“Speak Softly, but Carry a Big Stick”: The Role of Direct Action Operations in U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy

Research Question

For an inherently covert organization, US special forces are afforded a peculiarly high level of infatuation among the general public. Sleek, brazen recruitment ads, memoirs, and media bely both a public reputation and self-endorsed attitude of quick and violent effectiveness. Kicking in doors and raiding terrorist hideouts has become the widespread ideal of a special operation. Why have direct operations become the face of special forces? This work will address this question and one other: What is the appropriate role of direct action in contributing to overarching US counterinsurgency objectives?

Introduction to US SOF Mission

US Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, was organized in 1987 to manage and command all special operations forces, who by definition were intended to wage war by “special,” or unconventional, means, usually in small teams capable iof achieving more in niche areas with fewer resources than conventional troops.[1] This mandate has developed into two tactical approaches, or “primary missions,” by which SOF engages with the enemy.[2][3] The first indirect approach involves efforts focused on the development of infrastructure, improving the capacity of local security forces, and broad trust- and relationship-building among the population in order to destabilize insurgent grievances and support. This effort can be summarized by the mission of Foreign Internal Defense (FID),[4] Civil Affairs (CA),[5] Psychological or Information Operations,[6] and Military Information Support Operations (MISO).[7]

SOF’s second approach involves more hands-on tactics. Known broadly as kinetic or direct action (DA), this approach is delineated by the Department of Defense as “entail[ing] short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted with specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments.”[8] As articulated by the US Army, “Direct Action missions are short duration strikes used to seize, capture, recover or destroy enemy material, or recover personnel.”[9] In short, the objective driving all DA operations is blunt and unapologetic: seek out and eliminate the threat. Surgical strikes[10], night raids, or other forms of lethal or direct engagement operations qualify as direct action operations.[11] Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) was developed in direct response to the 9/11 attacks and is responsible for this kinetic prong of SOF’s indirect/unconventional – direct/more kinetic dyad.

Not all history remembers DA kindly. To date, direct action forces are allegedly responsible for a startlingly high number of collateral damage incidents, both in terms of infrastructure and civilian lives.[12] Even in cases of undamaged property or personal safety, the toll of accidents, mistaken intelligence, and even of accurate, successful operations on civilian sympathies, trust, and respect can have momentous impact and is noted by a multitude of official and unofficial reports.[13][14] The magnitude of DA’s influence for harm as well as good is undeniable, though whether it is exaggerated remains in hot contest. The question, then, is whether these costs are worth the progress achieved in the process. This work will examine the costs of direct action operations as compared to the progress they achieve toward US strategic goals.

While automated technology, controlled from a distance, has become increasingly central in direct action operations in recent years, this analysis will be limited to operations involving DA personnel.

Today, special forces’ mandate has expanded to include a variety of niche duties, including hostage rescue, humanitarian assistance, counter-WMD, etc.[15][16] While they do siphon resources and personnel as necessity demands, these responsibilities do not alter SOF’s focus, however; This remains fixed on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategic objectives. SOF – DA operations in particular – are considered the US military’s CT and COIN response forces.

The great difference between US special forces of the 1980s and those of today is evident in the magnitude of their forces and resources. Where in pre-2001 years SOF funding was capped at around $3 billion, it is afforded over $13 billion of the current DoD budget. Before 9/11, SOF amounted to 43,000 personnel, of whom perhaps 2,900 were deployed at any given time. SOF today is about 74,000 troops strong. 4,500 hundred of these are reportedly deployed during any week of the year.[17] These personnel are engaged with partners in an estimated 75-80% of the globe’s countries,[18] as compared to the 75 countries among which special forces were distributed in 2010.[19] Further, at USSOCOM’s conception, neither counterterrorism nor counterinsurgency, nor any of the other foci of SOF’s mandate, ranked on the list of top priorities for the US military at large.[20] Special operations forces were sidelined on the strategic level in favor of conventional methods.

Since 9/11, the United States has plunged its military might into a contest of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, aligning the entirety of US security doctrine with SOF’s previously marginalized mission. Overnight, CT/COIN became the single overarching security and foreign priority.[21] It naturally follows that SOF’s DA capabilities expanded as, first, the US military’s foremost option to reconcile the new terrain of warfare with the longstanding, conventional American way of war[22] and, second, a tactic intended to make visible progress to sate the fury of both servicemen and the American public at large.[23] Two decades later, direct action operations remain the first and best military response in the eyes of upper-echelon leadership[24] — so much so, in fact, that “while special operations forces make up just 3 percent of the joint force,[25] they have absorbed more than 40 percent of the casualties since 2001.”[26][27] This more than any other testimony witnesses of their front-and-center involvement in US operations worldwide.

Research Design and Methodology

This work will proceed to outline past analyses concerning the contributions of DA operations through a thorough literature review. Expert opinion, as accumulated through semi-structured interviews with individuals with various forms of experience with the research questions at hand, will bolster the findings presented in the that review. Their experiences will fall into one of four categories: military personnel having executed direct action operations at a tactical level; military personnel with experience organizing and commanding DA operations from an operational or strategic level; those whose experience has involved unconventional methods at a tactical or operational level, witnesses to the consequences – positive and negative – of DA on non-kinetic COIN tactics; and those with experience tracking the effects of DA on civilian populations from the point of view of NGOs or similar organizations. This research will also be developed through primary sources previously collected, including ACD interviews and other interviews available online; these will be evaluated and chosen by the same criteria previously listed. Each interview will serve to clarify arguments and theories presented throughout the literature review in the context of field operations.

This work will also analyze the effectiveness of reliance upon DA operations through the lens of two key case studies. The first will examine primarily unconventional warfare support employed in the Philippines against the Abu Sayyaf Group in Mindanao province between 2002 and 2015. A close analysis of SOF’s activity during this period – which leveraged DA operations solely in support of an overarching unconventional strategy addressing the underlying causes of the Abu Sayyaf Group’s (AFG’s) insurgent movement[28] – will provide insight into an appropriate balance between both capacities of SOF in other areas of the globe as they proceeds to accomplish their increasingly expansive COIN mission.[29] A second case study will revolve around SOF’s activities in Yemen since the early 2010s. Heavy emphasis was placed on DA operations in the struggle against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) over the course of this mission;[30][31] this study will examine the tactics and consequences of a DA-heavy strategy on insurgent capabilities and on relations with civilian populations. The final result juxtaposed with SOF’s strategic goals in the area will also be examined.

Hypothesis

This work expects to find additional support for the option to develop a strategically indirect approach to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, supported on a tactical level by precise direct action operations; that is, a hybrid approach of sorts. The prevalence of such vehement pro- and counter-DA literature as discussed here is somewhat of a surprise, however. This research also hopes to unearth examples or potential of what a blend of DA and UW might look like, how it might function, how this strategy might effectively implement forces designed specifically for either direct (including Navy SEALs and the Army’s Rangers and Delta forces) or indirect operations (such as Army Special Forces, or Green Berets), and in what capacities it promises to be more effective than present strategies which emphasize either indirect or direct operations over the other.

Literature Review and Expert Opinion

Policy-makers, academics, journalists, and military leadership alike share strong and conflicting opinions on the costs and benefits of relying on SOF direct action capabilities as compared to emphasis on unconventional warfare operations. The entire array of arguments may be sorted into one of three camps: those that emphasize the capabilities of DA to succeed where UW does not, those that argue that DA has little to no place in effective counterinsurgency, and those who advocate for the necessity of a blend of both.

The Shortcomings of Unconventional Warfare

There are those who claim that the unconventional approach to special warfare does not work.[32] Some cite the woefully inadequate success of FID and other forms of indirect warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan as evidence that direct action is essential to accomplishing any significant progress.[33] As argued by Matthew Miller, past failures of UW have less to do with their strategic potential and more to do with their execution.[34] Due to a of lack of professional reputation within US military structure at large, unconventional methods are rarely implemented to their full effectiveness; until US military leadership learns to perceive UW as a long term investment rather than an eternal slog, the more abrasive tactics of DA will seem exceptionally effective and efficient by comparison – and rightly so.[35] As summarized by Mark Moyar, “special operations forces, like conventional forces and the nonmilitary instruments of diplomacy and aid, are only as good as the strategies and policies in whose services they are employed.”[36]

“The United States is in danger of missing opportunities to counter nascent threats to national security. Allowing these threats to persist, by choosing not to act against them when there is an opportunity to do so, has detrimental effects on US national interests and threatens the safety of American citizens.”[37] In other words, there are costs to shifting direct action operations to the sidelines in pursuit of less abrasive tactics. The loss of time can sacrifice accurate intelligence and allow enemy forces to recruit, stabilize, and organize, plan, and execute attacks. Alternately, engaging in DA quickly and decisively has the potential to accomplish three objectives critical to long-term US counterinsurgency strategy.[38] First, it reduces the operational capacity of the insurgency in question, reducing its access to safe havens, eliminating ties in its communication and supply networks, and interrupting its command chain. Relatedly, effective DA is adept at eliminating the most skilled and/or experienced insurgents, including both leaders at the front and key supporters from behind. This further interrupts the command structure of the insurgent group and slowly erodes both the fervor and capacity of the insurgency to wage effective conflict.[39] Third, and perhaps most important, direct action forces the enemy to focus its efforts on self-protection rather than on planning and executing attacks. This exercises a psychological effect on the enemy, increasing the costs of carrying on the insurgency and spreading fear among insurgents in place of security. These effects in particular have rebounding consequences for the national security of the US and its allies, even while acknowledging that this is not a final solution in and of itself.[40]

There is a further danger in missing opportunities to strike at enemy forces directly when afforded the chance. US military culture – special operations culture in particular, despite and perhaps due in part to higher levels of training and a greater accumulation of overseas, on-the-ground experience than typical – is defined by capability, intelligence, reliability, fulfillment of duty, meaningful service, and a healthy dose of machismo.[41] Avoiding direct operations passes over the opportunity to develop, practice, and demonstrate these characteristics, as well as consequent promotions in reputation and even in rank.[42] This runs a real risk of eroding morale and confidence in the mission.[43] What’s more, as public sentiment toward military forces tends to be governed by largely the same measures, the morale of the American public stands to incur damage alongside.

The lesson consistent across the board is best articulated by Lloyd Edwards and his colleagues: “Allowing these threats to persist, by choosing not to act against them when there is an opportunity to do so, has detrimental effects on US national interests.”[44] Alternately, there are enormous gains to be had through quick, decisive action. “…Within a special warfare mission, counterinsurgency in particular, surgical strike is a fundamental and complementary effort, necessary for success.”[45]

The Shortcomings of Direct Action

General McChrystal said of the US approach to Afghanistan:

“We desperately wanted Al Qaeda in Iraq to be organized like we were, so that we could understand it, analyze it, pick it apart, and, ultimately, defeat it. Remove the leadership, some believed, and the organization would crumble.”[46]

Direct action operations represented a quick and straightforward answer to what otherwise seemed an overwhelmingly complex and unprecedented strategic challenge. When in doubt, past experience prompted, knock out the enemy. On the contrary, practical application in Afghanistan and other theatres illuminated serious costs inherent to the execution of direct action operations.

US SOF have proven themselves undeniably effective at targeting and removing key enemy figures, but four counterproductive consequences become increasingly pronounced as DA operations become more frequent, more emphasized, and, particularly, less precise. First, the potential for power vacuums is a natural effect of the removal of key targets.[47] While this may result in temporary disorganization and internal commotion of the insurgency, this vacuum also has the potential to be filled by a more experienced or more zealous figure, or both, than before, perpetuating the challenge to US SOF. Insurgent organizations countered in Afghanistan and Iraq proved to be particularly decentralized, rendering the elimination of individuals – even those deeply involved in the group’s operational, logistic, or financial networks – to rarely destabilize, incapacitate, or even intimidate the organization as a whole.[48] Second, DA strikes have a documented history of collateral damage among civilians and their property.[49] Whether a result of flawed intelligence, imperfect leadership, indiscriminate tactics, or downright bad luck, any form of harm to civilians and/or their livelihoods causes inescapable harm; it jeopardizes trust, crumbles legitimacy, sours the reputation of US forces, and has the potential to do the same for public sentiment toward the US as a whole. Effective COIN is intrinsically bound to public sentiment, sympathies, and trust. To lose or even jeopardize it is a threat to the entire US COIN mission. Thirdly, as a result of the former, direct action has the potential to result in recruitment to the insurgent movement.[50] Fourth, taking notice enough of an insurgent movement to target it through kinetic operations can serve to legitimize it in the eyes of the populace, particularly in an area afflicted by multiple insurgent groups.[51] In each of these categories of risk, the lesson is the same: a short-term tactical advantage is not worth the harvest of an even more formidable strategic challenge down the road.

Further arguments recall the capabilities of unconventional strategies – including FID, CA, psychological operations, and other units working in tandem – to address the root causes of insurgencies: political or economic grievance, government mistreatment and lack of governing capacity to quash rebellion, and, of course, public support.[52][53] Considering the effects of decreased emphasis on direct action operations in order to prioritize UW methods demonstrates several perks besides the avoidance of the sobering costs listed above.[54] FID training and operations in particular have a demonstrable tendency to improve the professionalism of SOF personnel and to cement long-term strategic goals at the forefront of their minds; whereas direct action operations tend to preoccupy SOF units on tactical achievements, the strategic “big picture” is a vital component to making progress in as long-term a game as counterinsurgency. Unconventional tactics further improve the capacity and stability of partner nation forces to handle security threats themselves, freeing SOF forces from large-scale, long-term commitments of support and physical engagement. FID and other forms of relationship- and trust-promoting operations can be exceptional sources of intelligence. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, effective and long-term UW erodes public support for the insurgency in question, starving it of new recruits, safe havens, and resources.[55] If the roots of the insurgency in question are attacked, the insurgency will never recover.[56] UW, therefore, has a significant impact on SOF’s ability to address the root of the insurgency, not only the symptoms, as direct action does. Direct action operations cannot win this battle single-handedly.[57]

Necessity of a Hybrid Approach

Solving the problems at the root of insurgency movements is an essential objective which direct action operations cannot accomplish alone. Though necessarily long-term in scope and difficult to visibly measure, it is critical to organize unconventional efforts at a strategic level, bearing in mind that direct action operations have significant tactical advantages if employed with precision within the scope of an overarching UW strategy.[58][59]

In General Stanley McChrystal’s words, the traditional images of SOF are lasting for two reasons:

“‘One, because they’re sexy, and two, because they are viewed as a way to do things on the cheap, meaning you could send 10 brave people in to do a job instead of 100,000 soldiers, which has political costs and casualties.’ The reality, [McChrystal] went on, is that the nonsexy parts of Special Ops are the ones that may have more lasting impact. Killing or capturing a murderous foe appeals to a sense of justice and provides momentary satisfaction, but eliminating a terrorist leader is not victory. It is, in [President] Obama’s words, just mowing the grass.”[60]

Similarly, former JSOC commander Admiral William McRaven, then head of USSOCOM, argued before Congress in 2011 that “the direct approach alone is not the solution to the challenges our nation faces today as it ultimately only buys time and space for the indirect approach.” He further argued that “in the end, it will be such continuous indirect operations that will prove decisive in the global security arena.”[61] More recently, the US Department of Defense contributed to the National Defense Strategy in 2020 with the following statement: “We must creatively mix our traditional combat power with proactive, dynamic, and unorthodox approaches to IW that can shape, prevent, and prevail against our nation’s adversaries and maintain favorable regional balances of power alongside our key partners and allies.”[62] When local populations, not diplomats or governments alone, are involved in these efforts, further advantages are added to this promising potential.[63]

The overwhelming majority of policy-makers, commanding officers, academics, and rank-and-file troops support these conclusions. This direct-indirect blend must, of course, be weighed by considerations of the culture, government functionality, infrastructural capacity, and threats of the region or mission at hand.[64][65] If these factors are appropriately considered at the strategic level, however, US SOF will find this hybrid approach the most effective at their disposal in accomplishing US CT/COIN objectives.

The slow, exasperatingly interdimensional, and comparatively undistinguished characteristics of unconventional tactics compared to the flash and bang of DA is a significant obstacle to efforts to reform SOF priorities, emphasis, and associated training to favor overarching UW strategies as discussed here. Particularly following the tragedy of 9/11, Americans at large clamored for justice, for vengeance, for results. SOF personnel were no exception; direct action operations seemed to be the quickest way to achieve all three. Despite past evidence of the Vietnam War to support the effectiveness of unconventional tactics, “[t]he decisive long-term success promised by indirect approaches [has frequently been] a casualty of political impatience and a desire for visible results.”[66] What is more, SOF structure at large is already organized in such a way as to prioritize DA. It would be financially expensive and costly in terms of time to restructure the system at its organizational levels.[67] Furthermore, integrated perceptions and traditions among SOF forces are bound to the reputation of DA forces. Among a results-centered organization like the US military, subtle and long-term missions take an automatic backseat to those quick, violent, visible, and tangible. As articulated by one officer among these forces, “while there are some Special Forces soldiers who thrive on FID, the vast, vast, majority are only interested in conducting Direct Action. Everyone wants to pull triggers. Very few want to concern themselves with the relatively mundane FID mission.”[68] As crucial as unconventional methods are to the long-lasting success of counterinsurgency efforts, there is no shortcut to earning trust, cultivating capability, or addressing root causes one area and need at a time.[69] But perhaps the demand for a shortcut represents SOF’s entire problem.

All things considered, weighing the capacity of direct action operations to contribute to short-term COIN/CT objectives provides little short-term incentive to the US military to revamp the organization in place. Thus it is that 20 years following the 9/11 attacks and approaching half a decade since the national security focus of the United States shifted away from counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, the forte of US special forces remains kinetic operations.

Case Studies

The juxtaposition of US SOF’s role in the Philippines between 2002 and 2015 and in Yemen later on, from 2014 to the present, demonstrates several important lessons for the application of FID versus DA tactics. It is notable that although these case studies involve the same actors, the stage on which SOF’s performance is illustrated are markedly different. The Philippines, for example, enjoyed a significantly higher level of functional governance at the time than the Middle Eastern countries in which SOF intervened, including Yemen; the island country had also maintained a healthy diplomatic and military relationship with the US for several decades preceding SOF’s appearance on its counterinsurgency scene. Yemen, for its part, suffered from preexisting economic dilapidation and political instability due to social fracturing. It has never enjoyed a strong relationship with the US – or even with most of its neighbors; American interests in the Yemeni civil war have had much more to do with economics, countering Al Qaeda’s presence on the Arab Peninsula, and the welfare of its Saudi ally, bordering Yemen, than with Yemen’s needs themselves. These factors contribute to a strategy more concerned with achieving quick results than ensuring long-term positive consequences.

YEMEN – “SOF as a tactical cure-all”[70]

The political and military landscape of Yemen is and has been a disaster since the 2000s began, in many ways much earlier. Zaidi Shia Houthis account for over 40% of Yemen’s Muslim population and have enjoyed the diplomatic, material, and instructive support of Iran for several decades. Their 2014 coup – on the heels of six escalating rebellions between 2004 and 2010 – successfully gained control of Sana’a, the capital, and forced President Hadi – only recently instated – into exile. The Houthis continue to control Sana’a until 2015 and today continues to exercise immense influence in provinces throughout the country, especially in the northwest. Various other tribal groups, separatists, and warlords arose in close succession and continue to hold sway in various cities and regions; some of them were fortunate enough to be backed by the UAE in subsequent years. To complicate the map further, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has long had a presence in Yemen’s southeastern regions. Finally freed of its pesky US watchdog, the organization was happy to take advantage of the instability sown by political upheaval to cultivate its influence and swell its ranks. Finally, Saudi Arabia, receiving the banished president and deeply concerned with the conflict developing on their border, began to lend its support to Yemeni government forces in the east alongside the US, who were eager to support their Saudi ally and engage once more with AQAP.[71] US special operations forces have combated AQAP since 2010; following the US military’s expulsion from Yemen in 2015 alongside all US diplomatic personnel, SOF returned in 2016 to continue their campaign, as well as to aid the Yemeni government in reducing collateral damage in the civil war, to aid Saudi allies, and to extend US influence in the region and in the global CT sphere.[72] It is evident, however, that the Yemeni civil war took generally second place to US concerns about AQAP.

In many ways, the UAE’s involvement in the fight against AQAP has been comparable to America’s. From accusations and arrests to direct strikes, the nation’s efforts have been accused of complicating the counterterrorism struggle at large. Norman Cigar argues that the UAE’s “direct military participation has led to an escalation in the level of violence and hardened local warring factions’ negotiating positions, prolonging the security vacuum that has favored AQAP’s activity.”[73] The same could be said of US forces’ involvement in kinetic operations in Yemen. To the extent SOF’s operations detract from regional stability, legitimacy and trust in the eyes of the public, and from the attainment and sustainment of peace, their activity only expands AQAP’s opportunities. Cigar additionally warns that AQAP’s network is as notoriously complex as Al Qaeda’s at large and would be difficult to eliminate altogether by means of direct strikes. For these reasons, direct action operations in the context of Yemen are limited in both their feasibility and effectiveness.

To an extent, this hands-on approach is understandable; amid such a fractured political scene, alliance with and investments in any faction of armed forces was likely to prove as instable as the political foundation it supported and therefore insufficient for the needs of the conflict in the case of any of them. SOF consistently sought to speed the decision-making process entailed in operation approval in order to shorten response time, though doing so invited a higher likelihood of error in operational integrity, intel, and execution.[74] All this said, US SOF involvement in kinetic operations have had critical consequences. On a domestic level, night raids similar to the kill/capture campaign waged in Afghanistan have resulted in a number of high-profile civilian casualties, certain of which remain unacknowledged or unconfirmed by the US military. Frequent airstrikes as well as these raids instill fear and distrust among not only AQAP supporters, as intended, but among civilian populations at large, including those actively supporting the Yemeni government – technically the side supported by the US.[75] These kinetic tactics have resulted in international backlash also; this holds implications for future US alliances and military intervention in the Middle East region, and elsewhere.

“…victory in this case may not mean AQAP’s elimination but containment and management once the organization has been degraded to an irreducible minimum,” stated Francis Reidy, Interim Director of the Center for Strategic Studies in 2018.[76] In lieu of adequate forces and resources, the only feasible option faced by US SOF in this region is diminished to keeping pressure on AQAP through territory denial and targeted kinetic operations, addressing the conflict as one of attrition rather than outright victory by elimination.[77]

None of this claims that direct action operations are, as a rule, an ineffective counterterrorism or counterinsurgency strategy. As previously argued, “popular mythology notwithstanding, effective counterinsurgency requires not only protecting the local population but also defeating enemy combatants.” Failure to do one or the other constitutes a failure overall. Past experience has demonstrated, in fact, that “in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States was most effective when the surgical strikes of special operations forces supplemented the counterinsurgency operations of conventional forces.”[78] The Yemeni example illustrates clearly why failure to address the civilian, unconventional theatre of the battlespace leaves a gaping strategic COIN hole which, try as it might, DA operations cannot fill alone.[79]

PHILIPPINES – “Through, by, and with”[80]

While the US military has supported its counterparts in the Philippines intermittently since the 1950s, the most obvious example of SOF’s participation in Philippine counterinsurgency can be traced to the years directly following the 9/11 attacks.[81] Even before September 2001, the Philippine government struggled with ungoverned space in its southern Mindanao province, the site of various minority factions and several successive uprisings, including that of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).[82] US SOF undertook Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P) between 2002 and 2015 in response to these threats as a part of the United States’ global war on terror.

This isn’t particularly striking; the ‘war on terror’ deployed SOF to a host of other nations, from Colombia to Somalia. The US’s methods in the Philippines, however, stand out among other examples. Due to constitutional interpretation and nationalist sentiment, preexisting relationships with US state and military leadership aside, US forces were prohibited from engaging in direct action operations themselves. This alone distinguished OEF-P from other areas of operation, particularly Afghanistan and Iraq.[83] In lieu of the DA option, SOF threw their full weight behind foreign internal defense (FID), one face of unconventional operations. As delineated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff by means of mission statement, “US forces are temporarily deployed to the Philippines in a strictly non-combat role to advise and assist the AFP, share information, and to conduct joint civil military operations.”[84] “Rather than a dramatic battle against terrorists and the establishment of a new government, OEF-P became, for the Americans, a largely steady-state application of multiple US government resources to fundamentally alter the relationship between the Philippine government and security forces and the people of the southern Philippines in support of American and Philippine strategic goals.”[85]

The principle put to the test in the Philippines 2002-2015 experimented with the US military’s fundamental understanding of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Major General Juancho Sabban articulated the goals of the joint strategy as follows:

“For three decades we were using a strategy of force,” he says. “It turned out to be a vicious cycle. We would have body count syndrome. Commanders would become popular because they were warrior-like. But I saw the more we destroyed, the more the number of the enemy increased. There were so many instances of collateral damage and innocent lives being sacrificed. Just by passing through fields with so many battalions we were already stomping on crops and that makes people resent the military. In the course of a firefight school buildings would get burned, houses would be razed to the ground, civilians caught in the crossfire. Everything was blamed on the military.

“I have told my commanders that all military operations should be intelligence-driven and surgical. How do we do this? Through intelligence enhanced by civil-military operations. We do civil-military operations to get people onto our side. More people on your side will produce more and better intelligence, and if you have better intelligence you’ll have more successful operations that are precise and surgical and that don’t hurt innocent civilians. Thus we will get more support from the people and … denying the enemy resources and space to operate. People will drive them from their own areas. So now their space is getting smaller and smaller, until we can pinpoint them with information coming from the people themselves.”[86]

As General Sabban indicates, emphasis in all counterinsurgency efforts was to be oriented to unconventional capabilities: gathering intelligence; developing relationships with local populations through information and civil affairs operations; and coordinating interagency strategies between both the US and the Philippines, particularly in diplomatic, development, and humanitarian aid arenas.[87] This coordination placed as much emphasis, if not more, on the desired outcomes of the Philippines as of the US. US special operations forces spearheaded training and advisory efforts of Philippine SOF forces first and foremost, extending later to higher-level command and conventional forces. That, in addition to their support capacity, was the extent of their participation in Philippine COIN. “The Philippine government and armed forces were not only active players but the leading actors in the entire endeavor.”[88] This role guarded against the dangerous consequences of DA operations striking back at the United States, especially regarding the civilian population; as SOF was involved only in a support and advisory capacity, the US military at large was perceived more as a benefactor and ally than as an occupier, a misconception that haunted SOF involvement in CT and COIN campaigns elsewhere.[89] This peripheral-only involvement also eliminated the risk of Philippine dependence on US special forces, enabling a relatively quick and simple withdrawal of American forces when objectives were deemed achieved. The Philippines were left with a self-sufficient security force, well-trained and experienced, and armed with clear objectives and strategies by which to accomplish them. These strategies were re-evaluated on a regular, frequent basis and revised inasmuch as they did not achieve results conducive to US and Philippine strategic goals or actively detracted from them.

As a result of these coordinated strategies, the threat posed by ASG decreased significantly. Between 2010 and 2012 alone, attacks declined by 56% in number; ASG safe-havens, in which insurgents could move freely, dwindled during the same span of time; militant numbers decreased from over 1270 to less than 500; popular support for the government similarly decreased to 2.5% for ASG forces, while it climbed to 63% for the Philippine government.[90] These trends alongside the relatively stable condition of the ASG insurgency today indicate the general success of this unconventional warfare strategy.

This is not to say that kinetic operations did not take place. The siege of Zamboanga in 2013 is likely the most vivid example of OEF-P kinetic action. The overwhelming majority of ASG leadership was eliminated by 2015, leaving remaining commanders still violent and influential, but little more than a challenge for police forces.[91] How was this accomplished? Direct action operations carried out entirely by Philippine special operations forces, trained by US SOF and supported in intelligence, communications, and even medical treatment by the same, accomplished their aims by Philippine hands. Is self-sufficient, long-term effective, indigenous counterinsurgency not the goal of all US SOF strategy?

Evidence in retrospect demonstrates that, while the strategy outlined by OEF-P was neither foolproof nor a final solution in and of itself, it has accomplished both US and Philippine strategic goals in the region. “OEF-P set precedents and examples for later COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially as regards partner capacity operations.” (Robinson 2016) This pattern for properly-crafted unconventional and direct hybrid strategies holds significant relevance for ongoing conflicts today.

Conclusion

It is clear that both unconventional COIN and kinetic operations are insufficient to attain US strategic goals when employed alone. As illustrated by US SOF’s progress in Yemen – marked by excessive use of direct action operations without  unconventional reinforcement – compared to their activity in Afghanistan – a recent and clear example of inadequate balance and collaboration between UW and DA – versus the military’s experience in the Philippines – a hands-off UW campaign which resulted in sustainable, self-sufficient security in the hands of indigenous forces – direct action is a necessary element of effective COIN, but must be used in support of unconventional operations.

Direct action has evolved into the face of special operations due to its appeal to the American way of war. Kinetic action is cheap, quick, and achieves evident results by which leadership and the American people are able to measure some kind of progress. To rely too heavily on DA operations, however, has its costs. It risks collateral damage among civilians, can legitimize and increase support for insurgents, and is likely to prove ultimately ineffective against decentralized and poorly-understood insurgent networks.[92] In the end, whatever progress they gain can be and frequently is irrelevant to long-term strategic objectives, as these operations are focused almost exclusively in the short-term. Kinetic operations are, however, essential to collect intelligence, build rapport, and, of course, eliminate threats. For counterinsurgency campaigns to achieve their goals of stability and security in the long-term, DA operations must be incorporated.

This work recommends the following to achieve an effective hybrid approach, blending direct action operations with unconventional methods:

• US SOF must recognize the limitations of both unconventional strategies and direct action-heavy tactics, many of which are discussed in this work. They must recognize that in order to achieve United States counterinsurgency objectives, SOF must focus their efforts on unconventional operations first and foremost – foreign internal defense, civil affairs, information operations, etc. and apply direct action operations as support of this primary emphasis.
• Personnel performance evaluation, promotion, and similar measures of success must reflect this approach: UW first, DA as support. These measures effectively define SOF’s idea of strategic ‘success’ and will encourage rising warfighters to cultivate whatever practices, attitudes, or capabilities will be celebrated moving forward[93][94]. Should they be encouraged to acknowledge and respect unconventional methods for their long-term effectiveness, achieving change in military systems and perceptions may not prove so impossible as it appears.
• Direct action operations must be planned and conducted with the input of locals and of those with experience and/or expertise in the geographic area and with the people and customs there. Plans must be designed to suit individual areas and peoples; consequences, both positive and negative, must be examined as regards their circumstances, expectations, and customs. This is essential to guard against unintended consequences and to ensure the effectiveness of these operations.
• SOF must respect indigenous sovereignty. When executing direct action operations, SOF must collaborate closely with indigenous leadership, both civilian and military, to ensure that their mission and methods are aligned with indigenous objectives and cultural landscape. While SOF serves US interests first and foremost, it often bests serves US COIN interests to align with and respect indigenous interests first.
• In a similar vein, SOF must acknowledge that reserving forward active roles in DA for indigenous forces not only cultivates long-term self-sufficiency, but guards against anti-US SOF sentiment in-country and abroad. Jack Nevile, a career special forces operator, articulates the mindset of many SOF personnel by corroborating US COIN’s experience in the Philippines: a local face on direct operations builds US SOF credibility and better accommodates cultural and linguistic nuances. In the long-term, allowing indigenous forces to carry out or at least lead kinetic operations is more efficient and lastingly effective in terms of popular support.[95]
• As these recommendations are implemented, SOF must consistently re-evaluate their operational progress against strategic goals, revising their tactical approach as necessary.

Direct action operations are exceptionally adept tools to capture and kill. As US special forces carefully reevaluate their posture toward direct action operations – including their planning, methods, and execution – and are incorporated into an indigenous-focused, primarily unconventional strategy, DA operations stand to contribute immensely to long-term counterinsurgency objectives.

 

 

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[1] Lopez, Nick and Kyle Atwell. 2021. “How Small Wars Fit into Big Ones: Lessons from the Masters of Irregular Warfare.” Irregular Warfare Podcast interview with Dr. John Arquilla and MGEN John Brennan. Modern War Institute, USMA.

[2] U.S. Army. “Special Forces Primary Missions.” Accessed April 2021.

[3] Broom, Owen. “Assessing the Role of Surgical Strike Operations in Support of a Special Warfare Campaign.” Master’s thesis. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2017.

[4] As defined by the Department of Defense in Joint Publication 3-22, “[f]oreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organization in any of the programs or activities taken by a host nation (HN) government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, violent extremism, terrorism, and other threats to its security.”

[5] SOCOM states that CA units help military commanders by working with civil authorities and civilian populations in the commander’s area of operations to lessen the impact of military operations during peace, contingency operations and declared war. CA forces support activities of both conventional and special-operations forces, and are capable of assisting and supporting the civil administration in the area of operations.”  SWCS. “About the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Regiment.” U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, IMSO.

[6] PSYOPS units, as defined by SOCOM, “are experts in mass media communication and use their unique skills to persuade, change, and influence foreign audiences. These Soldiers communicate to large audiences by various means such as newspapers, radio, television, leaflets and loudspeakers.” SWCS. “About the US Army Psychological Operations Regiment.” U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, IMSO.

[7] According to USSOCOM, “MISO are planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives.” United States Special Operations Command. Core Activities, USSOCOM, 2019.

[8] JP 3-05: http://edocs.nps.edu/2014/July/jp3_05.pdf

[9] U.S. Army. “Special Forces Primary Missions.” Accessed April 2021.

[10] Surgical strike, as defined by Army Special Operations publication ADP 3-05: “The execution of activities in a precise manner that employ special operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence adversaries and threats.” United States Department of the Army. Army Special Forces ADP 3-05.

[11] Department of Defense defined “Direct Action” as the following in 2007: “Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives.” www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf

[12] Van Linschoten, Alex Strick and Felix Kuehn. “A Knock on the Door: 22 Months of ISAF Press Releases.” Afghanistan Analysts Network, Thematic Report, October 2011.

[13] Edge, Dan. Kill/Capture. Directed by Dan Edge, produced by Dan Edge and Stephen Grey. May 2011, PBS Frontline, online documentary.

[14] UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan). “Highest Recorded Civilian Deaths from Conflict at Mid-Year Point – Latest UNAMA Update.” UNAMA, 2018

[15] Military.com. “Army Special Forces: Mission and History.” Military.com, 2021.

[16] United States Special Operations Command. Core Activities, USSOCOM, 2019.

[17] Turse, Nick. “Will the Biden Administration Shine Light on Shadowy Special Ops Programs?” The Intercept, March 2021.

[18] Ismay, John. “Elite U.S. Forces Critique Themselves: Overused, Underled, Raid-Obsessed.” The New York Times, January 2020.

[19] Boulton, Doug. “American special operations forces have been deployed to 135 countries this year alone.” Independent, September 2015.

[20] Bowden, Mark. “American Special Ops Forces are Everywhere/How Special Ops Became the Solution to Everything.” The Atlantic, 2021.

[21] Ellis, David C, Charles N Black, and Mary Ann Nobles. “Thinking Dangerously.” PRISM 6, no. 3 (7 December 2016).

[22] Hennigan, W. J. “The New American Way of War.” TIME, November 2017.

[23] Ellis, David C, Charles N Black, and Mary Ann Nobles. “Thinking Dangerously.” PRISM 6, no. 3 (7 December 2016).

[24] Bowden, Mark. “American Special Ops Forces are Everywhere/How Special Ops Became the Solution to Everything.” The Atlantic, 2021.

[25] Garamone, Jim. “Thomas Passes Special Operations Command Reins to Clarke.” U.S. Department of Defense, March 2019.

[26] Cronk, Terri Moon. “Special Operations Leaders Testify Before Senate on SOF Global Posture.” U.S. Department of Defense, February 2019.

[27] Vergun, David. “Officials Describe Special Operations Forces’ Contributions to National Security.” U.S. Department of Defense, March 2021.

[28] Cox, Daniel G. and Alex Ryan. “Countering Insurgency and the Myth of ‘The Cause.’” Air and Space Power Journal, Africa & Francophonie, 4^th quarter (2017).

[29] Robinson, Linda. “The SOF Experience in the Philippines and the Implications for Future Defense Strategy.“ PRISM 6, no. 3 (December 2016).

[30] Cigar, Norman. The Enemy is Us: How Allied and U.S. Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival. Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Report 18-4, 2018.

[31] McElhinny, Colin. “Assessing U.S. Special Operations in Yemen.” Small Wars Journal, July 2016.

[32] Filozof, Andrea. 2016. “Unconventional Warfare Is Not the Answer to Your Problem.” War on the Rocks.

[33] Jeffrey, James F. “Why Counterinsurgency Doesn’t Work: The Problem is the Strategy, Not the Execution.” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2015.

[34] Miller, Matthew E. “Special Operations Forces and the Professionalization of Foreign Internal Defense.” Small Wars Journal, August 2016.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Moyar, Mark. “Making the Most of Special Operations Forces.”  CSIS, 2017.

[37] Edwards, Lloyd, Matt Gibson, and David McCarthy. “From Fix to Finish: The Impact of New Technologies on the Special Operations Approval Process.” Harvard Kennedy School, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government Associate Working Paper Series, no. 56. May 2016.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Bennet, Richard and Max Boot. 2009. “Treading Softly in the Philippines.” The Washington Examiner via The Weekly Standard.

[40] Bowden, Mark. “American Special Ops Forces are Everywhere/How Special Ops Became the Solution to Everything.” The Atlantic, 2021.

[41] Moore, Emma and Stewart Parker. “Adapting the Image and Culture of Special Operations Forces.” War on the Rocks, July 2020.

[42] Murphy, Jack. “A Response to Linda Robinson’s ‘Future of SOF.’” SOFREP, April 2013.

[43] Long, Austin. “The Limits of Special Operations Forces.” PRISM 6, no. 3, December 2016.

[44] Edwards, Lloyd, Matt Gibson, and David McCarthy. “From Fix to Finish: The Impact of New Technologies on the Special Operations Approval Process.” Harvard Kennedy School, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government Associate Working Paper Series, no. 56. May 2016.

[45] Broom, Owen. “Assessing the Role of Surgical Strike Operations in Support of a Special Warfare Campaign.” Master’s thesis. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2017.

[46] McChrystal, Stan. 2013. “Lesson from Iraq: It Takes a Network to Defeat a Network.” LinkedIn.

[47] Edge, Dan. Kill/Capture. Directed by Dan Edge, produced by Dan Edge and Stephen Grey. May 2011, PBS Frontline, online documentary.

[48] Roberts, Nancy and Sean Everton. “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks.” Journal of Social Structure, volume 12. 2011.

[49] Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office. “The Cost of Kill/Capture: Impact of the Night Raid Surge on Afghan Civilians.” Open Society Foundations Regional Policy Initiative on Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2011.

[50] Edge, Dan. Kill/Capture. Directed by Dan Edge, produced by Dan Edge and Stephen Grey. May 2011, PBS Frontline, online documentary.

[51] Smit-Keding, Nicholas. ‘Killing Your Way to Victory’: The Failure of the Kill/Capture Strategy Against al Qaeda.” ResearchGate, October 2015.

[52] Afzal, Muhammad Sahool. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: An Individual Study Project. U.S. Army War College, February 1991, pp. 6-9.

[53] Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” The American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003), pp. 79-82.

[54] Paterson, Patrick. “Training Surrogate Forces in International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from Peru, Colombia, El Salvador, and Iraq.” Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Report 16-9, 2016, pp. vii-1.

[55] SORD. 2018. Interview with Jack Nevile.

[56] Connable, Ben and Martin C. Libicki. “How Insurgencies End.” RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, 2010, pp. 17.

[57] Murphy, Jack. “A Response to Linda Robinson’s ‘Future of SOF.’” SOFREP, April 2013.

[58] Broom, Owen. “Assessing the Role of Surgical Strike Operations in Support of a Special Warfare Campaign.” Master’s thesis. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2017.

[59] Murphy, Jack. “A Response to Linda Robinson’s ‘Future of SOF.’” SOFREP, April 2013.

[60] Bowden, Mark. “American Special Ops Forces are Everywhere/How Special Ops Became the Solution to Everything.” The Atlantic, 2021.

[61] Robinson: Robinson, Linda. “The Future of Special Operations: Beyond Kill and Capture.” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2012), pp. 110-122.

[62] United States Department of Defense. Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy, 2020.

[63] Lamb, Christopher J. and Martin Cinnamond. “Unity of Effort: Key to Success in Afghanistan.” Strategic Forum no. 248, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 2009.

[64] Murphy, Jack. “A Response to Linda Robinson’s ‘Future of SOF.’” SOFREP, April 2013.

[65] Paterson, Patrick. “Training Surrogate Forces in International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from Peru, Colombia, El Salvador, and Iraq.” Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Report 16-9, 2016.

[66] Ellis, David C, Charles N Black, and Mary Ann Nobles. “Thinking Dangerously.” PRISM 6, no. 3 (7 December 2016).

[67] SORD interview with GEN Stanley McChrystal, ret. 2018.

[68] Murphy, Jack. “A Response to Linda Robinson’s ‘Future of SOF.’” SOFREP, April 2013.

[69] SORD interview with CPT Ryan Steuk.2018.

[70] McElhinny, Colin. 2016. “Assessing U.S. Special Operations in Yemen.” Small Wars Journal. 

[71] Johnsen, Gregory D. 2021. “Order from Chaos: The End of Yemen.” Brookings.

[72] McElhinny, Colin. 2016. “Assessing U.S. Special Operations in Yemen.” Small Wars Journal.  

[73] Cigar, Norman. 2018. The Enemy is Us: How Allied and U.S. Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival. Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Report 18-4.

 

[74] Schmitt, Eric and David E. Sanger. 2017. “Raid in Yemen: Risky from the Start and Costly in the End.” The New York Times.

[75] Al Ahmad, Safa. 2019, episode 6. Targeting Yemen. Directed and produced by Safa Al Ahmad. PBS FRONTLINE, online documentary.

[76] Cigar, Norman. 2018. The Enemy is Us: How Allied and U.S. Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s Survival. Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Report 18-4.

[77] McElhinny, Colin. 2016. “Assessing U.S. Special Operations in Yemen.” Small Wars Journal.

[78] Moyar, Mark. 2017. “Making the Most of Special Operations Forces.”  CSIS.

[79] McElhinny, Colin. 2016. “Assessing U.S. Special Operations in Yemen.” Small Wars Journal. 

[80] Bennet, Richard and Max Boot. 2009. “Treading Softly in the Philippines.” The Washington Examiner via The Weekly Standard.

[81] Sinnott, Shawna and Nick Lopez. 2020. “Counterinsurgency in the Philippines: An Inside Look at Partner Warfare.” Irregular Warfare Podcast: Episode 11 with Dr. COL Joe Felter, ret., and COL Dennis Eclarin, ret. Modern War Institute, USMA. 

[82] Stentiford, Barry M. 2018. “Success in the Shadows: Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines and the Global War on Terror, 2002-2015.” Combat Studies Institute Press.

[83] Robinson, Linda. 2016. “The SOF Experience in the Philippines and the Implications for Future Defense Strategy.” PRISM 6, no. 3.

[84] Munson, Mark. 2013. “Has Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines Been a Success?” Small Wars Journal.

[85] Stentiford, Barry M. 2018. “Success in the Shadows: Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines and the Global War on Terror, 2002-2015.” Combat Studies Institute Press.

[86] Bennet, Richard and Max Boot. 2009. “Treading Softly in the Philippines.” The Washington Examiner via The Weekly Standard.

[87] Robinson, Linda. 2016. “The SOF Experience in the Philippines and the Implications for Future Defense Strategy.” PRISM 6, no. 3.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Stentiford, Barry M. 2018. “Success in the Shadows: Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines and the Global War on Terror, 2002-2015.” Combat Studies Institute Press.

[90] Robinson, Linda. 2016. “The SOF Experience in the Philippines and the Implications for Future Defense Strategy.” PRISM 6, no. 3.

[91] Stentiford, Barry M. 2018. “Success in the Shadows: Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines and the Global War on Terror, 2002-2015.” Combat Studies Institute Press.

[92] Roberts, Nancy and Sean Everton. “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks.” Journal of Social Structure, volume 12. 2011.

[93] SORD interview with CPT Ryan Steuk. 2018.

[94] SORD interview with GEN Stanley McChrystal, ret. 2018.

[95] SORD interview with Jack Nevile, 2018.