follows from this that Islamists – as defined above – cannot be genuinely democratic in terms of their underlying values, first because they view democracy as a “satanic” political system devised by Western “unbelievers” that is not in accordance with what they regard as authentic Islamic theological and legal precepts, and second because they are monists rather than pluralists inasmuch as they believe that there is only one, proper, divinely-inspired and divinely-sanctioned way of organizing human relations. Since “truth” and “falsehood” cannot be allowed to co-exist on this earth (as Sayyid Qutub often emphasized), and all Muslims are responsible for “enjoining the good and forbidding evil,” individuals must not be granted too much personal freedom lest they be tempted to “abuse” that freedom by consciously choosing not to conform to Allah’s will. This intrinsic theological and philosophical opposition to democracy does not mean, of course, that various Islamist groups have not cynically exploited democratic processes and procedures, such as participating in elections and forming temporary coalitions with other parties, simply in order to facilitate their accession to power, just as other monists and totalitarians like the communists and fascists had periodically done in past eras. However, it would be a terrible mistake to confuse the Islamist manipulation and exploitation of democratic procedures and institutions with an authentic Islamist commitment to democratic values, as many observers in the West have inexplicably done. As other specialists have rightly noted, Islamism (narrowly defined) is in fact a totalitarian ideology. Indeed, it can be justly described as the third major totalitarian

ideological movement that arose in the course of the immensely destructive twentieth century, along with the Marxist-Leninist form of communism and fascism.

The second thing that we must do is clearly understand the real objectives of the aforementioned global jihadists, who nowadays represent the biggest terrorist threat to the American and European homelands. Unfortunately, many analysts have consistently mischaracterized those objectives by arguing that groups like al-Qa‘ida are basically rational, pragmatic actors who are limited in their goals and “defensive” in their orientation. As I have documented at length elsewhere in a forthcoming book chapter, nothing could be further from the truth. In reality, global jihadist groups such as Qa‘idat al-Jihad – like Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutub, ‘Abdullah al-‘Azzam, and other influential Islamist ideologues before them – promote a utopian, expansionist, imperialistic, and frankly delusional agenda that is aimed at uniting all of the world’s Muslims into a single *umma*, re-establishing the Caliphate, and continuing to wage “offensive *jihad*” until the entire *dar al-harb* has been won for their own extremist brand of Islam. The ideological fanaticism, maximalist long-term goals, and apocalyptic undercurrents within this milieu seem to me to be perfectly self-evident. In particular, it must be recognized that there is virtually no possibility of appeasing, negotiating with, or compromising with groups that are fully committed to the global jihadist agenda, since the only thing that could ultimately satisfy them would be our abject submission to their stringent version of Islam. Those who fail to recognize this basic reality are reminiscent, at least to me, of those observers in the 1930s who insisted, despite massive evidence to the contrary, that Hitler had pragmatic goals which could actually be satisfied rather than an irrational hatred of real and imagined enemies, a passionate desire to exact revenge against them, and an outright will to exterminate them. It was precisely their failure to take Nazi ideological fanaticism seriously that led to so many misplaced efforts to appease the German chancellor. The same, alas, is true today inasmuch as many pundits and academicians persistently downplay or ignore the intrinsic ideological fanaticism of al-Qa‘ida and other global jihadist groups. We cannot afford to continue to delude ourselves about the nature and objectives of our Islamist and jihadist enemies if we hope to counter their pernicious absolutist and Manichean ideologies.

D. Re-orient or alter certain key aspects of current U.S. foreign policy. Since actions do speak louder than words, as noted above, we must change certain long-standing or recent policies in relation to the Islamic world if we ever hope to win the “War of Ideas” against the Islamists. Among other things, we should seriously try to broker a workable political settlement between the Palestinians and the Israelis (though this has become much harder now that the Islamist hardliners in HAMAS have displaced the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and even in some areas of the West Bank), move at long last to normalize relations with Iran (which would likely be the best way to get rid of the volatile millenarian Ahmadinezhad and weaken or outmaneuver his hardline supporters within the Pasdaran, military, and Basij, especially given that most Iranians and even leading elements within the clerical and political establishments would welcome some sort of normalization), improve relations and intelligence-sharing with Asad and the Ba‘thists in Syria (who are, superficial appearances notwithstanding) natural potential allies against

jihadist groups, at least those operating outside of Palestine and Lebanon), and, if at all possible, avoid invading and *occupying* Islamic countries, which not only serves to confirm global jihadist propaganda to the effect that we are waging a “war against Islam” and trying to “steal” Muslim resources, but also provides jihadist groups with a golden opportunity to bog us down and “bleed” us in costly and often frustrating counterinsurgency campaigns that are unlikely to be supported over the long haul by the American public. This does not mean that we should never forcibly overthrow or otherwise bring down governments that offer tangible support of various kinds to the global *jihad*, such as the Taliban, but it does mean that we should not remain there indefinitely by, e.g., occupying and trying to govern those countries (with or without proxies), which will both agitate Muslims elsewhere and constitute a major drain on our treasury. At most, we should remain engaged in such places by forging alliances with indigenous leaders who can provide a measure of stability, and station some special operations and rapid reaction forces in-country to hunt down jihadists and respond to military emergencies. This will help allay Muslim fears that we are trying to dominate and exploit Islamic countries in an arrogant, “imperialist” fashion.

At the same time, we should try to “de-frost” relations with Russia by abandoning further plans to expand NATO, not meddling in its traditional spheres of influence by supporting “colored” revolutions, no longer providing covert support to Chechen jihadist leaders or offering them sanctuary in the West (which offers us no tangible benefits but seemingly confirms the paranoid conspiracy theories of Russian hardliners regarding America’s sinister intentions), and not deploying anti-ballistic missile systems in eastern Europe. In this way, we may be able to lay the groundwork for the forging of a new and more effective anti-jihadist and anti-terrorist alliance in Eurasia. Efforts should also be made to strengthen collaborative security relations with China and India, both of which have their own jihadist threats to cope with. The purpose of these latter measures is obviously not to win Muslim “hearts and minds,” but rather to strengthen anti-terrorist coalitions and facilitate the launching of effective intelligence, paramilitary, and military operations against the vital nodes of jihadist networks. The struggle against jihadist terrorist groups must receive priority for the foreseeable future, especially in relation to the promotion of certain counterproductive Cold War-inspired schemes to encircle and weaken Russia, since one major way to undermine the credibility and lessen the attraction of jihadist groups would be to administer repeated defeats to them in different conflict zones.

E. Abandon simplistic democracy-promotion policies as a cure-all for seemingly intractable Muslim problems, including Islamist militancy and jihadist terrorism. Even if it is true that democratic states are less likely to make war on each other, which is itself a contestable claim, the proposition that Islamist terrorism is mainly the product of a lack of democracy in the Islamic world is arguably nonsensical, since it appears to be based on two spurious propositions: that the majority of Muslims are breathlessly awaiting the introduction of Western-style democracy and that jihadist terrorism mainly occurs because authoritarian, undemocratic Muslim states have prevented “democratic” Islamists from achieving their political goals through legal, non-violent means (or,

alternatively, because of other so-called “root causes”) – as if jihadists were really advocates of democracy and did not believe that it was necessary to wage eternal *jihad fi sabil Allah* until “unbelief” (*kufir*) is extirpated from the earth or at least totally subordinated to Islam! (Parenthetically, Islamist opposition to the authoritarian regimes in places like Egypt and Algeria is not due to the fact that those regimes are “authoritarian” and “undemocratic” – so are the Islamists – but rather because those states are considered to be “apostate” or “un-Islamic” and also because they have no qualms about using harsh repressive measures against Islamist groups. The Islamists’ professed but phony concerns about “authoritarianism” are comparable to, say, the American radical right’s hypocritical [but nonetheless justifiable] defense of “free speech” whenever the government takes measures to suppress *their* speech, even though these same right-wingers would have no hesitation about restricting the free speech of others if they ever attained positions of power.) In reality, the phenomenon of jihadist terrorism is primarily attributable to Islamist ideological extremism, as it has been reflected repeatedly in the intransigent, uncompromising views of al-‘Azzam, Usama b. Ladin, al-Zawahiri, al-Zarqawi (prior to his death), and many other jihadist ideologues. It is, however, true that really-existing political, social, economic, and cultural problems fuel alienation that can then be exploited by Islamist extremists to recruit new *mujahidin* and mobilize a larger base of popular support, and in that sense there is an indirect relationship between such problems and the potential growth of extremism.

Be that as it may, the approach that the Bush administration has thus far taken with respect to “spreading democracy” has been seriously misguided, since it is based on the erroneous view that the simple introduction of democratic processes and procedures, such as elections, will somehow magically yield positive results. In fact, it is first necessary to inculcate genuine democratic values like a commitment to pluralism, personal freedom, equal rights, and freedom of speech and assembly, a much more difficult process that might well take a generation or two to achieve, before sponsoring or organizing democratic elections, or the likely result will be the election of anti-democratic Islamist movements (as has already happened in Iraq and Palestine, would have happened in Algeria with the Front Islamique du Salut [FIS: Islamic Salvation Front] if the military-backed regime had not canceled elections, and would happen in Egypt today if the Muslim Brotherhood were allowed to participate in completely free elections).

F. Vigorously defend core Western Enlightenment values – the application of reason, freedom of thought, choice, expression, and assembly, the toleration of differing opinions and dissent, personal freedom, the inherent and equal rights of citizens, the separation of the public and private spheres – irrespective of whether Islamists, or even Muslims in general, support those values. These are, after all, the very things that distinguish the West from most of the non-Western world. Just as the West was willing to promote its fundamental principles and values in the face of the communist and fascist threats, so too must it continue to do so in order to confront the Islamist threat. We must not be ashamed of or apologetic about these values and principles, which have served in the past to inspire millions around the world who were subjected to brutal autocracy and

totalitarianism, nor should we be willing to sacrifice them in the interests of political expediency. This is true everywhere, but above all within the confines of Western countries, especially when those values are explicitly challenged and contemptuously repudiated by resident Islamists. In Europe, North America, and Australia and New Zealand, we must draw a firm line in the sand and make it absolutely clear to Islamist agitators and their sympathizers that we will no longer tolerate their systematic efforts to simultaneously abridge and exploit our freedoms in support of their reprehensible anti-Western and anti-democratic agendas. It should be recalled that there is a difference between the “loyal” and “disloyal” opposition (which would apply to foreign Islamists residing in Europe, who could immediately be deported), and between legitimate dissent and outright treason (which would apply to European citizens that act as jihadist recruiters, trainers, and facilitators, who could be tried and imprisoned if there is tangible evidence of their support for terrorism). At a certain point, after all, democracies must rise up to defend themselves against internal anti-democratic threats if they are to preserve democracy itself – pluralism and tolerance should never be construed as a *carte blanche* that permits extremists to threaten the very survival of democracy. Therefore, Muslims residing in the West must accept or at least adapt to the basic pluralist values regnant in their host societies by obeying the law. It is one thing for Muslims to lobby for the introduction of *halal* food and the building of mosques and Islamic cemeteries, which are normally reasonable requests, but another matter altogether for Islamists to demand that Western societies should tolerate the “honor killings” of women, forced clitorectomies, and the introduction of *shari‘a* law within segregated Muslim communities in Europe, disturbing practices which explicitly violate Western laws and customs and should therefore not be tolerated.

In promoting Western values to Muslims, however, two sorts of thematic approaches should be avoided. The first is the association of the West with the Judeo-Christian tradition instead of the Enlightenment tradition, as many conservatives are wont to do, because this can easily be misconstrued by Muslims – and may in fact have been originally promoted for that very reason by Western religious reactionaries – as a kind of religious war or “crusade” against Islam, thereby inadvertently reinforcing and providing new ammunition for Islamist propaganda. Second, although the promotion of the Western rights enumerated above clearly encompasses such matters, as a tactical matter the U.S. should avoid focusing primarily on, say, “women’s liberation” or “gay liberation” when making its case to Muslims outside Europe, since these are particularly “hot button” issues that are likely, if advocated in their most aggressive forms, to generate widespread hostility to the West. I am not suggesting for an instant that we should diminish or renege upon our support for these and other important rights if pressed, but only that we do not specifically highlight them or make them the centerpieces of our “public diplomacy” campaigns. Within the borders of Western countries, on the other hand, Muslims must learn to live with the rights that have been extended to women and homosexuals, whether or not they find them objectionable.

Sadly, one major obstacle to the vigorous promotion and defense of Enlightenment values is that broad segments of the Western intelligentsia – ranging from left-wing postmodernists and critical theorists, who have intentionally abandoned and

even consciously subverted them, to traditional elements of the right who have always opposed them – have either worked to undermine those values and/or no longer have faith in them themselves. This is a great tragedy, all the more so since the loss of faith in fundamental principles by societal elites has so often been a leading precipitant or cause of the decline of civilizations. The West's cultural vitality and global hegemony may soon be things of the past if its most influential opinion-shapers are so often unwilling to promote and defend its essential principles and values in the face of external challenges and threats. The Islamists firmly believe that the West no longer has what it takes, in terms of faith in itself and cultural stamina, to resist them, and they are moving "in for the kill" like sharks who smell blood. Let's do everything we can to prove them wrong.

G. Exploit the internal fault lines within Islamist and jihadist groups in order to weaken, isolate, and ultimately destroy them. As with all extremist milieus, the Islamist and jihadist milieus are rent by internal factionalism and conflicts, sometimes violently so, due to disputes between leading personalities, disagreements over ideology, strategy, and operational matters, and resentments stemming from national or ethnic infighting. Such internal divisions and disputes have often precipitated a kaleidoscopic process of organizational fission and fusion within extremist milieus, a process that can be further exacerbated or if necessary inhibited to our advantage – provided that we are sufficiently familiar with those internal dynamics and have established viable covert mechanisms to manipulate key components of these milieus. As it happens, a great deal of information has already become available about the internal divisions and struggles inside Qa'idat al-Jihad and other jihadist and Islamist groups, both from captured documents and from disgruntled former members and infiltrators, and it would be a terrible mistake not to try and systematically exploit that information for our own purposes.

One approach to exploiting those divisions has been outlined by J. Michael Waller in his book, *Fighting the War of Ideas Like a Real War*. He advocates an aggressive "message strategy," the centerpiece of which he refers to as "peeling the onion," i.e., the layers surrounding the jihadist hard core of intransigent fanatics (who must in the end be crushed militarily), by progressively splitting away their supporters from the least committed on the outermost layers to the increasingly dedicated inner layers surrounding that hard core. As he puts it,

We are attempting, as we peel away layers, to win anti-democratic and very hostile elements away from the hard core. We are not trying to persuade them of the virtues of democracy, the liberation of women, or alternate lifestyles. We are not necessarily trying to make them our friends. We don't expect expressions of gratitude. We are simply appealing to their own interests as the enemy of their enemy....Once we establish the enemy-of-your-enemy relationship, we will succeed in reducing hostility against us and allow us to form some sort of temporary alliance or working relationship. That uncomfortable alliance of convenience, for the short-term, will be sufficient to help us isolate and subdue the most

intransigent.

Elsewhere, he identifies seven such layers: 1) the hardcore fanatics who make up the upper leadership of jihadist groups, 2) the lower-level leaders and combatants, 3) the “hard” or most active components of the operational support network, 4) the looser and less active operational supporters, 5) more reluctant or timid supporters, 6) the ambivalent or passive supporters, and 7) everybody else, the majority of Muslims. However, he characterizes the “peeling” phase as “[a]ttack sequence 2” of his message strategy. Before this splitting process can be undertaken, though, Waller argues that one must initiate “[a]ttack sequence 1,” which is designed to “[b]reak the cohesion and spirit of the extremists” by “creat[ing] and deliver[ing] messages that undermine the image of the enemy leadership in each layer or ring of the metaphoric onion.” How can this be done?

According to Waller, the messages disseminated “should create, reopen or exacerbate internal differences, cause the leadership to overreact, quarrel, or otherwise lose control; and encourage desertions, defections, denunciations and fratricide within the enemy camp.” This means that “every possible case of infighting, denunciation or desertion needs publicity...[since] every overt defector [offers] an opportunity to expose the enemy’s inner nature, as well as a means to damage extremist morale and encourage further splits, desertions and defections.” Moreover, “[e]very attempt by other extremists to distance themselves from the main target likewise requires magnification and publicity to show how...isolated the terrorist core has become.” In short, “[i]ntra-extremist rivalries must be exploited for their political and psychological value.” In other chapters, he provides advice for American “message-makers” about what the contents of their messages should include: ridiculing the totalitarian enemy by exposing his incompetence and excesses, challenging (instead of inadvertently adopting via “semantic infiltration”) the enemy’s terminological distortions and replacing them with alternatives that serve our cause, and “branding” the enemy as “un-Islamic” or “evil,” perhaps by using Arabic terms like *hiraba* (fighting or war-making in lieu of the “just” cause supposedly animating *jihad*) and *mufsidun* (“spoilers,” i.e., those who make unauthorized attacks and thereby tarnish the image of Islam) instead of *mujahidin* (which has positive connotations). Finally, “[a]ttack sequence 3” involves reinforcing the “enemy of their [the jihadists’] enemy.”

In theory, this sounds like a fairly reasonable, if rudimentary and overly schematic, “message strategy” for conducting the “War of Ideas,” even though the specific details would eventually have to be designed very carefully by knowledgeable experts in order to make it work. More importantly, even if one concurs in principle that the U.S. should employ such an “enemy of my enemy” strategy, as I do within limits, does this mean that we should support all of the enemies of the jihadists, no matter how repugnant or dangerous they may be? On this important matter, there are considerable differences of opinion. Benard, e.g., argues that we should support the “modernists” first, the “secularists” on a case-by-case basis, and the “traditionalists” (especially the reformist ones) as potential allies against the “fundamentalists” [i.e., the Islamists], but that we should “energetically” oppose the latter, whether or not they are violent. I

essentially agree with her position. The key point, as I have suggested above, is that we must do everything in our power to isolate, weaken, and marginalize the Islamists, above all in Europe and North America, since – violent or not – they are intrinsically anti-Western: anti-secular, anti-Enlightenment, anti-liberal, anti-pluralist, opposed to personal freedom, prudish, humorless, intolerant, and anti-democratic, not to mention anti-Christian and anti-Jewish. Unfortunately, perhaps the majority of academicians, for seemingly ideological reasons, and various former members of the intelligence community (such as Graham Fuller and Reuel Marc Gerecht), primarily in the interests of *Realpolitik*, have instead argued, along with Antony Sullivan, that we should forge alliances with “moderate Islamists” (an oxymoron if one accepts my narrower definition). Sullivan apparently believes, if Waller’s summary can be trusted, that these so-called “moderates” are “committed to democratic governance and share cultural concerns held by mainstream American conservatives [!!!].” (From my point of view, this is hardly a ringing endorsement, since even if the Islamists did actually share the concerns of socially and culturally conservative Americans, that would still mean that they presented a threat to certain fundamental Western freedoms and Enlightenment values.)

In any case, given the complicated but often counterproductive prior history of Western support for both Islamists and jihadists, in terms of negative “blowback,” all arguments in favor of allying with non-violent Islamists against the global jihadists must be viewed with considerable skepticism. At the very least, such arguments would need to be very carefully assessed in relation to specific contexts. There may well be certain times, when democratic states are faced with acute security-related emergencies or perhaps even existential threats, that they may find it necessary to forge alliances with totalitarian regimes or movements, at least temporarily. After all, Britain and America openly allied with the Soviet Union in World War II against the greater immediate threat posed by the Axis powers, and then secretly recruited ex-fascists and ex-Nazis with specialized skills to wage covert intelligence and paramilitary operations against the Soviets during the Cold War (as the Russians did against us). Yet many other sordid ventures of this kind have not surprisingly created serious problems, and some have led to disaster. In retrospect, e.g., it may have been far better for the U.S. to have supported modernizing secular Arab nationalist regimes in the Middle East, such as those of Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir in Egypt and the Ba’thists in Syria and Iraq, rather than making covert alliances with “anti-communist” Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood in support of the periodic efforts made to undermine or overthrow them. These alliances with the Brotherhood can be viewed, like the provision of support to the Afghan *mujahidin* against the Soviets in the 1980s (a seemingly successful covert operation that ended up having catastrophic long-term consequences inasmuch as it inadvertently galvanized and emboldened anti-Western jihadist groups), as the unfortunate byproducts of the bipolar power struggle that marked the Cold War era. Similarly, factions within British intelligence apparently provided covert support to jihadist groups in Libya in an effort to kill or oust Mu‘ammar al-Qadhafi, the Israelis supported HAMAS early on in an attempt to weaken the PLO, and the Turkish military’s Special Warfare Department at first covertly aided a fanatical Kurdish-Turkish Sunni Islamist group known as Turkish Hizbullah so as to divide Kurdish loyalties and weaken the PKK. All of these secret

operations either failed or had very negative consequences in the long term. Hence the expected short-term benefits of these “enemy of my enemy” alliances must always be weighed against the possible long-term ramifications and costs.

In theory, e.g., the idea of secretly allying with non-violent Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood against jihadist networks in Europe might appear to make superficial sense. After all, both Western governments and the Brotherhood are strongly opposed to “jihadist Salafist” terrorism carried out against the “far enemy.” But the two protagonists are opposed to the jihadists for very different reasons. The Brotherhood is certainly not opposed to acts of jihadist terrorism for moral reasons (at least not if they are perceived to be acts of “defensive” *jihad*) or because its cadre have any genuine sympathy for the West, but rather only because such attacks may end up targeting them or otherwise interfering with their ability to carry out their long-term plans to gradually and stealthily Islamize the West. Every time the jihadists carry out an attack within Europe, it serves to reawaken the European populace to the dangers posed by Islamism, and thus brings the Brotherhood under closer scrutiny as well. In other words, in the wake of such traumatic incidents, both official and journalistic spotlights are, at least temporarily, focused on the activities of a multitude of Islamist groups, including the ostensibly non-violent ones, and this renewed attention often makes it more difficult for them to operate undisturbed and secretly pursue their agendas. Hence non-violent Islamists may at times be willing, for purely instrumental reasons, to work with the authorities in Western countries. Despite this, I am convinced that the gradualist but nonetheless corrosive cultural, social, and political activities of the Brotherhood and the Mawdudists, and perhaps also those of the fundamentalist Tablighis, represent a far greater danger to Europe in the long run than the jihadists do (unless, say, the latter are able to acquire nuclear devices and detonate them in European cities). For this reason, Western government agencies should not collaborate, either overtly or covertly, with non-violent Islamists in Europe (or, for that matter, anywhere else) except in the most unusual or dangerous circumstances, and they should never make the mistake of viewing such groups as their trusted allies or as genuine “friends” of the West.

H. Finally, with respect to means, employ very careful and sound techniques of tradecraft when providing covert moral and tangible support to anti-Islamist Muslims so as not to compromise their reputations or endanger them personally. In practice, this will require the use of elaborate and at times convoluted chains of intermediaries or cut-outs between the officials from USG agencies and Muslims they are secretly assisting. This is such an obvious point that it scarcely needs to be emphasized.

There is nothing really “new” about the conflict between Islamist and Western worldviews, since that conflict explicitly arose in the second quarter of the twentieth century, when the first bona fide Islamist movements – the Jami’yyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Society of the Muslim Brothers, or Muslim Brotherhood) and the Jama’at-i Islami (Islamic Association) – were inspired and organized, respectively, by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt and Sayyid Abu al-A’la Mawdudi in South Asia. As will become clearer below, one of the primary characteristics of all forms of Islamism is a virulent rejection of the secularized values associated with the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment tradition, values that were enthusiastically embraced by America’s “founding fathers” and have since become identified as the key features of Western “modernity.” What is relatively recent is that certain adherents of Islamist ideologies, specifically “jihadist Salafists” who have opted to target the “far enemy” (*al-‘adu al-ba‘id*), are now carrying out terrorist attacks

against Westerners in their own homelands.

Note that the “war on terrorism” is a singularly inappropriate phrase, given that terrorism is nothing more than a violent technique of psychological manipulation that can be – and historically has been – employed by a very diverse array of perpetrators. I have used the following definition of terrorism in my classes for the past twenty years: “the use or threatened use of violence, directed against targets selected for their symbolic or representative value, in order to instill anxiety in, transmit one or more messages to, and thereby manipulate the perceptions and behavior of wider target audiences.” Note that, unlike normal acts of violence that involve only two parties, the perpetrator(s) and the victim(s), terrorism invariably involves three parties, the perpetrator(s), the victim(s), and the wider target audience(s) that the perpetrators specifically hope to influence. For the best general introduction to terrorism, including the contentious definitional and theoretical issues surrounding the phenomenon, see Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2005 [1988]), an exceptionally valuable older work that desperately warrants updating. In any case, one can neither wage a war against a technique (or tactic) nor against every non-state actor and state that may be employing it at a given point in time.

Alas, the phrase “war on terror” is even more absurd, since the term “terror” refers to a psychological state marked by fear and anxiety, and it should be obvious that one cannot wage a war against a psychological state (any more than one can wage a war against an inanimate object, e.g., drugs). Thus the terms “terror” and “terrorism” should never be conflated or used as synonyms, as they all too often are these days – e.g., there is no such thing as a “terror network” or a “terror attack,” only a “terrorist network” and a “terrorist attack.” Needless to say, achieving a modicum of definitional and conceptual clarity is essential if one hopes to prevail in any contest of ideas.

Cited in the White House’s *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, February 2003, p. 5, available at HYPERLINK "[https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/](https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf)

Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf" https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf .

Ibid, pp. 23-4.

They are problematic for a number of reasons. First, as noted above, terrorism is simply a tactic, and like all tactics its adoption is generally based upon its perceived usefulness and effectiveness. There are no “root causes” of terrorism, any more than there are “root causes” of the adoption of *blitzkrieg* tactics or flanking maneuvers. Second, there is not even a one-to-one correlation, much less a verifiable causal nexus, between *objective conditions* of immiseration, poverty, and oppression, and the incidence of insurgent violence – what is important in these cases is *subjective perceptions of existing conditions*, accurate or inaccurate, not objective realities. If anyone is interested, I can provide them with a short 5-page essay that I prepared last year, in response to questions from the IC, on radicalization processes.

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, p. 1, available at HYPERLINK "<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf>" <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf> .

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid, pp. 5, 7.

Ibid, p. 7. The second part of that sentence is arguably rather utopian.

Ibid, pp. 9-10. In that same section, it was also emphasized – quite justifiably – that jihadist terrorism is “not the inevitable by-product of poverty” or the simple result of hostility to U.S. policies in Iraq and in relation to the Palestinians, or mere reactions to the “war on terrorism.” At the same time, real socio-economic problems, opposition to American foreign policies, and concern about U.S. anti-terrorism actions are matters that affect the attitudes and behavior of Muslims in general and can be successfully exploited by jihadist groups, and thus need to be paid close attention to, if not reconsidered and actually altered, in any serious efforts to win the struggle for Muslim “hearts and minds.”

Ibid, p. 1.

Ibid, p. 9.

Ibid, p. 10.

Ibid, p. 9.

William Rosenau, “Waging the ‘War of Ideas,’” in David G. Kamien, ed., *The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), pp. 1132-3.

Ibid, pp. 1137-8 (quote from p. 1138). Cf. Robert B. Reilly, "Winning the War of Ideas," *Claremont Review of Books* 7:3 (Summer 2007), available at HYPERLINK "http://www.claremont.org/publications/crb/id.1387/article_detail.asp" www.claremont.org/publications/crb/id.1387/article_detail.asp . Reilly claims that the amount of money spent by the U.S. on public diplomacy annually is "roughly *half* of what Saudi Arabia has spent for *the past two decades* to spread Wahhabism throughout the Muslim world and here." (Italics in original)

Cited in Michael Pan, "Forfeiting the War of Ideas," Center for American Progress website, February 10, 2004, available at HYPERLINK "<http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/02/b29046.html>" <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/02/b29046.html> .

Cf. J. Michael Waller, *Waging the War of Ideas Like A Real War: Messages to Defeat the Terrorists* (Washington, DC: Institute for World Politics, 2007), pp 111-12: "People seething with anger, resentment, disillusionment, humiliation, fear and other negative motivators are not normally receptive to warm messages from a power they view as an adversary, an enemy, or simply hypocritical or unjust."

Reilly, "Winning the War of Ideas." He continues as follows: "If there is to be a war, let it be of one claim to truth against another – not of a seeming indifference to truth on our side against an absolute claim to it on the other. For if we take the side of relativism, we will lose." Although I do not share Reilly's conservatism or even his belief, outside of the scientific realm, in "absolute truth claims," he is right to argue that we have to defend certain fundamental principles. The nub of the issue, however, is which principles or "truth claims" we end up defending. No doubt he prefers Christian moral values, whereas I prefer Enlightenment values.

Ibid. Alas, Reilly's extreme cultural conservatism is on full display when he argues that "the new nearly all-music formats pander to another part of the human anatomy" rather than the mind. He sadly fails to understand just how much Western pop culture and music can subvert closed societies and positively affect America's image abroad, as it did during the Cold War, even if those cultural forms of expression will almost invariably repel or offend cultural conservatives, like Reilly himself, who generally consider them "vulgar" or "decadent." That, however, is precisely the point – pop culture serves as a vector of Western modernity, in all of its thrilling and banal varieties, into culturally hidebound societies elsewhere.

For a good introductory overview, see Jørgen Nielsen, *Muslims in Western Europe* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2004). For the efforts of three major European governments to deal with and accommodate Muslims, see Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper, *Islam and the State in Britain, France, and Germany* (New York: Cambridge University, 2004).

Note, however, that other individuals and their families from Third World countries, especially former colonies, were allowed to settle in European nations largely for political or moral reasons, as when the British grudgingly allowed citizens from former Commonwealth countries to settle in Great Britain and when France allowed its native Indo-Chinese and Algerian supporters, who were certain to be targeted for reprisal as "collaborators" by indigenous regimes in the newly-independent countries, to settle in France.

For highly critical analyses of "multiculturalism" as a political ideology – but not as a demographic reality, which no rational person can object to (unless members of those multiple cultures are systematically killing one another) – see Richard Bernstein, *Dictatorship of Virtue: How the Battle over Multiculturalism is Reshaping our Schools, our Countries, and our Lives* (New York: Vintage, 1995), for the U.S.; and Patrick West, *The Poverty of Multiculturalism* (London: Civitas/Institute for the Study of Civil Society, 2005), for Britain. For some examples of how multiculturalist dogmas are sabotaging Western resistance to Islamists, see Melanie Philips, *Londonistan* (New York and London: Encounter, 2006), esp. pp. 57-76. For critiques of post-1960's "Third Worldism," which essentially involves the excessive romanticization of Franz Fanon's "wretched of the earth," see Pascal Bruckner, *The Tears of the White Man: Compassion as Contempt* (New York: Free Press, 1986); Caroline Fourest (a self-described supporter of the "anti-totalitarian left" who is opposed to the "Third Worldist left"), *La tentation obscurantiste* (Paris: Grasset, 2005), pp. 33-51; and Pierre-André Taguieff, *Prêcheurs de haine: Traversée de la judéophobie planétaire* (Paris: Fayard, 2004), who provides numerous examples of the harmful political and moral consequences of uncritically glorifying and supporting all anti-Western movements in the Third World, no matter how reactionary they may be (as the Islamists clearly are).

For the quasi-official multiculturalist "line" on "Islamophobia," in its British version, see Runnymede Trust, *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All* (London: Runnymede Trust, 1997), a text that is full of spurious (or at least unconfirmed) allegations and problematic interpretations. Sadly, "Islamophobia" has become a loaded word, like "racism" or "sexism," that Islamists, other Muslim activists, and

multiculturalists regularly use as a virtual epithet to try and de-legitimize, if not slander, all those who criticize, no matter how justifiably, Islamism or aspects of Islam. Moreover, it is a misnomer insofar as it implies that significant numbers of Westerners are irrationally fearful of or hostile to Islam *as a religion*. Apart from a relative handful of ultra-traditionalist Catholics, Protestants, Eastern Orthodox Christians, and Jews, few if any Europeans are hostile to Islam for narrowly theological or religious reasons. Of course, all too many Westerners still retain racist or xenophobic attitudes towards Arabs, Iranians, Turks, and other non-European Muslims, just as they do towards non-Europeans who are not Muslim (though even the prevalence of racism has often been exaggerated). Nevertheless, most of the hostility in Europe towards Muslims *as Muslims* stems from the perceived unwillingness of the latter to assimilate, the insistence of their self-styled spokesmen that the host societies must adjust to Islam rather than vice versa, and the disproportionate amount of terrorist violence that is nowadays committed by Islamists against both Muslims and non-Muslims. As Walter Laqueur has wryly observed, if Eskimos began committing disproportionate amounts of terrorism, there would be an understandable increase in the amount of suspicion and hostility directed at Eskimos, which would then inevitably lead to bogus accusations of “Eskimophobia.” See his review of Gove’s *Celsius 7/7* book, *The Times Literary Supplement*, 11 August 2006. In the face of continued Islamist agitation and jihadist terrorism, unfortunately, it is likely that both racism and real “Islamophobia” will increase. Alas, two other important trends that will have a considerable bearing on Europe’s future relations with Muslims – widespread Muslim and especially Islamist hostility to non-Muslims, and “Islamophilia” if not “Islamism-ophilia” amongst key segments of the European intelligentsia – are rarely discussed at all.

For the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, see Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York: Oxford University, 1992 [1969]); Brinjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928-1942* (Reading, UK: Ithaca, 1998); and Hisham al-‘Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982-2000* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004). For descriptions of key components of the Muslim Brotherhood network in Europe, see, e.g., Johannes Grundmann, *Islamische Internationalisten: Strukturen und Aktivitäten der Muslimbruderschaft und der Islamischen Weltliga* (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2005), pp. 15-74; Xavier Ternisien, *Les Frères musulmans* (Paris: Fayard, 2005), pp. 187-323; Udo Ulfkotte, *Heiliger Krieg in Europa: Wie die radikale Muslimbruderschaft unsere Gesellschaft bedroht* (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn, 2007); Fiammetta Venner, *OPA sur l’Islam de France: Les ambitions de l’UOIF* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2005); and Lhaj Thami Breze, *Qu’est-ce que l’UOIF?* (Paris: L’Archipel, 2006).

For an indication of the Brotherhood’s strategy and agenda in the West, see Sylvain Besson, *La conquête de l’Occident: Le projet secret des islamistes* (Paris: Seuil, 2005), pp. 191-205, wherein a secret Brotherhood document outlining the group’s plan to “establish the reign of Allah on Earth” is published in its entirety (in a French translation).

Many people are familiar with Ramadhan’s works that are designed for Western consumption, which are both fairly sophisticated and seemingly moderate in their orientation. See, e.g., Tariq Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam* (New York: Oxford University, 2004). Alas, far fewer Westerners have read his other works, which provide a much better indication of his real agenda, such as Tariq Ramadan, *La foi, la Voie et la résistance* (Lyon: Tawhid, 2002); idem, *Jihād, violence, guerre et paix en islam* (Lyon: Tawhid, 2002); and idem, *Dār ash-shahāda: L’Occident, espace du témoignage* (Lyon: Tawhid, 2002). Fewer still are aware that he employs a deceptive “double discourse,” one that is designed to appeal to and allay the concerns of well-meaning Western intellectuals, and another that is far more radical and designed to rally the support of Muslims living in the West. On this, see Caroline Fourest, *Frère Tariq: Discours, stratégie et méthode de Tariq Ramadan* (Paris: Grasset, 2004); Paul Landau, *Le sabre et le Coran: Tariq Ramadan et les Frères musulmans à la conquête de l’Europe* (Monaco: Rocher, 2005); and Ralph Ghadban, *Tariq Ramadan und die Islamisierung Europas* (Berlin: Hans Schiler, 2006). For more sympathetic views of Ramadhan, see Aziz Zemouri, *Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?* (Paris: L’Archipel, 2005), pp. 15-62; and Ian Hamel, *La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan: Sa famille, ses réseaux, sa stratégie* (Paris: Favre, 2007).

For the general history and characteristics of Hizb al-Tahrir, see especially Suha Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate* (London: Grey Seal, 1996), an outstanding monographic study. Compare also Zeyno Baran, ed., *The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combatting Radical Islamist Ideology. Conference Report* (Washington, DC: Nixon Center, 2004); and Emmanuel Karagiannis and Clark McCauley, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating the Threat Posed by a Radical Islamic Group that Remains Nonviolent,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18:2 (July 2006), pp. 315-34. For further evidence of Hizb’s ideological radicalism, compare also its numerous

publications, many of which are available in PDF format on the group's own website, available at HYPERLINK "<http://www.hizbuttahrir.org>" <http://www.hizbuttahrir.org>.

For the Turkish Islamist background, see Irwin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak, eds., *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives* (New York: Oxford University, 1987), chapter on the religious right; and Jean-Pierre Touzanne, *L'islamisme turc* (Paris: Harmattan, 2001). (Many of the more recent scholarly studies concerning this subject, however valuable their actual research or fieldwork may be, seem to me to be virtual apologia for growth of Islamist influence in Turkey.) For more on Turkish Islamist groups in Europe, see Metin Gür, *Türkisch-islamische Vereinigungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Frankfurt: Brandes & Apsel, 1993); Birol Caymaz, *Les mouvements islamiques turcs à Paris* (Paris: Harmattan, 2002), pp. 189-255 (Milli Görüş); and Werner Schiffauer, *Die Gottesmänner: Türkische Islamisten in Deutschland* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2000), pp. 17-33, 92-227 (Kaplan movement).

For more on Mawdudi and the JI, see especially Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (New York: Oxford University, 1996); and idem, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California, 1994). For Mawdudist networks in Britain, see Anthony McRoy, *From Rushdie to 7/7: The Radicalisation of Islam in Britain* (London: Social Affairs Unit, 2006), esp. pp. 166-9 and 169-76 (since the umbrella Muslim Council of Britain is dominated by Mawdudists).

For the Tablighi, Jama'at al-Tabligh in Arabic, see Yogindar Sikkand, *The Origins and Development of the Tablighi Jama'at, 1920-2000: A Cross Country Comparative Study* (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2002); Muhammad Khalid Masud, *Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama'at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000); and Mumtaz Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms Observed* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago, 1991), pp. 510-24.

The phrase "Trojan horse" has been applied to Islamists in Europe by, among others, Michael Gove, *Celsius 7/7: How the West's Policy of Appeasement has Provoked Yet More Fundamentalist Terror [sic] – and What has to be Done Now* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), pp. 84-113.

There is a large literature on the "Rushdie affair," but good introductions are provided in Malise Ruthven, *A Satanic Affair: Salman Rushdie and the Rage of Islam* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1990); and Lisa Appignanesi and Sara Maitland, eds., *The Rushdie File* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University, 1990). For the broader significance of the "headscarves affair" in France, see John R. Bowen, *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2006).

See, e.g., the excellent overviews provided by McRoy, *From the Rushdie Affair to 7/7*, pp. 9-79; and Gilles Kepel, *Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1997), pp. 81-233.

For more on the development of "Londonistan," see Dominique Thomas, *Le Londonistan: La voie du djihad* (Paris: Michalon, 2003); and Jeffrey M. Bale, "Hiding in Plain Sight in 'Londonistan,'" in Michael A. Innes, ed., *Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), pp. 139-51, 192-8. See also Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, *The Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque* (London: Harper Collins, 2006). However, support networks for foreign jihadist networks as well as jihadist cells were also implanted elsewhere in Europe. See, e.g., Lorenzo Vidino, *Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2005); Berndt Georg Thamm, *Terrorbasis Deutschland: Die islamistische Gefahr in unserer Mitte* (Munich: Diederichs, 2004); Magdi Allam, *Bin Laden in Italia: Viaggio nell'islam radicale* (Milan: Mondadori, 2002); Marcella Andreoli, *Il telefonista di Al Qaeda: La confessione del primo terrorista pentito della jihad in Italia* (Milan: Baldini Castoldi Dalai, 2005); Claude Moniquet, *Djihad et islamisme en Belgique: Tout sur les réseaux et les ramifications* (Fléron: Jourdan le Clerq, 2005); Siem Eikelenboom, *Jihad in de polder: De radicale islam in Nederland* (Antwerp: L. J. Veen, 2004); [J. A.] Emerson Vermaat, *Nederlandse Jihad: Het proces tegen de Hofstadgroep* (Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2006); Gustavo de Aristegui, *La yihad en España: La obsesión por reconquistar Al-Ándalus* (Madrid: Esfera de los Libros, 2005); Julien Lariège, *Islamistes algériens au coeur de l'Europe: La menace djaz'ariste* (Paris: Ellipses, 2005); Léon Kline, *Marruecos: La amenaza. Su guerra de baja cota contra España* (Barcelona: Pyre, 2005), pp. 196-224; and Hassane Zerrouky, *La nébuleuse islamiste en France et en Algérie* (Paris: Éditions 1, 2002), pp. 98-121, 208-23.

This may seem to be an overly harsh criticism of the behavior of European elites with respect to the Islamists, but it is amply confirmed in a number of eye-opening accounts – from all sides of the political spectrum – by numerous authors, e.g., Bruce Bawer, *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West* (New York: Broadway, 2007); Karen Jespersen and Ralf Pittelkow, *Islamistes et naïvistes: Un acte*

d'accusation (Paris: Panama, 2007); Gove, *Celsius 7/7*; Alice Schwarzer, ed., *Die Gotteskrieger und die falsche Toleranz* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2002); and Claire Berlinski, *Menace in Europe: Why the Continent's Crisis is America's, Too* (New York: Three Rivers, 2007). Only the French government, though it has made other terrible blunders with respect to the treatment of immigrants, has tenaciously defended its "laicist" traditions, even in the face of fierce opposition from multiculturalists, Islamists, and some non-Islamist Muslims. In general, however, guilt-ridden European elites have long been behaving like *de facto dhimmi* – vulnerable second-class citizens of other faiths who are being "protected" and ruled by Muslims – despite the fact that they are presently in a position of strength vis-à-vis Islamist agitators, especially in their own countries, a behavior pattern that is surely self-destructive in both the short and long terms. These desperate attempts to appease and display tolerance, even for attitudes and practices that are reprehensible and incompatible with Western values, are rarely if ever viewed by Islamists as good faith measures that require some degree of reciprocation, but instead as signs of growing European "decadence" and weakness that can be further exploited.

Cf. the analysis of Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University, 2004), who emphasizes the importance of the "virtual umma," and the "social network" approach promoted by Marc Sageman in both *Understanding Terror [sic] Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2004) and *Leaderless Jihad: Terror [sic] Networks in the Twenty-First Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2007).

For an example of Muslim attitudes in Europe, see, e.g., Anthony King, "One in four Muslims sympathises with motives of terrorists," *Daily Telegraph*, 23 July 2005; and Patrick Hennessy and Melissa Kite, "Poll reveals 40pc of Muslims want sharia law in UK," *Daily Telegraph*, 19 February 2006. Similar attitudes have been documented in various other European countries, e.g., Holland and Belgium. Meanwhile, new jihadist plots are being uncovered on a regular basis by the European security services.

For examples of these types of exposés, which are of variable quality, see Hugh Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2008); Daniele Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe* (London and New York: Frank Cass, 2005); and J. Patrice McSherry, *Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).

For a serious but harsh critique of the dominant intellectual orthodoxies within the field of Middle Eastern studies, see Martin S. Kramer, *Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001), esp. pp. 44-83. However, there are also lots of delusional ideas being peddled outside the corridors of academe by people on the right, e.g., by neoconservatives and old Cold Warriors within policymaking bureaucracies and think tanks. One such idea is that today's jihadist terrorism is primarily a product of state sponsorship by so-called "rogue regimes" such as Syria, an exaggerated or distorted view that is also promoted (for largely cynical reasons) by Israeli hardliners. For a discussion of bogus propaganda vs. the actual efforts by states to use terrorists as their proxies, see Jeffrey M. Bale, "Terrorists as State 'Surrogates' or 'Proxies': Separating Fact from Fiction," in Michael A. Innes, ed., *Making Sense of Proxy Wars: The Politics of Armed Surrogacy* (Washington, DC: Potomac, 2008), in preparation. Moreover, if truth be told, the primary facilitators of Sunni extremism and terrorism have been America's supposed "allies," Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, not hostile "enemy" regimes (except in the cases of certain Palestinian rejectionist groups).

I am not suggesting, of course, that the terrorist threat has not been frequently hyped or exploited by those with vested interests, both inside and outside of government, only that jihadist terrorism has constituted a very real and indeed growing threat for some time. For examples of misdirected attempts by academicians (and journalists) to downplay or minimize the threat of Islamist terrorism in the years leading up to 9/11, a period in which jihadist groups were carrying out a series of increasingly bloody attacks all over the world, see John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (New York: Oxford University, 1999); Bruce B. Lawrence, *Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1998); Fariba Adelkhah and Alain Gresh, eds., *Un péril islamiste?* (Brussels: Complexe, 1994); and W. A. R. Shadid and P. S. van Koningsveld, *De mythe van het islamitische gevaar: Hindernissen bij integratie* (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1992). This situation has not improved markedly since 9/11, since many members of the professoriate have continued to insist that the dangers presented by Islamism are overblown, or even that those dangers have been cynically exaggerated, if not manufactured out of whole cloth, in order to justify Western "imperialist" schemes. Emblematic of this one-sided approach, whose constant refrain is that "Islamophobic Westerners are unfairly demonizing the innocent Muslim Other," is the book edited by Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells, *The New Crusade: Constructing the Muslim Enemy* (New York:

Columbia University, 2003).

For examples of this sort of conflation, see, e.g., Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p. xi: "I use the terms *political Islam* or *Islamism* synonymously..." However, he admits to defining those terms "perhaps more broadly than some other analysts do." And it is unfortunately no accident that the book by French Arabist François Burgat, *L'islamisme en face* (Paris: Découverte, 1996) was translated into English as *Face to Face with Political Islam* (London: I. B. Taurus, 2003). In many other books, Islamism and/or political Islam are simply identified with Islamic fundamentalism without any further qualifications, as in Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds., *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996).

See further Jeffrey M. Bale, "Islamism," in Richard F. Pilch and Raymond Zilinskas, eds., *Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense* (New York: Wiley, 2005), pp. 296-8; and my forthcoming article, "Islamic Fundamentalism, Political Islam, and Islamism: An Alternative Categorization Scheme," in Jeffrey M. Bale, ed., "Political Islam, Islamism, and the Religionisation of Politics: The Islamist-Fundamentalist Quest to Remake the World," special issue of *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, forthcoming from Taylor & Francis in 2009. For more on Islamist doctrine(s), compare Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven: Yale University, 1990); Abderrahim Lamchichi, *L'islamisme politique* (Paris: Harmattan, 2001); Johannes J. G. Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1997); and Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi', *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World* (Albany: SUNY, 1996). See also the contrasting interpretations found in Martin Kramer, ed., *The Islamism Debate* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University/Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1997).

See, e.g., Bassam Tibi, *Die neue Totalitarismus: "Heiliger Krieg" und westliche Sicherheit* (Darmstadt: Primus, 2004); Alexandre del Valle, *Le totalitarisme islamiste à l'assaut des démocraties* (Paris: Syrtès, 2002); and Amir Jahanchahi, *Vaincre le IIIe totalitarisme* (Paris: Ramsay, 2001). Cf. also the remarks of Cheryl Benard, *Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), p. 7: "Fundamentalists [a term which she unfortunately substitutes for Islamists because she claims that the latter – see *ibid*, p. 3, note 3 – is "used by different authors to describe either the fundamentalists or the traditionalists"] have as their goal an ascetic, highly regimented, hierarchical society in which all members follow the requirements of Islamic ritual strictly, in which immorality is prevented by separating the sexes, which in turn is achieved by banishing women from the public domain, and in which life is visibly and constantly infused by religion. It is totalitarian in its negation of a private sphere, instead believing that it is the task of state authorities to compel the individual to adhere to proper Islamic behavior anywhere and everywhere. And ideally, it wants this system – which it believes to be the only rightful one – to expand until it controls the entire world and everyone is a Muslim." Precisely so.

This does not mean, as some polemicists and propagandists who have peddled the notion of "Islamofascism" would have it, that Islamism is actually a form of fascism. Since fascism is a secular revolutionary ideology combining radical nationalism and non-Marxist socialism (or, in the case of its most notorious but highly atypical Nazi variant, overlaying both nationalism and socialism with biological racism and eugenics), and Islamism's principal enemy is Western secularism, it is absurd on the face of it to characterize Islamism as a form of fascism. For the same reason, it is misleading to attempt to draw too close of a comparison between communism and Islamism, as Rosenau has sought to do in his otherwise excellent analysis, "Waging the War of Ideas," pp. 1135-6. On the other hand, it is true that various components of the radical Western right and left view Islamism sympathetically because all three ideologies share certain common enemies: Israel (if not Jews), American "imperialism," democracy, and capitalist "globalization." On this, see Jeffrey M. Bale and Gary Ackerman, *Will the Extremes Touch? The Potential for Collaboration between Islamist Networks and Western Left- and Right-Wing Extremists*, book in preparation; Taguieff, *Prêcheurs de haine*; and George Michael, *The Enemy of My Enemy: The Alarming Convergence of Militant Islam and the Extreme Right* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 2006).

See, e.g., Michael Scheuer, *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terrorism* (Washington, DC: Potomac, 2004), pp. 17 (where he argues that "Bin Laden and most Islamists, therefore, can be said to be motivated by their love of Allah and their hatred of a few, specific U.S. policies and actions they believe are damaging – and threatening to destroy – the things they love. Theirs is a war against a specific target and for specific, limited purposes"), 6-7 (where he asserts that "[a]t this point in history we need worry little about the threat of an offensive and expansionist jihad meant to conquer new lands for Islam and convert new peoples to the faith"), and 8 (where he concludes that the Islamists are "not so offended by our democratic...system of politics, guarantees of personal rights and civil liberties, and separation of church

and state that [they are] willing to wage war against overwhelming odds in order to stop Americans from voting, speaking freely, and praying, or not, as they wish"). These arguments are all seriously misleading.

Jeffrey M. Bale, "Jihadist Ideology and Strategy and the Possible Employment of 'Weapons of Mass Destruction,'" in Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tansett, eds., *Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (New York: CRC Press, 2009), pp. 3-59. One must distinguish clearly between the public statements by jihadist spokesmen such as Usama b. Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri, which are examples of carefully crafted political propaganda designed to influence particular targeted audiences, above all other Muslims but also Westerners, and the real attitudes and objectives of al-Qa'ida (as can be gleaned from their in-house publications, including jihadist websites, and from insider testimony), which often directly contradict those public pronouncements. Cf., e.g., Usama b. Ladin's contrasting explanations for waging *jihad* against America (and, by extension, other Western and "infidel" countries) in his relatively restrained and "defensive"-sounding but still hyperbolic open address to the Americans, on the one hand, and in his belligerent, bellicose letter to "prostrating" Saudi intellectuals, on the other, wherein he insists upon the waging of "offensive jihad" until the "eternal" struggle against the "infidels" has been won, in Raymond Ibrahim, ed., *The Al Qaeda Reader* (New York: Broadway, 2007), respectively pp. 197-208 and pp. 22-62. Note also that, however extravagant and unachievable their maximal objectives are, al-Qa'ida and other global jihadists are often ruthlessly effective on the operational level. Indeed, it is precisely their combination of phantasmagoric, impossible-to-attain goals and brutal, efficacious methods of violence that makes them so dangerous.

See further Walid Phares, *The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), pp. 188-91.

On this matter I also concur with idem, *The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p. 245: "the real root of [jihadist] terrorism [is] the ideological vision and strategic objectives of the Islamists."

Cf., e.g., the Harmony documents that have been made available by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point; Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad went Global* (New York: Cambridge University, 2005), who cites lots of internal jihadist sources; Mohamed Sifaoui, *Mes "frères" assassins: Comment j'ai infiltré une cellule d'al-Qaïda* (Paris: Cherche Midi, 2003); Ed Husain, *The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside, and Why I Left* (London: Penguin, 2007); Omar Nasiri, *Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda. A Spy's Story* (New York: Basic, 2006); Montasser al-Zayyat, *The Road to Al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Lāden's Right-Hand Man* (London: Pluto, 2004); and Hind Fraihi, *Infiltrée: Parmi les islamistes radicaux* (Brussels: Luc Pire, 2006). Much more information about internal jihadist disputes and factions can be gleaned from Arabic-language sources and from judicial materials relating to jihadist plots.

Waller, *Fighting the War of Ideas*, p. 35.

Ibid, pp. 120-1.

Ibid, p. 122.

Ibid, pp. 38-109. Concerning these proposed efforts to substitute these alternative and relatively negative Arabic terms for *jihad* and *mujahidin*, which are hardly likely to succeed, see the harsh critique of Phares, *War of Ideas*, pp. 200-1 and 258-9, note 13. He argues therein that this scheme originally stemmed from a Saudi-backed initiative designed to divorce the concept of *jihad* from the negative connotations it has now developed outside of the Islamic world, that it has since been peddled by the Kingdom's lobbyists in the U.S. (as well as by Islamist front groups like the Council on American-Islamic Relations [CAIR]), and that it has subsequently been adopted, wittingly or unwittingly, by certain policy analysts and academicians.

Benard, *Civil Democratic Islam*, pp. 47-8.

Paper delivered by Antony T. Sullivan, "Conservative Ecumenism: Politically Incorrect Meditations on Islam and the West," delivered at The Historical Society conference in Boothbay Harbor, Maine, on 4 June 2004, cited in Waller, *Fighting the War of Ideas*, p. 116, note 133.

For critical but rather polemical overviews, see John K. Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism* (London: Pluto, 2002); and Robert Dreyfuss, *Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam* (New York: Henry Holt, 2005).

PAGE

PAGE 1