New Book Examines the Global History and Power of Policing
For years, Amit Prakash, visiting assistant professor of international and global studies, and Max Ward, professor of history, had been studying similar topics related to policing around the world. It wasn’t until Mark Williams, professor of political science and director of the Rohatyn Center for Global Affairs, made them aware of the similarities in their research that they began collaborating.
The result was Critical Approaches to Global Police Power (Bloomsbury), a collection of essays by leading scholars examining the development of modern policing, its relationship to state power, and the ways policing ideas and practices have circulated around the world. Published in October, the book was celebrated at a book launch on November 18, in the Robert A. Jones ’59 Conference Room.
“In our introduction, we argue that there is a global nature to police power, historically, sociologically, and politically,” said Ward to a full room at the book launch. “The volume brings together essays that explore how this police power manifested in different regions, at different scales, and with particular consequences, but generally at the same time in the 19th century, and how police and police knowledge circulated between emerging nation-states, metropoles, colonies, and later post-colonial societies. No matter its local formation, police were tasked with the same general function: to reproduce the type of social order unique to capitalist and colonial modernity, even as, or because, this order is inherently violent and prone to deep social contradictions and crises.”
In this Q&A, Prakash discusses the origins of the book, the historical forces that shaped modern police institutions, and how the research relates to contemporary debates about public safety and policing.
What inspired you to put this book together, and why now?
Policing and the question of police as the representation of state power, at least in our lifetime, has been kind of an evergreen topic of interest. We see it often represented controversially with regard to police-society relations, if you can call it that. My original interest in the question of the role of the police in everyday life really came from my interest in decolonization and migration. My first book centered around how police surveillance became a key feature of the managed decolonization of North Africa in France. What I found was that the state interface that had the most connection with migrant communities was the police. That sparked my original interest. I never thought I was necessarily going to become a historian of policing, but the archives kind of drove me there.
The global revolt that ensued after the murder of George Floyd was an indicator of police power being a global issue, although it was articulated in local ways. There were idiosyncratic issues depending on the locale, but the presence of the police and a confrontational relationship with the people they’re ostensibly there to protect seemed to have global ramifications.
How did you approach selecting contributors and organizing the book?
We started talking about the kinds of people we wanted to bring in and really wanted to get a decent amount of global perspective on the question of what global police power looks like. It’s going to be different in every space. So we end up getting Asia, Latin America, the United States, and we touch upon Europe. We wanted to see what scholars of different disciplines, who have expertise in these different regions, could tell us about what global police power looks like. That can be the circulation of ideas; it can be certain practices; it can be the ideological transformation of the police apparatus in the wake of revolutionary atmospheres that then take on transnational characteristics. All of those things come up in different ways in the chapters.
One of the themes that emerges is how policing practices developed in the 19th century spread around the world. Were you surprised by the similarities of these practices?
People who study this always talk about how policing is as old as time. But “the police,” when you add the definite article, becomes a state institution that is pretty modern. Particularly the idea that, down to the municipality, you’ll have a uniformed force, often armed, that has the right to do the legitimate violence of the state, so to speak. That organized, coercive arm of the state that penetrates all registers of political organization, from the town to the state to the national, is a 19th-century-onward phenomenon.
What’s interesting is that there is a lot of mimicry. The original model was the London Metropolitan Police, which the Parisians copy, and then the Bostonians copy, and then New York, and we can go down the line. That idea of having a uniformed force, which was originally for putting down union organization and national agitation in Ireland, becomes a norm for “good governance” and the idea of “good order.” By the early 20th century, you get what one police scholar calls “police fetishism”—the idea that if you don’t have a police force, you must have disorder, quickly forgetting that for most of human history, we haven’t had the police. The extent to which you have a good, modern, cutting-edge police force becomes almost a measure of the relative sovereignty and good government of the modern state.
The book examines the relationship among policing, capitalism, and the state. How are they connected?
The principal thing is the protection of property. One of the things about the contemporary narrative of policing, which we see in our TV shows and that one scholar recently called “copaganda,” is that the police are there to protect you. They identify criminals and crimes, and they work that up to the district attorney’s office, and justice is then served. That is the general arc of most police procedurals that we see on television and in movies. But what this forgets, I think—and this is not to say that the police never do those things; they do—is that the police were originally created for the protection of property. That’s their fundamental aim: protecting property in order to maintain order.
In the 19th century, increased industrialization and urbanization gave rise to critiques of capitalism that questioned the seizure and privatization of property, particularly land and the means of production. Governments passed laws restricting union movements, while revolutionary Marxism emerged in the mid- to late 19th century and was promptly criminalized as a threat to private property.
The relationship between capital and the state goes back even further. In medieval Europe, states used coercion to extract the resources needed to fund themselves. Taxation and conscription required a coercive apparatus, and the police eventually became part of that apparatus, helping to ensure the continued flow of resources to the state.
How do these global patterns of policing translate to smaller communities, such as those in Vermont?
In a small place like this, unlike a big city where the police are kind of faceless, they’re sort of an anonymous force, here you might know your police officer. If you lived in the community, you might have gone to high school with them and they ended up becoming a local cop. One thing to remember is that policing is a major labor force in the country. There are over 2 million people who work in some aspect of policing, and there are 17,000-odd police departments. It’s a very normalized, ubiquitous aspect of life and career path.
In the local context, it’s different because the police cannot act in ways that would be as aggressive. The standards of the use of force and things like that might be a little bit more muted because you might see that person in the grocery store next week. Your kids might be going to school with the police officer’s kids. The proximity of relationships in small places has a moderating effect on the nature of aggressive policing. But nevertheless, all the police forces still have the matériel of a sort of militarized force. That’s where you see the influence of the marquee departments around the world that are doing the cutting-edge policing that others try, in their own ways, to keep up with.
Can you give an example of how a policing practice developed in one place becomes widespread?
We can think about the history of the growth of the SWAT team, for instance. SWAT originally came out of the brainchild of an officer, later police chief, named Daryl Gates from the LAPD, who in the 1960s, after the Watts riots, started working with local Marines at various bases in Southern California. He wanted to create a new force based on the recently created Green Berets that were fighting in Vietnam. They wanted to do that for what they described as the possible urban warfare to come with racial tensions and things like that. That force was supposed to be for hostage situations, somebody barricaded with an arsenal in their house, active shooters—really emergency situations. It’s another example of how something that comes as an emergency measure becomes a normal part of policing.
Now people get “swatted,” where somebody can call and report a crime at somebody’s house as a joke and a SWAT team will show up, because SWAT teams are not deployed just for emergency measures. They’re deployed for serving low-grade marijuana warrants. There are tens of thousands of them that happen every year all across the country. You can see how what starts out as almost a test case, an experimentation in coercive governance, comes to be seen as a necessary arm of the state.
You’ve talked about how people become accustomed to policing practices that initially seem intrusive. How does that happen?
When the Paris police started putting uniformed people in the street in the mid-19th century, the first thing that happened was that they would go to neighborhoods, usually working-class neighborhoods, and the local toughs would punch them in the face right away. Because the whole question was, how dare you put these armed men in our neighborhood? This has never happened before. This is an intrusion.
The way I talk about it with students is it’s kind of like some of the outrage that people are feeling when they’re seeing ICE, masked men in the streets, snatching people. It seems very foreign and very jarring. It seems like a very clear, violent act by the state. There were similarities to that with the original beat cops. But now we’ve just gotten used to them. I also point out that eventually, if this keeps going on, people will get used to masked men being in the streets, because that will become normalized and there will be a rationale for it.
What is understood globally is that police, because it’s this amorphous, precisely imprecise thing in its definition, can adapt to whatever situation. It becomes a very useful tool of the state to advance whatever that state’s agenda happens to be, whether it’s capitalist or communist.